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. 'EREFACE 
Any academic research into the interaction of Buddhism and politics 
in Thailand is bound to face certain difficulties. For even if the 
existence of such an interaction is recognized by informed sections of 
society, whether they are monks or laity, it is seldom genuinely 
acknowledged and frequently denied. This paradox derives from two 
deeply rooted notions. First, that politics is 'the dirtiest 
business' and 'the most distasteful manipulation of power' in human 
affairs. Second, that only a 'pure' Buddhism. and a. sound' Sangha 
can ensure the moral welfare of the nation, and that their preservation 
in unadulterated form is critical for the survival of national unity. 
It is therefore maintained by the Thai rulers and the Sangha authorities 
alike that the Sangha is divorced from mundane affairs. Thus the 
study of the interaction of Buddhism and politics probes areas which 
are sensitive for both the goverment and the Sangha authorities, and 
they discourage it. - In this situation the researcher runs the risk of 
being accused of 'having malicious intentions towards the nation's 
religion', and, since the nineteen sixties, he is likely to be suspected 
of being a 'communist'. 
When I first formalated my research topic in 1974,1 did recognize 
that these religio-political constraints might have undesirable effects 
on my research. But at-that time Thailand might be characterized as 
being in a period of democratic experiment. There was promise of 
greater academic freedom than ever before. Research in Buddhism and 
politics seemed to be a real possibility, and I was optimistic that 
extreme repressive government would never again return to Thailand. 
Between mid-1974 and 1975 1 conducted some preliminary field research, 
and I left Thailand for Hall in early 1976 with the hope of returning 
y 
ii 
for intensive field research in November. My plan was shattered by 
the bloody coup dletat of 6 October 1976 which brought in the most 
repressive rule in modern Thai history. The academic freedom the 
Thai universities had temporarily enjoyed was severely suppressed. 
The prestige and reputation of certain liberal-minded lecturers and 
professors suffered considerable humiliation. With this abrupt change 
in the political climate I had to adjust my methodology and the content 
of my projected thesis and avoid fieldwork in Thailand. The data for 
the core chapters was to be gathered by fieldwork; it now rests on 
the preliminary field research, library sources and personal co=mic- 
ations with a number of individuals, some of whom are main characters 
in the study. 
, Being unable to conduct 
field research in Thailand, I went to the 
United States of American to carry out library research instead. There 
I spent nearly six months (mid-April to October 1977) at Cornell Univer- 
sity where I gained considerable benefits from the vast resources of its 
library, especially the rich variety of its collections on Thailand. 
Comercial-publications and other written materials unavailable in 
libraries in the United Kingdom and USA were acquired through the good 
offices of friends in Thailand. 
As this research was undertaken under political constraints, it 
inevitably has many limitations. However inuch I wanted this research 
to be enTirical, the political constraints did not allow hie to utilize 
sociological methods of field inquiry. I had therefore to base this 
research on somewhat 'unconventional' research methods. Also inevit- 
ably I have had to be cautious in what I haveincluded in the thesis 
even for the academic reader. In view of the many setbacks along the 
way, I must ask the reader not to treat this piece of work as a discip- 
linary or theoretical thesis, but as an inter disciplinary descriptive 
thesis offered as a contribution to South-East Asian Studies. 
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'OF'THAI 
The exact sounds of Thai words might be difficult for non-Thai 
speakers to pronounce. To make it easier the words have been trans- 
cribed as closely as possible to the original sounds in the Central 
Thai dialect except that the tones have not been put in. The trans- 
lation of Thai into English has been kept as close as possible to the 
original. Where it is not possible to do this, the translation is 
intended to preserve the ideas conveyed by the words. The spelling 
of Pali words and their meanings is based on Phra Rajavaramuni's 
A*Dictionary'of'Buddhism. 
1 
CHAPTER I '' INMODUCTION 
1. ' 'Purposo. 'of 'the *8ttidy 
The main ptirpose of this study'is to investigate the interaction of 
politics with Buddhism and the Sangha, (the community of monks) in 
Thailand. ' Buddhism is seen as having long served as one of the main 
socializing, acculturating, and unifying forces in Thai society. It has 
profoundly influenced the cultural, economic, and political development 
of the nation,, and also reputedly continues to mould the social and 
political values of the great majority of the Thai population. The 
Sangha has played a very important role in the social life of almost 
every Thai, '' I intend to show that-though Buddhism and the Sangha have 
had complex interactions with politics over a long period of time, recent 
socio7political changes in Thailand have led to the formation and 
assumption of new roles and a quite unique redefinition of roles for the 
Sangha. The main force behind this change has been the political develop- 
ment of the Thai state. To acquire a full perspective of the, relation 
between Buddhism and kingship, Sangha and state, it is necessary to 
examine the nature of their interactions from early times, and in this I 
am fortunate in being able to draw on a number of previous works. 'Ihese 
I- 
earlier studies have their limitations, as will. become clear when I 
consider them in more detail below, for they only take up the topic as a 
subordinate part of their consideration of other problems, and the most 
recent of them only bring us up to 1972. The most original part of-this 
study is therefore the ex=ination of the modern period dating from the 
late 1950s.. 'especially the period between 1973 and 1976 when I attemptIto 
elucidate the critical political d6velopments-and their interrelationship 
with changes in, the Sangha. 
In this. connection, the study, atteirpts ýto investigate the I. I- 
impactl, of 
2 
gove I nunent controls and directions I on the Sangha., I. intend to show why 
since the late 1950s the government has encouraged the Sangha to 
participate in the execution of government policies and how the Sangha 
has responded to this political mobilization. I will attempt to 
, establish the degree to whicIf the Sangha, has co-operated with the govern- 
ment. Assuming part of the Sangha is willing to'collaborate with the 
government, I will then attempt to answer the questions: how far can 
Buddhism and the Sangha provide a positive ideologyand assistence for 
the. goal realization of the government and by what methods? Assuming 
part of the Sangha is not willing to co-operate with the govemnent,, I 
will ask the question: what are the opportunities for the. Sangha to retain 
its place and its traditional status? I will attempt to understand the 
Sangha's own perception of its roles in this light. 
Another important area of investigation in this study, is that., if 
some members of the Sangha. are not willing to qO-operate with the govem- 
ment and react independently to socio-political changes, what arethe 
stimuli for their actions, and what are the opportunities for these monks 
to retain theýirplace'and traditional s. ta I tus? In this, I'intend to 
V 
show how the abrupt socio-political changes during 1973-1976'have resulted 
in the-assumption and formulation of new and non-traditional'roles, and' 
activities by certain groups of m6nký. "I'will'consider their ideological 
positions and'their perceptions of their roles. 
2. ''Concepts 
Certain concepts are. crucial'for this,, study; mostimediately the 
concep ,t of*socio-Political chanje-and, ýthe'-derivative notions. of traditional 
society, political modemization and political development. "It is, also 
necessary to consider political legitimacy, because, it is this that 
distinguishes authority-from power., Though what I mean by these terms 
3 
will become clear in the. detail of later chapters, it will be helpful 
if I attempt some brief preliminary definitions here. 
(a) Socio-ýPolitical 'change 
Since thereare many definitions of politics, I must make clear 
I 
that, for the purposes of this study, I ain concerned with ideas and 
actions which relate to the use of power in the organization of the state. 
I include in mý concept of political, action those activities in which 
men acquire, employ,, or influence the distribution of power, authority, 
wealth and prestige within a social structure. As I am particularly 
concerned with the question of the responsiveness of goverment to com- 
peting interest groups, any action which has relevance for the broadening, 
or narrowing of popular involvement in govermental decision-making, for 
the pursuit or maintenance of power or authority; or has effects on the 
distribution of prestige or wealth in the nation, can be considered 
political. 
' 
By socio-political change I have in mind processes by which set-5 of 
social relationships, particularly those based on power and wealth, and 
sets of ideas about the nature of society and its power relationships, 
alter through time. I consider that ideas about power and its, associated 
relationships are not coterminous with the actual context of these relation- 
ships in society, and that the relationship between the two fluctuates 
through history. Though frequently , in this thesis this involves an idea- 
............. .--I- 
For discussion of what constitutes th'e, co'ncept of P'Olitics. see; for 
exmTle: Hani. Gerth and C., Wright, Mills. %''Chdtdct'et*and'SbCial - 'Strdtttire - (London: -Routledge and Kegan Paul-LUL -, -1970) pp., F., '192- 
196; - Bemard R.. Crick,, i' I ri'Doferidd . (London: 
'Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1962) pp. 20-22; Morton H. Friea; TF6'EV61uti6ft"6f'P6litical 
House, 1967) pp. 20-21; and Marc-J. Swartz., (ed*'j 
Local Politics (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 196.8) pp'. 1-12. 
i 
1, 
4 
of movement in'one direction, that is of modernization., I want to stress 
now that I do not wish to'imply-that this movement is a necessary 
cmdition. * I recognize alterations in social organization produced by 
such factors as increasing numbers, of'persomel'within an. institut. ion or 
the appointment of a, new incunbent of a status, may produce socio- 
political change without modernization or development - without what 
was once called progress. A broad definition of socio-political change 
such as this allows for the inclusion within the definition of everyday 
alterations in social organization of little long term significance, and 
2 broader oscillations in social structure, while still incorporating such 
notions as modernization and development. Wýile socio-political change 
is the prime concept in this study, any such broad notion presents 
difficulties'when considering detail: wherever possible I intend to 
specify much more precisely the processes which constitute socio-political 
change in each situýation. 
Both political modemization and development are here considered. 
% partly as process and partly as ideology. Much previous''work in the 
West has concentrated on'pibcess, while some recent work has stressed 
ideology. Both aspects are important in any"study of politics and 
Buddhism in Thailand. But as in a previousýwork!, -'P61itical'Buddhism in 
.. Southeagt. A8ia, I have considered these as process in some detail, I now 
.......... ..... 
I- 
A yalUabl&. study revealing elements of just,, such, a situation is C. , Geertz, ",, 'Agtidtilturdl'Involtitibri*. ''lh6 TiodO88 *of 'Ecological *Change Am 
Indonet a (Berkeley-and Los Angeles: Wiversity of California Press, 
1968). Ihese processes of pr . ogressive change, stagnation and retro- 
gression are elegantlyincorporated-into a. general theory. of change by 
W. F. Wertheim, ih'EVoltition'and-,. 'Rev6ltitioný(Londoii*. -ýHamondsowrth, 
P6. ngiiin- Books'. Ltd.,. J974), Oýqpters 1 to 3. 
2. Such 
' as 
have., been Is* uggested, for the Kachin Hills, in'E. R. ', Leach, 
'Polititdl'Sýstems'of'Highland-Burma (London:, G. '-Bell' &-Sons, 1954). 
S. 
S.... 
S 
wish to lay emphasis on ideology. Political modernization and develop- 
ment are particularly considered as legitimizing power relationships, 
and it therefore becomesýcrucial to understand the concept of legitimacy 
in Thailand. I will now consider these concepts in more detail. 
(b)''PolitiCal'iftoclondtation and'politiedl'development 
Certain authors employ the tenas 'political modemization' and 
'political development' as near synonyms. For them political modemiz- 
ation-development, takes place within an historical context in which 
influences from outside the society are capable of being absorbed within 
the society's process of social change in a similar fashion to the way 
in which changes in different elements of a society (e. g. the economy, 
the polity and the social order) all act on one another. 
I Other authors 
find it more convenient to distinguish two separate notions, 
2 
so here 
immediately we encounter serious difficulties of definition which need 
further examination. 
The conditions for and directions. of political modernization and 
development appear to depend largely on the type of society, its historical 
heritage. ' its culture, and its political, economic and social structure. 
3 
For example, Lucian W. Pye, 'Aspdctt'6f'P61itiddl'Ddvelopment (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1966) pp. 44-45; S. N. Eisenstadt; Modernization, 
'Growth'and'DiVOrsity (Bloomington: Department of Goverm-en-t-, -Miana 
University, 1963) p. 'S; Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham G. Powell Jr., 
'qoLnq)dtativd*P61itic8,. ý_*A'DoVolopmeritdl'Ap'pr'o'a'ch, (Boston: Little., Brown 
& Co.,, 1966) pp., 34-37; See also Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. 
Blackmer' Ihe'EMergirig'Ndti6ns (Boston: Little 
.9. 
Brown & Co., 1961) and 
Daniel Lerner, Ahe'Passing'of Traditioridl'S6didty (New York: Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1958). 
2. For example, 'Norman Jacobs, 'Mbderriitdti6ii. *Without. 'DeVdl(jlxnent. ý'Thailand 
as'an*Asiari'Cd86'StudY (Nevý'York: Praeger, 1971); Hans-Dieter Evers, 
'Modernization and Te lopment" in H-D Evers Ced. ) P, Modernitation'in 'Southd"t*Mia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universi * Press, 1974); and 
Samuel F. -FMt-ington;, *P61itital'Otddr'in'ChangiTi, 6'Sotioýy, (New Haven: 
Yale. Univqrsity Press, 1975). 
3. David E. Apter; 'Thd*Pblitie-g*of'Moddniization CChicago: Chicago University 
Press,, 1965) 
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Nevertheless,, the leaders of developingýor modernizing societies initially 
I 
tend to fook to the more advanced societies, significantly Westei3i 
societies, which they admire, as, their models for change., Usually then, 
a process loosely labelled as 'Westernization' enters into considerations 
of political modernization and development. 
In general the students of political modernization and development 
tend to take up a single daninant. criterion as indicative of the degree 
f 
of political development or modemization that a society, has-experienced. 
Thus, we find einphasis on increasing national integratibnol the increasing 
. 
differentiation of specialized : ftmctions, 
2 the institutionalization' of 
political organization and procedures, 
3 the expanding capacit y of the Political 
system to respond successfully to and cater for the rising expectations of 
4 its citizens, a broad set of socio-economic factors, 
S the ability to 
achieve soci al mobilization for new goals., and the degree of participation 
in government. 
6 
.............. . 
1. Forexample, Claud"Ake; *A'Theor)ý*of'Pblitical'Iritegtdtion (Homewood: 
Dor 
, seyPress, 
1967); Karl A. Deutsch and William J. toltz (eds. ), 
York: Atherton, Press,, 1966); Leonard Binder., '(New 
'Political'De t'ih*d'Chahgihg'S6dibty (Berkele y: University of 
Call" ýomia, Press, 1964).. pnd Pye, -'op. cit. - 
2. For example, Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats aýd Political Development"; 
Joseph La Palombara (ed. ), 'Bureauctacy*and'Politicdl'Development 
(Princeton:, Princeton University-Press, 1969). 1' 
3. For eiaWle,, - Iimtington., -op-*cit- 
4. Almond and'Powell, ''op. *clto; Robert T. Holt and Jolul E. Tuinier, 'The, 
'Political Tasig'of'Ecim-omic'Development (New York: Van Nbstrand , 
-196 6) 
Zbigniew Brzezins7l, "The Politics of Underdevelopnent'l, '*World'Politics, 
Vol., 9 (October 1956). 
5. Seymour M. Lipset., *'Polititdl. 'Man. (New. york:. Doubledayt 1963); Phillips 
Wtright, "'National7P--olitical Development: Measurement and Analysis", 
Vol., 28 (Aprilt 1963); Deutsch.. "Social 
Ro-T-ilization and Political Develolxnent"*'Amdricý. M'Pblitical*Science 
'Review, Vol. ' 5, (Sepýember, 1961). 
I- 
6. Lemer, op1 cit. - 
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An examination of these studies suggests that political development 
and modernization rely on a number of supportive and overlapping con- 
ditions. First, they depend on national integration or nation building. 
This involves the development of a capacity to maintain a certain level 
of public order, and to mobilize resources for a specific range of 
collective enterprises. They entail the translation of diffuse and 
unorganized sentiments of nationalism into a spirit of citizenship, and 
equally the creation of institutions that can translate the aspirations 
of nationalism and citizenship into policies and programmes. Second, 
development and modernization involve the establishment of separate 
structures to perform a wide variety of functions, i. e. there must be a 
gradual separation of roles, structures,, or'sub-systems. 
2' Third, in 
the less differentiated former institutions of the society, there must be 
a certain level of new institutionalization, such as the development of 
political organizations-or procedures which acquire legitimacy and 
stability. 3 Fourth, they require a high level of capacity to regulate 
and respond to the demands of citizens, if a political system is to 
acquire popular support. This has implications for the sheer magnitude 
of, political and govenmental performance, and its effectiveness and 
efficiency in the execution'of public. policy, its rationality in adminis- 
4 tration, and a secular-orientation towards policy. Fifth, they depend 
upon four basic economic and social conditions: wealth, industrialization, 
urbanizationX and education. 5 Sixth . the-political system must attain a 
1. Pye, *op. cit , pp. - 37-38. 
2.. RiggsJ, ', *6p. eit., pp. 122-123; Almond and Powell, ''op. tit., p. 22. 
3. I-hmtington,, pp. 12-24'. 
4. Almond, and Powell, 'oý. tit. . pp. 28-29ý 198-212; P)re, 'op-'dit- p pp. 43p 46-47. 
5. Lipset; 'op. eit., pp. 27-58. 
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high level of social mobilization, a process in which, major clusters of 
old or traditional social, economic, - and psychological comitments are 
eroded or broken down so that people become available for new patterns 
of secularization and behaviour. Seventh, political development and 
modernization, in so far as they are based on the concept of equality 
as well as public order, depend oý the'expression of mass participation 
and popular involvement in political activities. 
2 Finally, 'political 
development and modernization rely on the level of secularization of 
political culture whereby, men'become I increasingly xational, analytical, 
and'empirical in their political orientation. 
Political modernization, then, are both euployed to 
refer to similar fields of study, Having viewed their content, the 
question remains for the purposes of this study of whether they should 
be distinguished. from one another. Normm Jacobs in his study of 
Thailand defines them separately. To him modemization is used to", 
denote: 
the maxiinization of theýpotentiaj of the, society. ,, 
within the limits set by the goals and the fundamental 
structure (or forms) of the'society. ' Modernization 
is stimulated by novel, recently revealed waysýof 
. accomplishing-tasks which, offer 
improved, more success- 
ful ways to cope with the existing, traditional environ- 
ment ..... This is a continuous process. The stimulus for modernization may be extemal, or internal, or both. 
Development, - in contrast, ýdenotes th6, maxhnization of 
the, potential ofthe society, regardlessýof any limits 
currently set by', the goals-or, fundamental structure'of 
the society ...... 
it is an open-ended commitment to 
productive change, no matter what-the-consequences mig4t 
-be on. existing goals or existing ways of 
doing things. 4 
1. Deutsch (1961)'OP. eit., pp. 494-, 503. 
2. Pyq, ', op. eit. ýj pp. 39-40, ' 45-46.,, 65. 
'3. -. Almond, and, Powell 'Op-*eit., pp. : 23--; 25ý,,. 50-63. 
4. Jacobs; 'oý. tit., f. P. 9. 
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Jacobs goes on to suggest that development alone is confined to 
'feudal' societies and not 'Patrimonial' societies such as he defines 
Thailand. He further argues it-can be expressed quantitively. 
Jacobs is followed in*eEphasizing this trend of distinction by Hans- 
Dieter Evers who is concemed to'confim the idea of modemization 
2, 
without-development. While -appreciating the nature of their concem 
to differentiate'objectively between what'is essentially maximizing, the, 
potential of an existing structure, to exploit the environment, and 
maximizing the exploitation of the environment by introducing new 
structures, I'vould see both notions present in government policyin 
modem Thailand. For, contrary to, Jacobs' view, -they stem essentially 
from conservative and, progressive viewpoints respectively. Each 
produces change, but-the'nature of the change in'both cases can be' re- 
actionary-or progressive, so that it is only after'change in any situation 
that one can establish whether attempted modernization has in fact 
produced. modemization or development; -or, wheth6r attempted development 
has in fact produced modernization or development. ". Since modernization' 
can become development or vice versa with relative ease it seems this 
distinction does not carry us very far' that'3. n'practice the fields 
o 
covered by the terms overlap to such a degree that the'tenns. canýbe dealt 
with as synonyms. ' For'in fact politicallY, b6th'are ideologically, 
motivated; in Thailand'they'are both contained within and stem-from 
goverment'policies. ' Both are'concerned'with political, economic, and, 
social change away froii, uhat is, called-traditional society- d bo an th 
derive -their impetus 'from internal an& &xternal forces., 
Ibid, pp. 10-12. 
2. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Introduction: ýbdernization and Development" in 
Evers xiij. ' 
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There is a further radical view about modernization and development 
which must be mentioned. ' Radical'scholars'are very critical of the 
Western-based 'conceptions of development and modernization. Andre 
Gunder Frank, for-example, rejects-them for theii theoretical inadequacies 
and policy ineffectiveness, and regards such modernization and'development 
theories as a cloak concealing'imperialist interests. He strongly 
rejects the presuppositions that 'developed countries exhibit the pattern 
variables of universalism, achievement orientation, and functional 
specificity, while underdeveloped ones are characterized by their 
_9PPosites particularism, ascription,, and functional 
diffuseness'; 
and that to develop the underdeveloped countries it is merely necessary 
to eliminate the characteristics of underdevelopment and adopt those of 
development by changing particular variables, roles, or parts of the 
social system - in other words that it is unnecessary to change the power 
structure and the distribution of wealth and prestige in the system 
itself. To Frank the theoretical inadequacies stem partly from the fact 
that these conventional theorists construct one theory for one part (i. e. 
the developed part) of what has been one world economic and social system 
for two or more centuries and construct. another theory for the other part 
(i. e. the underdeveloped part). The policies of 'modernization' 
theorists'are based'on the presupposition that development'occurs through 
the diffusion of knowledge, skills, organization,, values, technology, and 
capital from the developed to underdeveloped countries. Frank argues 
that such diffusion indeed takes place, but that the end result is 
corpletely different. Instead of promoti. ng, development, this diffusion 
perpetuates and indeed intensifies. the-, underdevelopment, of the under- 
developed countries. For example, Frank points out that the diffusion 
.......... I. 
1. Andre Gunder-Frank; 'Sbeiblb *(5f TOV616pwit" and 'UhdeitdevejbT)mejjt 'of 
'SbcicslogK'(London:, Pýlut6-Pf6sýs, 1973 
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of economic liberalism from the developed countries to the underdeveloped 
ones encourages a capitalist economy, and as a consequence, it widens the 
economic and social,, gap not only between the developed and underdeveloped 
countries, but also within the underdeveloped societies themselves. 
Social liberalism encourages the monopoly of social and economic power 
by a few individuals and thereby resists the development of economic, 
political and social wholes. 
11 
Along with Frank's view, Robert 1. Rhodes stresses that conventional 
theorists fail to take the historical relationships of development and 
underdevelopment into account, and they ignore the existence of social 
classes when they consider the obstacles to development. 
2 For example, 
I 
they have often evaded the simple historical fact, that, colonialism 
destroyed the natural roots', which would have nourishedthe rise of- 
industry. Rhodes points out that continuing political and economic 
backwardness-in, underdeveloped countries was in, fact created by the 
intrusion of forces of capitalism and colonialism in an earlier period. 
As such he -regards the conventional theory of, development aý a legacy of 
colonialism. - 
3 
while Colin Leyes describes this as 'bourgeois' development 
theory. 4 
These critics argue that by following the Western model of develop- 
. ment and'modemizatioii., underdeveloped countries o* subordinate, 
them- 
............ 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 27-40. 
2. Robert I.. Rhodes, "The Disguised Conservatism iný. Evolution De, velqpm? nt, 
Theoiy", ''Scie'nce*and'S6diety, Vol. XXXII, 1968, pp. - 385-397. The vieW 
_that 
IsoCiral -classes!, play., an inportant part, -inthe. perpetuation of 
underdevelopment in South-East Asia is also'expressed by'Evers" 
pp. 108-131. 
3. Rhodes, '-Lbýid.., pp. 401-403. - 
4. Colin Leyes', "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes" 
'Journal . of-Cont6mpbrary-Atia,, Vol. ', 7., ' No. 1,1977,, pp. 93-107. * 
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selves to the econ'omic, political, and technological domination of 
developed countries which are capitalistic and neo-colonial., and thereby 
perpetuate their underdevelopment. They also argue that such modes'of 
development and modernization not only increase the gap between rich and 
poor countries, but also widen wealth, status and power differentials 
between groups within the dominated countries. Hence, exploitation and- 
oppression are maintained and even intensified. 
Although these radical'scholars do not, often make their alternatives 
explicit, they suggest that effective progress can. only be achieved 
through a social revolutýon-. As Frank put it: 
an alternative policy for-economic development and 
. cultural change will 
have to be politically even more 
revolutionary and'helpýthe, people-oflthe underdeveloped 
countries to take the destruction, of this'structure 
and, the development-of another system,. into their own' 
hands. If-the developed countries cannot diffuse 
development; development'theorY, or development policy 
to the underdeveloped, countries, '. then the people of ' 
these countries will have to develop themýby'ýthemselves., 2 
Frank goes on to suggest that the Western-based moýes`of development are 
in fact 'the Fzperor's clothes, which have served to hide his naked 
imperialism'. ]Rather than fashioning the Fzperor a, new suit, these 
3 
people will have to dethrone him and clothe themsel-ý6s. 
These radical views. of the natu're of modernization and'develo'pment 
are inportant to our study-because their-presence in. Thailand became, 
mmifest in the 1970s. , The inpgrtance, of. these, ideas, especially, the 
association of the, te= I development ý , and, 'modernization' with 'Westem- 
ization'-will. become clearer when. we. 'discuss'. the, ideologica1 polarization II 
A similar view'can be found in, for exanple, W. F. Wertheim's 'Resistance 
to Change - From. Whom? " in-. Evers-6p. 'Cit. v pp., 97-107. 
Frank, *op. 'tit p. ' 55. 
Ibid. 
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among the political groups, activists and the political monks. 
(c) "Traditional sÖciety 
The views we have considered on political modernization and develop- 
ment tend to proceed from an idea of there being some social or economic 
or political conditions in the past which can be considered as 
'traditional'. This is, of course, the comon English usage of the 
term 'traditional' and I have found it difficult to avoid using it in 
this sense in this thesis. Even so I see it as somewhat unsatisfactory 
when it acquires additional attributes, such as referring to a static 
state. ' Then socio-political change becomes a process by which society 
moves from one rigidly defined form to another. This appears to distort 
history and imposes a narrow view of the nature of socio-political change. 
I find it hard to envisage Thai society as ever having been socially, 
economically or politically static, whether one is discussing it at the 
level of ideology or social action. When it comes to considering 
political arguments which employ the term without reflection, we'should 
recognize that Itraditionall actually refers to the set of ideas about 
the nature of previous-society which is held by every new generation. 
Though apparently historical in form, these ideas often partake more of 
the nature of myth than of the hypothetical complete history. In this 
sense, 'traditional' is what is thought by the people today to-have been 
the condition of previous society, and is a set of models composed of 
mmy changing elements which ultimately, in discussions of. political 
action,, is the many sets, of ideas about the past currently held by the 
present society. These sets of ideas differ increasingly from one 
another as one moves one's examination of them from those held by con- 
.. servatives to those held by radicals. Traditional therefore, is also 
As, for example, in S. N. Eisenstadt,, "The Influence of Traditional 
and Colonial Political Systems on the Development of Post'Traditional 
Social and Political Order".. in EVers,, *bjj. *cit-v pp., 3-6. 
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used in this more elusive but. more-exact sense when, examining political 
debate, 
There is then no gulf between 'traditional' and 'modem' society; 
rather there is a continuity in. socio-political change which subsumes 
them as relative and constantly changing concepts. On theoretical 
grounds, this, is. a, reason. for the need for considerable historical depth 
in the thesis as I explore. the ideologies and processes which are the 
paraphernalia of the ideology-makers -, of many generations. The constant 
search for legitinacy which is faced by power holders demandsýtheir 
frequent reappraisal, of a long histQry which is -familiar, at least in 
outline, to all-Thai. There is-alsQ a-practical. reason for this 
historical stress; originally I intended to write a thesis based on a 
field study of the modem Sangha and its political relationships. This 
field work was partly conpleted in 1975, but the disturbed political 
situation in Thailand in 1976 rendered this course unwise, and I have 
had to focus on documentary sources to a greater extent than originally 
intended. 
(d) * Tolitical 'legitimacy 
The notion of political legitimacy is, in general, based on the 
belief that the govemment has the right to. govern and. the, people (the 
I 
governed). recognize'that right. It involves, the capacity of a political 
system to engender and maintain the belief that its political : Institutions,, 
structures,, processes., policies, decisions, and'. actions-are'the ones most 
appropriate for-the sQciety in question., A legitimate. goverment or 
political system is one which has proved'it possesses those qualities of 
righteousness, propriety, 'or moral goodness which are accepted by the 
is 
governed. 
1 Thus, whether a goverment is legitimate or illegitimate 
depends on the goverment's success in convincing the people that its 
values are their primary values. 
In a broad sense legitimacy is derived from two*types of value. 
According to David E. Apter these are 'consummatory' and 'instrumental' 
values. Consummatory values-are based on a particular set of moralities, 
an integral set of cultural norms that are widely dispersed in the 
population, or contradictory sets held by mutually antagonistic groups. 
Instrumental-values refer to the capacity of a government-or political 
system to deal effectively with political, economic, and social problems, 
and to make provision for the future well-being of that society. 
2 
These values have a time dimension, which was well recognized by 
Max Weber when he wrote of 'the sanctity of imemorial traditions' as 
the most universal source of legitimacy. The modes of legitimation 
accepted as traditional consist of the belief that the present institutions 
of authority are continuous with those that existed in the past, or that 
the power holders have acceded to their positions in accordance with 
procedures and qualifications which have. been valid for a very long time. 
3 
In this study I consider religious values as a mode of legitimation. 
1. 'For more detail see, for example, Dolf Sternberg6r, "Legitimacy", 
Internatiorial'BiCytIopaedid *of 'the 'Social 'SCioiiees, Vol. IX, 1968, 
p. ZZ4; -Carl J. -Friedrich., Man . and'His Govenment*. -AA'ErftpiriCal' 
of'P61itics (New York: McGraw-Hill., 1963) p. 234; Lipset, op. cit., 
p. 6T; Max Weber , 
(New 
York: Free Press, 17968) pp. 124-132,7324-329; and David Easton, A 
'Sý8tot'Arialy8i8'of*P61itical'Life (New York: Wiley, 1967) pp. -237-288. 
2. Apter; '6p. *tit , pp. ' 83-85, -236-238. 
3. Weber;, *6p. *cit., pp. 124-132. 
-1 
1 16 
I, shall atteupt to show that in'Thailand, religion is a major, source of 
both consumatory-and instrLunental values in the legitimation, of 
authority, 
In Thailand, only a small part of the ruling elite exposed to 
Western ideas has developed a'real comprehension of, and presumably a' 
commitment to, )Vestern modes of modernization which include democratic 
procedures. Others have been distrustful of alien ideas, and on the 
whole, would have preferred to perpetuate the traditional authoritarian 
system'which maintained the belief, that. the function of*govenment is to 
lead and the role of the people is to obey. 
1 Both see the masses as 
remaining-steeped in conservative, modes of thought, -, and as being in any, 
event far removed from the decision-making process-. In this situation, 
the ruling elite has atteupted, to mobilize', mass support for its moderniz- 
ation and'-develolpment programes in line with Western ideas. The para- 
doxical position'of the conservative elite here may be, explained by thý 
desire to demonstrate to, outsiders the. legitimacy of its position. 
The process of transformation of, the'society has frequently produced 
conflict and tension both within and between conservative and modernizing 
factions in the country. By this I mean there have been clashes of 
opinion both between conservatives and progressivos over the need for' 
modemization, and clashes, of opinion within conservative and progressive 
factions over the kind of modemization - whether it should be socialist 
or capitalist, Westem or non-Westem, for example. At thnes this has 
......... .. 
For elaboration, of the. persistence'and'continuity of 'traditional 
authoritarian goverment ,I 
in modern Thail 
-, 
and. sep-,. for_exanple, 
Thinapan* Nakata,, "Political'Legitimacy in Thailand: Problems and 
Prospects", 'Journal'bf'Pblltitdl'S(tiencb'ReView (EnglishEdition), 
Vol. I, No. ' 1, March 1976 (Bangkok,., The Social cience Association 
Printing Press of Thailand,, 1976)., ,. "-, ý, -ý,, I V 
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led to confusion and even chaos in the society. When this has occurred, 
the government has often seen its prime task as retaining office, and to 
achieve this has resorted to repressive measures. However, since the 
leaders have wished to retain their comitment to Western ideas of 
modernization and democracy they have continued to seek popular legitimacy 
for-their rule, since it permits them to govern from day to day without 
resort to coercive power., Coercion can then be. reserved for possible 
major-crises. 
In Thailand since religion rariks highly among the nation's traditional 
institutions, the close association of religion with political authority 
would appear to be an invaluable means for the goverment to maximize 
its legitimacy. By exploiting the consummatory values that Thai 
Buddhism so obviously provides, they secure legitimacy. This can enable 
them to build a government with sufficient popular support to carry 
through their modernizing plans which they envisage will, given time, 
legitimize their rule through instrumental values. Thus, in Thailand 
we can conceive of, a political situation quite different from that 
enjoyed by modem Western goverments,, among whom the instrumental values 
of legitimacy are sufficiently developed for them to relegate the 
institutions providing the consummatory values of legitimacy to a lesser 
place in their development planning. 
3. ' Previous -work'on *Buddhism and'Politics in Thailand 
It is not my intention to consider here all previous work which 
provides data on Buddhism and politics in Thailand. Rather, I select 
for discussion only those works which by reason of their analysis or 
substantial data have been valuable in helping me to fonmiate my 
argument and in providing factual material for consideration. 
18 
The earliest commentary I have discovered which deals directly 
with this area of this study is a 'Special Allocution' by Prince 
Wachirayan Warorot (Vajiranana - 1859-1921) when he was Supreme Patriarch 
of the Thai Sangha, on King Wachirawut's birthday in 1916. It is 
entitled The-Tuddhist Attitude'towards National'Defence*and Administration. 
Originally published in Thai, it was later translated into English, 
possibly by the King himself. This work is very significant in that 
the author was regarded as one of the finest scholars in the Buddhist 
world. He had been one of the most important assistants to King 
Chulalongkorn (his elder brother) in launching the King's programme of 
modernization, notably in the reform. of education, provincial adminis- 
tration, and the Sangha administration in the late nineteenth century. 
The first part of the text makes clear the continuity of Buddhist 
ideas of the righteous king as the devout Buddhist, the patron and 
protector of Buddhism and the Sangha, and the leader and protector of 
his subjects. It legitimizes the position of the king (Wachirawut) by 
describing him as a ruler who had completely performed the duties of a 
righteous king, thereby bringing prosperity and stability to the nation 
and the people. The second part of the text deals with the policy of 
governance. Here Buddhist canon and legends are invoked to justify 
goverment policies and actions. For instance, it states that defence 
against external forces is me of the policies of governance, one that 
cannot be neglected. It sets out the organization of state and the 
amy necessary for the successful defence of the realm. 
King Wachirawut (1910-1925) himself also wrote a set of articles 
Justifying his policies in Buddhist terms. 
1 He injected into the Thai 
For-example, 'Tetsana-*Saupha (sennons to the Wild, Tiger Corp) (Bangkok: 
Kurusapha, Pre-ss-9-1953); Phrd'Phutthachao'TtdtsaruArai? (What is the 
Knowledge Attained by'th6-BuiJN-m? ). (Bangkok: National Library, 1925). 
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collective consciousness certain new, and potent -ideas of nationalism. 
These, on the me hand, conjoined the concept'of nation and the older 
symbols of kingship and, religion, and; on the other hand, mobilized all 
these symbols as a safeguard against colonialism. His works also re- 
affirm and continue the traditional Thai religio-political ideology 
that, the, prosperity and progress of the nation-is closely related to 
\ 
the prosperity of-, Buddhism, and that the religion and'the king constitute 
the moral foundation of the nation; they are inseparable. 
Prince Dhaniniwat's work on Monarchical Protectim'of'the'Buddhist 
'Church'in'Siaml spells out the relationship between the monarch and the 
Sangha. But it concentrates mainly on the period before 1932, and it 
offers little social and political analysis of the nature of the relation- 
ships between the two parties and the people. 
The political relationship of the Sangha and state was also taken 
up by Yoneo Ishii in a short article entitled "The Church and State, in 
Thailand". 2 His work is probably the first academic study that con- 
siders the political use of Buddhism and the Sangha for the promotion of 
national development and national integration by political leaders since' 
the 1960s. Although Ishii's work is valuable in opening up a new horizon, 
the analysis is confined to establishing a causal connection between, change 
in goverament policies and Sangha reorganization, and is illustrated by the 
Sangha Acts of 1905,1941 and 1962.. Hedemonstrates, eadý goverment 
involved reorganized the Sangha for politicýIends,, but the ideas put'. 
forward require more consideration and elaboration than, the seven pages 
of the article d1low. ' 
........... 
1. Probably first published in the 1930s. The work I refer to here was 
reprinted by. World, Fellowship-of. Budclhists, 1964. 
2. ''Asian'Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (1968) pp. 864-871. 
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This need for a deeper investigation was partly fulfilled by J. A. 
Niels Mulder' who went on to investigate the political mobilization of 
the Sangha by Sarit (1957-1963). Mulder's main analysis was that Sarit 
as well as his successors sought national security and stability through 
the promotion of national developwnt and social welfare; and that the 
Sangha, by virtue of its religious qualities and leadership especially 
at the village'level' presented itself as one of the best possible 
instruments to effect goverment policies. Thus the goverment 
mobilized the Sangha to help in community development and national integ- 
ration. However, much of the study is devoted to an argument as to 
whether the Sangha wielded greater motivational power than did secular 
leaders, and to the premature evaluation of the negative consequences 
of the Sangha involvement in goverment policies. Mulder tells us little 
about the actual roles of the Sangha in government programmes. 
More details of Sangha activities were provided by Charles F. Keyes 
in his excellent analysis 
2 
of King Chulalongkorn's efforts to pacify the 
dissidents in Northern Thailand and to unify the country by breaking up 
'primordial 13 ties through the reorganization of provincial administration 
and the reform of provincial Sangha administration. His work further 
clarifies the interaction of Buddhism with politics in the twentieth 
century. He suggested that the govenment policy of national integration 
1. ' Monks. ''Merit'and Motivation: An Exploratory'Study of the Social 
Functions of Buddhism in Thailand in the Process of Guided cial 
t 
pe 
le., 
? Cjun (Special Report Series No. 1, Centre for Southeast Asian 
tu ies,, Northern Illinois Universityt 1969). This work was revised 
in 1973,, and changed the title tdMonksp-Merit'and Motivation: Buddhism 
and'National*Develolxnent'in Thailand. 
2. "Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand", ' Asian Studies, Vol. 
XXX, No. - 3,1971, pp. 551-568. 
3. i. e. the relationship by which local leaders maintained their power 
at the expense of the authority of central government. 
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since the 1960s was in fact the legacy of King Chulalongkorn. This 
policy manifests itself in the Phra Dhamatuta and Phra Dhanmajarik 
programes. ' His article!, however, focussed on the goverment's 
attempts to integrate hill people into Thai society, culture and 
-politics. Despite the valuable discussion of the possibilities of 
the success of the Phra Dhammajarik prograime, Keyes tells us little 
about its actual operation. 
The inadequacies of previous accounts of the Sangha's roles in 
govermnent policies of national development and national integration 
were partly filled by my previous work. However, this study i's con- 
cerned only with the period up to 1972. Moreover'. I now see s6me of 
the weaknesses of my analysis of the problems in that study. For 
instance, my concept of political modernization and development then 
was too narrowly defined, and certain aspects of such concepts were not 
taken into account. This led to some premature conclusions which 
will be seen to be modified in this thesis. 
Another intensive study on the interaction of Buddhism and the 
Sangha with politics has been carried out by S. J. Tambiah .2 
-This 
work 
provides us with a valuable sociological and anthropological analysi's of 
the interaction of Buddhism and Thai kingship of early times, of the 
development of the Sangha structure and organization in relation to the 
Thai polity, and partly of tI-he political mobilization for the, achievement 
of certain goverment policies today. The study has been both criticized 
and praised for attempting to encompass a wide range of topics over a very 
Political'Býddhism'in'Southeast'Agia: The Role'of*the-san 
mociernization ot 'Iftalland (London: L. HurSt 0 
haln'the 11 
World Conqueror'and'*World'Renouncer: 'A study'of'13uddhism. *and'-Poli-ty - : rLn riýiland aggainst a Historical Background (Ca-m-briiýe-. 
UT1ýversity Press, 1976). 1 
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long period of time within the bounds of a single theory. I must 
confess that I do not fully comprehend the issues in dispute in the 
sociological and anthropological theories, -for they are largely outside 
my field of interest, but I'do feel that the imense span of the work 
does at times appear to make the illustrative material fragmented and 
confusing. Also, unlike Keyes,, Tambiah seems not to have made'exien- 
sive use of the original written Thai sources. Nevertheless, his thesis 
that changes in the nature of relationshipsbetween Buddhism, the Sanghýa 
and the state'can-be attributed to the. forces of socio-political change 
is unmistakenly valid. His stress on continuity in the'Sangha 
structure and of Thai ideas on the relationshi' of the Sangha and'state IP 
and Buddhism and kingship, is most acceptable. I have found his work 
particularly useful for understanding the early period of Thai polity, 
and overall consider it as a stimulating and original contributibn to the, 
field. 
Other contributions to the study oftfieýinteraction of Buddhism 
with politics in Thailand have been concerned with Buddhistmillenarianism 
in Thai history. ' T he articles by Tej Bunhag 
2 
and Keyes*, 
3 for example, 
suggest that under certain socio-economic and political circumstances 
Buddhism could be manipulated to provide legitimacy for rebellious or, 
revolutionary ideologies. 
See, -for example, Edmmd Leach., "The Dharma of Kingship' I, - The 'Times 
Iitetaty*2ýpplemdnt'(T. 'L. S. ), Friday, -14 January 1977, No. 7_, _5GT; 7 
p. 22; and also the Review'by Richard Gombrich in']Bulletin'of'the TIO 'School *6f'Otieritdl I'Afridari'Studies, Vol. XLI, - Part _2,1979'Tpp. 
-4126 
I, 
2. "Kabot-Phumibun'nai'phak, -'Isan, r. s-,. 1211"(Millennial Revolt in Northeast 
Thailand, "--1902); 'Sangkomsdt, 'Pariýýat., V'ol. -V (1967). pp. '78-87. ' 
I. I'Millenialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Societ)el, 'Asian Studies'. 
Vol., XXXVI 
- 
(1977), pp. 283-302; see also his "Ihe Powe-f o-)TTe-r-1FtTr, -, 
'Visakha'PUja*B. E. '25l6 (Bangkok: 1973). 
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Lanka. The problem with these studies'is the extent to which they are 
relevant to I Thailand. It must be -recognized that there are a number Of 
difficulties in their use which stem from differences between the Sangha 
organization and its relation to the state in'the, various countries. 
Though all the countries are TheravaAa Buddhist and have substantially 
the same doctrine, there the similarities end. First, in both Burma 
and Sri Lanka the Sangha, has had at times a large degree of autonomy from 
the goverrment and a tradition of opposition to attempts at state 
2 
control without their consents a-condition totally unlike Thailand where 
the state and the Sangha have, been. closely enmeshed since early times. 
Second, both Burma and Sri Lanka were colonial dependencies. buring 
their struggles for independence, the nationalists found, Buddhistýsupport 
by pointing to, the neglect,, and destruction of the religion, by the colonial 
goverment. In time Buddhism and nationalism converged. to the extent 
that monks became political, leaders and played a-prominent role in the 
achievement of independent statehood.; Later,, after, independence wheii 
For example, Michael E. Mendelsono,, I'Religion and 
Authority in Burma", 
The'World'Tod Vol. 16 (1960) pp'9 110-118j- "Buddhism*and Politics 
in r1ma e 
96djLtX, Vol. 1'(1.9.63), and'Sanghd'and'State'in'Burma: ' 
A'Study'o nastic*SedtdtidAism and-Lbddershj2, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1975); Donald E. Smith, 'Religion and'Politics'in 
'Burma (New Jersey: Princeton Univeisity Press, 1965). Soutli Asian 
'P-olliftids'and*Roligion (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 6); 
Emanuel Sarkisyanz, 'BLiddhigt'Bd6kground-ý'oý'thb*BLitnie, 80'R6volution (The 
Hague: Ma 
' 
rtinus Nijh-oTF, -175);. 
_Fred 
von der Mehden, ýIon and 
ison: -Wiversity of Wisconsin Pi: ýess, 1963), - "SecularizYtim f, 
Buddhist Polities: Burma and Thailand", Donald E. Smith'(ed. ), Religion 
and'Political Modernization (New Haven: Yale - 'University 
Press, 1974) 
pp. 49-66; Heinz Bechert,, "Buddhism and Mass Politics'in Burma and 
Ceylon", Donald E. Smith (ed )''Rell ion'and Political Modemization 
(1974) pp. 147-167, "Theravaaa'BuddhRist Sanih-a: 
' 
Some General. Observations 
on Historical'and Political Factors on its'Development",, 'Asian Studies, 
, 
Vol. 29 (1969-1970) pp. 761-778; Urmila Phadnis-Religrion and'Politics 
(London: C. Harst,, & Co.., 1976); - D. C , 
711jayavardhana, 2je 
Revolt irn7tTeIemple (Colombo: Sinha, Publicaýions, 1953). 
2. For elaboration see, for example, Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma;, 
Phadnis''ibid.; Vijayavardhana-ibid.; and Hans-Dieter Evers., ! '-TTTe- 
Buddhist Sangha in Ceylon and Thailand:,, A Comparative Study of Formal grganization in..: Iýo-Ndn-Industrial Societies". "Sociologus 
0 NO. '1"(1968)'jo. "2 --ý350' 
1 
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certain nationalists, such as Aung San, attempted to secularize their 
policies, they found the Sangha unwilling to relinquish its political 
power. With the anti-colonial'issue closed, the energies of the' 
politicized Sangha could now be. concentrated on other political problems. 
For example, the re-establishment of Buddhist education and the local, 
language in schools and universities became a very important cause in 
both countries. Further, during the colonial period the discipline 
of the politicized monks had become very lax, but attempts to reorganize 
and purify the Sangha by the secular authorities often met with strong 
resistance, and led to a proliferation of Buddhist organizations with 
widely differing views, on how the Sangha should be, ttructured. This 
in turn led to much manoeuvring by both lay and monastic political 
groups for each other's support. In Sri Lanka, while Bandaranaike 
initially managed to exploit this situation to achieve power, he was 
later assassinated by a monk. In Burma, U Nu was, also initially success-ý- 
ful in a similar, fashion, but his promise of stateBuddhism. threatened the 
disintegration of the Union of Buma -and led ultimately to his- downfall*" 
This history of, the involvement of Buddhism in politics created in both 
countries a public acceptance of political monks and indeýd an' expectation 
of monkish political activity which is quite alien to Thailand, where 
colonialism had always remained an external threat. Indeed in Thailand 
Buddhism is traditionally seen as diametrically opposed to politics; 
pure to impure. There is no expectation of political activity by monks; 
on the contrary,, such activities are generally, discouraged. 
Because the modem relationshýpýbetween, politics-and BLiddhism iýi'-, 
these other Theravada-Buddhist countries"is so ,u nlike thývpertaining in 
'Thail6aid, ' I decided-that. rather than. burden the text with detailed back- 
For Sri Lanka's case see Phadnis. ''op. 'cit.; and also Vijayavardhanaý, 
op., cit. In Burma's case see., for example, Smith (1965), *op. cit., .. -. - -- ----A- 
anu vienc 
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ground on these countries in order to make reasoned comparison possible,, 
I would confinc my study to Thailand- This aoes not mean that r 
abandon these other works completely, for I have founcl them valua)Ae ýn 
deciding on areas and methods of investigation, and wish to acknowledge 
this debt. 
1 Much the same arguments apply to the more general studies 
of Theravada Buddhism in South-East Asia. 
5. ' Methodology 
I 
This tbesis was originally intended to be a study based on fI ieldwork. 
As explained in the preface, I was left with no alternative but to pursue 
my topic largely by library research. In this section I explain the 
methods I employed to accumulate and analyze my data. 
(a) 'Documentary'data 
Works in ]English have provided the necessary theoretical orientation 
and background knowledge of the problems, whereas the information com- 
prising the main body of the thesis and for analysis has been drawn 
largely from Thai sources. 
Thai written materials comprise (1) goverment and commercial 
publications, (2) goverment documents - both confidential and non- 
confidential, (3) statements and publications of political groups, 
1. Particularly to the works cited on page 24, note 1. 
2. For example, Robert C. Lester, 'ýTheravada*&iddhism. in*SoutheastAsia 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973 ; Robert N. Bellah 
(ed); 'Rdligion 'anclTrogless 'iii -dern, 
Asia (Illinois, Glencoe: The 
Free s. 1965); Maiming Nash (ed. ).. Anthropblodcal*Studies in 
Cultural Report Serle-s-To. -. 13 (New Haven: 
Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1966); Heinz Bechert, 
'Staat'und' Ge. ýOllsdhdft'in ý'den'Landem 'des Therav5da- 
Tuddhismus (Otto Harrassowitz: WiesbWn, 1967); see also Smith 
(1974) ýTp-. cit. 
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individual activists, and political monks, and (4) periodicals and news- 
papers. The confidential government'documents were conipiled mainly by 
government agents specially assigned to watch the specific activities of 
the political groups, individual activists and political monks. ' These 
documents are very useful for they not only provide necessary information 
for analysis, but also enable us to understand the government's perception 
and attitudes towards the people under surveillance. 
Scattered statements and publications, mainly in the fonn-of I 
leaflets, press releases, produced and distributed by, the political , 
groups, activists, and political monks provided information, abOut their 
ideological positions, policies, and techniques of mobilizing public', 
support. Some of, them had a limited circulation, but certain government 
departments had them all. Others were more widely, available. These 
docLunents also enable one to make an objective distinction between the 
authors' perceptions of their positions and the'evaluations of their 
positionsýby the'government officials. 
I 
I managed to obtain, access to some of these confidential documents 
through the good offices of certain govenment officials and some other 
individuals who fled the country after the 6 October 1976 coup. These 
helpful people pref6r'to remain anonymous., 
The monthly joumal'Buddhachak, published by the Mahachula Buddhist 
university provided me with information about the attitudes. and 
ideological positions of the_, Iprogressivel monk-students of the two 
Buddhist universities towards the socio-pOlitical changes of the 1970s,, 
whereas the'Dharnmachaksu published, ýy Mahamakut Buddhist University 
represented a rather conservative view of the 'less progressive' monk-. 
students. 
The-fortnightly newspapers'siang'Ytiýasong, ý"published bý the Federation 
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of Buddhists of Thailand was valuable - in providing, info-nnation about 
its own activities alid programmes as well as keeping one informed of 
th6 movements of other monks' organizations. I had to rely on this 
source to study the Sangha reform movement. 
The statements of the right wing monks, especially those made 
publicly by Kitthiuuttho were mainly obtained from two major-sources 
the monthly journal'Chofa and the small books or pamphlets published by 
the Abhidhama Foundation whose managing director was KitthiwutthO 
himself . 
(b) Field data 
Much of the first hand information about the roleý and activities 
of political groups, activists, and of-left, wing monks throughout 1974 
and 1975 was. acquired through my own participant and non-participant 
observations. The observation was 'uncontrolled' as it was carried 
out as the events took place. By 'non-parti6ipant', I mean I did'not 
assume a role or take part in the activities, but was'an ýLitside observer. 
By 'Participant' I mean that I was actually involved 6fidissumed certain 
roles in the activities. 
I began to collect the information 4out the political monks as 
early as mid-1974, by non-participant observation., From mid-1974 I 
concentrated my attention on the. activities, of. some left wing monks in 
three main events; the farmers' demonstrations, especially in late 
November 1974; th6 monks' sit-in'(ihe Phra. Phimon&am, case); and the 
campaign for the totalýwithdrawal of American troops, especially the* 
Mayaguez incident in late 1975. These observations enabied me to 
identify initially, certain leaders among the left wing monks, and later 
I was able to establish a rapport with some of, them', ', In contrastl 
had little opportunity to observe closely'ihe activities' of the, right' 
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wing monks,, for to a large extent these were accessible only to the 
establishment and sworn members of certain right wing movements. How- 
ever, in some public meetings I did make non-participant observations 
of their activities. 
My assumption of a role as one of the executive members of the 
Union for Civil Liberty during 1974-1975 also enabled me to obtain access 
to part of the first hand information about the ideologies, activities, 
I 
and policies of certain secular left wing movements. My direct respon- 
sibility then was to deal with the farmers or their representatives who 
wished to make their-grievances known to the govennent., and to make a 
point of contact for other sympathetic organizations which either acted 
on behalf of the farmers or supported their demands. Because of my 
position,. the observations undertaken then were both participant and 
non-participant. I 
- In the-process of making decisions on strategies for redressing 
grievances, bargaining., and demonstrations, the organizations or move- 
ments concerned would meet and adopt resolutions. In most cases I 
would be involved in this process., i. e. I was a participant observer. 
Once, this stage was over,. and, a demnstration,. for. instance,, had actually 
taken place, I became an outsider, i. e. non-participant observer. In 
any event, ýj tried to focus my attention on how the monks 
became involved 
and what their activities were in particular events. 
In order to minimize the extent of my own value judgments of the 
roles and activities of the political monks in certain issues, during 
1974-1975 1 tr ied to coummicate personally and informally with a good 
number of people of different socio-economic status. This involved, for 
example, friendly conversations over coffee with some university lecturers, 
casual chats with students in the university campus,, and with shopkeepers, 
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and sometimes, with passengers on buses. On these occasion's I would 
attempt to solicit their opinions about the roles and activities of 
the monks either in particular events or on certain issues. I do not 
claim that this method is technically sound, or the sample represents 
genuine public opinion. Nevertheless, as a, Thai living in Thai, culture, 
I am confident that allowing for. its weaknesses, the information acquired, 
by this method was genuine, at least at the time the research,, was under- 
taken. 
I. 
Also during this period I was in constant conmmication with certain, 
political groups, individual activists and some political monks. 11iis 
informal con-anmication provided me with insights which could not have 
been obtained by other means. This kind of information proved to be 
very useful. for the analysis of part of my data. 
A close rapport with specificpolitical groups, activists, and' 
political monks made during 1974-1975 was maintained throughout' 1'97'6 by 
means of correspondence. I was kept informed of their activities in 
addition to what was reported in the press'. But this'pattern. of 
communication suffered a great deal due to the'censorship'iinposed during 
October 1976-January 1978. At this time. the goverment controlled the 
press to such an extent that the expression of viewpoints differing from 
the official position virtually disappeared. -I then gathered; information 
from people who visited Britain and the United States. This repressive 
condition had begun to relax a little by March 1978 and Lwas, then able 
to, resume correspondence with some persons, and monks in Thailand.,,, In 
addition, I made up a set of questions and asked friends to put them'to 
certain monks. Some of them were very helpful and gave answers 'which 
were recorded and'sent-'on. to me here. Although this'method of data 
collection is not, considered as an important source of information, it 
has' proved useful to my analysis. Because"of the' uncert'aintie's'of Thai 
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politics, it is necessary that these helpful people too must remain 
anonymous. 
6. , The'structuro of, the'thb8is 
In this chapter so far I have spelt out the purposes of the study 
and discussed basic concepts crucial to the thesis. A survey has been 
made of the relevant literature, and the sources of data and the methods 
used to collect it have been described. Within the basic theme of the 
interaction of the Sangha with politics in the context of socio-political 
change, a number of major problems have been selected for discussion. 
The fomat of the theýis follows from these problems. 
It should be clear from the above sections that the thesis has a 
larger historical content than previously intended. In the discussion 
of tradition I indicated my views on the continuity of Thai society, and 
on the impossibility of divorcing the study of the present from the past. 
Chapters II and III are therefore concerned with the history of the 
relationships between Buddhism and kingship, and between the Sangha, and 
state, moving from early times to the present. 
In Chapter II I investigate the relationship between kingship and 
Buddhism in Thai history. I seek to show how Buddhism served as a 
moral legitimation for the king; what kind of contribution religion 
provided to the religio-political ideology of the state; and how and 
why the Thai kings manipulated Buddhism to legitimize their policies, 
positions, and their right to rule. I also consider the effects of 
,, 
socio-political changes on the conception of kingship. 
This sets the background for Chapter III which deals with'the 
relationship between the'-Sangha and the state. -It begins with the 
assuEptiOn that the Sangha, 'due to'its-religious! a"nd's-ecular roles, 
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can exercise social control over the people, and thus regulate the 
I 
social order. I then investigate the relationship between the Sangha 
and, the society focussing on their role relations. ' Although my findings 
suggest tha 
It 
my initial assumption to a 
'large extent is valid, the 
evidence presented here suggests that the Sangha is unlikely to have 
great influence on political leaders. Rather, -the Sangha tends to be 
subjugated or subordinated to the state. 'In order to understand why 
the Sangha is loyal and subservient to the political authorities, I 
examine the patteiii of relationships between the Sangha and the state 
and the inplication of their relationships. ' In this., I investigate 
the reasons for and the development of patterns of patronage and control 
by the political authority over the-Sangha in the light of socio-political 
changes in the structure of the Sangha authority and its administration. 
Overall this chapter is intended to show how and why the Thai Sangha 
became in instrument of the state. 
The stage is now set to consider the political mobilization of the 
Sangha, and its responses in Chapter IV. I seek to show that the Thai 
political leaders, especially since the 1960s, have rýsorted to the 
Sangha to promote the goverment policies of national development and 
national integration in order that they might legitimately maintain their 
power. I first examine the problems confronted by the Thai rulers. 
These are problems of conamism and national integation. They are 
regarded by the government as threats to national security and the 
stability of the nation, and as hindrances to national development. 
Secondly, the justification employed by the political leaders to mobilize 
the Sangha to assist in these goverment policies is investigated. The 
responses, of the Sangha at various levels are examined in order to under-, 
stand their ideological position in response to the political mobiliza- 
tion. The involvement-of the Sangha in goverment policies-is divided 
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into (1) the role of the Sangha in development programmes, (2) the 
Sanghals role in strengthening the people's attachment-to Buddhism, 
and (3) the role'of th6 Sangha in strengthening bonds of sentiment 
between the Thai and the hill, people, and-in creating loyalty to the 
nation of minorities through the development of a strong belief in 
Buddhism. ý The study conceives the roles of the Sangha as political, 
and as becoming institutionalized and intensified at a time when national 
security and integration was seriously threatened by com=ism and 
dissidence in the North and North-East. The roles and activities of 
the Sangha in these progr=mes were political in that all these 
programmes were interrelated and were intended to counteract communism 
and subversion, -achieve national integration, and secure people's 
loyalty to the government. 
The nature of these programes and the roles,, activities and 
involvement of the Sangha in the programes will be discussed and 
analyzed. 
With this perspective, it is now possible to examine in Chapter V 
the socio-political changes of the early 1970s whichled to the emergence 
of 'political monks' during 1973-1976,, and, -to define, this, key-tem. I 
consider,, the nature. of,, those changes, which, penetrated the Sangha, 
especially the effects of ideological, polarization and the monks' 
responses to. it. - After having discussed. reasons 
fof the emergence-of 
the political. monks, J seek to, identify wýojthe political monks were; 
their ideological positions;, and their association with the secular, 
pol#icallmovements. , Then_these considerations are used to-, determine 
the distinction j between ý left. and, right, wing political monks, andj 
explore their, organizations,, their, objectives, and leadership in the 
period 1973-1976. 
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I then proceed to examine the roles, activities, and involvement 
of the leftwing political monks in Chapter VI. Before investigating 
these problems, the debate on the question of whether or not the monks 
should involve themselves in political issues is discussed. This 
chapter is also intended to illuminate the ideological conflicts between 
the conservative and the progressive monks in the light of socio- 
political changes. I seek to investigate the left wing political 
monks' justifications for their involvement in political issues, their 
reinterpretation of certain Buddhist teachings, and their redefinition 
of their roles. 
The most explicit involvement in political issues of the left wing 
monks was manifested in their taking part in electioneering and peasant 
demonstrations. I take these two sets of activities as case studies 
in which to examine the issues raised in the general debate with which 
I 
I began the chapter. These cases are particularly interested to provide 
illustration of the common justification that Buddhist monks should serve 
the people who support them and involve themselves in humanitarian causes. 
Then the monks' sit-in and the Sangha -reform movement are considered 
to elucidate how the political monks use socio-political changes to 
promote their causes and justify their actions. This involves an 
examination of demands for 'justice' and reform in Sangha affairs, and' 
leads to a fuller investigation of views and actions of the left wing 
political monks. In order to understand the range of their views, the 
various groups of left wing monks and the connections between them are 
described, and their relations with secular left-wing movements are 
examined. Lastly, I discuss the strategies and tactics employed by 
left-wing monks and the attitudes to them of various sections of society. 
To conclude the study of political monks, the political roles, 
3s 
activities, and involvement of a right wing monk, Kitthiwuttho Bhikku, 
are considered as a case study in Chapter VII. It begins with an 
examination of the conditions in which produced a, right wing reaction 
and how Kitthiwuttho became politically active., These were the 
effects of socio-political changes following the political crises of 
1973-1976, the-creation of a Parliamentary system of government in 
Thailand, and the commist victories in neighbouring Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam. I investigate Kitthiwuttho's ideological position, his 
notions about social order and his connections with right wing secular 
movements. In this, great attention is given to the discussion of 
his perception of communism and its threat to the nation, religion, and 
the monarchy*(chart9*sdtsana, -Phrd Maha'Ka. 8at in Thai), 
' 
which led to 
his declaration of a 'holy war on connunismt., This is followed by an 
examination of his manipulation of Buddhism to justify his ideological 
position, and his startling claim that 'killing conmmists is not 
demeritorious'. Equally importantly, I attempt to show the methods 
he employed to manipulate the provincial monks, and gather mass support 
for his ideology and actions. Lastly,, the attitudes of various sections 
of the society towards the actions and ideology of this monk are discussed. 
In the conclusion (Chapter VIII) I recapitulate the ideas put forward 
in earlier chapters, and discuss them further to make clear what I consider 
to be the critical factors in the roles, activities and involvements of 
the Sangha in Thai politics. I attempt to evaluate the effects of their 
increased political engagement on the Sangha as a whole, and consequently 
the fate of Buddhism in Thailand. Finally., I consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of my research, and offer suggestions for-future investigation 
. in this field. 
This is a central concept for all Thai, and the words are loaded with highly emotive symbolism. In the period under consideration the concept 
is used repeatedly in political dialogue, and I have found it difficult 
to find alternatives to replace its rather cumbersome formulation. In 
consequence I must ask the reader in advance to forgive its necessary 
repetition which becomes tedious at times. 
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CHAPTER II ' '13IMMISCAND TOLITICAL AUTHORITY: 'A'HISrORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical data on the 
relationship between Buddhism and political authority in Thailand. I 
deal first with the arrival of Buddhism and its development in the 
country, atteEpting to trace how and why Buddhism became attractive to 
the Thai rulers. Second, I investigate the contribution of Buddhism 
to political authority, that is I inquire into the relationship between 
Buddhism and kingship; and examine the mobilization of Buddhism by the 
state for political legitimacy. I shall also investigate the dependence 
of Buddhism on political patronage. 
1. ' The'ar-rivdl of Buddhism'and'its early'develolxnent 
According to Prince Damrong Rajanubhab., Buddhism was introduced to 
the area of modern Thailand long before the formation of the Thai state. 
In Thai myth it was brought from India by missionaries of King Asoka in 
the third century B. C. We have evidence of it being brought by Indian 
traders from Magadha to the Kingdom of Dvaravati in the mid-sixth 
century. 
1 This was a Mon state, a confederation of city states, the 
most inportant, of which were Uthong, Nakorn Pathom, Lopburi in the 
Central region and Lainpun in, the ýbrth- 
2 It is thought to have become 
a centre from-which Buddhist civilization was disseminated to other 
1. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab (thereafter Damrong), V' Monuments of Buddhism in'Siam (transl. Sulak Sivaraksa and A. B. GriswoW TBangT(Tk., The Siam 
ISREI-ety, Monograph'No. 2 (revised), 1973), pp. 1-2. 
2. Chamvit Kasetsiri, '*Thd'Risd'of-'*Ayudhya, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1977) pp. 5-11; H. G. Q. Wales,, Dvaravati: 'the Earliest Kingdom 
of"Siam., (London: Quaritch., -1969)'pp. 20-28; an7 Kachorn Sukphanit, 771rýa Prawatsart lae Prawatsart Thai" (History and 
i 
Thai History) 
Sangkomsdt*Pdrithat, Special Issue, Vol. 1, December 1964, p. 42. 
37, 
cities such as Suphanburi, Ratchaburi,, and Nakorn Ratchasima and other 
, 
South-East Asian kingdoms. While Theravada Buddhism flourished in 
the areas under the domination of the Mon, further to the south in the 
Malay Peninsula- from Suratthani as far south as Pattani Mahayana- 
Buddhism thrived under the rule of the powerful kings of Srivijaya, in 
Sumatra who cherished this faith. The Khmer kingdom received its 
Mahayana Buddhism from the island enpires of Sumatra and Java sometime 
during this period. 
2 By the beginning of the eleventh century the 
Dvaravati state had succunbed to Khmer power, probably in the-reign-of. 
Suriyavarman I of Angkor. Lopburi, the former capital of the Mon, 
became an outpost of the Khmer empire, but further north the direct 
13 
rule of the Khmer did not go beyond the Sukhothai-Sawankalok region. 
The Kluner domination of the area marked the end of the Dvaravati 
kingdom and lasted well into the early part of the thirteenth century. 
The people in the territory under direct Khmer control now underwent a 
very different cultural experience, being exposed to the impact of 
Hinduism and Brahmanism brought in from Angkor by certain Khmer kings 
who were devotees. Damrong believed that Mahayanism continued in these 
4 areas through the support of some rulers. However, the long period 
of Khmer domination (eleventh to thirteenth centuries) gave sufficient 
time for the Indianized Kluner culture to enrich local culture'deeply. 
As a result, the concept of kingship under the domination of the Khmer 
1. L. P., Briggs, I'Dvaravati, the Most Ancient Kingdom of Siam! ', 'Journal 
of'American'Otidntal'S6diety, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April-Jýne 1945) pp. 98- 
101; Gordon Ii. Luce, "Rice and Religion", 'Joumal'of'the'Siam*Societ 
Vol. -53, No'. 2'(July, 1965) p. l40;,, -and'Damrong, 'op. cit,,, p. z. 
2. Damrong; 'Lbid.; see also the translators' footnotes 5, '8-9 on pp., 41-42. 
3. G. Coedes, 'The-*Indiahized'Stdtes'of*Southeast Asia (ed. W. F. Vella, 
transl. S., B. Cowing),. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press., 1968) pp. 137-138. 
4'. Damrong, -Op. cit.., 
_p. 
3., 
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was a product of a, mixture of Mahayana Buddhist and Hindu-Kluner culture 
which was the main charaýteristic of Ayudhya kingship. Being a Kluner 
vassal and far from direct Mmer influence, Sukhothai developed a 
concept of kingship'which had fewer 1-11ndu and Khmer cults and ceremonies 
than Ayudhya. Sukhothai kingship was mainly developed from and 
influenced by Buddhism of the Theravada school which was brought to 
this area by King Anuruddha 
- 
of Pagan. 
' By the time of the emergence 
of the Thai polity, which was signified by the formation of the kingdoms 
of Sukhothai and Cheingmai in the North around 1250 A. D., it appears 
that the Mon tradition of Theravada Buddhism was strongly established. 
Despite the uncertainties about the development of the early Thai king- 
doms and the location of the original homeland of the Thai, 
2 it is agreed 
that they had lived alongside or among the indigenous population and 
submitted to the political authority of first the Mon of Dvaravati (Sixth 
to eleventh centuries) and then the Khmer of Cambodia (eleventh to- 
thirteenthýcenturies). During-the eleventh and twelfth centuries, there 
appeared many tiny independent-states. Among them were the loosely, , 
organized states of Sukhothai and Cheingmai-in the North-and Ayudbya in 
the South. 3 From the thirteenth century onwards, the Thai began, to 
gain political. control over the Mon and Khmer. 
1. 'Ibid. 
2. According to Thai sources, the emergence and origin of the early 
Thai kingdoms was very complex and much is concealed in myth. See, 
for exanple, Damrong Raj anubhab; *RtibAS'PhrdRLiang (Mstory- of 'Sukhothai 
Dynasty) (Barigkok: 1960), *Phrdratcha'Phongsawadan'Chabab Phratatchahat- 
. 'lekha (Aimals., Autograph Edition by King Mongkut) (Bangkok: 
Thri Amarthyakul, Phrardtdia Phongsawadan'KrunR'Sayam (Amals, History 
of Siam)'(Bangkok: 1964); Phraya, Prachakitkomchak - Chaem Bunnag, 
"Phongsawadan Yonok" (History of the North) mi'Prachum'Phongsawadan 
fes. (Collections of Chronic es, National, Library 
Edition) Vol. 2 (Bangkok: 1964); and Kachom Sukphanit, "The Thai , 
Beach-Head States in the llth-12th centuries". Silpakorn, Vol. 1. nos. 
3-4 (September-November 1957). 
3. Coedes. *'oý. cit., p. 190. 
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, The religio-Political ideology of the early Thai rulers appears to 
have been a kind of syncretism-of Khmer-Hinduism and Buddhism. However,, 
perhaps partly because of the adpative capacity of the Thai, the mixture 
of different cultures seemed to lead to no major cultural conflict. As 
Damrong puts it: 
The Tai (Thai) knew how to pick and choose. When they 
saw a good feature in the culture of other peoples, if 
it was not in conflict with their own interests, they 
did not hesitate to borrow and adapt, it into their own. 
requirements. 1 
Nevertheless, in the Ayudhya region where the Khmer ruled directly, the' 
Hindu-Khmer culture was stronger than it was in the northern kingdoms of, 
Sukhothai and Cheingmai. As a result the H: mdu-Khmer influence on 
Ayudhya kingship and its religio-political ideology lasted for centuries. 
The relationship between kingship and Buddhism in the early Thai 
kingdoms must be largely deduced from myth. According to the Taman 
history, or history of Buddhism, which came into existence well before 
the fifteenth century, there was a close relationship between the develop- 
ment of Buddhism in the kingdoms and the patronage of the faith by 
Buddhist kings, In the Taman, the Buddhist kings of India, Burma, 
Ceylon, Cambodia and Thailand are linked together as if they were in 
the same dynasty, ie. the dynasty of Buddhist kings. They succeeded 
one another as the upholders of Buddhism, their ties going back to the 
Buddha himself who was the creator of a comon tradition to which all the 
kings belonged. All these kings appear to have been religious men 
ascending to the throne as a result of merit drawn from their acts as 
supporters and protectors of the, faith. ýTheir kingdomsý were prosperous 
and progressive, and their positions were secure as'long as they were 
Damrmg, ' Monument-: ý 'the 'Buddha; ' pp. 4-5. 
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religious and righteous. 
' 
Despite the fact that the extent of Buddhist arld Hinclu-Khmer 
influences on kingship and religio-political ideology in, the early 
Thai states is ill-defined and debataýle, we'can tentatively suggest 
that the religio-political ideology and conception of kingship, of 
this period are a reworking of certain Buddhist and Hindu-Khmer ideas. 
By 1250 A. D., approximately, the Thai kingdoms in the North 
especially Sukhothai had, reached a stage of political development at 
which they could challenge Khmer and Mon power. In the South the 
power of the Khmer in the Ayudhya-Lopburi region began to decline and 
finally Ayudhya emerged as an independent state around the middle of 
the fourteenth century. 
When Sukhothai emerged as an independent kingdom, Theravada Buddhism 
was already-firmly established there. A few decades later it became 
clear that the Sukhothai kings favoured the Singhalesevariant of 
Theravada Buddhism. This had been first established in Nakhon, 
Sitthanmarat and attracted a great number of, followers., -, When the king' 
of Sukhothai heard of this he invited the, monks of the new order to come 
to Sukhothai. Singhalese Buddhism thrived and remains the state -religion 
in Thailand to the present day. 
2 In Ayudhya, despite strong Hindu-Khmer 
influence, a close link was also maintained with Theravada-Buddhism. 
1. Charnavit Kasetsiri., *op. 'eit., pp. 8-11,52-60. 
_For 
elaboration sed 
N. A. Jayawickrama (transl. ); 'Th6'Sliedf: bf'Gatland. ý'bfýth6'Epoths of 
'the 'Conqueror (A Translation -of--Ji-n-aika-lamalipakar-, na-m o)-f-lUt-anapanna. 
Thera) (London: Pali Text Society, 1968); Phraya Prachakitkornchak 
op. cit.; Department of Fine Arts. -Tamari ML! rilasdtsana (History of 
Origin of Religion) (Bangkok: n. d. ---believed to have been written 
in the 1420s)., 'Tamti'Prakat'Muang 'Nakomsithammarat (History of 
Nakomsithammrat) (Bangkok: 1962). 
Damrong, ' , Buddhism", in'Siam, p. 6. 
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It would require a lengthy discussion to explain why Theravacia 
Buddhism had such great appeal to the rulers of the newly emerging 
kingdoms of Buýma., Laos, Ceylon, and Thailand and why it was adopted 
as their national religion. f1owever, Trevor O. Iing suggests that 
Theravade Buddhism was attractive to the rulers of these kingdoms 
because it possessed a number of'valuable features: 
First, it had what seemed to them a sophisticated 
system of psychology and ethics - sophisticated, 
that is to say, by comparison with the indigenous 
spirit-cults and debased Indian priestcraft which 
had until then constituted the spiritual powers 
of the region. Secondly, the professional 
carriers of this form of Buddhism were non-priestly. 
They did not claim to command supernatural forceý 
nor were they, likely to invoke supernatural sanctions 
They relied on the good will of the people, the 
attractiveness of their philosophy and the uprightness 
of their own conduct. What they did seek., beyond 
these advantages, was the protection and support which 
the kings could afford them and their way of life. For their part kings were by no means unwilling to 
guarantee such support, once they came to see the 
potential value of this cult of the Buddha. 1 
He further points out that from the point of view of the ruler Theraýada 
Buddhism was attractive as a socio-political system which provided the 
people with (1) a perspective within which each human'existence could 
be seen as the working out of moral gain and loss in previous existences; 
(2) a scale of moral values in which equanimity, peaceableness and 
generosity rated high; and anger, conflict, violence and desire for gain 
rated low. It also (3) embodied an organisation of voluntary teachers 
and moral preceptors (the Sangha) whose main concerns were strictly non- 
political; and who would be economically supported by the people,, but 
were also prepared to cooperate with the ruler and advise him on religious 
, and social matters in return for his guaranteeing them a virtual monopoly 
1, Trevor 0. Ling, *An'Introductibri't6'Political'Buddhism'in Southeast 
'Asia., 'Thd'R(ile'of the Sangha'in_Modernizatim'of Thailand (London: 
C. firrst and Co,, 19'77) pp. x-xi. I 
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as the spiritual and religious professionals of the kingdom. 
' The 
relationship between the kings and the Sangha was reciprocal. The 
king desired the cooperation of the Sangha because he saw that this 
would provide his kingdom with moral legitimation and considerably 
assist in matters of social control. At the same time, the Sangha 
sought to secure the king's adherence to Buddhist values, for this would 
guarantee his support. Thus, it is possible that these two interests 
more or less coincided: that an ideology which needed a supportive 
political power met a political ruler looking for a legitimizing ideology. 
2. 'The Buddhist concept of kingship 
In Buddhist scripture, political authority is embodied in kingship. 
This belief is best understood if one examines the creation myths. In 
the beginning the world evolved as part of the universe. From fire came 
solids, liquids and gases which became the earth, the moon, the sun, the 
planetary system and stellar constellations. Plant and animal life 
evolved, and over time became increasingly differentiated. Eventually 
human beings became differentiated from other animals, and fed on rice 
-after it evolved. They then became stronger, and differences in 
physical type and sex appeared. At this stage fragrant and clear- 
grained rice in unlimited supply was naturally available in open spaces 
and became communal property. Every human being enjoyed as much of it 
as his body required. Some males and females became interest in sexual 
intercourse; they developed in them passion and lust, which were con- 
sidered immoral. These immoral persons were expelled from the settle- 
ments; they made huts to conceal their immorality, and yet were still 
allowed to have a share in the commmal property. Then, there appeared 
1. * Ibid. , p. xi. 
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greedy persons who collected and hoarded rice. As passion, lust; 
imorality, and greed, increased, rice ceased to grow spontaneously, ý and 
its quality degenerated. Men then divided rice fields among themselves 
as private property,, and settled boundaries. Disputes over property 
arose; men proceeded to steal otherls'plots; and censure, lying and 
punishment became known. 
As men became increasingly immoral and greedy for private posses- 
sions, conflict, violence, and disorder grew. This led men to gather 
themselves together and discuss how their lives should be regulated. 
They then agreed that they needed a 'certain being' who should give order 
to society, who should censure that which should be censured, and who 
should banish those who deserved to be banished. They also agreed to 
select the most handsome., best favoured, most attractive and Mosi 
capable from among them; and they invited him to be their ruler and to 
regulate society. 'In return., the ruler was given a proportion of the 
rice produced by the people. 
The ruler was called'Mahasanmata (the great elect) because he, was 
chosen by the many; ]Khatthiya'(Yhasathiya - Thai) or the Lord of the 
Fields'(Chaophaendin - Thai) because he protected the people's fields; 
and*Raja (the one who pleases the many) because he was righteous and 
guided by Dhanme 
1 
Conceived of in this way, the Buddhist concept of'political authority 
suggests that kingship was established because of the imperfections of 
This brief account of the origin and evolution of the ýorld, society 
and Buddhist kingship derives from Buddhist scripture especially - 
Aggana'Suttanta*''Angdttdrd'Ni]ýýXd'Stittanta-*'Diglid'Nikaya'Suttanta; 
and'Jataka. These works have been translated into English by many 
scholagr-s, ; and can be readily consulted in the publications of the Pali 
Text Society. 
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man and the need for social order. Buddhist scripture such as the Pali 
canon and the Jataka emphasizes the need for a kýng if order is to 
prevail. The relationship between the king and his subjects is 
described as follows: the king was elected because he was the great 
merit-maker in former lives. Such accumulation of merit'afforded him 
the kingship, "otherwise he could not have-been born a ingil. .1 He 
governed the kingdom and reigned over the people and was endowed by them 
with authority to reprove, rebuke, punish or destroy anyone who trans- 
gressed a royal command. 
2 
Hewas the receiver and enjoyer of tax from the 
people'. 
3_ He was their source of happiness and paternal protector. 
4 He 
was the upholder of Dhamma through which he watched over and, protected 
his subjects. 
5 The king was also endowed with five qualities: physical 
strength, material strength, the strength of officials, the strength of 
nobility, and the strength of wisdom. 
6" 
On the part of the subjects, they needed the king'for protection 
f 
and went to the king for the sake of honour and security. They esteemed 
him and obeyed him without challenge. 
7 Therefore a person who cared 
for his life should refrain from despising the king., and should conduct 
himself properly towards him. 
Thus Buddhist kingship was essentially based on the-concept of 
righteousness. To maintain his political authority and to regulate state 
1. Samyutta'Nikaya, Vol. I, p. 93. 
2. 'The Miliridapanha, p. 226. 
3. 
- 
''Anguttara'Nikaya, Vol. III, p. 45. 
4. Digka'Nikaya., Vol. 3., pp., 93,97., 
5. ''Anguttara'Nikaya, Vol.., I,, 'p. 109; and Vol. III, p., 149. 
6ý* ' Jataka, Vol, V, p. 120. 
7. 'Ibid., Yol. IV, p. 
ý 
1269! ', 
I 
8. Samyutta Nikayý, -Vol- 1, p. '96. 
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affairs for the benefit of the kingdom and hence reaffirm and enhance 
his authority, the king had to be a righteous -ruler, the Mamma Raja,. 
The ethics of Dharnma are of universal relevance., applicable as much to 
individual conduct as to the principles of government. This is 
beautifully stated in the Anguttara Nikaya,, part of which is the 
dialogue between the Buddha and his disciples about the good Buddhist 
ruler: 
The Buddha: 174onks, the rajah who rolls the wheel (of state), a Dhama 
I man, a Dhmma Rajah, rolls on indeed no unroyal wheel". 
A Monk: "But who, lord, is the rajah of the 'rajah .... T' 
The Buddha: "It is the Dhamma., monk. Herein, monk, the rajah, the 
wheel roller, the Dhamma man, the Dhamma rajah, relies 
just on Dhamma, honours Dhamma, reveres Dhanmaq esteems 
Dhamma; with Dhamma as his standard, with Dhamma as 
his bamer, with Dhamma as his mandate, he sets a Dhamnia 
watch and bar and ward for folk within his reald. 1 
Thus, the king existed to uphold the righteous order, and could not 
act arbitrarily. He was also advised to shun the four wrong courses of 
judgment and decision either through favouritism, malice, delusion or 
fear'(chanda' 'm6ha ' 'bhaya Also he should constantl ' observe y 
the Ten Royal virtues'(Dasardjadhama . namely, 'Dana (charity, giving, 
or generosity), 'Sila (high moral character), "Taritcaga (self-sacrifice), 
Ajjava (Honesty, integrity)., 'Maddava, (kindness and gentleness), Tapa 
(austerity, self-control,, non-indulgence), ''Akhodha (non-anger), *'Ahimsa 
(non-violence, non-oppression), '']Khanti (patience, forbearance, tolerance), 
and Avirodha (conformity to law). 
2 
The. morality and righteousness of the Dhamma Raja is closely'related 
I 
F. L. Woodward. -The Book*of*the Gradual'Sayings,, Vol. III (Pali Text 
Society,, Oxfor 37i-versifT-Fr-ess., 1933) pp. 114-115. 
2. For elaboration of the implications of the Ten Royal Virtues see Phra: 
Rajavaramuni, of'Buddhism (Bangkok:, Mahachula Buddhist 
University, 1075) 206-208$ 216-218; and also Siddhi'Butr-Indr, 
The Social*Philosophy'of*Buddhism (Bangkok: Mahamýut Buddhist University, 
1973) pp. 149-150. 
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to the prosperity of his kfiigdom and the physical and mental well-being 
of his subjects. The king's conduct, and his actions had far-reaching 
consequences since they affected his own kingship as well as the 
fortunes of his subjectsýivho were almost entirely dependent on him. 
We are told that: 
When the kings are not righteous, so are'princes, 
brahmins, and householders, townsfolk and villagers. 
This'being so, the moon and the sun deviate from their 
courses, so'constallations and stars, days and nights. ' 
..... months, seasons and years; the winds blow 
wrong ...... ; the god (of rain) does not pour down 
showers of rain, the crops ripen in the wrong season; 
thus men who live on such crops have'short lives and 
look weak and sickly. Conversely, when the kings, 
the rulers, are righteous, the reverse consequences follow. 1 
This conception of Buddhist kingship appears to suggest that the 
king is not only the ruler but also the mediator and regulator of the 
social order. Thus, if he was righteous, he was a blessing; if he 
was unrighteous, he brought disaster on his subjects. A king who did 
not adhere to Dhanma and take it as master, and who failed to observe 
the royal virtues, would lead his kingdom to ruin. He would no, longer 
2 be a worthy king and the people would dethrone or kill him. 
Rulers of Buddhist kingdans, in South-EastlAsian-absorbed the concept 
of ideal ruler, Dhamm Raja, as part of their own traditions. They 
realized that the maintenance of their power, rested on adherence'to the 
Dhamma. It was therefore necessary for them to. keep Dhamma alive by 
supporting the Sangha which perpetuated and. disseminated Dhama. By 
patronizing and supervising the Sangha, týe. ruler preserved the Dhamma.. 
and in doing so ensured that his duty as-righteous king could b e. fulfilled., 
'kigutt6ra *Nikaya, Vol. II, p., 74! 
, 
(C#ed.,. by Siddhi. ]Butr-Indr. ) 
2. Majjhim 'Nikaya, Vol. -II, p. 88; -- (Cited by, Siddhi, Butr-! Indr. ) 
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Knowledge -of -the teachings of the'Buddha should never die for with it 
would die the norms against which , the ruler' sý conduct could be judged. 
3. ''Buddhism'and'Kingship at'Sukhothai 
The Sukhothai polity has been described as a paternal govermnent. 
ýThe king was regarded as the father of. the people to whom respect was 
paid and in whom the people had faith. He was easily accessible to 
his subjects when they had trouble. This is exemplified in an inscrip- 
tion which reads: 
II 
If any comonerýin the land has a grievance which sickens, 
his belly and gripes his heart, and which he wants to make 
known to his ruler; it is easy; he goes and strikes the , bell ... King Rama Gamhen, the ruler of the kingdom, hears the call; he. goes and questions, the man,. examines the case, 
and decides justly for him. 2 
The paternalism of Sukhothai may have been. reinforced by certain 
Buddhist values. For example, the Buddhist principle regulaiing the 
social relationship between parents and children. delineates the rights 
and duties of the two parties. 
_ 
Here,, respect, gratitude, obedience, 
and love towards parents are strongly emphasized. -Parents are advised 
to care for their childreii. by expressingtheir parental love for them, 
3 by. restraining them from doing evil deeds and exhorting them to do good. 
There are many standard works on the character of the Sukhothai polity;, 
see, for example: Damrong Rajanubhab; 'Lak8anq kan'Pokkhrong'Prathet 
Sayan'tae'Boran (The Ancient Goverment of Siam) (Bangkok: Ministry of 
Interior, 1959); A. B. Griswold and Prasert Na Nagara., 'A'Declaration of 
Jridependence'and*R8'Conse Epigraphic and Historical Studies No. 
I (Bangkok: The Siam Socie The*Inscription of King Rama 
'Gamhen, Epigraphic and His es No. 9 (Bangko : The Siam 'SEE-lety, 1971), King Lodaiya'of'Sukhodaya and His Contemporaries, 
Epigraphic and Historical Studies No. 10 (Bang k: The Siam Society, 
1972), and Thelpigraphy'of'Mahadhamaraja I,, Epigraphic and Historical 
Studies No. 11 (Bangkok: The Siam Society., 1973). 
2. Griswold and Prasert, ''The*Inscriptiori'of King'Rama, Gamhen, p. 208. 
II 
3. Forelaboration-of this point'see Siddhi Butrý-Indr;, opxit. ý pp. 95-100. 
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It is very probýble that the kings of Sukhothai had utilized the 
Buddhist concept of kingship to, enhance and maintain their political 
power. , 
The notion that Dhýmma was the supreme code-for regulating the 
social order and a moral guide for goverment was espoused by 
iing Ram 
Kamhaeng (and his successor). 'Ram Kamhýeng, for example, was said to 
have believed that: 
If society is morally sound and the people have a high 
spirit by keeping steadfast to Buddhism and adhering 
to Dhamma, the kingdom will be tranquil and prosperous-1, 
To demonstrate their righteous rule-and thereby constitute the norm for 
the society, the kings ofISukhothai took a leading role in religious 
activities, promoting, and protecting Buddhism, and'in patronizing the 
Sangha. King Ram-Kamhaeng, for instance, not only'showed his subjects 
his own dedication to Buddhism: but also taught Dhamma to the people. On 
each Ubosatha day. (6bservance of the Eight Precepts, -or bi-webkly recitation 
of the Vinaya by monks) he invited a learned'monk'to teach Dhamma at his 
palace. He personally led the people to observe the Buddhist precepts 
strictly during the season of-'vassa retreat., At the &nd of vassa he 
presented'Kathina to the monks. 1-b gave*donations to monks who were 
proficient in Dhamma and- in propagating Buddhism. He built monastries 
and religious places and encouraged his subjects to follow his example. 
Buddhism in his reign was said to have prospered because of the kinglý, 
2 devotion. 
His successor, King Lothai (or Lodaiya) followed Ram Kamhaeng's mode 
of govenunent, and, continued io support'Buddhism., This king is also, 
Kraingsak Pisanaka, Thai'Ha, Yuk (Five Periods of the Thai Nation) 
(Bangkok: National Library, F9969) p. 152., 
Griswold and Prasert, "Kingship and Society at Sukhodayall, in-Change' 
and'Pdr8i8tefice': 'm'Thai Society, eds. by Skinner and Kirsch (Itha8i 
Cornell Universiýy Press., 1975) p. 44. 
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said to have been a patron of Hindu cults and as a consequence the 
Brahmanical tradition seems to have been strengthened during his reign 
by influences from South India. ' Despite the fact that he was a 
fervent Buddhist,, little is known of his manipulation of Buddhism for 
political ends during his long reign (1298-1347 approximately). When 
he died in 1347 his son, Lithai (Lidaiya) succeeded him. It was this 
king who made extensive use of religion to, facilitate his iule. 
According to Griswold and Prasert, King Lithai, while following 
King Ram Kamhaeng's method of government, may have made more use of 
Hindu tradition of government than his grandfather. He is believed 
to have known the Dharmasastra (the Hindu treatise on the science of 
kingship) well and made use of it. For example, at his coronation 
the Brahmanical ritual (Abhiseksa) was performed to complete the 
2 
CereMony. As a Buddhist king, he proclaimed himself'Maha Dhammraja 
(king of righteous kings). He is said to have thoroughly studied the 
Three Pitakas. 3 During his reign, Buddhism appears to have prospered 
because of his devotion. He was recorded to be the first Thai king 
4 
who donated land and sla, ýes, probably prisoners of war, to the monasteries, 
a practice that was followed up to early Bangkok period. 
Probably the most inportant religious act of Lithai was his 
ordination. He was the first Thai king who tenporarily left his throne 
to enter the monkhood, an act that in 
ýhai belief gains the highest merit. 
Besides being the action of a religious man, the king's ordination should 
be seen in the light of the political conditions of Sukhothai in this period. 
1. 'Ibid.., pp. 48-49. 
2. Ibid. v pp. 59-60. 
3. 
_ 
Ibid., p. 56. 
4. 'Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
so 
When Lithai came to the throne he was confronted with at least 
two heavy responsibilities; that is, first to ward off an 'invasion 
from the newly emergent and expansive Ayudhya, and second to recover 
his father's territories and to pacify rebellious vassals. In both, ' 
cases he needed alliances with independent neighbouring rulers. By 
promoting Buddhism, and establishing himself as a righteous king, , 
exemplified by his ordination, Sukhothai became the centre of Buddhism. 
At his ordination it was recorded that the rulers of Lama - and Nan had 
come to participatein merit-making. They and some other rulers in 
the North sent diplomatic missions to Sukhothai in order to bring 
Singhalese Theravada Buddhism to their homelands. ' In this fashion 
Lithai succeeded in cementing strong alliances against Ayudhya or, at 
the least, in ensuring the neutrality-of his neighbours. His devotion 
to Buddhism also assured his vassals, that they would be treated with, 
kindness and compassion, the essential virtues to be observed by a 
righteous Buddhist king., We are told that Lithails policy of pacification 
of his vassals involved a military campaign followed by a generous peace. 
When he succeeded in subduing the vassals, he assured them that they 
could rely on his justice and mercy. He taught them to be good 
Buddhists. 2 
Lithails use of religion as an ideology to support the status quo 
and -for purposes of social control is well exhibited in his own book 
called'Triphum'Phrd'Ruang or: Tribhundkatha. (lit. the storY of the three 
1. 
. 
For fuller details see Satuan Supasophone Phr2Mtthasatsana kap*Phra 
Maha'Kasat'Thai (Buddhism and Thai Kingship) (Bangkok: Kiang WittfEya, 
1962) pp. 65-69; Babara Andaya, "Statecraft in the Reign of Luthai 
of Sukhothaill, 'Cornell'Jbtirnal'of'Social*Relatims (Special Issue on 
Southeast Asian-S-Hu-H-es) Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1M, pp. 61-83. 
2. Griswold and Prasert, ' op. Cit., p. ' 57. 
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worlds of Phra Ruang). , The text describes the structure of the 
universe, the Triphum Cosmography, the relationship between the merit 
and_power, the destination of each'category of entities and deities 
as determined by the kamma and merit of each entity. All entities 
were ranked, from demons to gods in a hierarchy of merit which, accrued 
according'to kamma. It describes the cyclic processes of birth, 
death and rebirth of*deva, human beings and animals of various forms. 
Their three worlds were divided'into 31 levels. The highest world 
contained four levels inhabited by the high gradd*brahma*(phrcm - Thai) 
deities. The middle world contained 16 levels inhabited by lower 
grades of brahma deities. The lowest world consisted of eleven levels 
with human beings dwelling in the fifth level from the bottom. The 
six levels above. the 'world of mankind' were inhabited by entities of 
higher status than human beings. Below it were creatures of less merit. 
The text describes'the nature of each level, the conditions of existence 
for its inhabitants, how they came to be there and how they might change 
their status. 
The central euphasis of tho'Triphum is on the effects of good and bad 
kamma. It stresses that the people who have good kýnma are rewarded,. 
I 
in contrast with those who acquire bad kanna. after death. Rewards and 
punishments for certain kinds of good and bad kanmu are described. For 
exwnple, when a person who had accumlated great merit died, he would go 
to a higher level in the three worlds, depending on the amount of merit 
acquired while he was alive. He might even go straight to the brahma 
level, if he had sufficient merit. 
This powerful statement of the king's view of the entire world was 
intended to be propagated throughout the kingdom. It makes some major 
points that are of direct relevance to our study. 
52 
In the first place the notions of good and bad kamma, and merit 
and demerit were employed to promote and regulate the social order. 
'Pie promised reward'for good kama was intended to encourage people 
to do good and be moral thereby promoting social order. The concept 
of merit and demerit serves to justify the social and economic position 
of individuals in the hierarchy of the society. Secondly. ' the con- 
cept of religious sanctions reinforces social sanctions as an over- 
riding coercive force on the population. Thirdly, that the prescrip- 
tion of punishment for acts of demerit varies according to the status 
of the person serves to regulate the social relationships between 
people of different statuses. For example, punishment for people of 
high status is more severe than for people of lower status who commit 
the same act of demerit. The Triphum also prescribed the appropriate' 
relationship between people of different statuses. For example', it 
delineated the proper conduct of members of the family to each other; 
the -relationship between the clergy and the laity, between superiors 
.1 
and subordinates and so on. 
. Apart from using-the Buddhist values expressed in the Triphum as 
an instrLment for social control, Lithai appears to have used the 
concept of merit to justify his right to rule. This is succinctly 
expressed in the following excerpts: 
"One who had made and accumulated merit in previous 
lives by paying homage, honouring and revering the 
Triple Gems (the 13uddha, Dhama, and the Sangha) as 
well as having gratitude to them, adhering to Dhamma, 
observing moral precepts. LSjLa), practicing'Phawana (concentration of mind on the-]Buddha and his-Maim-w-) , when he dies, goes to heaven. When he is reboni,, he is born a-ruler or in a higher caste with power, 
wealth and subordinates ..... With greater merit than others, he becomes'cakkapat*(Chakravartin - king of kings) ..... For those who are born in the ruling 
class, or king, should be aware that it is so because 
they had good'kama and had accumulated merit in 
previous lives-. --Tt is not so because of natural 
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causes ...... It is writ and demerit that determines 
one's destination; (that is why) sane people are born 
with wealth., wisdom, beauty, power, and, have long 
lives as against the ones who are born with poverty, 
suffering, ugliness, idiocy, and have a short life. 
Merit and demerit detennines who will be the ruler and 
who will be the slave or servant or governed". 1 
Associated with his righteousness and the right to rule is his authority. 
His subjects have the duty to obey and to serve the ruler. The text 
states, 
"Whenever thd'Cakkaýat emerges, people all over the 
realm come to-Tevere, pay respect and obey him. 
Whatever the king commands, it is legitimate because 
he is righteous ..... The lesser lords come to pay him homage and offer themselves as his subordinates 
and -render their territories to him". 2 
Following this discussion, it is possible to consider the, Triphum' 
as a political as well as religious treatise. For it, shows how 
religion can help stabilize the social order and maintain the political 
power of theýruler- By inculcating the fear of hell in the minds of 
the people, it discourages social and political protest. It also 
encourages either meek acceptance of suffering and present status or 
withdrawal from the tribulations of human society. 
a 
After the death'of King Lithai, some time between 1370 and'1374, 
Sukhothai gradually declined and fell under the control of Ayudhya. 
King Lithai' (Bangkok: Klang Witthaya, 1966) 
pp. 94-98, 
ill, 1432 201. 
2. 'Ibid., pp. 94-108.1 1 
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Kingship 
The religio-political ideology, the concept of kingship, the 
adrninistration, and political institutions of Ayudhya were - influenced 
by the interwoven traditions of Khmer and Mon, Hinduism and Buddhism 
working in combination. From Khmer-Hindu tradition, Ayudhya inherited 
its concept of divine kingship'(2Lvar2aija . The king was considered 
as a receptacle of divine essence, as the earthly embodiment of Vishanu 
(Vishna) or Siva (Shiva) for instance. He was Lord of Life and Lord 
of the Land. As the sovereign of the kingdom,, his absolute power and 
authority was beyond challenge. The king was described thus: 
He is the highest in the land, because he is god- 
like. He can make the superior person'(Phu' - 
Thai) be a subordinate person'(Phurioi - Thai) and 
vice versa. When the king giVe-s an order, it is 
like the axe of heaven. If it strikes the trees 
and momtains., the latter cannot withstand it, and 
will be destroyed-1 
Hindu tradition manifested itself in the form's of royal ceremonies such 
as rituals associated with the oath of allegiance and the coronation. 
The kings of Ayudhya introduced and adapted from the Khmer many features 
of their political institutions and administration, their arts, their 
honorific court language, and their system of honorific titles and social 
ranking. 
The influence of the Buddhist concept of the righteous king manifes- 
ted itself in Pali Dhammasdttha, the Theravada, legal code for guidance in 
government. However, it must be euphasized that although the*Dhammasattha 
was of Hindu origin, it was the Mon version that guided the Thai kings. 
The Mon-Pali'Dhammasattha sought legitimacy not from Hinduism but mainly 
from. the-Buddhist genesis myth contained in a Sutta. Lingat makes 
Akin Rabibhadana "' 'The Organization'of Thai Society'in the Early 'Bangkok'P6rio ''178Z-1873 (Ithaca: Lomeli University, southeast 
Asia Progrwný Data Papers No. 74,1969) p. 44. 
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. clear 
the--Buddhist content thus: 
"In composing this literature, Mon writers took for. 
their model Hindu Dharmasastras, and this is why many 
provisions of the new code may be found in the Indibn 
Manu code or other similar works, But (Buddhist), 
Dhamasatthams are quite different from Sanskrit 
Dharmasastras. First, of all their authors left aside 
every matter which, in Hindu codes, was connected with 
Brabmanical religion or traditions. They were Buddhist 
people,, and their codes were first to be applied to 
Buddhist people ..... The, substance of law was not 
entirely taken from Hindu codes. They introduced, as 
was natural, a few cust9mary rules prevalent among the 
indigenous population". 1 
Prince Dhaniniwat also suggests that the kings of Ayudhya followed 
the principles of Buddhist righteous kingship. As he put it: 
"(The king) abides steadfast in the Ten Kingly Virtues 
constantly upholding five common precepts,.. 
and eight precepts, living in kindness and good wH1 to 
all beings. He takes pains, to study the*Thammasat 
(Dhaniasattha) and to keep the four principles of 
justice, namely: to assess the right or wrong of all 
service or disservice rendered to him, to uphold the 
righteous and truthful, to -acquire riches through none but just means and to maintain the prosperity of'his 
state through none but just means". /. 
The king was also thought of as a potential Bodhisattva, that is, 
he was seen as one who temporarily had given up striving to achieve 
Nirvana, so that he might serve his fellow men in their quest for 
religious and material satisfaction in this worldly life. Thus it is 
recorded'thai when King Ramadhipati and his successors died, they 
entered Nirvana. This concept is probably of Mahayanist origm 
R, Lingat, "The Evolution of the Cmception of, Law in Buma and 
Siadl, * Joumal'6f'the Siam Socioty, 
-Vol. 
38 (1950) p. 14. 
I 
2. Prince Dhaniniwat, IIIhe Old Siamese Conceptions of the Monarchy", 
Journal of 'the * Siam Society, Vol - 35 (Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1954) p. 1163. 
I 
3. Griswold and Praser, t, "Kingship and So'ciety at Sukhodaya! ', --p. 69. 
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The political uses of, Buddhism by Ayudhya kings were manifold. 
The examples that follow are intended to illustrate this. At the 
oath of allegiance ritual which was of Hindu origin and performed by 
Brahmins, the Buddha, Dhamma and the Sanghawere invoked to complete 
the ritual. From Ayudhya to the early Bangkok periods this ritual 
was performed in Buddhist monasteries in which the monks took an equal 
part with the Brabmins for the completion of the ritual. 
1 
Another aspect of the political exploitation of religion was 
manifested in the unification of Ayudhya and Sukhothai in the reign 
of King Trailok of Ayudhya (1448-88). Prior to his reign, though 
Ayudhya had ruled over Sukhothai, it had failed to absorb it. It has 
been suggested that King Trailok had succeeded in integrating the 
kingdom because he understood the importance of the Buddhist religion 
2 
and recognized that military dominance alone was fruitless 0 He 
sought to build a religio-political base in order to secure support 
from the Sa. ngha, and to, reach the peasants through the Sangha and 
religion., In order to win 'the hearts and minds' of the people of 
Sukhothai., the king made great efforts to restore and build monasteries 
in the North. Among these activities, which afforded him the 
reputation of being a good Buddhist king and greatly impressed the 
SUkhothai population, iwas the restoration of Wat Buddha Jinnarat. This 
was once the spiritual centre of the Kingdom, where the image of Buddha 
Jinnasi, the Sukhothai paladium was housed. Following the example of 
.......... 
1. Chitt Phumisak ''Bot'Wikhroh'Wannakam. 'Yuk'Sakdina (An Analysis of ýO-m 7 Sakdina Literat"u-r-e- gt an T 
ýe , )ran aw , 1974) 
pp. 113-120. 
2. Charnvit Kasetsiri, "Buddhism and Political Integration in Early 
Ayudhya: 1350-1488" . 'Jotirndl *of 'thbTdW1ty *of 'Archaeology, Silpakorn University, Vol. 4., No. 4. p. 446. 
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King Lithai of Sukhothai, King Trailok temporarily left the throne to 
enter the monkhood and stayed in the North. His ordination was 
symbolically significant in that it was intended to be a replica of 
the Buddha's ordination. He had five of his men ordained before 
him, just as the first five disciples of the Buddha were ordained 
before him. Likewise he had another-2348 men ordained after him. 
Politically, his ordination and his stay in the North Dust have pleased 
the Sukhothai folk, for the actions followed the good example of the 
great'Sukhothai king, Lithai. 1 On his ordination, the kings of 
Cheingmai, Pega and Luang Prabang sent him gifts. Charnvit suggests 
that the king's ordination might have been planned so that the king 
could penetrate and take command of the Sukhothai Sangha. The idea 
was that his 2348 men who were ordained with him would remin in 
Sukhothai and become the critical link between the political authority 
2 and the rural population of the North. 
Another religious act which suggests that the king . sought 
legitimacy from Buddhist tradition was manifested in his composition 
of a royal version of Jakata, the religious story of the Buddha's life 
before attaining Buddhahood. The political significance of this 
literature was that it euphasized the religious acts of the king as a 
prime qualification for a righteous ruler. It was also intended to 
follow the local tradition of King Lithai who conposed the Triphum. 3 
It is interesting to note that Buddhism was also used to legitimize 
the usurpation of the throne. For example, when King Songdham of 
Ayudhya seized power from a rightful heir and established himself as' 
.......... 
1. -Ibid., pp. 448-449. - 
2. 'Ibid., p. 449. 
3. 'Ibid., p. 450. 
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king (1610-1628), he sought legitimacy through his religious acts. 
The Supreme Patriarch of the sixth reign described it thus: 
The king realized that he had illegitimately seized 
power, and he had to be conscious of his unpopularity 
among the masses. Although at that time there was 
no one who dared to challenge his power, he sought 
support from the masses. Being accornplished in 
Buddhism and knowing that it was held in esteem by 
the people, he sought popularity and legitimacy 
through the religion. He encouraged ecclesiastical 
education and devoted his efforts to-promote Buddhism. 
The king revised the Jakata, and ordered the compil- 
ation of Tri Pitaka. He encouraged the people in the 
court to adhere to Dhamma. He himself regularly 
attended the sermons ..... 
1 
The interaction of politics with religion in the Ayudhya period 
may be summarized as follows. The Ifter-Hindu and Buddhist 
influences had converged in Ayudhya and achieved a complex reworking 
there. Each gave legitimation to the polity. Buddhism affirmed 
the role of kingship as the expression of Dhamma and righteousness, 
and as the fountain of justice, as well as the ordering principle of 
society. Its moral principles ensured that the king should be 
measured against the law. The Hindu-Khmer notion of divine kingship,, 
in its modified form, conceptualized the king as the embodiment of the 
law and provided him with a majestic aura of mystery and a place in the 
cosmic order. Both traditions buttressed the political authority of 
kingship. 
It should also be noted that the religious concerns of the kings 
of Sukhothai and Ayudhya were examples for their successors to follow. 
Their interest for us is not only because some of them were good 
Buddhist kings but also because they realized that Buddhism could afford 
Somdet Phra Maha Samachao Krom Phraya Wachirayan Warorot Pramam 
Thraniýhon (Collection of Writings) (Bangkok: Mahamakut BuJE17st 
University., 1971) p. 273. 
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them legitimacy. There is also a continuity of the political use of 
religion for various purposes up to the present day. This will be 
spelt out throughout this study. 
S. ''Buddhism'and'Kirig8hip'at*Dhonburi 
Ayudhya finally fell through the Burmese invasion of, 1767- The 
capital was looted and burnt, and many of its population, both monks 
and laymen.. fled. Eventually General Taksin forced back the enemies 
and restored Thai freedom. He became king and moved the capital to 
Dhonburi. 
In the early years, of his rule, King Taksin shouldered the heavy 
tasks of pacifying the dissidents and unifying the kingdom. Among the 
rebels was a group of dissident monks led by a high ranking monkv Phra 
Fang. These monks organized themselves in army style. They led 
their lives just as laymen, observed no Vinaya, indulged in mundane 
and government affairs, but still wore saffron robes. They managed 
to seize power in the northern capital of Pitsanulok, but were soon 
captured by Taksin. Phra Fang and his followers were executed. In 
the South Taksin also succeeded in pacifying another group of dissidents 
led by the ruler of Nakhon Sitthammarat. 
In his efforts to unify the kingdom, Taksin sent high ranking 
monks from the capital to assume important supervisory positions in the 
northern Sangha. After pacifying the southern rebels, he invited the 
leading southern monks to receive gifts. He built new monasteries and 
restored the ruined ones. 
' Since Nakhoný Sitthannarat was the centre 
of Buddhism in the South, these religious acts could be seen as an 
1. For detail see Satuan Suphasophont''OP. *dit., pp. 148-152. 
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attempt by the king to utilize religion to justify his political inter- 
vention and to acquire support from the southem people. 
As a king seeking legitimacy through religious values, Taksin 
devoted his efforts to restore the prosperity of Buddhism, which had 
suffered from the Burmese invasion. Following King Lithails exanrple 
and that of Songdham, he ordered the revision of 'Triphum and commanded 
a new edition of the Tripitaka be compiled. He built and restored 
many monasteries in the country. 
Taksin lived in an age when Buddhism assumed aberrant forms due 
in part to the lack of proper support and supervision resulting from 
the perennial war with Burma. In consequence, the behaviour of the 
monks had deviated far from the conventional norms of Buddhism. The 
king set out to purify the Sangha and unworthy monks were cruelly 
purged. For example, in order to distinguish virtuous monks from the 
unworthy, some monks were tried by ordeal. ' Taksin himself seriously 
took up the study of meditation and claimed to have acquired super- 
natural powers, a claim unacceptable in Buddhist orthodoxy. Moreover, 
) or stream-winners a type of he saw himself as a'sodAban (PaliýýL2Rana 
deity who had embarked on the first of the four stages to enlightenment. 
2 
Because of this illusion, he claimed superiority over the monks and 
ordered them to bow to him. Those who refused to accept his claims 
were flogged and sentenced to menial labour. The supreme patriarch 
and two other senior monks who would not yield to his demmds nor recognize 
........... 
Iaming arid P. Phitsanakha,, Somdot'Phrachao Tdksin'Maharat (King 
Taksin the Great) (Bangkok: -1956) p. 299. 
2. ' Ibid... p. 424. 
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his claims were demoted. It was Taksin's assumption of'sodaban, and 
his unorthodox treatment of the Sangha that partly contributed to his 
downfall. Because of his unorthodox behaviour, he was seen as insane 
and as a potential threat to the unity of the Thai nation. He was 
forced to abdicate and sentenced to death by his successor, Rama L' 
As far as the belief that the king was the one who possessed the greatest 
merit is concerned,, the downfall of Taksin was described thus: 
"When the king (Taksin) ran out of his*bun 
(merit), he died at the age of 48. tt2 - 
6. Buddhi-sti'and'Kingship'in'Bangkok 
King Rama I assumed the throne in, 1782 and began the Chakkri 
dynasty. He moved the capital of Thailand to Bangkok. Though during 
his dynasty significant changes took place in the concepts of kingship, 
the process of change was slow. On the one hand the Hindu tradition 
began to decline'in importance. For example, in a Royal Decree of 
1782, the king ordered that'linga, as central features of Hindu worship, 
be destroyed. In many state ceremonies, Buddhist rituals were super- 
imposed on Brahmanical ones. For instance, in the oath of allegiance 
ceremony, the initial ritual became the worship of the Triple Gems 
instead of the former Brahmanical ceremony. Ye t in his. goverment, 
Rama I., despite some adaptations, largely followed the model of Ayudhya. 
For exmiple, the Buddhist Dhamnasattha was still his. guide in the adminis- 
tration of justice and goverment. His approach was paternalistic. 
3 
1. For more detail sed'Ibid.; and also Craig J. Reynolds, 'The'Buddhist 
es Moilkh66d'iji'thd*Niftdteenth'Ceritury, Thailand (unpublishe'a D. t esis., 
Comell University., 1972) pp. 29-34. 
2. Akin Rabibhadana, -ojj. *cit., p. 12. 
3. Prince Dhaniniwat, "Me Reconstruction of Rama III, *Joumal of, the 
'Siam'Socidty. ''SblOctdd'AttiCles., Vol. IV, 1959, p. N-1. 
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When Ram I succeeded Taksin there were many important tasks to 
carry out in order to bring the kingdom out of chaos. However we 
are concerned here with his restoration of the moral tone of the 
kingdom, with the acts that established him as a Buddhist righteous 
king. As a strong king who sought. legitimacy and stability for his 
rule in the orthodoxy of Buddhism, he declared that 'it was one of his 
main priorities to restore the prosperity of Buddhism and the purity 
of the Sanghawhich had suffered from the Burmese invasion and the 
unorthodox acts of King Taksin. 
1 
One major act was the revision of the Tripitaka in 1788. The 
king appointed a council of 218 monks and 32 Buddhist scholars for this 
task. They took five months to complete the revision, the ninth since 
the Buddha's enlightement. The Tripitaka was said to be correct. 
2 
The Tripitaka revision had manifold implications. 'Symbolically, 
it was merit-making on the grand scale, the greatest merit accruing to 
the king as sponsor., Politically, since Dhamma was contained in the 
Tripitaka, the-revision led to the revival of the moral tone of the 
kingdom, and indicated Rama I's intention to be a righteous king. 
The king also ordered the revision of the Triphum so that the text 
was in accordance with the Tripitaka. His intentions in revising the 
Triphum were in line with those of King Lithai. It was meant to be a 
primary instrument for educating the people in Buddhist values. As 
we have seen already this effectively reaffirmed the values of kingship 
1. Chao Phraya Thiphakarawong, *Phraratcha'Phongsawadan'Krung'Ratthanako- 
(Annals of Bangkok, the First Reign) (Bangkok: 
Klang Witthaya, 1962) p. 6. 
2. Reynolds, 
_ 
cit -9 pp. 50-53; Klaus Wenkp''The'Rd8toration o Thailand'týM Mam-I (Tucson: Arizona University Press, 19 
p. 41. 
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and justified hierarchy in the established social order. 
In order to purify the Sangha and restore its prestige, the king 
issued a number of decrees on monastic conduct. The decrees specified 
the correct behaviour which the monks had to observe. They laid down 
the relationship between the monastic community and lay society, and 
between the monks and civil authority. Punishments for disobedience 
were also prescribed. 
1 
In his legislation and adn-dnistration of justice, the king, as did 
his successors, closely followed the prescriptions in the DhanuLasattha. 
If there was any doubt about the merit of a law, the laws were 
"to be examined with regard to their agreement with 
the Pali canon,, and : *Ln cases where they did not agree' 
were to be altered accordingly in order to restore 2 what was believed to be the original text". 
Rana I's own behaviour was intended to be exemplary for his officials 
and his subjects. Thus we'are told: 
"In the moming the king used to come out to offer 
alms to monks ..... (He) invited (them) to partake 
of food in the Audience Chamber ..... In the evening 
the king ... cwne out to ... listen to the 
daily 
sermon delivered bya monk". 3 
The king, moreover, instructed his officials and the royal household to 
4 
observe regularly the five and eight precepts in the monastery. 
Examining the -religious activities of Rama I we can see that there 
........... 
1. For a good elaboration see Prince Dhaniniwat; 'Moridtchical'Protection 
(Bangkok: World Fellowsidp of Buddhists, 
1964) pp. 1-15; see also 17eýFolds, *ibid., pp. 35-50. 
2. wenk., -6p., eit., p. - 36. 
3. Dhaniniwat, "The Reconstruction of Rama I", pp. 257-258. 
4. ''Ibid. 
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was a slight shift in the conception of kingship from one of divine 
kingship towards that of the Dhammaraja or Buddhist kingship. In a 
sense, ýit reflected the Buddhist kingship of Sukhothai. From now on 
Thai kingship was sacred because it symbolized the Dhamna, the prin- 
ciple upon which the order of the kingdom depended, and it. became less 
and less dependent on the Hindu myth, of divine kingship. 
After the death of Ram I in 1809, it could be said that the con- 
dition of the religion and the Sangha was healthy and stable as a 
result of his restoration and purification of the faith and the Sangha. 
Ib had also established the close relationship between kingship and 
religion which continues to the present day. The main. religious tasks 
remaining to his successors were to maintain the prosperity and purity 
of Buddhism and the Sangha, and to secure the people's adherence to 
Dhamm. 
During the reigns of Rama 11 (1809-1824) and Rama 111 (1824-1851) 
there'appears to have been no significant change in the relationship 
between kingship and Buddhism. Both kings continued to assume the 
traditional functions of patronizing and protecting Buddhism and the 
San&a. 
The relationship between Buddhism and kingship began to change 
during the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV - 1851-1868). King Mongkut 
had been in the monkhood. for 27 years before assuming the throne. As 
a monk he had gained a reputation for being a reformer influenced by 
the Mon tradition. Dissatisfied with the old practices of Buddhism, 
the prince-monk had launched a reform programme to make Thai Buddhism 
as close as possible to the Pali canon of Theravada Buddhism. This 
involved the reform of monastic disciplines, changes in details of 
rituals, and the redefinition of the canon. One of the most important 
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consequences was the establisluwnt of the new'Thammayut order within 
the Thai Sangha. The new order has been highly regarded ever'since 
for its disciplinary strictness and its close-association with the 
royal family. 
1 
As king, Mongkut thought of himself as being essentially a man, 
not a Isuperhuma n' as held by the concept of divine kingship. 
2 He 
was very sceptical about the legendary stories which glorified divine 
kingship such as Jakata and Triphum. He rejected everything in 
religion that claimed supematural origin. He was also very sceptical 
about the notion of heaven and hell which was prominent in Triphum. 
3 
It has also been suggested that the public image of the king 
from this -reign onwards gradually changed from that of divine king 
buttressed by the Brahmanical cult and ritual to that of the leading 
human, the defender and patron of the Buddhist church. The old customs 
and ceremonies associated with divine kingship were questioned, re- 
interpreted in Buddhist terms, secularized, or neglected and gradually 
forgotten. Buddhist rituals were introduced to replace the Brahmanical 
rituals in the royal ceremonies or superimposed upon them. 
4 However 
this does not mean that the Chakkri kings had lost their interest in 
1. For the mst comprehensive study of King Mongkut's-refom in this 
respect, see Reynoldst''00. *cit., Chapters 3-4 (pp. 66-137). 
2. F. W. Riggs,, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bdreaucratic Polit 
(Honolulu: East-West Center Fress,, IV()/) pp. 
3. W. L. Bradley, "Prince Mongkut and Jesse Caswellllý'Journal of'the 
Vol. LIV, No. 1 (1966); C. J. Reynolds, "Buddhist 
CosmograpHy-in Thai History with Special Reference to Nineteenth- 
Century -Culture Changell. 'Asian'Studiest 
Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (1976) 
pp. 210-220. 
4. ýiggsl-op-*Cit-l pp. 99-101. 
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the classic Dhammaraja concept of kingship,, or that they were entirely 
averse to the glorification of the king as Devaraja. As Tambiah has 
pointed out., King Nbngkut, like his predecessors, while striving to 
justify and legitimate his position by capitalizing on the Buddhist 
concept of kingship, also relied on Brahmanical rites which glorified 
the king as Devaraja. 
1 This view is shared by John Blofield who 
said that although the ceremonies were associated with the Brahmanical 
cult, the context was essentially Buddhist. The two elements were 
in ha-nnony. Each dealt with different compartments of life. As he 
put it: 
*** it would be going too far to say that King Mongkut 
permitted the Brahmin ceremonial merely because it 
lent splendour to royal occasions .... One turned to the Buddha to understand how to pursue the gTeat týSk 
of liberation, and to the, Hindu gods to obtain various 
mmdane favours affecting the welfare of the individual and of the kingdom as a whole. As a pious 
man, who was nevertheless the king, it was his duty to 
Pursue his own liberation and at the same time solicit 
the protection of the Hindu gods for his throne and his 
country. 2 
It appears to be difficult to measure the degree to which the Thai 
kingship was divorced from the Hindu cult. We can only speculate 
that from the time of King Mongkut., the Thai kings have been more 
identified with Buddhist values than previously, but have by no means 
totally discarded the tradition of Hindu kingship. Brabmanical cere- 
monial is still used to complement Buddhist rituals in royal ceremonies 
today. 
During King Mongkut's reign, manifold cultural, economic, and 
1. Tambiah, *'op. *cit.,, pp. 226-227; see. also Wales, 'op. 'Cit. 
2. John Blofield''Kin *Mah Monglait'of'Siam (Singapore: Asia Pacific 
Presst 1972) ý. 
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social changes had been initiated. After Mongkut's death in 1868, his 
son Chulalongkorn succeeded him and launched further Imodemization, 
1 
pýogrames. 
King Chulalongkorn was very concerned with the task of modemiza- 
tion of the country. His long reign (1868-1910) brought administrative, 
judicial, and financial reform; the development of modem conumications; 
the first stirring of political development; the growth of social 
services and bureaucracy; and great economic development. Administrative, 
social, and economic reforms in this reign constituted a great leap in 
the transformation of the society. The king nevertheless did not 
neglect the traditional legitimizing functions of a Buddhist king, 
namely the prowtion of and purification of Buddhism and the Sangha. 
Following traditional expressions of monarchical support for 
Buddhism and the Sangha, the king built many new mnasteries and restored 
the old ones. He had a replica made of the Buddha Jinnasi, the image 
of the Buddha which was once one of the paladia of the Sukhothai kingdom. 
The replica was housed in a new royal mnastery, Wat Benjamaborpit. The 
king's atteupt to I pacifý Buddhism and to propagate it was manifested in 
the revision of Tripitaka. The revised edition was later translated 
from Pali into Thai and printed in book form. The translation was 
intended to enable the people to understand Buddhism more widely. The 
entire set consisted of ten volumes. The king himself paid privately 
For details con Ming the cultural, social, economic ancl political 
modernization s 
Zemes 
attempted by King Mongkut see, for example, 
John Blofield, 'ibid. * A. B. Griswold-Kin of Siam (Ithaca: 
Cornell Uhiversiffýess, 1961); W. A. biam (London: De La 
More Press, 1924); Kenneth P. Landon-Siam in'Transition (Chicago: 
TT--.. -- -- ... .? - 
ulicago Lmiversity Fress., 1969); Walter r. Vella, The_Impact of 
the West on*Government'iri'Thailand (Berkeley: The University of 
Calitoinia Fress., Igs5); H. G. Q. Walesp Anciont Siamese'Goverrmient 
-and'Administration (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965 (reprint)ý 
an=. Watthanaset, 'ICiatthikim Phra'MongkLit ]Klao ghe Fame of King 
Mongkut) (Bangkok: Thai Watthana Panitch Press, 1957). 
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for the publication of 1,000 sets for distribution to monasteries in 
the kingdom and to libraries abroad. He entered the monkhood, 
temporarily in 1874. In 1898, the king received the Buddha's relics 
found at Kalapilavatthu in India from the Viceroy of India. 
' It was 
in this reign that the great reform of the Sangha was launched to 
unify the Sangha organization and to systematize the Sangha adminis- 
tration. This reform, as part of the attempted 'modernization' of 
the country, significantly aimed at nation-wide integration, of which 
educational and provincial administrative reform were a part. We 
shall discuss the manifold reasons for and the implications of these 
reforms and the parts played by the Sangha in the next chapter. 
The concept of divine kingship continued in decline, and many 
customs associated with it were curtailed or abolished. For example,, 
King Chulalongkorn abolished the practice of prostration in front of 
the monarch. From this reign, the king's traditional duty-of adhering 
to Dhammasattha was extended so that the king was no longer just an 
executor of traditional laws; he became a legislator with unlimited 
powers to change Thai government and Thai life. The change in the 
conception of kingship in this respect was attributed to the impact of 
2 Western notions of -modern government. 
King Chulalongkorn died in 1910 and was succeeded by his son, King 
Wachirawut (Rama VI) who ruled the kingdom between 1910 and 1925. The 
new king perpetuated the traditional legitimizing functions of a Buddhist. 
Despite the absence of significant'religious acts of purification and 
Prachoom Chomchai (ed. and transi. ); 'Chuldlonjzkom*the'Great (Tokyo: 
The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1965) pp. 100-103. 
For more details see Vella''61j. eit.; Riggs, Op-cit.; and Wales, 
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promotion of Buddhism and the Sangha equivalent to his predecessors, 
the political exploitation of Buddhism by this king was unmistakable. 
In the face of the threat from the colonial powers, King Wachirawut 
was very concerned about national unity, essential to maintain the 
independence of his kingdom. In order to realize this goal, he in- 
jected into Thai collective consciousness a spirit of nationalism and 
national allegiance. He developed a sense of nationhood composed of 
nation*(chart - Thai), religion'(8at8ana - Thai), and monarchy'(phra 
'maha'ka-qat - Thai). These three symbolic components constituted the 
pillars of the Thai nation; each depended on the other and had to be 
preserved if the Thai nation was to survive and progress. The king 
inplored the Thai to mite in body and spirit to defend the nation, 
the religion,, and the monarchy from the incursions of enemies, mainly 
Western colonial powers. In the course of defending and protecting 
the three institutions, the king maintained that it was legitimate if 
the soldiers killed enemies. As he put it, 
For those who have to fight in war in the defence of 
our nation, some may think that it is against the 
teaching of the Buddha which prohibited killing ..... 
But we' are not intending to wage war against me 
another, but to protect ourselves. In this case, 
the Buddha once said that it was the duty of able men 
to fight against enemies who invade with the inten- 
tion to take our land, to jeopardize Buddhism, and to 
destroy our sovereignty ..... Let us make it known to 
the world that we, the Thai, are determined to 
protect our nation, religion, and monarchy, and to 
preserve them as they were in our ancestors' time.... 
We shall fight with swords and guns, sacrifice our 
bodies as fences for protecting and preserving them.. 
It is not against the Buddha's teaching.... ýr'o*tecting 
our nation is indispensable, just as we 
have to protect Buddhism and Dhamma. 2 
1. For elaboration of Wachirawut's idea of the interdependence and inter- 
relation of the nation, the religion, and the monarchy see: Frank E. 
Reynolds, "Civic Rel 
, 
igion and National COHInunity in Thailand' 't''Asian 
-Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, February 1977,, pp. 267-282. 
2. King wachira-wut., *T6tsand'Sad'Pha (Senmns to the Wild Tiger Corps) 
(Bangkok: Kurusapha Press, 1953) pp. 168p 193-194. 
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The king furthermore tied national independence to the survival 
of Buddhism. He reminded the Thai that Thailand was the last line of 
defence for Buddhism; he eRphasized that the first and second lines 
(Burma and Ceylon) had already fallen and now it was up to the Thai to 
make the last stand. If they did not take this responsibility, they 
would ensure the end of Buddhism. This would be a great disgrace for 
the generations of Thai to come. 
1 Buddhism,, in the eyes of the king, 
could provide basic principles I necessary for preserving the moral order 
Of the society and thus he encouraged the people to adhere to Dhamma. 
By adhering to Dhama, the king said people would live in peace and be 
2 happy. In order to strengthen people's adherence to Dhamma and 
Buddhism, the king introduced Buddhist , daily prayers in schools, police 
stations, army garrisons, government departments, and even in prisons 
3 and mental hospitals. 
The innovation of the concept of nationhood as couposed of the 
nation., the religion., and the monarchy by Wachira-wut has continued to 
play a crucial role in Thai religio-political ideology. It has become 
the foundation of thelcivic religion' of Thai socio-political life. 
4 
The political exploitation of the religion in this respect has been 
followed by later Thai rulers, especially in the 1960s, to mobilize the 
support of the Thai people for politically defined ends. More recently, 
the symbolic slogans of nation, religion, and the monarchy have been 
1. - Ibid. 
2. King Wachirawut, 'Phrd*Phiitthdchao'Tratsaid'atai (What is the knowledge 
attained by the Buddha) (Bangkok: National =1rary, 1925) p. 34. 
3. Frank B. Reynolds, 'op. 'cit... p. 274; Virginia Thompson, 'Thailand: 
'The'New*Siam (New YoTF. Macmillan, 1941) pp. - 368-369. 
4. For elaboration of the tem 'civic religion' see Reynolds., ''ibid., 
pp. 267-282. 
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invoked by certain political movements and activists of the 1970s to 
provide legitimacy for their political ideology and activities. 
Wachirawut died in 1925 and was succeeded by King Prachathiphok 
(Rama VII - 1925-1932), the last absolute monarch of Thailand. The 
1932 Revolution brought an end to absolute monarchy and it was replaced 
by constitutional monarchy. Thailand now embarked on a democratic 
fom of goverment. However, the Thai king still played an important,, 
though mainly symbolic role in Thai Buddhism. The king now is both 
the high protector and patron of Buddhism and the constitutional head 
of government. Unlike the absolute monarchy for whom protection and 
promotion of Buddhism and the Sangha was a prerogative., the Thai king 
nowadays, as constitutional monarch, acts in accordance with the wishes 
of the cabinet. 
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CHAPTER III ''THE'SANGHA'AND'SrATE 
This chapter considers the continuity of the interaction of Sangha 
and state. First, in order to understand why the political rulers are 
very concemed with the prosperity of Buddhism and the uprightness of 
the Sangha which is-expressed in their patronage and control, we shall 
investigate the relationship between the Sangha and society. The 
Sangha is seen as one, of the influential social and moral forces that 
may exercise control over the population, and that can influence the 
social and political behaviour of Buddhists. Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests that it is unlikely to have great influence on the 
Political rulers; rather it tends to be subjugated or subordinated to 
them. 
Secondly, in order to understand why the Sangha is loyal and sub- 
servient to the political rulers, we'shall-examine the various means of 
patronage and control over the Sangha exercised by the political authority. 
Patronage of the Sangha by political rulers is conceived not only as a 
traditional legitimizing function of a good Buddhist ruler but also as a 
means to acquire co-operation and to secure the loyalty of the Sangha. 
One significant implication of patronage is that the high-ranking and 
administrative members of the Sangha have been incoxporated or co-opted 
into the establishment and become an integral part of it. By exercising 
tight control over the Sangha. organization and administration, the political 
rulers ensure that the Sangha. keeps in line with the. goverment's policy 
as the whole Sangha becomes part of the government's structure. 
Thirdly,, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the impact of socio- 
political changes which have conditioned or stinulated the need for 
changes and modifications in the patterns and methods of patronage and 
control over the Sangha. Because of its prestige and quality, its 
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incorporation into the administrative structure of the state, and its 
tight control by the state, the Sangha is seen as possibly the best 
political instrument to enhance the political rulers' legitimacy in 
various goverment policies. 
1. 'The Sanglla'arid'Socioty., ARociptotilloldtionship 
For the Thai who are Buddhists (approximately 93% of Thailand's 
population) the Sangha is one of the greatest, most traditional, and 
most important institutionsin the society. The members of the Sangha 
(the monks) have played a prominent role in, and are closely involved 
with, the life of almost every Thai, both in religious and secular 
matters. 
(a)-Religious*toje'6f'the mnks 
As far as the religious role of the Sangha in relation, to the laity 
is concerned, the monks are held in esteem; they are respected, revered, 
arid considered indispensable. Because of their austere lifes their 
association with blameless activity, and their familiarity with sacred 
literature through study, teaching, and meditation, the monks are seen 
as being dedicated to following the path of the Buddha - pure, disciplined, 
self-denying,, and intellectual. 
1 As such they are the mediators and 
vehicles of merit-making activity. As religious specialists only they 
can properly officiate at the Buddhist ceremonies and merit-making. The 
monks are the source of spiritual guidance on. which the laity can depend 
for spiritual satisfaction and mental security. The dependence of the 
For elaboration see S. J. Tambiahv''Buddhism'and'the' irit'Cults'in 
Njtthecft. ýt'Thaildnd (Cambridge: Cambridge University-Press., 1970); 
Jane Bunnag., 'EMMi. -ýt'Morik; 'BLkldhitt'*Layrilan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press., 1973); see, also Somboon Suksamran, 'op. cit., 
pp. -l-11. 
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laity on the monks in this light is succinctly expressed in the following 
quotation: 
"The bhikkhus (monks) are necessary for the successful 
completion of these ceremonies whether it be a cere- 
mony of marriage, housewarming, sickness, death, or 
protection against ill omens. The bhikkhus give 
their rel 
* 
igious blessing as they carry out the 
necessary chants and rituals ..... In terms of popular Buddhism such ceremonial attendance is considered one 
of the principal duties of the bhikkhus ..... Whether it be a village festival or a family ceremony, a 
protective aura of the bhikkhus' attendance is desired- 
by the village people". 1 
The religious functions of the monks are manifold. These and their 
significance have been well studied by many scholarso 
2 thus we will not 
reiterate them here. While the laity depends on the monks for their 
spiritual guidance, the monks, restricted by the Vinaya code (the 
religious rules regulating the life of the monks).. are entirely depen- 
dent on the laity's material support for their livelihood. Thus, 
monks and laymen are interdependent; their relationship is in effect 
reciprocal, though it is not regarded as such in Buddhist theory. To 
keep Dhamma alive as their spiritual refuge, it is the duty Of the 
laity to support the Sangha. As recipients of material benefits from 
the laity, the monks themselves are under a moral obligation to cont- 
ribute their services for the benefit of the laymen., and not to concern 
themselves only with their personal salvation. The traditional religious 
services rendered to the laity in Buddhist orthodoxy are expressed in 
. various. 
forms of ritual and ceremonial as well as spiritual activities 
1. William J. Klausner, 'Popular Buddhism in Northeast Thailand', * Visakha 
'PujA'B. E. ý'25l4-(Bangkok: Thai Watthana Panit., 1971) pp. - 36-37. 
2. See,, for example, Melford F. Spiroý'Buddhism and'Society: 'A Great 
'Tradition and'Its'Bunne8ci Titi88ittides Lo George Allen and Unwin, 
1971); Tambiah; op. cit.; -Bunnag. 'op. cit.; oon Suksamran, . op. cit., 
pp. 5-11; J. Ingersoll, 'The Priest Role in Cen ral Village Thailand' 
in Manning Nash (ed. ); 'Aiithrop6loRicdl'Sttidios'in'Theravada'Buddhism 
(New Haven: Yale Univei7siFlt-y Press, 1966); and Steven Piker, 'Buddhism 
and Modernization in-Conteurporary Thailandl, 'Colittibutions-to-Asian 
'Studies, Vol. 4 (1973) pp. 51-67. 
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which in turn constitute the -religious functions of the monks. In 
Buddhist theory, the monks by performing religious functions, can 
transmit religious virtue to the laymen; and by propagating the 
religion and teaching of Dhama they raise the laity's standard of 
morality by showing it how religion and Dhamma. can be utilized for a 
happier daily life. In the process both monks and laity acquire merit. 
' 
Socular'functions 
In Thai Buddhist thinking, the Prosperity of Buddhism and the Sangha 
is believed to be related to the prosperity of the society. It is 
generally recognized among the Thai Sangha as well as the laity that 
since the monks are tied to secular society for their living, the well- 
being of society enhances the opportunity for monks to achieve their 
religious ends satisfactorily. Monks are expected not to turn their 
backs on society but to offer help, even in secular tasks, when no one 
else competent is available. In this respect, the monks have not only 
religious functions but also secular, or social, functions to perform 
for the benefit of society. The reliance on help from monks in secular 
affairs, especially in the rural comamity, is partly attributable to 
the often minimal-extent or even absence of goverment services in such 
fields as schools, police, a court system, banks, some social welfare 
services, recreation and development. 
The secular services that monks have provided for society are mani- 
fold. In my previous study., 
2 the types of secular activities in which 
. monks. 
have been involved., the political and social inplications; of these 
1. For more detailed discussion see Somboon Suksamran, **ibid., pp. 6-11. 
2. *Ibid. x pp. 11-212 70-108. 
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activities have already been detailed. In the context of this study, 
I shall therefore, discuss some aspects of the monks' secular roles 
briefly. 
'EdUcdtiondl*role: ' In the past, before the school system in the modern 
sense had been set up, monks were the teachers of people from all 
classes. The monastery was the only educational institution for the 
great majority of the people, and gave instruction in secular as well 
as religious subjects. The monks then were the intelligentsia of the 
nation and they monopolized national education. Their teaching role 
gradually declined when the state educational system was introduced 
during the 1840ý 'and 1880s. The new system had at first to rely an 
monastic help; the monks, though no longer monopolizing national 
education, still helped in teaching secular subjects due to the inade- 
quacy of trained lay teachers, and most government schools were situated 
1 in the monasteries. Since 1932, state education has'rapidly expanded, 
and monks have lost their vital function as teachers of the young. ' 
Nowadays, although the monks have lost their direct teaching functiont 
the majority of state. schools are still attached, to, the monasteries. 
The monks are sometimes asked to help in. teaching, such subjects as 
2 morality, Buddhism, and ethics in schools and, universitiqs. it is 
they who persuade. pious Buddhists to build. new schools and libraries in 
the monastery grounds, and to repair and upkeep the. old ones. 
1. For fuller detail see David K. Wyatt, 'The Politics of Reform. ' 'Edacation 
'in (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2. Phra Maha Chai Apakaro, 'Some Observations on Present Day Education 
for Mmks Ti8akha *PujA'B. E. * '2513, pp. 60-61. 
3. Department of Religious Affairs, * 'Amual'Report -of -Reli 
(Bangkok: Department: of'Relig: Loýis-Attairs, 19(3! i)-pp.. 131-133. 
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Many Buddhist Sunday Schools have been established by monks in , 
the country in order to improve the morality of the younger generation 
which is said to have been affected by undesirable aspects of Westem- 
ization. Their main purpose is to instruct the young to understand 
Dhamma and lead their lives in accordance with it. 
' Some monks them- 
selves still hold that they cannot entirely abandon their teaching role. 
For example, a learned monk claims: 
In the countryside, when boys finish their state 
atrumry school and come to be ordained, they are not Cap le of 
reading and writing as well as týeý ought to. Monks have to teach them all over again. 
The education for monks themselves has been modernized to meet the 
requirements of a changing society. For example, the Buddhist univer- 
sities have expanded their departments to include such secular subjects 
as Hmmities, Education, Social Science, Library Science, Southeast 
Asian Studies, Mathematics, Sciences, and Sociology. These univer- 
sities also sponsor a programe to. encourage their graduates to take up 
teaching in rural areas. 
3 
'Counselling'role: The monks also act as counsellors for the villagers 
in secular affairs. Whether it be personal or commal matters,, a 
respectedmonk, especially the abbot, is frequently asked for advice. 
In domestic matters the advice sought by the laity is-of great variety. 
The counsel desired may be a., request for an auspicious date to raise 
house pillars, to hold a wedding or house warming, to have'a. son enter 
or leave the monkhood, to undertake a new job or to begin-a. journey, and 
1. -Ibid., pp. -131-133. 
2. Phra Maha Chai Apakaro, 'op. cit., p. 60. 
3. Mahachula Buddhist University; 'G6neral'Irifbrmation (Bangkok: Kurusapha 
Press, 1972) pp. 6-8., 
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to hold various ceremonies. Some come to ask whether they should 
engage in new occupations. Others come to talk about their occupational 
difficulties such as shortage of irrigation water,. the high price of 
fertilizer, debt, land holding, and problems with middlemen and land- 
lords. Sometimes the monks help in dividing inheritances and settling 
disputes in the family. ' 
In an age of modernization, the monks are closely involved in helping 
villagers to adapt to the new demands of a modern society. In cammal 
activities, they give advice, co-operate and participate in many 
activities. In such activities as the construction of village wells, 
small dams, roads and bridges, the building or repairing the public rest- 
houses or schools, whether the inspiration be the villagers' own needs or 
a government direction, the monks will have been consulted and their view 
sought on the particular village projects before work commences. It has 
been suggested that the monks' influence on these activities is consider- 
able. The approval of monks is indispensable, if the can=al projects 
are to have a chance of success. 
2 Banjob Isdulya and his colleagues, 
in their study which compares the relative influence of the monks and 
............ 
Village studies in Thailand relating to the role of the monks in these 
respects are numerous. For example, Suthep Sunthomphesat, Amart- : je charodri'Di8tritt -; 'An * Iritenýivd 'Study'6f 'd "Villagd 'on 'Local L2a ýsri- 
(Bangkok: Local Affairs Press, 1968); H. K. Kautmang' Ban&]ýjuad: A 
'CoMunitY'StddY'ih'Thdiland (Locust Valley, "New York: J. J. Austin, 1960); 
Ruangdej Srimuni ' 'Leadershiij' and 'Devel2pmerit 'iri'Northeast 'Thailand 
(Unpublished M. A. thesis, I=hmn university, 19721); Chakkrit Fo-raniti- 
phadungkarn,, 'Elito**Po, Wor. 'Stratture-and'Politic8 in'Thai Communities 
(Bangkok: Kur-usaphal Press, 1970); Pattaya, Saihoo,, 'Botbat Khong 
patthanakorn nai phak tawan okk chiangnual (Role of Development Workers 
in the Northeast), in-Suthep, Sunthornphesat (ed. )., 'Sangkom Witthaya 
muban nai'ýhak*tawan'okk, dhiangnua (Sociology of Northeastern Village 
THailand) (Bangkok: Social Scien e Association Printing Press of 
Thailand, 1968);. and Ingersoll, ''op. Cit. 
2. John E. De Young, * Village'Life in Nbdern Thailand (Berkeley: California 
University Press, 1958) pp. 14S--156; Klausner, op. 'eit.,. pp. - 36-37; 
.. 
Ruangdej Srimuni, jbid., pp. 135-137; see also Somboon Suksamran, ''212. 
cit., pp. 15-16. 
Chakkrit Noraniti- 
79 
goverment officials as leaders,, suggest that the majority of villagers 
in the sample tend to follow the advice and decisions of the monks rather 
, than those of the government-officials. In this case, - 3811 people were 
asked whose decision they would follow if they were, requested by the 
goverment officials to co-operate in a comamal project. of which their 
respected monks, did, not approve. Thirty point six per cent, said they 
would not co-operate, while-17.5 per cent. said they would; and, 
surprisingly,, 36.1 per cent could not make a decision. The rest said 
1 they would make their own choice. Mnks not only actually participate 
A 
in the communal projects but also sometimes initiate and organize such 
proj ec s. 
I 
The monks are consulted on political issues and sometimes. give their 
opinions. For exmple., Isdulya discovered, that some 64 per cent of-731 
monks, he interviewed were consulted on political issues by villagers. 
3 
Unfortunately the study does not specify the political issues, on which 
the villagers sought'advice. 
The political parties are also aware of the influence and importance 
of 
the leadership of the village monks. Politicians always try to win 
t: he monks" favour and support, especially at elect 
. ion times. In the 
general elections of 1968, for example, I observed the national election 
campaign of the United Thai People's Party in their central office. Each 
BanjobJsdulya et al, 'Raingan, 'phon'kan*Wichai'Ruang'Laksana bang 
prakan -khonjý'SathabaA'Sangkom Thai thi pen uppasak thor Ran poZIrong 
rabob, Prachathipathai-(Certain Characteristics of Social Institutions 
: M-e-ct: Lng Democratic Gove=ent in Thailand) (Bangkok: Krmg Sayam, 
1972) pp. 149-151. 
2. Ruangdej Sihimi ''op, 'clt,,, I pp 135-437; Chaklciitý Noranitiphadunikam, 
op. "Cit. pp. 80-81; -SEI Smthomphesat, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
3. Isdulya, *"OP. 'C*lt ", p". ý. 143; ' , 
'ý'ee. also 196mboon Suksamran, 'cit. pp. op. 
'16-17. 
i 
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ca I ndidate was instructed to secure the support of the village leaders 
including the abbot. Funds from the party, budget were allocated for 
this purpose, part of them were to be spent on buying things for the 
vat, and part donated to, the wat. Other parties with sufficient funds 
presumably, atteiTpted something similar, in the hope that the monks would 
at the least not-speak against them. The practice of attempti 
' 
ng to win 
the support of the monks has continuedý as we shall see later. 
'The monks'ag arbitrators: In association with their counselling role, 
the monks sometimes serve the community as arbitrators of village disputes 
which are open to compromise and do not seriously violate the law. 
People come to monks to have their disputes settled mainly because they 
trust them to be impartial, and because they dislike getting involved 
with government officials or law courts. In the villagers'-thinking, 
to have a law suit in the court is a somewhat shameful business, and to 
spend money on hiring a lawyer is very unwise. 2 The relationship 
between the villagers and government officials-is,. an unequal one. It 
is characterized by an. air of superiority assumed by the officials who, 
perceive themselves as intellectually and. socially superior to the, 
villagers. Generally, the villagers recognize and dislike the unequal 
relationship, a fact which does not encourage, good understanding and co- 
operation between, the two parties. The occasions which bring them 
together are few. The. villagers. go to the. government official when, it 
is absolutely necessary or uhen they are, sent-for. It is , commonpýace 
that, when, they met, the villagers have-to treat the officials as if they 
1. Strongly contested disputes and crimes mast, of course, go to, the 
courts and police, 
2. This is expressed in a popular Thai saying that 'sue kanom hai ma kin 
dee kaow"chang mor kawml (It is, wiser'to' buy'a sweet for a dog than 
to - spend money - hiring, - a lawyer) 
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were their masters*(ýý ý; moreover, being unfamiliar with the 
'official procedure', they are easily subject to the officials' reproach. 
There is also much resentment of red tape, abuse of power and corruption. ' 
The villagers may meet the officials when policemen or excise officers 
go to arrest law-breakers; and when officials go to the village to 
instruct the village headman and villagers to carry out an order, to 
convene a meeting or to make an inspection tour. 
2 This kind of 
relationship pften leads the villagers to the view that every government 
official is their master, vested with the aýthority to order and control 
and to give rewards and punishment. They further believe, as Moerman 
has observed, that all officials are those who eat the head and the tail 
by greedily demanding taxes, fees, and bribes, which support them and for 
3 
which they give nothing in return'. 
In this situation the idea that the bureaucracy are the servants 
of the people who pay taxes or elect the gove=ent seems not to have 
occurred to'most villagers, and the idea, that they have power to control 
the govenunent seems remote. Their relationship then may be character- 
ized by an absence of democratic procedures: a one-way traffic of 
For more details see Stephen B. Young, 'The_Northeastern Village: A 
Non-Participatory. Democraýyl''Asian'Survey, Vol. 8, No. 11 (1968); 
Thulyathep Suwanajinda,, Khein =eravit, kid Somboon Suksamran, 'Sap 
Taený-Mubcan'Keo'Mieo'Dao (Sap Daeng: The Village of Sickle and Red 
Star) (Bangkok: Phikkhanet., 1975) ; see also Pattqya Saihoo, op. cit., 
pp. 268-270; ' Choowong. Chayabutr; 'Ydwm'*rub'ljhid'chob*khong'kharat- 
Accoýnta 1 ity ot Government OfficiEFF 'chakan'thor'prdchachon (The F1 =ity 
To-tlie--People) (A typescript paper contributed to the Seminar on 
Govenment Officials' Accountability, Augustv 1969); Kaufman, op. cit., 
pp. 32-36; and Herbert J. Rubin, 'Will and Awe: 'Illustrations of Thai 
Villager Dependency upon Officialsl, 'Mian Studies, Vol. 32 (1973) 
pp. 425-444. f, 
2. Thulyathep Suwanaj inda et al., * ibid. ; Pattaya Saihoo ., ibid. ; Kaufman 
op.. it. 
3. Michael Moerman, 'A ThaiVillage Headman as Synoptic Leader' . Asian studies, Vol. -23 (1969) p. 543. 
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suggestions and ordersIrom. the'top downwards, and a feeling, of ineffective' 9 
ness on-the'part of the villagers. ItIhas been their experience. that 
direct contact with goverment officials usuallyleads to complications, 
to expenditure for no purpose, jollowed by the officials' reproach and 
further trouble. Thus, direct contact with the officials is regarded 
as best avoided whenever possible. For all of these reasons when any 
dispute ortrouble occurs the villagers tend to-prefer having their 
cases, if possible,. settled by mnks or in other ways. 
The close relationship and association between the monks and the 
villagers can also be viewed from the functions of the monastery. From 
the functional point of view, the wat is more than simply a place of 
residence for monks. After the family, the wat is the most important 
institution in rural life. It stands as a symbol of the commitment of 
the people to Buddhism and the core of village unity. It constitutes 
the vital focus of commity life in the village, and almost all 
religious and secular activities take place there. It has been suggested 
that the wat may serve as: a camunity chest; a meeting place where news 
and gossip are exchanged;. -anentertaiment centre; 
dhospital, in times 
of difficulty; a school, for religious-training as well as secular 
education; a 
'warehouse 
from which coummity, equipment may - be borrowed; 
an enployment agency; a social work and welfare agency; - a free hostel 
for students; a free, hotel; an information-and news agency; a play 
ground for-children and a sports centre; an estate office; -a counselling 
centre; ' a musem, where'traditional arts are. preserved; and an admifils- 
trative'office for'some'official, pýirposesýsuch as-village meetings and 
,. 1 
.. ballot, booths., 
Fýr. elaboration, of, -the-functions ofýthese, see Kaufman''op. -cit;, pp. 
113-115; Phra Maha, Pr'ayut Payutto? "Botbat. khong phrasong nai, Sangkom 
patchuban' (The Role of, the Monks,: Ln Conteinporary Thailand),. in 
Thuttha8at8aAd'kU Sangýom Thai (Buddhism and Thai Society) (Bangkok: 
Sivaphom Press, 1970) pp. I5-Ib. 
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The intimate relationship between the Thai, people and the wat, and 
its monks is well expressed, in th6 Thai saying: 
"Thevat will be prosperous if it is supported by the , villdge-rs; and the villagers will be. good, if they have 
thovat and the-monks guide their morality. If the 
'wat, tHe monks, and the villagers co-operate everything 
will be fine. If they are in conflict and turn against 
each other, they will both be destroyed". 
Despite, the atteinpted modernization launched by the govenunent, 
its effects seem not to have radically changed the relationships between 
the rural population and the Sangha. The recognized religious status 
and prestige of the monks, the dependence of the laity on their religious 
role, their indispensable role'in certain secular activities, and their 
social utility in, the conmunity all contribute to the unique position of 
the Sangha. The monks thus are spiritual leaders, the centre. of 
respect, trust and co-operation. It is obvious that their position as 
spiritual leaders mainly derives from their religious role, and this is 
their primary source of influence. Their secular role strengthens and 
enhances the monks' influence further. 
Indeed, a number of studies on leadership in rural Thai society have 
suggested that'in many respects the village secular leadership is weaker 
than its religious leadership, and that monks wield greater-motivational 
1 
power than do the secular leaders. Because of the recognized qualities 
of the monks, it is likely that they can, provide the integrative force in 
............ 
For example, Kaufman; -*ibid., pp. 
30-40; 65-80; De Young. .. qnxit. -, 
pp., 1657170; Ruangdej-Tr-immi, op. cit., pp. 200-205; see't 
J. A,. Niels Mder Monks * 'MIbtit"and'M6tivatiOn: 'Buddhism'and 
'National'Developmehl in talland , Sp-ecial Report No. 1 (Second 
revised edition) (DeKalb: Northern Illimois University; -Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1973) pp. 28-34,40-43; Charles F. Keyes, 
'Local Leadership in Rural Thailand' in Clark D. Neher (ed. ), 'M6dern 
'Thai'Pblitics: 'Frot'Villdkd'to'Nation 04assachusetts: Schenkman , 
lUE-lishing Co.., 1976) pp. 219-243; and Somboon Suksamran., op. cit., 
pp. 70-71. 
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the social and cultural life of Thai Buddhists, and help induce social 
solidarity by providing a-set of basic Buddhist values for the regulation 
of the life of the society. If they want to exercise their powers to 
mould the social and political behaviour of Buddhists, it is also 
possible. Nevertheless, it would be a serious error to assume that 
the Sangha can exercise a form of socio-political control at its dis- 
cretion. In fact, the Sangha is hampered in achieving an independent 
socio-political role because it receives recognition and patronage from 
the political authority. With its strength at the village level, it 
might ideally be an autonomous ecclesiastical hierarchy which could 
exert considerable influence on government. But this, in fact, has 
never been the case in Thailand. Rather the Thai Sangha has been loyal 
and subservient to the political authority in return for protection and 
patronage. The hierarchical Sangha organization is a goverment 
creation modelled on and part of the civil service. We must now examine 
this relationship between the Sangha and the goverment more closely. 
2. ' The Political'Authorityls'Pat-ronage of the Sangha 
One conspicuous element in the relationship between the Sangha and 
government has been the institution of patronage. This has taken many 
forms over the centuries, and it is the intention of this section to 
deal with those types of patronage in turn. 
(a) land'donation, and slave endowment 
It has been a long established tradition that when a new king 
ascended to the throne, he built a new royal palace and a new royal 
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monastery. The magnificence of the buildings signified the extent 
of the king's pious concern for the well-being and prosperity of the 
religion and the Sangha. It also, ýuggested the righteousness and merit 
of the ruling king, upon whom the progress and tranquility of the-society 
depended, The simultaneous construction of the wat and the palace 
indicated an earthly structural relationship between the Sangha and the 
political authority. 
Wat building entails a great deal of labour and financial resources,. 
and it is believed to be one of the most meritorious donations to the 
religion and the, Sangha. Associated with merit is the prestige acquired 
by the builder, of the wat. As the king was, and still is the leading, 
merit-maker and the model for. secular behaviour, his meritorious acts 
have been followed by the princes., -nobles., and the rich. Those who 
cannot afford to sponsor the, building-of the wat themselves usually seek 
the opportunity. to have a part in it, thereby sharing merit and prestige 
with the major building sponsor. The wat built by the king or under 
his patronage is called'Wat'lUang (Royal Monastery), and the one built 
by a comoner is'Wdt'rath (Comoner or privatevat). 
2 
The. building of the wat, especially in the Ayudhya period, served. I 
The evidence. of wat building activities by, various Thai kings are . well documentedin, for exanple, -Sukhothai Inscriptions; Chronicles 
of Ayudhya and Bangkok periods. - See alsoA. -Brand, 'Merit, Hierarchy 
and Royal, Gift-giving in Traditional Thai Societyll, BijdrMen'tot de 
Taal-ý, Iand-ý'dii'Volk6nkuhde, ' Vol. - 31,, 1975, pp. 112-119; , J. de Campos 'Early Portuguese Account of Thailandl; ''Joumal'of. the. 'Thailand Research 
'Societyi-Vol., XXXII,, 1940; and Dam-rong Rajanubhab, 'Moonhet, haeng kan, 
sang wat nai prathet thail (Nbtives for the Building of Monasteries in 
Thailand) in hig'Chutntirft'niphonI66 Iap'tanmian phra phutthasatsana - Collections_of Writings on History of Buddhism) (Bangkok: Rungruang Tham 
Press, 1971) pp. 148-152.: 
2. For distinction and status of Royal, wat and Comoner wat see Damrong, 
'ibid., -p., -115; Jane Bumag, 'op'. 'Cit-'s pp. -114-115;.. and Tambiah, World 
L; Onqueror. and, -World'Renounter, pp., Z31-Z3b. 
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the practical purpose of drawing together additional labour, which was 
very necessary for defensive and economic purposes. A shortage of 
manpower in Ayudhya had risen because of casualties in the wars with 
Burma and the practice of the victors taking away people as slaves as 
well as looting captured cities. It was increased by people hiding 
away to avoid military service and corvee labour. One method of avoid- 
ing becoming an outlaw was to register with the government as a Fha phra 
(monastery slave). 
1 
The monastery slaves were assigned to the service of a wat and were 
exempted from corvte labour. The kha phra settled their families in 
the vicinity of the monastery compound and on the land belonging to the 
wat. They were required to tend to the upkeep of the monastery and to 
provide security for its sanctuaries and other properties. Where a 
monastery possessed cultivable land, they worked it for the benefit of 
the monastery and its monks. In some cases the kha phra were allowed 
to keep produce surplus to the requirements of the wat. 
2 
The tradition of assiping*kha phra to serve the monks and the 
donation of land to the wat E-aTiong been practiced in Hindu-Buddhist 
countries. Buddhist countries received this tradition from the 
Hindu tradition by which kings donated land and slaves for the upkeep 
of Hindu temples. By the twelfth or thirteenth centuries this 
practice became comon in Theravada Buddhist kingdoms of South-East 
Asia. See for detail, W. Geiger; 'Culturdbf Ceylon in Medieval Times 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1960j--p-p-. --35---56,194-M--, -IC. r. -H. 
Gunawardhana, 'Some Aspects of Monastic Life in the Later Anuradhapura 
Period'' Ceylon Journal of'Historital and Social Studies, Vol. II, No. 
1,1972: G. H. Luce, Old Burma: Early Pagan (Locust Valley, New York: 
J. J. Austin, 1969-197Uý -pp. -106-118; Pe Maung Tin, 'Buddhism in the 
Inscriptions of Pagan'. -Journal of'Barma'Research Society, Vol. 26 (1936) 
pp. 63-65. 
2. For further details see: David K. Wyatt, 'The Abridged Royal Chronicle of 
Ayudhya of Prince Paramanuchitchinorotl)'Joumal of the'Siam'Society, Vol. 
LXI, part 1 (1973); Kana Kammakan chatph ekkasan thang Prawatsat Watthana- 
tham. lae Borankadi (Committee on the Publication of Historical Cultural and 
Archaeological Documents), 'Ptachum'Phratamra Boromrachuthit phua kalapana 
samai AnjdhXa*2jak 1 (Collected Documents on Royal Land Donations of 
Ayuchya, Part 1) (Bangkok: '1967); ''Phongsawadan'Nau; 'op. 'cit , pp. 26-27; Department of Fine Arts ' 'Phongsawadan Maang Pattalung' (History of Pattalung) iii'Prachuni'Phoiig8awadan*Phak'15 (Bangkok: Kurusapha Press, 
1964) Vol. XII. 
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-The allocation of kha phra to the monasteries could be seen as a 
way, by which governments solved their manpower problems by collecting 
a population in pemanent, settlements within easy political reach. In 
I 
addition, once established the-wat also becwne a centre of a new 
comimmity and attracted further groups of people to reside in and 
a-round it. 
The donation of kha phra was practiced throughout the Ayudhya and 
early Bangkok periods. It ceased in the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
who., with a growing population in more peaceful conditions, was able to 
abolish slavery and the corvee system. Thereafter the political 
patronage of the Sangha took other forms. In the place of kha phra 
the government provided funds for the wat so that they could hire labour 
to maintain the wat, and this practice continues to the present. The 
kha phra became the tenants of wat land. 
/I 
Another feature of material political patronage of the wat and its 
monks, still being practised today, is the donation of land and the 
donation of benefits from the land to the wat. Land that is donated 
to the wat is called*Thi'th(irarii'song or monastery land. Once donated, 
ownership is invested in the wat and its, management becomes the respon- 
sibility of the wat lay comittee'(kannakakan*wat) who are appointed by 
the abbot of the wat. The other type ofland is called Thi kalapana 
or monastery revenue estate from which the rent or other benefits are 
dedicated to the upkeep of the wat and welfare'of its monks, though 
ownership remains in the hands of the donor and the arrangement can be 
terminated at his discretion. The major donor of both types of land 
has been the political authority, whether it be the king or the goverment. 
In the Sukhothai and"Ayudhya periods the mnastery lands comprised 
, rice 
fields and orchards. These lands were cultivated by kha. phra, or' 
I 
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were -rented to tenants. For example, a Sukhothai inscription recorded 
that the harvests of the rice fields and garden lands were to supplement 
the monastery's resources. 
1 We are also informed that the kings of 
Ayudhya made grants of lands to ecclesiastical dignitaries, 
2 
or again 
that King Songdham. (1620-1628) donated Thi kalapana. to the new wat he 
built at Saraburi on the occasion of the discovery of the Buddha's Foot 
Print. He also released all 600 families who lived on the donated land 
from taxation and labour corvee and assigned them to serve the monks and 
cultivate the land as kha phra. 
3 The kings of the Chakkri dynasty 
followed the example of their predecessors. 
4 For example, Rama IV 
bought a rice field in Saraburi and donated it to the monks in Lopburi. 
5 
The amounts of land given to the wat by the ki. ngs are far from certain. 
Western visitors in the nineteenth century were impressed that many wat in 
the country possessed a considerable acreage of the best land. 
6 A. W. 
GrisuDld and Prasertt''The'Asokarama Inscription of*1399 A. D., Epigraphic 
and historical studies -, -no-. --Z , The slam Society, Vol. 57 
(1969) P'. 54. 
2. Wyatt., * op. eit., p. 42. 
3. National Library, 'Kam haikan khong khunkon ruang phra Phutthabat' 
(Statement of Khunkon on the History of the Buddha's Foot Print) in 
'Prachum phongsawadan'Phak 7 (Collected Chronicles Part 7) (Bangkok: 
Rungruang tham Press, 1964) pp. 58-68. 
4. The land donation activities of the early kings of Bangkok are frequently 
described in Royal Chronicles of the First to the Fourth Reigns-, see, for 
example, Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, * Phraratcha Phongsawadan Krung Rattana- 
kosin'Ratchakan Thi'l-3 (Royal Chron-1cles of the First-Third Reigns) 
(Bangkok: 1960-1961); see also Department of Fine Arts (Comp. and ed. ), 
'Prachum*Chanik'Wat'Phrdchetthuphon (Collected Inscriptions of Wat Phra- 
7e--tthuphon) (Bangkok: 1974); Prince Wachirayan Warorot, Taman Wat 
Borwornni'Wetwihan (History of Wat Borwomniwetwihan) (Bang]767'. _ý. 
Department of Fine Arts,, Trakat Phraratchatan laek plean thi - 
Wisungkamasima C. S. 12241 (Royal Proclamation on the Exchange of Conse- 
crated Land C. S. 1224) in'Prachum. Prakat Ratchakan thi 4 (Collected 
Proclamations of Rama IV), part 6. 
6. Jacob T. Child.. ''Tho'Pe; irl*of'Asia: 'Rem: 'Lniscences of'the Court of a 
Supreme'Monarch'or Five Years in Slam (Chicago: 1892) p. 20. 
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Graham reported that ihe Thai Sangha enjoyed a considerable income from 
the land. Today, the everyday business of the wat properties is, as 
in the past, administered by the wat lay comitteep although'their 
activities are supervised and closely controlled by the Department of 
Religious Affairs. Nevertheless, : 'm practice, the abbot of the wat 
still enjoys his prerogative in making decisions as, to whom the-wat 
,3 estate should be rented. 
We know very little about how wealth derived from the monastery 
land and estate is distributed among the monks today, apart from the 
generalization that the proceeds go to the wat for its upkeep and the 
welfare of the monastic conamity. But in the past it would appear 
that the national'SaRdina ranking system included the Sangha, and their 
rank was associated with their land holding. This is mýde clear in the 
ThraAiyakan 'Tamaiig'nai B. E_. ' '1998 V4a law pro- 
claimed by King Trailok of Ayudhya in 1455. According to this'law, the 
population-was classified by rank, A'rank served as an indication of 
one's status and authority in the social'order and one's responsibility 
towards society, in the administrative I system. ý Differentiation of ranks 
was measured by the amount of land which had been conferred upon each 
individual by the king. This arrangement of the social order was known 
as the. Sakdina sys'tem. 
5' 
I 
I 
1. A. W. Graham. ' Siam: 'A Handbook of Practical, Commercial and Political 
Information (London: 1902) p. 507. 
2. - Sanghd'Act'1941, Article 49; --and'Sangha"Act'1962, Articles 33,40. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
For details of tenancy practices; rate'of rent and income derived by 
a wat, see Kaufman, 'op. cit., p. 11, and Jane Bunnag, op. dit., p. 125. 
This is translated into English by H. G. Quaritch Wales as 'Laws of Civil,. 
Military, and Provincial Hierarchies of 14541 in'Ancient Siamese'Govem- 
p. 34. 
For details of the'hierdicliý-of rank, and amount of land each rank could hold, seo*Laws'of'CiVil, ''Military, 'and Provincidl'Hierarchies., being 
appendices to Chai-anan Samutwanit; Sakdina kap Phatthan c-an khong Sangkom'Thai (Sakdina. System and the Development of Thafi-Social Order) 
(Bangkok: Namaksorn, 1976) 
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In this law there was a provision for monks, novices, brahmans, 
and other religious men. Their Sakdina. grade was justified by their 
skills or responsibilities towards the society. For example, the monk 
of'Phra. khru rank who was thoroughly cognizant of Dhan= had a Sakdina 
grade of 2,400'rai (a measure of land; today 6.25 rai =I hectare, or 
2.5 rai =1 acre), while the monk of the same rank who was not competent 
in Dhmmna enjoyed the Sakdina grade of 1,000 rai. An ordinary monkyho 
had knowledge of Dhamma was given a Sakdina grade of 600 rai, while the 
other rank-and-file monks who had no knowledge of'Dhanma. had a Sakdina 
grade of 400 rai. A novice who was cognizant of Dhamma had a Sakdina 
grade of 300 rai, as against 200 rai for one who was not. In-later 
reigns the SaRdina system underwent many revisions. It was totally 
abolished in the reign of Chulalongkorn. 
It is far from clear as to whether the individual monk actually 
possessed the land. Chitt Phumisak's interpretation seems to be the 
most valid. According to him, the individual monk did not actually 
possess the land. Rather, the Sakdina grade for a particular monk 
indicated the share derived-from Thi thoranisong and'Thi kalaPana. 
1 
(b)''Ecclesiastical'honorific'title awards 
Another kind of patronage by the political authority of the Sangha 
is the award of ecclesiastical honorific titles, the Sammasak. The 
word'samana here basically refers to the monk or the one who leads the 
ascetic life. -Sak or*Sakdi means power in the sense of resources or 
energy. Just as the Sakdina served as'a refined index of rank in lay 
society, Samanasak signifies the rank and status of an individual monk 
........... 
Chitt Phumisak''Chom'na'Sakdina *Thai (Faces of Thai S *' ) (Bangkok: akdiLna 
Charoenwit, 197ý) pp. 182-197. '1 
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in the Sangha hierarchy. Thus while the title of'Somdet'Chaophraya 
denoted the highest rank, and status of an official in the Sakdina 
system, the title of'Somdet'Phrasanghdracha indicates the highest rank 
of a'monk in the system of Samanasak. 
According to Damrong Rajanubhab samanasak has been established since 
the Sukhothai period when the king received this tradition from Ceylon. 
In Sukhothai there appears, to have. been a simple hierarchy of Samanasak; 
'Ehra'Sanghdratha, at the top, next to this were'Phra'kru and'Thera 
respectively. These Samanasak were conferred upon the monks by the 
king, in order to give a lasting. honour to them in a similar manner to 
2 titles given to the brahmins who served in the court in secular affairs. 
In the Ayudhya period, as a result of'Hindu-Khmer influence, the 
Samanasak system was elaborated. It became . obviously tied to administ- 
rative positions within the Sangha. The Samanasak for monks, in descen- 
ding order of inportance were Somclet'Phya'Sangharacha.. ''Phraracha kana, 
', Phra'khru, andmaha'Thora. The Samanasak of Somdet Phra Sangharacha 
was conferred on the titular head of all monks in the kingdom, i. e. the 
Supreme Patriarch. Within the Phraracha kana -rank, there were different 
grades. 3 ýIbnks of this rank were'either the Sangha governors of ma jOr 
provinces or the abbots of important royal monasteries or both. The 
Phra khru holders were assigned to look after the Sangha affairs in lesser 
4 provinces and, cities. The title of*Maha Thera was conferred on long 
Damrong Ra anubhab''Chtimum Niphon keokap'Tanman'Phra Phutthasatsa-na 
ýi .0 (Collection of Writ gs; on History of Buddhism) (Bangkok: Rungruang 
Tham, 1971) pp. 164-167. 
2. ' Ibid. , pp. 167-168. 
3. For details see-ibid. i, pp. L. 173-175,177-190ýs and also PrJMce'Dhaniniwat, ' 
'A'Hi, 8t6rYý'6f'Bud=lsm"in'Siam, (Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1965) pp., 16-17. 
4. Daihýong; 'ibid. 
serving monks of good conduct. The Samanasak system has continued,, with 
some -revisions and modifications'. until today, 
At the present time there are basically four divisions of Sanianasak: 
these are (in descending order of importance)'Somdet Phrdracha'kana, 'Rong'somdet 
*Phraracha'kana, ''Phraracha kana, and'Phra khru. It, is a monk from Somdet 
Phraracha kana rank who is appointed the Supreme Patriarch*(Somdet Phra- 
sangharat) of the Thai Sangha. Although the Rong Somdet Phrdracha kand 
bears the title Somdet, he is not of full Somdet status. The Phraracha 
kana rank is further subdivided into four hierarchical grades or statuses 
(see Table 1), and there are further distinctions within each of these, 
grades. The honorific Phra Khru title is awarded by the king andthe 
holder is generally known a8'Phra'khru'sanyabat. He is superior to the 
Phra khru, swnan, who is appointed by monks of phraracha, kana rank and is 
generally known a. ý'phra'khru Thana nukrom. 
The modern ranks, titles, and numbers of Samanasak monks from Phra- 
racha kana upwards are set out in Table 1. 
'Tabld 1 ''Ranks'and Honorific Titles of'Samanasak ýbnks 
. Rank.. Samanasak. 
1 Somdet Phra Sangharat 
2 Somdet Phraracha kana 
3 
6 
Rong Somdet Phraracha kana 
Phraracha kana chan tham 
Phraracha kana chan thep 
Phraracha kan. a chan rath 
Phraracha kana chan saman 
Nmber 
6 
14- 
25 
46 
107 
313 
'Source: Department of Religious Affairs 'Tamiab Samanasak (Directory 
of Samanasak) 5 Dec6mber 1976. "- 
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Ihe criteria adopted for selecting recipients for honorific titles 
have varied through time. The evidence suggests that in the Sukhothai, 
Ayudhya and early Bangkok periods, competence in ecclesiastical education, 
knowledge of Dhamma and Buddhist scriptures, and good behaviour were the 
main qualifications for securing honorific titles. 
1 
Today success or achievement in the following areas would contribute 
significantly toward royal recognition and the award of an honorific 
title: 
"the education of self through success in taking Pali or 
Thai exams in religious subjects; contributions towards 
the education of others; a record of social service 
projects; the ability to inspire laymen in the 'develop- 
ment areas' (usually construction of monastery buildings 
or even secular structures); a reputation for adminis- 
tering one's monastery as an abbot and for carrying out 
responsibility well and eagerly; talent in preaching, 
writing, or even medicine - if such talent creates faith 
among the people; and, naturally, public respect for 
living a correct and proper life as a Buddhist monk". 2 
A reputation in meditation is also taken into consideration in giving 
honorific titles to certain monks. 
When a title becomes vacant., the Mahatherasamakom considers candidates 
from the rank or grade below that title, with the advice of the Deparbnent 
of Religious Affairs. When a decision is reached, it is passed through 
the Minister of Education to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister and thus 
to the king for ratification. 
On the king's birthday each year, the successful candidates of Phra- 
racha kana upwards, are called to the palace to receive certificates and 
1. Simon de Loubere, 'A*NeW*Historical'Relation'of'th6, Kingdom, of Siam 
(London: T. Horne, 1963) p- 115; Damrong, 'MM, pp. 194-195. 
2. John P. Ferguson and Shalardchai Ramitanondh, 'Monks and Hierarchy 
in Northern Thailand', iji*Jbtinial'of'the'Siam'Society, Vol. 64, part 
1 (1976) p. 118. 
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ceremonial fans from the king or his representative. The certificate 
indicates the rank and status of a particular monk and involves a 
change of nam for him, the new name usuaily being chosen to mirror the 
qualities for which the title is given. The ceremonial fan'(Pat ot 
reveals by its shape, colour, and design to an informed observer the 
rank, status and honour of its owner. Furthermore, it is only used 
at royal ceremonies'(Ratcha'phithi and at state ceremonies'(Phithi Luang). 
At such a ceremony, the monks sit in order depending on the rank their fan 
represents, not according to their rank in administrative system., and not 
by*seniority. 2 These Samanasak monks are invited to officiate and 
perform at royal and state ceremonies more often than the monks without 
honorific titles. The more important the ceremony, the higher the rank 
of the monks invited. As such, the opportunity for the Samanasak monks 
to establish contact or connection with the secular establishment (king 
or goverment officials) is greater than for the rank-and-file monks. 
Materially, the giftsgiven at the royal and state ceremonies are usually 
better in both quality and quantity than the ones received in a private 
ceremony. 
Associated with Samanasak is the monthly stipend or Nitayapat 
accorded to the Samanasak holders. 
3 The scale of stipend varies with 
administrative responsibility, and ranges between 50 baht per monthý for 
For the elaboration of the categories of ceremonial fans see: 
Department of Religious Affairs, 'Phathithin Satsana (Religious 
Calendar) (Bangkok: 1977) pp. 2657-280; also-Na-mrong., op. cit., pp. 
201-203. 
2.. For details of the seating arrangement for monks of different ranks and 
grades at a ceremony, see: Phra Kawiworayan; 'Anachak Song Thai (The 
Thai Sangha Domain) (Bangkok: Thai Baebrian,, 1963) pp. 204-205. 
3. These represented less than 25 per cent of a total Sangha population of 
approximately 286., 838 in 1974, Wat Vachiradhammapadip, Thai Buddhism: 
"'Faet8'and'Figures*1970s (New York: 1976) p. 28. 
4. In 1978,40 baht = U. 00 and the average labourer's wage would b6 
approximately 900 baht per month. 
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petty Phra khru rank to 1,700 baht for the Supreme Patriarch. Like 
the salary of the secularofficials, the monks' stipend has been 
occasionally imp-roved to keep pace with the increasing cost of living. ' 
A simplified list of stipends in 1975 is given in Table'2. 
'Table 2 Stipends of titled and graded monks 
Monthly nithayapat 
Honorific Title (stipend) in baht 
Soradet Phra Sangharat 1,700 
Somdet Phraracha kana 10500 
Phraracha kana (special grade - 
i. e. Rong Somdet rank) 320-340 
Phraracha kana chan tham 300 
Phraracha kana chan thep, 280 
Phraracha kana chan rath 260 
Phraracha kana chan saman 140-240 
Phra kru 50-140 
Monk who attained barian grade 9 160 
'Source: Department of Religious Affairs; Thaleangkan kana song 
(Announcement of the Sangha), Vol-. 6T, - part 6,25 June 1975, 
pp. 11-19; for fuller details of classifications ofmonthly 
stipend for Samanasak monks who are at the same time officials 
in the Sangha administration, see*. ''Banchee'attra nithýxapat 
phra Samanasak*, lae'phrd'Sangkhdthikan (Scale of Stipends tor 
Samanasak monks and monk-officials).. Official Document of 
Department of Religious Affairs, dated 26 March 1975. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that those monks who are stationed in 
provi I nces that are considered kandan (hardship or remote posts) are given 
an additional allowance*(bid'kandan), an arrangement that follows the 
The rate is decided in the Department of Religious Affairs and, to 
my knowledge, -there is no record of the monks themselves asking1for the increase. 
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practice for govenment officials. 
An honorific title also helps its holder to'climb the ladder in 
the administrative hierarchy of the Sangha. This does not mean that 
the honorific hierarchy exactly parallels the Sangha administrative 
one. Rather, the former complements the latter, with the two merging 
at the top. Table 3 shows in simplified form the relationship between 
honorific titles and positions in the Sangha administration from the 
top to the provincial level. 
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A monk of Phraracha kana rank and upwards is empowered to appoint 
personal assistants, the number depending on both his honorific rank 
and administrative position in the Sangha hierarchy, see Table 4. He 
can confer upon them the title of Phra khru with a further title 
affixed to signify their functions. 
. *Table 4 Samanasak'ranks and assistants 
'Samanasak*ranks NLnber of 
'Assistants 
The Supreme Patriarch is 
Phraracha kana of Somdet rank 10 
Rong Somdet Phraracha kana 8 
Phraracha kana chan thmn 6 
Phraracha kana chan thep 4 
Phraracha kana of rath and saman grade 3 
Based on information acquired from Phra Maha Pheera Suchatho 
of Wat Buddhapadip., London. 
Before leaving the subject of monastic honours, it would be useful 
to focus analytically on some points. 
First, the award of honorific titles is seemingly in conflict with 
fundamental Buddhist tenets. Within the monkhood all should be equal, for 
ideally monks are men who have chosen to put aside the world with its 
distinctions of authority, status and wealth. The imposition of the 
Samanasak system on monks ranks them like laity. The higher ranks enjoy 
greater privilege, which is further marked by differential monetary rewards 
and positions in the Sangha hierarchy. 
Second., the practice of giving stipends to individual monks encourages 
the personal accumulation of wealth. This is not compatible with Buddhist 
orthodoxy, in that monks should not have personal possessions. Wealth, 
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if acquired, is considered to belong to, the whole monastic com=ity. 
Third, the practice of linking directly or indirectly the Samana- 
sak to the administration of the Sangha results in, a hierarchical order- 
ing of the monkhood. This again seems to be in conflict with canonical 
Buddhism. The organization of the Sangha prescribed in the Vinaya was 
based on the seniority and honour due to the teachers and preceptors. 
The relationship was characterized as one of teacher to pupil. If the 
monkhood was to be organized at all, the organization would have to be 
minimal. Thus the later emergence and development of a hierarchical 
ordering of the Sangha can be seen as part of the creation of secular 
political authoritys possibly to keep control of the monks. By giving 
rewards in the form of honorific titles and stipends, the political 
authority secures the administrative Sangha's loyalty and co-operation., 
Finally, honorific titles and dignitary fans are not merely symbols 
of high and valued status in Thai society, but their acquisition is also 
a prime motivation for ambitious monks. This is a genuine ingredient 
in Thai Sangha affairs, and it is difficult to see how it can be recon- 
ciled with the idea of a 'pure' Sangha. As a leading fmdamentalist 
critically coments: 
I'Nbwadays the monks are losing their inportant function 
as spiritual leaders. ' They become followers of lay 
society which is filled with, status consciousness, and 
greed for power, prestige, and wealth. In such circum- 
stances., if the laymen cannot rightfully and morally 
satisfy their desires, they deceive, corrupt "' ' bribe, 
, flatter, and generally become crooked in order to satisfy 
their greed ..... This situation is also prevalent among the 
monks. Whatever kind of greed the laymen possess, so do 
the monks, perhaps even more so". 1 
TI, 
Phra Maha Sathienphong, Thra Song Thai nai -rob 25(phij puddhist 
Monks in a Quarter of Century) in'Sangkomsat Parithat ,ý 
Vol. 9,, 
No. 6 (December 1971) pp. 22-23. 
I 
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Phra Maha Sathienphong also suggests that the merit system based on the 
learning, teaching, and practising of Dhanma is given less importance 
as a qualification for the conferment of Samanasak than other 
abilities. As he puts it: 
"The selection of monks for thd'Samana-ýak is made by 
the Sangha authorities ..... Bel eve it or not, very 
often the selection is unjust and has the air of 
corruption., flattery, partiality and favouritism ..... 
Some unworthy monks were awarded honorific titles because 
they were the favourites of some influential Sangha 
authorities. Apart from these 'privileged monks', the 
second priority has been given to ability in promoting 
the construction of material things such a8'bot (a 
building in a monastery in which important r-ellgious 
ceremonies and rituals are perfomed) or'sala (preaching 
hall). It becomes a practice that if a NET could have 
a'bot built, he would be given a preceptor position 
(LTpachaya) and A'sdla could be exchanged, for aThra. 
*Idiru titlell. -L 
- 3. ' The*Authority of the State over the Sangha 
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the political 
authority expects loyalty and co-operation from the Sangha in return for 
patronage. Yet patronage alone is not enough to Secure religious 
support. Thus in conjunction with patronage it is necessary for the 
political authority to exercise a measure of control over the Sangha. 
Here I consider the mechanism of this control. The political control 
of the Sangha probably stems from the following suppositions. 
First, the government views a strong and uncorrupted Sangha as a 
means for social integration and as an effective safeguard against 
hostile ideology, i. e. communism. In this respect, the political control 
primarily aims at the protection of the monks against themselves, that is 
against the allegedly inevitable tendency of some monks to become lax and 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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corrupt and to forget their primary role of maintaining diligence in 
religious learning. 
1 Govenment control and intervention in Sangha 
affairs is further justified by the assertion that the traditional 
Vinaya code alone does not cover certain kinds of misconduct by monks, 
wid if this occurs the Sangha lacks authority to deal with it; and 
thýt goverment control over the ýangha 'helps ensure civil peace and 
social order, because if the Sangha loses the respect of the people, 
the trouble is liable to affect the people as well'. 
2 
Second, the Sangha organization is me of the biggest national 
organizations with a large number of members. Although ideally it 
is outside the secular social system, its size and organization alone 
constitute a menace to the political ruler and justify the latter's 
control over the Sangha7. For instance, the goverment might fear that 
the monks might become subversive teachers of the masses, or become 
rebellious themselves as had been the case in Burma and Vietnam. 
4 
Political disturbances caused by monks such as the Phra Fang case might 
also encourage the authority in this view. 
5 
Dhaniniwat, Monarchical Protection'of the Buddhist Church'in Siam, 
pp. 1-2. 
2. Phra Sasana Sobhana, 'Govenunent of the Thai Sanghal, in Visakha Puja B. T. 
'2510, pp. 9-10. 
3. In 1976 the membership was estimated at nearly 300,000 monks and novices. 
For the figures of members of the Sanghain relation to population from 
1927-1970 see Mulder, *op. cit.,, p. 10. 
4. For example of politically active monks in Burma during colonial days 
see Mendelson, '*Saxighd*and'State, pp. 173-234; Smith; Religion'and, - 
Tolitics'in. 'Airma, pp. 86-107, and in Vietnam in the 1960s see Smith, 
Religion, Politicsp''and'Social'Change'in'tho Third'World (New York: 
The Free Press, 1974) pp. 121-128. 
S. See Chapter II. 
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Finally, control over the Sangha enables the govermient to keep 
. the Sangha in line with government policy and all -Thai gove=ents 
have attempted to achieve this. For example: 
/ "Every major governmental policy change, be it 
the Cakkri Reformation of 1782, the early 
modernization efforts of King Mongkut and King 
Chulalongkom, the Revolution of 1932, or Marshal 
Sarit Thanarat's policy of national development 
through strong leadership has been accompanied ýy 
efforts to reform and reorganize the monkhood". 1 
The political authority has had several means of control. These 
have been revised, modified, and redefined over time to ensure that the 
Sangha adapts to the policy of the government. The sanctions applied 
to the Sangha appear to be not qualitatively different from those evoked 
to justify intervention into, or supervision of the activity of any 
other social organization. 
I 
The Nature*of'the'Controlling'Authority: We know very little about the 
controlling authority in Sukhothai period and before the fifteenth 
century. Since the fifteenth century, the control and supervision of 
Sangha affairs has been delegated mainly to civil departments. Never- 
theless, some kings, such as Taksin and Rama I, directly supervised the 
Sangha themselves. 
The Krom Dhannakan (Department of Church Administration) was estab- 
lished in the reign of, King Trailok. It had responsibility for Sangha 
affairs and acted as the king's agency through which he appointed monks' 
to high offices in the Sangha hierarchy, and conferred Samanasak. This 
department was empowered to supervise the behaviour of the monks in 
every province. Attached to this department was a special court whose 
-responsibility was to adjudicate any serious crime committed 
by monks. 
Mulder, **op. *cit.,, p. 19. 
2. ' Wales, ''Ancient *Siamese* Goverment 'and 'Administratim, pp. 78-81,93, 
243. 
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This system remained in force until the early Bangkok period. 
The first king of the Bangkok period, Rama I, enacted a series of 
laws on Sangha activities'(Kotmai Phrasong , the consequence of which 
was the imposition of tight control on the Sangha. These laws on the 
whole emphasized the King's concern for the healthy condition of Buddhism, 
the right conduct of monks, and the authentic learning of Buddhist 
doctrine. They laid down the guide lines for the protection of the 
religion from deterioration, spelling out the responsibilities of civil 
and ecclesiastical officials, and penalties for monks and laymen who 
damaged the faith and prestige of the Sangha. 
1 During the reign of 
King Mongkut another similar set of laws was proclaimed. He even for- 
bade monks of Phraracha kana rank to disrobe without royal permission. 
2 
The Krom Dhammakan continued to act as the agency of the kings. 
After King Chulalongkorn launched administrative modernization in 
the late nineteenth century, the bureaucracy became more differentiated 
and specialized. The Krom Dhammakan was promoted to ministerial 
position and became the Krasuang Dhammakan qUnistry of Public Instruc- 
tion) responsible for eduction in the country and religious affairs. 
This was later merged as the Department of Religious Affairs into the 
Ministry of Education, the present day authority. Today this depart- 
ment is directly responsible for controlling and supervising the Sangha. 
The Department of Religious Affairs is functionally divided into 
eight sections which are further sub-divided into thirty-one sub-sections. 
1. Dhaniniwat; op. cit.., pp. 1-14; Wenk. *'op. cit., p. 139; Tambiah 
'Wbrld'Conqtieror-*--j, pp. 183-187. 
2. 'Prakat Ruang Phraracha kana thana barian suk mak kern pai cha thong 
khao duan phim' (Royal Proclamation on Phraracha, kana, Disrobe Without 
Royal Permission) in'Collectiori. ý*of'Roydl Proclamationý'of the Fourth 
'Reign, Vol. I (Bangko, 7: IDM P. 7M. 
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An -investigation into the functions and responsibilities of some of 
these divisions will illuminate the extent of the goverment's control 
of the Sangha. 
(1) The Secretariat Office of tho'Mahdth6rasamakom: This 
division is of particular interest for the purpose of this section 
'because it inplements the policies and decisions of the Mahatherasamakom 
(the administrative body of the Sangha), 
l 
and acts as a channel of 
conmmication for the Sangha between its various levels and units 
throughout the country. It also acts as the link between the govern-, 
ment and the administrative body of the Sangha. This division arranges 
and keeps records of the meetings of the Mahatherasamakom, and publicizes 
Sangha activities. It prepares the lists of candidates for the award 
(or withdrawal) of honorific titles and honorary fans; it registers and 
maintains the record of Samanasak, administrative, and barian2 monks. 
This division enforces the orders of the Mahatherasamakom regarding the 
dismissal of monks. It prepares and controls the allocation of the 
monks' stipend. It issues monks' identity cards, and is enpowered to 
reprimand monks who behave wrongly. It also has the power to investigate 
cases where monks are accused of violating the Vinaya'and secular laws, 
and to bring the accused before the Sangha authorities for trial. If' 
the accusation involves criminal law., it is empowered to arrest the 
accused and force him to disrobe, if convicted. 
3 
(2) Division of Ecclesiastical Properties: This division'is 
-entrusted with the management of 
the Sangha's and individual wat proper- 
1. The detail about Mahatherasamakom will be discussed in later sections. 
2. Monks who have passed a certain level of Pali examinations. 
3. Department of Religious Affairsp''Thaldengkan kana 'Song (Announcement 
of the Sangha, Authority) Vol. 65, part 2 (February 1977) pp. 77-82; 
see alsb'SanghdAtt*1962, Articles 26-28,42. I 
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ties. It makes decisions on and controls the economic transactions 
of these pr6perties. 
1 
(3) Division of Ecclesiastical Education, *- This division is in 
charge of promoting and inproving ecclesiastical education, publishing 
religious text books arid periodicals, establishing libraries, and 
, revising syllabuses. - It makes 
decisions on the allocation of the 
2 budget for ecclesiastical schools and Buddhist universities. , 
Thus, 
religious education is tightly controlled both in terms of content and 
activities. 
(4) Religious Development Division: Among other activities 
entrusted to this division is the sponsorship of missionary monks who 
participate in the progranme of national development. It is this 
division which is the architect of the Phra Dhanmatuta programe (see 
Chapter IV). 
Finally., at the decision-making level in the Sangha administration, 
the Director General of the Department of Religious Affairs is, ýIx- 
officio, the only lay member in the Mahatherasamakom., He serves as 
its Secretary General. As the head of this departm6nt he has respon-* 
sibility for the formulation and implementation of goverment policy 
relating to religious affairs. He should not only keep the Mahathera- 
samakom informed of goverment policy, but also influence the decisions 
made. Theoretically, the Mahatherasamakom, as the sole executive of 
the Sangha administration, is empowered to regulate Sangha affairs by 
issuing regulations and, orders which will affect the whole Sangha. In 
''Ibid. 2 pp. 87-95; see also'Ministeri. -ii'RegulatiOn, 
No. 2, B. E. 
2511. 
2. -Ibid., pp. 47-55. 
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practice, it is the Department of Religious Affairs who prepares such 
regulations and orders for the Mahatherasamakom. At the meeting 
these -ready-made docLnents are presented to them for consideration 
and scrutiny. There, the Secretary General will explain why such 
regulations and orders were so formalated, and press their acceptance. 
An informant, a high ranking Phraracha kana, who prefers to be anony- 
mous, gave me the impression that the Mahatherasamakom is usually only 
a rubber stamp for the Secretary General's proposals. 
The political control over the Sangha is extended downwards to 
provincial, district and village levels. There are government educa- 
tion officers hierarchically organized from national to district level. 
The education officers' task is to encourage the adoption of government 
policies by local monks, but in cases of conflict he can pass the 
problem on to the district officer and if necessary the provincial 
governor,, who has the authority to override ecclesiastical objections. 
At the provincial and district levels, the goverment places the Sangha 
in certain geographical areas firmly under the control and supervision 
of the civil provincial governor and district officer. Attached to 
the office at each level there is also at least me representative of 
the Ministry of Education to execute their policy concerning Sangha 
affairs. 
There are also other governmental departments which are involved 
both in providing bureaucratic services to the Sangha and supervising 
them. For example, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for 
registering new wat, and decides whether a new wat should be erected 
or an old me be abolished. It also supports the Phra Dhammajarik 
progranme and eEploys Buddhist chaplains where necessary under it. 
The Ministry of Public Health provides medical care to sick monks. 
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Such secular control and supervision of the Sangha leaves it 
little autonomy in its own affairs. Structurally speaking, the 
Sangha as a whole seems by no means to be in a position to challenge 
the power of the political authority. Rather it is subservient to 
it. An investigation into the administrative structure of the 
Sangha, to which we are now turning, will further illuminate the 
tight control of the Sangha by political authority. 
I 
4. The Administration of the Sangha 
In the introduction to my book, Trevor 0. Ling wrote: 
In the case of Thailand, religion is still publicly 
prominent ..... both in the sense that the religious 
professional ( ..... the monk) is a very obvious feature of public life, and in the sense that 
religious institutional structures have, uatil now 
at least, held a considerable place in the calcula- 
tions and plans of successive Thai goverments and 
have received a good deal of patronage. if 
Buddhism is to be counted as one of the 'great' 
religions, then Thailand provides a good example of 
the part which the political nexus has played in 
making and keeping a religion 'great' ... (P. X) 
The close association and relationship of the'Sangha and the state 
can be seen from the administrative structure of the Sangha. TWO 
major features of the Sangha administration may be described as follows. 
Firstly, its development has always been a result of socio-political 
changes, and at any one stage a modification of the previous stages. 
Secondly, at all times the administration of the Sangha has been sub- 
jugated to the political power in the sense that the administrative 
structure of the Sangha is incorporated intol that of the civil govern- 
ment in'such a manner that it is easily controlled. 
(a)-Continuity'in'development 
Iii the Sukhothai period, the, administration of the Sangha was 
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hierarchically organized corresponding to the hierarchy of civil 
administration, The civil administration was characterized as 
follows: at the apex was the king, who was referred to as'phor khun 
(father of the people). Under him was a hierarchy of administrýtors, 
the upper ranks recruited from the nobility, who assisted the king in 
goverment administration. Some were stationed in the capital, 
others were assigned to govern principalities or provinces called 
'Muang lukluang. These incumbents had status in the administrative 
hierarchy as'phortuang (father of the city). Next to phor nuang were 
'phor'ban (father of the village), who were responsible for. the adminis- 
tration of a cluster of villages. In the vassal states, the king 
appointed his officials and/or members of the royal family to govern. 
Some vassals, however, had semi-autonomy and their own indigenous rulers 
who were called'khun. 
1 
At the apex of the Sangha hierarchy was the Phra Sangharat (Supreme 
Patriarch) appointed directly by the king. His assistants ýere Phra 
khru each of whom had jurisdiction over a specified territory. In 
certain major principalities or provinces and major vassal states there 
were Phra Sangharat who presumably had less power and prestige than the 
one who resided in the capital. Head monks in smaller and less import- 
ant provinces had the status of Phra khru and were appointed_by the 
rulers of the provinces. The administrative monks in vassal 'states I 
were appointed by their rulers. 
2 The king retained the right to 
3 intervene in all Sangha affairs. 
I 
1. Damrong, -Laksana'kan-pokkhrong *. *, pp. 6-7. 
2. Damrong, 'Taman kana Song', pp. 164-166. 
3. Chao Phraya Wichitwong Wuthikrai and Phraya Phitthathibodi, 'Tannan 
(History of Monastery and Di7r-ectory 
of Ecclesiastical Officials) (Bangkok: Rongphim Thai., 1914) pp. 34- 
35.. 
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The organization of the Sangha then appeared to have been in 
orders: the kamawasi (gamavasin - Pali) or town orders, otherwise 
known as'khanthathura (ganthadhura - Pali), and'Aranyawasi (Aranna- 
vasin - Pali) or forest dweller order, otherwise known -ts'Wipatsanathura 
(Vipassana dhura - Pali). The'kamawasi order comprised the monks 
who devoted themselves to the study and teaching of Dhanma. The 
Aranyawasi order included monks who devoted themselves to the practice 
of meditation. 
' 
Ayudhya. period: The organization of the Sangha. remained unchanged 
until about 1424 when a group of monks, having received a new ordination 
from Ceylon and having secured recognition from the king, established a 
new order, *Vanarat-dna. 
2 This was also categorized as a Kamawasi order 
because its members concentrated studying and teaching Dhauma. Thus, 
from this time to the reign of Rama III of Bangkok the organization of 
the Sangha appears to have been made up of three orders. The new 
kamawasi was called tho'Right'Kamawasi, the original kamawasi became 
the Left'KamaRdsi., and the Aranyawasi remained as it was. 
3 
The administrative structure of the Sangha was now modified to 
accord with the structure of the civil government which was influenced 
by Hinda-Khmer traditions. The Sangha from now on was more hierarchically 
ranked, and the sammasak became more elaborate. 
The administration of the Sangha in the Ayuc1hya period can be 
. 
briefly-described as follows: 
1. -Ibid.; see also C. J. Reynolds.. ''The*Buddhist Monkhood pp. 7-11. 
2. Reynolds, 'ibide, ppo 12-16. 
3. Wichiwong Wuthikrai and Phitthathipbodi, ''op. 'Cit., pp. -43-45. 
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I 
(1) Somdet'Phrd Sangharat (Supreme Patriarch) was the titular 
head of the Sangha in the country.. 
 
(2) Below him were thredl'Chao kana'Yai (Sangha General Governors), 
one-at the head of each order. The king normally appointed the more 
senior Chao'kana Yai of either the kamawasi of the Left or the 
Aranyawasi as the Supreme Patriarch. 
(3) Below the Chao kana Yai in each order were Phraracha kana who 
were the heads of monks in the capital and important provinces. 
(4) The head monks of the lesser provinces or cities were monks 
of Phra khru rank. 
(5) At the bottom of the Sangha administrative hierarchy were 
abbots who supervised the religious affairs of their wat. 
1 
These monk-officials were authorized to establish their own adminis- 
trative staff to help them in the administration of the Vinaya. 
The formal link between the Sangha and the political authority 
appeared to have been that the Supreme Patriarch and Chao kana Yai cons- 
tituted an advisory comittee to the king in matters of Vinaya, 
3 
religious affairs ceremonies and rituals. The administrative monks 
and all monks were supervised and controlled by the Department of Church 
Administration. 4 
1. Damrong; op. cit.., pp. 170-183. 
2. For details about the number of assistants each of the higher 
administrative monks could have, see: Wichitwong Wuthikrai, op. cit., 
pp. 55-67. 
3. 'Ibid., p. 59.1 
4. For detail see pp. 102-103. 
ill 
Early Bangkok Period: The main characteristics of the Sangha adminis- 
tration underwent little change throughout the later Ayudhya, Dhonburi 
and early Bangkok periods. Nevertheless, there were changes in, the 
organization of the Sangha in the reign of Rama III. These included 
the establishment of a'kana'klang (central section), but this new 
section was essentially part of the Kamanwasi of the Left. In this 
reign there also emerged the order of Thammayut under the initiative 
of King MongRut when he was in the monkhood. 
1 
A major change in the administrative structure of the Sangha appears 
to have taken place in the reign of King Chulalongkorn as part of the 
programme of modernization. Some of the massive schemes of his reign 
led to change in the administrative structure of the Sangha. ' Since 
Chulalongkorn's reforms are well documented and have been studied by many 
-scholars, 
2 
we will not reiterate all of them here. 
1. For details of the emergence and development of this new order see: 
Reynolds., ''op. 'eit., pp. 63-113. 
2. A few of the standard works by the king himself and indigenous 
scholars are given below. Other works are listed in Yoneo Ishii 
(et al)''A'Selocted'Thii'Bibliograph .4 _y 
on th6 Reign'of King Chulalong 
'korn (Osaka: Osaka University of Foreign Studies, 1972) pp. - 
20, and 21-44; King Chulalongkorn; Phra borom'rachathibai'kaekhai kan 
pokkhrong'phaendin (King* Chulalong corn Is Explanation ot Govenunent 
Reforms) (Bangkok: 1927), 'Proclamation on the Siamese State Council 
and Privy Council', in S. J. Smith (ed. ); Siam Prepository (Bangkok: 
S. J. Smith's Office,, 1874), 'Phra. rachobal--k okap kan suksa, khong 
chart' (Royal Policy on National Education) in Silapakorn, Vol. 3, 
No. 3., 1949; Damrong Rajanubhab, ' Thesaphiban (Bangkok: Klang Witthay, 
1958),, ''Phraratcha'Phoiigsawadan, krun-9 Ratthanakosin Ratchakan thi 5 
(Dynastllc Chronicle of the Fifth Reign) (Bangkok: Furusapha,, 1961);, 
Chakkrit Noranithiphadungkan, 'Sordet Phrachao'Borommawongthoe Krom. 
Phrýya, 'Damron& Rajanubhab'kap Krasuang Mahatthai (Prince Damrong 
19j"anubhab and Ministry ot Interior) (Bangkok: NIDA., 1963); Prachoom. 
Chomchai (ed. and transl. ), Chulalon rn the Groat (Tokyo: The Centre 
for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1965). 
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Before examining the main features of the Sangha. administration 
of this period, it would be useful to survey briefly some aspects of 
civil administrative reform which led to the reform in the Sangýa 
administration. 
The administrative structure of Thailand prior to the great reforms 
in the reign of Chulalongkorn was characterized by the lack of differen- 
tiation of fimctionand authority in the departments within the central 
government; an ineffective financial administration; a loosely- 
organized provincial administration; and, above all, the absence of a 
true centralization of power. One of the main factors that worked 
against the centralization of power was the loosely-organized provincial, 
administration. 
The provincial administration before 1892 was described as'Kin 
. m-iang (lit. eat province) system. Under this system the king appointed 
a provincial govemor'(Chao'nLiang) who received no salary, but took his 
income_in the fonn of taxes and corvee labour from his subjects in return 
for his protection. The Chao nuang was ernpowered to control judicial 
adainistration. and very often that meant the interpretation of the law 
to his own liking. The obligation to the central govenment oi a 
provincial govemor was to remit part of the revenue to the king, and to 
i. 
recruit men for corvee or military purposes. As long as he was loyal 
to the king and there was no serious public outcry against him, the Chao 
nuang-was rarely disturbed by the central, govenuneAt. , Because of this, 
and being economically independent; th6, Chao nuang becarne de- facto kings 
Fovelaboration see: Damrong Rajanubhab, ''Thesaphiban (Bangkok: Flang 
Witthaya, 1952); Tej, Bunnag; 'The'PtoVihcial Administration of*Siam 
'1892-4915 (Kual4lumpuri Oxfora-uh-lversiy PressjA977) pp. 
k 
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in their own areas. In the, remote provinces the office of Chao nuang 
became semi-hereditary and the incumbents sometimes challenged the 
power of central government. 
' Such a lack of national unity and 
effective administration endangered the territorial integrity and 
independence of the kingdom., This became obvious'when the imperial 
power of France and Britain encouraged remote semi-independent provinces 
and vassal states to seek freedom from the'Thai polity under their 
protection. 2 Thus the need for reforms in administrative structure 
became absolutely imperative by the reign of Chulalongkorn. 
The reorganization of provincial goverment was closely related to 
the reorganization of central goverment. As far as the reorganization 
of provincial goverment is concerned, the organization of the Ministry 
of Finance resulted in the centralization of financial power and accord- 
ingly undermined the economic self-sufficiency of the provincial rulers. 
The reorganization of the Ministry of Interior under -the strong leader- 
ship of Prince Damro. ng Rajanubhab, was followed by the experimental re- 
organization of provincial government. Between 1888 and 1892., High 
Commissionerships were created to supervise and control the provincial 
administration; to terminate the provincial nobility's almost indepen- 
dent existence by transforming them into salaried civil servants; to, 
systematically nationalize the judicial and financial administration of 
the provinces; and to secure the co-operation of the people at the 
.. 
lower. levels of every sphere of the provincial administration. 
3 Encour- 
1. Damrong.. ''ibid., pp. 18,28-29; Tej Bumag, *jbid., pp. 27-39. 
2. - Damrong, *ibid.,, p. 12; Likhit Dhiravegin,, 'Siam'and'Coloriialism'(1885- Elysis'6f'Diplomatie'Relations TPE-MgToT. -- hai Watthana '1909) -.; 'An 7Fa 
Panich Press, 1975) pp. 27-46. 
3. For detail see Tej Bwmag, -op, 'cit*., pp. 99-118; and Chakkrit hbranithi, 
. phadungkan'`Somdot'Phrdcha6 Boromawongthoe'Krom'Phray *Damrong 9 _a 'Rajanubhdb"kap'Krasuan& Mahatthai (Prince Damrong Rejanubhab and, 
Ministry ot 1nterior) (Bangkok; RIDA, 1963). 
I 
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aged by this success, the Act concerning District Administration 
(Phraratcldbanyat'Laký; ina'Pokhrbrig'Thorigthin was promulgated in May 
1897 and followed by Regulations Concerning Provincial Administration 
(]Kho*Bzingkhap'Pokkhrong'Huamang in 1899. The act and regulations 
formulated rules for the organization of the provincial, district, comme, 
and village administration. 
Under the new structure, the system of local administration was 
centralized under the control of the Minister of Interior. For adminis- 
trative purposes the whole country was geographically divided into monthon 
(circles). -changwat (provinces). -amphur (districts), 'tambon (communes) and 
'nuban (villages). These territorial divisions, except the lowest two, 
were administered by salaried goverment officials sent from the Ministry 
of Interior. ' There were 22 monthon in 1915. Each monthon was under 
the supervision of a superintendent comissioner'(Khaluang Thesaphiban) - 
formerly the high commissioner. Each changwat was administered by a 
governor responsible to the superintendent comissioner. A changwat 
was divided into districts (amphur) whose head was a nai anphur, (district 
officer). The coiTnune was administered by a conmme headman who was 
elected by the village headman*(Rhuyai ban). The village headman was 
responsible for administrative tasks in his village and was elected by 
the villagers. The comme and village headmen were supervised by 
the district officer. 
The reform proved successful although it took time for the Ministry 
of Interior to check the provincial power of some great families. The 
country gradually became so effectively centralized that a Western 
scholar remarks that Thailand at this period was a more stable and 
-integrated society than were most other 
Asian countries. 
1 
Lucian W. Pye, '*Southodst'Agidl, -ý'Polititdl*Sy, -qtdms 
(New Jersey, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967), p. 23. See also Wyatt, 'Family Politics 
in Nineteenth Century Thailand' in Clark D. Neher (ed. )$-MOdern'Thai 
Politics: 'From'Villdge*to'Nation (1976). 
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In the reform of the provincial administration the goverment 
discovered the provincial Sangha was an imperfect imitation of the 
civil administrative hierarchy,, and was in a state of disrepair. The 
reasons for this were manifold. 
First, although the predecessors of Chulalongkorn, notably Rama I 
and Rama IV (Mongkut), had established many of the principles which 
were to form the important bases of the national religion, there was 
no single body of Sangha law aiming at the unification of the Sangha. 
Furthemore, prior to the late nineteenth century, the Thai political 
rulers had little concern with the state of religion and'the Sangha as 
they existed in the 'Lao' tributaries, i. e. in, the areas which are today 
ýbrth Thailand, North-East Thailand, and Laos proper. Keyes suggests 
that although the people in these areas were Theravada, Buddhists, their 
local version of Buddhism and practice was different from what the 
central political leaders conceived as the orthodoxy of Buddhism. 
1 The 
majority of people in the North, for example, adhered to the local 
version of Theravada Buddhism known as thb*YUan'cLdt. Keyes described 
the distinctive character of this kind of Buddhism thus: 
"It differs from the variant in Siam proper (Central and 
North Central Thailand) in the script used for sacred 
literature, in the structure and content of rituals, and 
in the organization of the Buddhist clergy or Sangha.... 
The Yuan church in the 19th century was relatively un- 
structured. Each temple'(ýýt had, autonomy, and its, 
clergy was only minimally tied to clergy elsewhere. Powers 
to*ordain monks and novices belonged to the senior monk in 
each temple and he in turn could pass his power on to one 
of his followers when he was near death". 2 
1. Charles F. Keyes, 'Buddhism and National Integration in 
Thailandl. -Asign'StLidies, Vol. 30, No. 3, May 1971, pp. 552-555. 
2. ''Ibid., p. 552. For more details see, for example, W. C., Dodd, ''The 
'Tal' Race (Cedar Rapids,, Torch Press, 1923) pp. 75-78; Ferguson 
and Schalardchai, -(p. eit., , pp. 124-135; Sanguan Chottisukkharat, 'Prawat*Ki-Libd'Srii4ichal'Nakbm*haeng*Lannd'Thai (Biography of Kruba 7r-Ewýiai: Lama Thai Saint) (Cheingmai, Sanguan Press, 1963). 
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Moreover, the Sangha of the Yuan tradition appeared to have had little 
hierarchical organization. Jt has been suggested that some leaders 
of this church, were very popular for their presumed magical powers 
and attracted large followings. Their influence was such that they 
defied the Sangha authority in Bangkok, and the Thai officials in the 
North feared that they would lead a millenarian movement with revolution- 
ary implications. 
1A 
similar situation in terms of dutonomy was also 
reported to have been found in the North-East. 
2A 
millenarian uprising 
took place there in 1902. The leader of the movement was an ex-monk 
who claimed to possess magical powers acquired during his sojourn in the 
3 
monkhood. . 
Second, the lack of a systematic and clearly defined Sangha admini§- 
tration encouraged the fonnation of dependent relationships between the 
large monasteries and the lesser monasteries. These dependent relation- 
ships had arisen from the relationships of teacher to student, leader to 
follower, and of group allegiance. The network of dependent relation- 
ships might have been in existence a long time, but only came to the 
notice of the civilýauthority in the 1890s. II 
The main problem was that the informal teacher-student., and parent- 
dependent monastery network effectively bypassed the formal structure'of 
authority within and without the Sangha. Thus many monasteries were 
semi-independent of the, formal control of the civil and Sangha 
1. Keyest'ibid., pp. 557-558; ' Chottisukkharat., *ibid.., pp. 16., 23-24. 
2. For details see Prince Wachirayan Warorot " ''Kan'Kand Song (On the Sangha Affairs) (Bangkok: Mahamakut Education-7 Council, 1971). 
3. See Tej Bunnag, 'Kabot Phumibun phak Isan R. S. 1211 (Millenarian 
Revolt in Northeastern Thailand, 1902) ih'Sangkomsat Parithat, Vol. 
So 1967, pp. 78-86; Damrong Rejanubhab, Nithan Borankadi (Historical 
Anecdotes) (Bangkok: Phrae Phitthaya, 1971-) -pp. ý 335-338; 'Keyes, 'The 
Power of Merit' in'Visakha*Pujd'B. 'E. -25l6, and 'Millenialism, Theravada 
Buddhism, and Thai Societylp''Asian Studies., Vol. - 36, No. 2 (1977) pp. 283-302. 
'k 
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authorities. For exaniple, in provinces all abbots were supposed to 
be under the supervision of the Sangha provincial governor. But if 
the abbots grew discontented with the provincial head, they could 
subordinate themselves to their parent monasteries and limit their co- 
operation with the formal authorities. Another manifestation of 
dependency was that appeals could be made to the parent monastery to 
resolve dispute or adjudicate on infractions of the Vinaya, instead 
of seeking intervention from the formal authorities. 
1 
Finally, the reorganization of the Sangha in the provinces was also 
intended to be an instrument for the accomplishment of the government 
policy of national education in the 1890s. In this effort the govern- 
mient heavily relied on the assistance and co-operation of the Sangha. 
The king appointed his younger brother, Prince Wachirayan Warorot, who 
was then the de facto head of the Sangha, to be one of the directors of 
the educational refom programe. Wachirayan Warorot was designated as 
the organizer of the religion and education of the Buddhist population. 
It was decided that the national education scheme would be implemented 
by 23 high ranking monks appointed in each monthon. These monks were 
called 'education directors' and worked under the direct supervision 
of Wachirayan Warorot and the civil authorities. After having made 
preliminary investigations, it became clear to the civil and Sangha 
authorities in Bangkok that the chances of success of educational reform 
in the provinces depended largely on the active co-operation of the 
provincial Sangha. This was because in the beginning the government 
schools would still be attached to the monasteries. Furthermore, the 
goverment did not have as yet enough trained personnel to replace the 
A well docmented analysis of dependent relationships is in C. J. 
Reynolds; *op. 'tit., pp. 224-233. 
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monks to teach in and to -run the schools. Goverment goals could only 
be realized when the Sdngha administration was systematically organized 
and centralized in line, with the civil administrative structure., and 
the provincial monks became responsive to government policy. It was 
also believed that state education and faith in Buddhism could flourish 
only if there was a centralized Sangha with a clear-cut chain of 
authority, and rationalized procedures for maintaining the purity of the 
Sangha. 2 
In summary, the, thrust for the refom of the Sangha administration 
came from the need for national integration and the unification of the 
. Sangha 
itself, the need for harmony between the Sangha and the civil. 
administration,, and the need to purify the Sangha. It was on these 
grounds the goverment promulgated the Buddhist Church Administration 
Act of 1902 (Sangha Act 1902). 
(b) ' 'The 'Sangha Act *of '1902 
The Sangha Act of 1902 reflected the traditional notion that 
the progress and prosperity of the nation and Buddhism'were inter- 
related. This is clearly stated in the preamble to the Act, thus: 
'Iffiereas the amendment of the law and the reformation 
of the administrative system of the State have brought 
about manifold developments and outstanding progress 
to the country ...... It is obvious that the religious 
affairs of the Buddhist Church are also of'no less 
inportance to the development and prosperity both of 
Buddhism and of the country in that.,, systematically 
administered, they will serve to attract more people... 
to Buddhism under the guidance of Bhikkus, thereby 
leading them to the right mode of living in accordance 
with the Buddha's instructions", 
For, fuller detail see David K. w)ratt; The Politics of Reform, pp. 
210-253. 
2. Reynolds, OP-Cit-, P. 2S3. 
/ 
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The Act was also designed to create a systematic and unified national 
Sangha hierarchy for the first time in Thai history and to establish 
a centralized authority, for all monks who could control the decisions 
of the lower ranks. The main features of the Sangha administration 
and its relation to the political authority can be briefly described as 
follows: 
1. The central administration consisted of four Chao kana Yai (Sangha 
General Governors) each of which was the head of a section. These 
sections were three - North, South and Central - for the Mahanikai order, 
and one for thd'Thammayut order. Each Sangha General Governor had one 
deputy (Vice General Governor). The eight of them constituted the 
Mahatherasamakom or Council of Elders. This was the highest authority 
in the Sangha hierarchy acting as an administrative body and an 
ecclesiastical tribunal. The Mahatherasamakom was also advisory 
committee to the king in ecclesiastical affairs and administration. The 
Mahatherasamakom performed its administrative and judicial functions and 
exercised its authority under the supervision of the king (under His 
Majesty's Grace). ' It should be noted that the Act does not mention 
the office of Supreme Patriarch. At the time the Minister'of Public 
Instruction (now Minister of Education) acted as secretary to the 
Mahatherasamakom and implemented its decisions with the consent of the 
king. Later when Prince Wachirayan Warorot was officially installed 
as the Supreme Patriarch, he was the president of the Council of Elders 
and the person in whom authority was centralized. However, his exercise 
of power was to be approved by the king. 
1. ''Sangha Act 1902x Article 4. 
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2. The provincial administration of-the Sangha was designed to 
parallel the provincial administration of the civil govenunent. It 
was hierarchically organized into montbon (circles), changwat (provinces), 
districts (amphur or kwang), commune (tamban), and, at the bottom, the 
village wat. ' Each level had Sangha administrators who worked in 
liaison with the civil authorities. The top administrator in each 
monthon was chao kana monthon (corresponding to'Ehdluang*Thesaphiban 
who was at least the holder of Phraracha kana rank and wa§ appointed by 
the king. His main : ftmction was to supervise the monks in his juris- 
diction and to execute the decisions of the Comcil of Elders. The 
rest of his functions were largely common to each level, such as appoin- 
ting the lower administrators at district level, helping his immediate 
subordinates solve problems, judging appeals against subordinates, 
decisions, and recommending the promotion of monks under his supervision. 
Below him were Chao kana muang or changwat (provincial Sangha 
governors) who were also royal appointees. The functions of each 
incumbent were similar to that of the Chao kana. monthon, though his 
authority was restricted to his province. The head of the Sangha 
administrators at the district level was Chao kana amphur or kwang.,, In 
the province of Bangkok he was appointed by the king from Phraracha kana 
rank. In other provinces, he was appointed by Chao kana monthon on the 
recommendation of Chao kana changwat. He was assisted by Chao kana 
tambon who presumably were his appointees and who were responsible for 
the administration of Sangha affairs in the conmmne. 
, 
At the bottom of the Sangha hierarchy was the wat headed by the 
abbot'(Chao awat). Generally, the abbot of a royal wat was appointed 
by the king. Otherwise, the appointment was made through the Chao 
kana kwang by the consent'of the monks in that wat and the laymen who 
supported the wat. 
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3. The Act explicitly indicated the controlling power of the political 
authority. The king either directly, or indirectly through his civil 
officials, supervised the important ecclesiastical appointments. He 
personally made appointments in the capital and, by controlling the 
conferment of Samanasak, regulated the high-level appointments in the 
provinces. The Council of Elders was to regulate Sangha affairs 
under 'His Majesty's Grace'. Moreover, appointments in the provincial 
Sangha were to be approved by the civil authority, i. e. the provincial 
governor. The Department of Religious Affairs supervised and controlled 
the management of Sanghals properties, the establishment or abolition 
of monasteries, the registration of monks, and the conduct of the monks. 
InIconclusion, the Sangha Act of 1902 enabled the political authority to 
k6ep tight control over the Sangha. 
This Act remained in force until it was replaced by a new Sangha 
Act in 1941. 
(C) ''The * Sangha'Act'1941 
The introduction of this Act appears to have been a very much 
long-term result of the Jme 1932 Revolution. ' The 1932 Revolution 
brought about an end to absolute monarchy and replaced it with the con- 
ventional Western institution of constitutional goverment. The idea 
of separation of power was advocated; a parliamentary form of goverment, 
,a responsible cabinet headed by a prime ministers an independent judicial 
system, political parties, and an electoral system were also introduced. 
After 1932, the new ruling elites sought legitimacy for a democratic 
For detail of causes and consequences of the 1932 Revolution see: 
Thawat Mokaraphong; 'Histoa'of'Thai'Revolution (Bangkok: Odian Store 
Press, 1972); David-A. Wilson, Politics : Ln 1hailand; and Kaitthichai 
Phongphanit, ''Kan'Pdthii4dt'2475 (The 1932 Revolution) (Bangkok: 
Phadung Wittlia--yas 1971). 
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fom- of govenment by propagating the ideals of equality, f-reedom, - 
liberty, and representative'government at the expense of the defects 
of the previous'authoritarian regime. 
These Western notions of democracy penetrated into the Sangha. 
Some monks, who were fascinated and excited by these new political 
ideas, expressed the view that the Sangha authority structure should be 
more democratized and the Sangha administration should follow democratic 
principles. At the time of the 1932 Revolution, we are told: 
The new political ideas Penetrated into the temple 
grounds ..... Novices and young monks were some times 
requested not to leave the temple grounds during the 
period of revolutionary activity. The pull was too 
great,, however. The roads of Bangkok were dotted 
with yellow robes during the exciting days. Some 
temples forbade discussion of political subjects. 
There were people who suggested that a democratic form of government was needed in the temples as well 
as elsewhere. To this some of the head priests 
agreed. Many more objected. 1 
There were also protests against some administrative monks and the 
general character of the Sangha authority structure. This was well 
reported by Virginia Thompson: 
Among the welter of petitions that greeted the new 
regime were some monks asking for the transfer of 
certain provincial officials who had been approved 
by the church authorities. By September 1932 many 
monks had formed themselves into parties in order, to 
do away with the control of the lord abbots. This 
threw the abbots., whose attitude toward the revolution 
had not crystallized until then, onto the side of the 
goverment, which in turn strengthened their position 
by protective legislation. That this did not 
entirely liquidate the movement among the monks was 
apparent when the patriarch ordered thirty-three monks 
to retire in January 1933 because they had tried to 
force their abbot to hand over power to them., In 
February 1935 a delegation representing some two thousand 
monks from twelve provinces arrived in Bangkok to petition 
the Premier to bring government control of the Buddhist 
Church into line with the democratic regime. 2 
1. Kemeth P. Landon " Siam in Transition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) p. 216. 
2. Virginia Thoinpsonp--Thailaiid:, tho'New'Siam (New York: Macmillan, 1941) 
p. 642. 
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I 
There was very little Thai written evidence available to prove 
that the influence of the movement Ifor'democracy in the Sanghal of 
the monks had enough impact for the promulgation of a new Sangha Act. 
It would be misleading to speculate that the promalgation of the 
Sangha Act 1941 was a result of a single movement of dissident monks. 
Rather, it was a result of a number of factors combined. Two probably 
major factors which encouraged the legislation were, firstly, the wide- 
spread Western idea of democracy which was spurred on by the anti- 
authoritarian stance of the new commoner-recruited political leaders, 
and secondly, the comitment of these leaders to live up to their 
ideology, i. e. to do away with anything deemed authoritarian. It might 
have been for these reasons that the government agreed to liberalize 
the structure of the Sangha authority. Ishii interprets the legislation 
of the Sangha Act 1941 as 'an experiment to introduce the ýuddhist order 
to the principles of democracy., i. e. the idea of the separation of. 
administration., legislature, and judicature'. 
' Accordingl I y, the 
I 
administrative structure of the Sangha became once again a replica of 
the political and administrative system of the civil govenunent. I 
The main features of the Sangha administration were briefly: 
(1) The Supreme Patriarch'(Somdot'Phra'Sangharat was the head of the 
whole Sangha. He was appointed by the king and held the office for 
life. He was empowered to issue ecclesiastical regulations or orders 
through and by consent of the'Sangha Sapha. Ib exercised administrative 
pqwer through and by consent of the'Ydna'Sangha*M6ntri; and exercised 
2 judicial power through and by consent of the Yana Winalthorn. 
Yoneo Ishii, 'Church and State in Thailand'. ' Asian Survey, Vol. 8. 
No. 10, October 1968, p. 867. 
2. ' 'Sanghd Act'1941, Articles 5-9. 
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2. The Sangha*Sapha, (or Ecclesiastical Assembly corresponding to the 
legislature) consisted of not more than 45 life-long members who were 
appointed by the Supreme Patriarch mainly on the basis of seniority. ' 
Its chief function was to legislate ecclesiastical orders and regula- 
tions concerning the mode of practice, the conduct of monks, and the 
penalty for the monks who violated the Vinaya and Sangha Act. It also 
had power to investigate into Sangha activities. 
2 
3. The'Kana'Sangha*Montri (or Ecclesiastical Cabinet corresponding 
to the executive branch in the civil goverment) was composed of the 
'Sangha'Nayok (corresponding to the Prime Minister) and not more than 
nine Sangha Montri whose positions were equivalent to those of members 
of the cabinet in the civil goverment. All of them were appointed 
by the Supreme Patriarch and had tenure for four years. Among the 
nine members, at least four of them must be appointed from the members 
of the Sangha Sapha. The main function of the ecclesiastical cabinet 
was to administer the Sangha. 3 
4. The central administration was divided into four departments: 
Ongkan'Pokkhrong (administration), ' Ongkan Suksa, (education), ' Ongkan 
'Phoeyphae, (propagation), and'OngkA-h'Satharanupakan (public works). 
Each department was headed by a Sangha ýIbntri, but the whole cabinet 
was collectively responsible for their decisions. 
4 
5. For the purposes of local Sangha administration, the whole country 
was divided, parallel to the civil administration, into nine phak (regions) 
1. Ibid., Articles 11,15. 
2. ''Ibid., Articles 16,21-23,25. 
3. Ibid., Articles 28-30. 
4. ''Ibid., Articles 30,33. 
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and 71 provinces (changwat). Each province was further divided into 
amphur (districts), which consisted of cammnes (tambon), each of which 
in turn consisted of villages (puban). The head administrative moAks 
of these units were'Chao *kana-ýphak, '-ýchaftgwat, '--ýEThur,, and'--ýtambon 
respectively. The head of a village wat was Chao awat (abbot). Each 
I 
area was hierarchically controlled and supervised by an ecclesiastical 
comittee headed by the'Chao katia of each level. 
6. The Kana'Windithom or ecclesiastical court corresponded to the 
civil judiciary and consisted of three leviý-, ls'. ''K-ma'WincLithom-Chan 
'diga, -ýchm, utthorn and, --ýchan ton. 
1 These corresponded to the 
supreme court., court of appeal and court of first instance, respectively. 
Yet however many democratic features the Sangha administration 
may appear to have had, it was not beyond the control of the political 
authority. The Supreme Patriarch was appointed by the king. who as a 
constitutional monarch, acted on the advice of the government. Tile 
Minister of Bducation had power to issue ministerial regulations for the 
implementation of the Act, to countersign the appointment of the 
president and vice-president of the Sangha Sapha, to attend the meetings 
of the Sangha Sapha and to submit proposals for its deliberation, to, 
determine the day on which its session should open and request'the con- 
vening of special sessions, 
2 to grant or withhold permission-for the 
r 
publication of any matter discussed in the Sangha Sapha and the Kana 
Sangha Montri and to'countersign the appointment'of the members 
ýf Sangha 
Nbntri. 3 Furthermore, the Minister of Education could overrule the 
. decision. of the Sangha Sapha. 
4 With regard to the property of the 
1. Ibid.,, Articles 50-52. 
2. Ibid., Articles 4,12,14,16. 
3. 'Ibid., Articles 19-20,27. 
4. 'Ibid., Article 28. 
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I Sangha as a whole and of the. individual wat,, - the Ministry of Education 
reserved the rigýt to intervene at any time in any matter. 
Based on this Act, the administrative structure may be seen as 
follows: 
, Table 5 -The Admini8trative * Sttdc"bf 'M& 1941 
Somdet Phra Sangharat 
(Supreme Patriarch) 
.......... ......... I .... ..... 
I 
Sangha Sapha Kana Sangha Montri 
(Ecclesiastical (Ecclesiastical 
Assembly) Cabinet) 
I 
Chan, Diga 
(The Supreme Court) 
I 
Chan Utthom - 
(Court of Appeal) 
I 
I 
Kana, Winaithom 
(Ecclesiastical 
Courts) 
Chan Ton 
, (Court of First Instance) 
II 
Central Administration (4 Departments) Provincial Administration 
........... ...... ............. ......... I 
III 
Phak (Region) 
Education Public Works Propagation Administration 
(Ongkan (Ongkan (Ongkan (Ongkan 
II 
suksa) Satharanup- Pheoyphae) Pokkhrong) Changwat (Province) 
akan) I 
Amphur (District) 
I- 
Tambon (Comme) 
II 
Wat ftnastery) 
1. ''Ibid... Articles 47-49. 
i 
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The democratic reform of the Sangha administration seemed to work 
smoothly at first, but the principle of separation of'power which was 
the prime spirit of the Sangha Act 1941 permitted the re-emergence of 
long dormant disputes between the two sects'QIjLq2i - the Mahanikai 
order and the'Th order. The Mahanikai order was, and still is, 
the majority order controlling about 93 per cent Of monks in the 
country, but the prestigious minority Thammayut order., owing to its 
close association with the royal family and its reputation for disciplinary 
strictness, had long controlled a significant proportion of the powerful 
positions in the upper levels of the Sangha administration. This 
perennial confrontation was worsened by a number of factors which 
justified the intervention of the government and brought an end to the 
democratic character of the Sangha administration. The Sangha Act 1941 
was abolished in 1962 and replaced by the Sangha Act of 1962. 
(d) 'The'Sangha'Act 1962. 
The 1962 Sangha Act stemmed directly from the assumption of 
powe .r by Sarit Thanarat through coup dletat in 1957 and 'in October 1958. 
The reasons for the 1958 coup were amounced as follows: 
1. The growing menace of com=ism was undermining the 
basic foundations of the state by attempting to up- 
root the monarchy, destroy Buddhism, and overthrow 
institutions of all types which the Thai nation 
cherished. 
2. Several parties had made a mockery of the constitution 
by their selfish manipulation of democracy. Their 
abuse of privileges and liberties provided by the 
constitution had obstructed national progress, created 
rifts within the nation, and made people enemies of 
each other. This would lead to the eventual di's- 
integration and fall of the nation. These national 
ills could not be solved by the mere act of replacing' 
the government. It needed a-major transformation ..... 
3. External threats to the country created by the 
deteriorating situation in Indo-China by the conmmist 
aggression ... needed to be remediedJ I 
1. -Prakat'kana Pathiwat Chabab'Thi 8 (Revolutionary Council's Announce- 
ment No. 8), 20 October 1958. 
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In contrast to his predecessors, Sarit was doubtful about Western 
democratic goverment as an effective means to modernize the country. 
In spite of pretending to be a constitutional leader, he stated openly 
that Thailand was not ready for Western-style representative goverment 
and that the post-1932 experiments had been a failure. 
1 He abolished 
the constitution, dissolved Parliament, bamed all political parties, 
and replaced them with a system of military dictatorship. In place of 
symbols of democracy, i. e. constitution, people's assembly, and represen- 
tative goverment, Sarit introduced and invoked certain other political 
labels in Thai political life. These were national development, national 
integration, and the perils of communism. These political symbols were 
used to initiate, explain, defend and legitimize his political actions. 
To Sarit national development and national integration-were seen as a 
means of modernizing the country through which national security and 
political stability could be achieved. While the peril of com=ism 
was conceived of as constituting a major cause for national disintegration, 
and as being a hindrance to national development and thereby a threat to 
national security and political stability. Being aware of the import- 
ance of the traditional institutions of monarchy and religion, Sarit 
appears to have employed the strategy of invoking and popularizing these 
two collective identity symbols of the nation to promote certain politico- 
economic objectives of national development and national integration. 
As far as the Sangha is concerned Sarit considered that if the 
Sangha was to be an effective tool for national advancement., it must be 
strong, disciplined, and well organized. The internal discord of the 
1. Kaitthichai Pongphanit; 'bp-*cit-., pp. 40-43. 
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Sangha and its inability to overcome it troubled Sarit and seemed to 
him intolerable. , He therefore made a move to impress his own will on 
the Sangha. In October 1960 he announced that 
"The goverment always holds the nation, religion 
and monarchy in esteem. The 250,000 monks and 
novices have always been respected and given 
privileges over common people in that they have 
free accommodation, a good livelihood without 
engaging in any work, pay no tax, are exempted 
from army conscription and therefore risk no 
danger. The only request from the government is 
that they be pure, leading an ascetic life, be 
disciplined in the Vinaya, and perpetuate Buddhism. 
Now ..... there has been a long and chronic 
discord 
in the Sangha which is worrying the people and 
government ..... If the Sangha cannot settle the dispute and asks the government to intervene, the 
government will co-operate within the legal framework. 
The goverment hopes that the dispute will be 
settled in the frame of Vinaya, ecclesiastical regul- 
ations, and by the Sangha itself. But if there should 
be any ill intentions causing deterioration to BuddhiSmp 
presenting trouble and difficulty for the maintenance 
of law wid order, and above all threatening national 
stability, this goverment will have to intervene in 
Sangha affairs to the utmost degree". 1 
The gove=ent did intervene and the monk who was accused of causing 
trouble was removed from his administrative position and stripped of 
his honorific title by goverment order on 11 November 1960. Neverthe- 
less, Sarit decided to reorganize the Sangha two years later. In this 
he is said to have been supported by the top administrative Sangha. 
They were in agreement with the gove = ent that the Sangha Act 1941 
had only caused schism within the Sangha. This is because the Sangha 
Sapha had become a forum for conflicting views. The members were bound 
to divide into those for and those against the motion under discussion, 
Prime Minister's Office,, ' Kam Thaleangkan khong'Ratthaban Ramg Fwam 
]2ýn ... 'K -* pal nal Cana ong (Amýouncement ot the Government concerning the 
Disputes within the Sangha) 28 October 1960. 
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and then the voting caused further division in the Sangha. 1 For the 
authoritarian goverment the Sangha Act 1941 with its democratic 
spirit was no longer suitable for the Sangha administration. This 
is clearly expressed in the statement appended to the 1962 Act: 
The reason for the enactment of this act is, that 
the administration of the Sangha is not a matter 
to be based on the principle of separation of 
powers for the sake of balance among them as is 
the case under the current law. Such a system 
is an obstacle to effective administration, It 
is therefore appropriate to amend the existing 
law so that the Supreme Patriarch, head of the 
ecclesiastical commmity, can command the Order 
through the Council of Elders in accordance with 
both the civil law and the Buddhist principle, 
thereby promoting the progress and prosperity of Buddhism. 
Sarit himself had told the top Sangha, administrators that: 
It is the intention of the government that the 
Sangha Act 1962 should be passed in order to re- 
organize the Sangha so that it would be as similar 
as possible to that pertaining in the Buddha's life- 
time., and that it is the intention of the government 
to give support in every possible way to Buddhism 
which has been the Thai's religion from time 
immemorial and whose culture is deeplý ingrained in 
the national stability and character. 
The main features of the Act can be sumiarized as follows: 
At the apex of the Sangha, hierarchy is the Supreme Patriarch (Somdet 
Phra Sangharat) appointed by the king. He is given supreme 
authority in the govenment of the Sangha to appoint an&dismiss- 
members of Mahatherasamakom, and to issue patriarchal comands. 
3 
I 
2. The Mahatherasamakom (Council of Elders) was created as a single, 
............ 
Kamahuno (pseud. ), 'Phutthasatsiiid'8amrab'samanchon (Buddhism for the 
Coamon Man) (BangkoR: Aksorasamphan., 19b4) p. 149. 
2. Office of the Prime Minister, 'Tho'Prime Ministert s Message to the 
. 'President'of 'the 'ColinCil '6f 'Elders 'on'the OPeniftiz'Ceremony of the 
Irst Session of the_Meeting of the Council'o 
ja-nuary 1963. 
I 
3. '', Sarigha'Act'1962, Articles 7-8,12-13. 
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I 
administrative body to replace the former Sangha Sapha, Sangha 
Montri, and Kana Winaithorn. It is responsible for the adminis- 
tration of th6 Sangha, and for administrative purposes, it is 
einpowered to issue the Mahatherasamakom regulations and orders, 
and acts as advisor to the Supreme Patriarch., 
' The Mahatherasamakom 
consists of all Somdet Phraracha kana as ex-officio members, and 
four to eight members from Phraracha kana rank appointed by the 
2 Supreme Patriarch The appointed members hold the office for 
3 two years and can be reappointed . The Supreme Patriarch himself 
is the ex-officio President of, the Mahatherasamakom. The Director- 
General of the Department of Religious Affairs is thý ex-officio 
Secretary General and his department is the General Secretariat 
Office of the Mahatherasamakom. Thus, the whole of the Sangha 
affairs are closely controlled and supervised, through the Secretary 
General, by the govermnent. 
3. The Act keeps intact the hierarchical provincial administration 
ranging from region (phak), province (changwat), district (ainphur), 
and commune (tambon) to village (rmban). The organization of the 
administrative structure of the Sangha continues to parallel the 
structure of the civil govenment. Ibre again honorific titles 
play an important role in determining a monk's position' in the 
administrative hierarchy, especially at district level and iipwýrds. 
The provincial administrators in the Sangha hierarchy in descending 
order are illustrated in the following chart. 
Ibid., Article 18. 
2. 'Ibid., Article 12. 
3. ''Ibid... Article 14. 
I 
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'Tabld 6 ''Oýsanitdtibii'6f'thb'Sanghd*admirii8ttatioii'illu8trating 
. 'hierarchical 'line 'of cont-ml 'wid'7p-p-o-: rL-ntment* 
Somdet Phra Sangharat (Supreme Patriarch) 
I 
Mahatheiasamakom (Council of Elders) 
Chao kana Yai (Sangha General Governors) 
Appointed from 5 monks with at least 
Somdet Phraracha kana rank by the Supreme 
Patriarch I 
18 Chao kana Phak (Sangha Regional Supervisors) 
Appointed from monks with at least Phraracha kana 
chan thep by the Supreme Patriarch upon the recom- 
mendation of the Mahatherasamakom and Chao kana Yai 
- respectively 
72 Chao kana Changwat (Sangha Provincial Governors) 
Appointed from monks with at least Phraracha kana chan 
saman by the Supreme Patriarch, upon the recommendation 
of Chao kana Yai and Chao kana Phak respectively 
I 
510 Chao kana Amphur (District Head Monks) 
Selected from the holders of at least Phra 
kru Sanyabat rank by Chao kana Changwat and 
appointed by Chao kana Phak with the approval 
of Chao kana Yai 
I 
4961 Chao kana, Tambon (Comwne Head ýbnks) 
Selected from 'suitable monks' by Chao kana. 
Amphur and appointed by Chao kana, Changwat 
I 
25,000, (approx. ) Chao Awat (Abbots) 
Selected by the residents of and congreg- 
ation of the wat and appointed by Chao 
kana Changwat upon the recomendation of 
Chao kana Amphur and Chao kana Tambon 
respectively. 
I 
Ordinary monks 
(300,000 approx. ) 
Elaborated from Sangha Act 1962 and Mahatherasamakom's Regulation 
No. 5,1963. The population figures refer, to 1975. 
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The 18 Chao kana Phak are the head administrators of the 18 regions. 
Their term of office is four years and they may be re-appointed. Each 
is assisted by a deputy uho should have similar qualifications. The 
Chao kana Phak's main function is to supervise the Sangha administration 
in his region and be responsible to the Chao kana Yai. Each Chao kana 
Changwat is assisted by a deputy. The main ftinction of the Chao kana 
Changwat is to supervise the Sangha activities in their provinces and 
they are responsible to the Chao kana Phak. The chief administrators 
of the district Sangha are Chao kana Anphur who supervise the Chao kana 
Tamb9n who, in turn, supervise the abbots and are responsible for the 
Sangha affairs at conmme and village levels. An abbot is responsible 
for supervising the monks and novices in his wat. 
1 
The relationship between the Sangha organization and the govemnent 
is shown in Table 7. 
For more detail about the organization and responsibilities of these 
administrative monks see'SanghdAtt'l962, Articles 20-23., * 36-38; 
and als(j'K6t'Mdhathorasaiýa-lýo-m'chabdb'Fh-lý"5_'_B. 'E. '2506 (Regulations 
No. 5,1963). 
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Table 7 'Administrativo'Stiý, utttire'Of'the-Sangha and Its Relationsl2in 
'to the Govenment 
KING 
Protector of Buddhism Constitutional Head of Government 
SUPREME PATRIARCH 
(SOMDET PHRASANGHARAT) 
COUNCIL OF ELDERS 
(ýMTHERASAMAKOM) 
Direct liaisoh 
(Off 
, 
icial 
-., Fonsultation) 
9 
SANGHA 
GENERAL GOVERNORS 
(CHAO KANA YAI) 
SANGHA 
REGIONAL SUPERVISORS 
(CHAO KANA PHAK) 
SANGHA 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS 
(CHAO KANA, CHANGWAT) 
DISTRICT 
HEAD MONKS 
(CHAO KANA AMPHUR) 
COMMUNE 
HEAD. MONKS 
(CHAO KAM TAM]3ON) 
ABBOTS 
(CHAO AWAT) 
I ORDINARY MONKS 
Indirect 
liaison 
Official 
consultation 
takes place 
Official 
consultation 
takes place 
Pff icial 
consultation 
takes place 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
(CABINET) 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 
(DEPT. OF RELIGIOUS 
AFFAIRS) 
OTHER MINISTRIES AND 
DEPARTMENTS 
REGIONAl INSPECTORS 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS 
DISTRICT OFFICERS 
Unofficial 
ic 7n s-u-1 Ez 117 'o n 
COMM HEADNEN 
takes place 
unotticlai 
1Eý; tiion 
takes place 
I 
I VILLAGE HEADMEN 
_ý 
I VILLAGERS 
I 
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It should be explicitly or implicitly clear from the preceding 
discussion that changes in the I authority and administraiive structure 
of 'the Sangha in"relation to the political authority has, 'to a major 
extent, stemed from the socio-political changes of the time. 
Symbolically,, the political authority justifies its intervention into 
Sangha affairs and its exertion of control over the Sangha by asserting 
that this must be done for the sake of the purity of the faith and the 
Sangha. Politically, the reorganization of the Sangha authority 
structure by political leaders has frequently been intended to make 
the religious structure an instrument for the promotion of national 
goverment policies. This will become clearer in the following chapter 
when we examine the political mobilization of the Sangha for politically 
defined ends. 
I 
I 
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CHAFM JV ''THE'POLITICAL'MOBILIZATION'OF'THE MODERN'SANGHA 
The imediate concern of this chapter is to examine the political 
mobilization of Buddhism and the Sangha in the process of socio-political 
change. While recognizing that religious institutions have long been 
used as a means of political legitimation for rulers and to promote 
goverment policy, our imediate interest is focussed on the period 
since the late 1950s. , This is because the political use of religion 
since that time has been more marked both in fom and content than 
previously. The political mobilization of the Sangha occurred when 
the rulers thought that national security and integration were threatened, 
and when they wanted to enhance their legitimacy as a government. It 
has resulted in the formlation and assumption of new roles by the 
Sangha which has had to adapt and redefine its fomer roles. 
This chapter therefore investigates various problems that are con- 
ceived as threats to national security and integration. It seeks to 
demonstrate how the rulers have tried to solve these problems, and why 
they have resorted to traditional institutions such as Buddhism, the 
Sangha and the monarchy to provide assistance. Justifications for co- 
operation with the government on the part of the Sangha are also con- 
sidered. The later part of the chapter is devoted to an examination 
of the active role of the monks under the direction of the govemment 
and the Sangha authorities in programes instigated for political reasons. 
The monk's roleas goverment agent in these programmes is conceived as 
an institutionalized role in contrast to the role of 1! political monks" 
to be discussed in the next chapter. 
1. Political'Devblopments leadingto the Mobilization*of'the Sangha 
i 
Chapter III ended with the consideration of changes in the internal 
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structure of the Sangha in the Sangha Acts of 1941 and 1962. To under- 
stand the changes in the direction of Sangha activities external to the 
order, it is necessary to return briefly to 1932 and examine certain 
political developments since then. 
I 
The 1932 Revolution brought an end to the former structure of 
political power and authority and a shift in the bases of legitimacy. 
In place of the absolute monarchy, the new ruling elite, comprising the 
military and civilian bureaucrats, took over political power. The 
f0mer religio-political ideology of the state was replaced by new 
political values and symbols. These were the assembly of the people's 
representatives, a democratic constitution, and a constitutional monarchy. 
The democratic notion that 'the country belongs to the people' was 
espoused for the first time. 
However, hopes for democracy suffered many setbacks. Since 1932, 
with few exceptions, major changes in the control of government have, 
been matters confined strictly to small elite groups. The coup dletat 
has become a major device for bringing about changes in the possession 
of power. The political system remains largely authoritarian and the 
vast majority of the people-are still far removed from the political 
process. Between 1932 and 1976 Thailand has had at least ten 
constitutions (some of, which were labelled 'provisional); and corres- 
pondingly, the popularly elected assembly has been periodically dissol- 
ved, often as a direct result of a new coup or a shift of poiVer. Other 
political institutions for the popular control of the government, such, 
_' 
as political parties, have risýn'and fallen. Political and economic 
changes-have continued to be mediated through the ruling elite. 
The ruling elite, whether legitimized by coup or constitution, 
seems to have been reasonably successful in perpetuating authoritarian 
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rule. ' Dr Thinapan Nakata- a Thai political scientist, has attributed 
the continuity of authoritarianism to the stability of traditional 
Thai culture which was itself authoritarian. Buddhism, he argued, 
has played an important part in moulding Thai political culture and 
submissive attitudes towards political authority. 
1 He is supported 
by some American scholars who consider the stability of Thai political 
culture to be the result of cultural continuity, and the persistence of 
traditional ideas until the present. 
2 
This view has been reinforced by anthropological evidence thaý 
such Buddhist concepts as merit'Qýunq or virtue 'Qý2MELI) and demerit 
QLzLb) have continued to shape Thai traditional values concerning power 
and the social order. According to this perspective, merit and de- 
merit determines me's station in life, and the rise and fall of 
individuals in the social hierarchy. 3 One implication of this concept 
is that merit and power are related. Thus, a person with greater 
merit has more power or wealth than one who has less merit. David A. 
Wilson, for example, attributes part of the capacity of Phibun (1944-' 
1957) and Sarit (1957-1963) to maintain authoritarian rule for a long 
time to their cumulative merit. He suggests that the Thai recognized 
their political authority partly because: 
1. Thinapan Nakata., ''The*Problems'of, Democracy in Thailand: A Study'of 
'Political*Culture--an-d -Socialization'of College Students (Bangkok: 
Prae Pitthaya, 1975) pp. 55-6T. - 
2. - For detailed discussion see, for example, James N. Mosel, 'Conymication 
Patterns and Political Socialization in Transitional Thailand' in Luqien 
W. Pye (ed. ) ý 'Connmitdtim'and'Politital'Developraent (Princeton: ,- Princeton Univ73-r-sityPress, 1963). and 'Thai Administrative Behaviour', 
in William J. Siffin (ed. ); *Toward'the'ComparatiVe'Study-of-Public 
'Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959); Siffin, 
W. J.., The =1'Burbaticrdty-'InstitUtional'Chanize and Development 
(fbnolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966). 
-3. Lucien M. Hanks, 'Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order' American 
'Anthropologist, Vo . 64, No. 6,1962, pp. 1247-1261, and 'The Thai Social order as Entourage and Circle' in G. William Skinner and A. Thomas 
Kirsch. (eds. ))''Change*and, Persistence-in-Thai-Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Pre 18.1 
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According to Thai thought, moral goodness (merit) 
results in good fortune, and therefore good fortune 
is a sign and proof, of moral goodness. The content 
or manifestation of good fortune includes profit or 
wealth, fame or high rank, praise or good reputation, 
and happiness. The moral goodness of a man is deter- 
mined by his merit, which is considered as a cumulative 
result of his good deeds in many lives. 1 
While accepting that the Buddhist concept of merit still serves 
today,, as in the past, as the basis of religious legitimation for the 
Thai socio-political order, Charles F. Keyes points out that there is 
a major difference between the old and new concepts of the relationship 
between merit and power. In the old ideology, the merit of the king 
was believed to be utilizable for effecting secular political ends. 
The welfare of the kingdom was tied up with the merit of the king. 
The people, in turn, either experienced beneficent rule as the result 
of the king's merit which he compassionately shared with them, or 
oppressive rule because of the king's relative lack of merit. However, 
the king's merit is now conceived as manifesting itself at a different, 
and higher, level of benevolence towards the people of the country. 
The ruler shares his merit with his subjects primarily in the form of 
moral welfare. Today, the povýer to determine the material welfare of 
the people lies in the hands of the political leaders of the country. 
While this power cannot be exercised until its holders have been given 
the king's blessing, the populace no longer thinks of their material 
welfare as a function of the merit inherited by the king. Rather, the 
new ideology has opened up the possibility for greater striving among 
all Thai to realize their own welfare. This new ideology sanctions 
.. greater 
mobility than was possible in traditional Thailand. 2 
1. David A. Wilson , ''Politics'in'Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) ppe 134-1 
2. Charles F. Keyess 'The Power of Merit' in'Vi8akhd'PUja'-B-'E. 2516 
(Bangkok: Thai Watthana, 1973) pp. 95-102. 
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It is difficult to make the'legitimizing function of religion 
explicit in today's political system in Thailand. However, the 
evidence suggests that religion is still reinterpreted and used to 
provide support for political rulers comaitted to modernization. By 
the same token, the resources of religion may be tapped for the legiti- 
mation of change. Since. the late 1950s., especially during Sarit's era, 
and subsequently, the ruling elite have made special efforts to invoke 
and popularize the oldest and most potent of Thai collective symbols - 
religion and the monarchy. These two institutions are used to 
initiate, explain, or defend political actions., 
It was Sarit who introduced new ideological elements into Thai 
political life. These superseded the symbols of the 1932 Revolution 
of constitution, representative government,, and a popularly-elected 
assembly which Sarit subsequently destroyed. The new ideologies 
introduced by Sarit have become the legacy of succeeding governments. 
These are national development*(kan'pdtthana'prathet), national integ-, 
ration, and anti-commism. - In the Thai context, national development 
encompasses the building up of armed forces and weaponry, the construc- 
tion of roads and dams, the introduction of rural development, the, 
expansion of education, the extension of bureaucracy, and the sponsoring 
of economic development schemes by ministries and departments. National 
integration comprises the policy of integrating the country politically., 
socially, and economically. It ranges from appeasing and developing 
the relatively poor and undeveloped ýbrth-East, and spreading the Thai 
language, religion, and custom to the ethnic and, cultural minorities in 
the Northt'North-East, and the South, to the coercive resettlement of 
migratory hill peoples. Anti-commism involves the suppression of 
communist activities in the countryside, especially guerilla activities 
and insurrections. It has broader implications because there is also 
i 
I 
I 
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a tendency to label any dissidence as conmunist. Thus, people who are 
antagonistic to or directly oppose the ruling elite, and 
&se 
who 
advocate changes which are unfavourable to the position, status,, and 
interests of the establishment are only too likely at times to be seen 
as commists and to be treated accordingly. 
It would appear that modem Thai governments see themselves as 
confronted with two basic problems which must be minimized if they are 
to be successful in effectively maintaining their rule. These are M 
the problem of counmism and (ii) the problem of national integration. 
We can now consider these problems more closely. They, of course, 
overlap and they are considered separately only for convenience of 
presentation. 
2. -, The 'Problem of 'Commism 
Com=ism made its initial appearance in Thailand in the late 1920s 
within the Chinese and Vietnamese camminities. In 1931, a coimmmist 
party was formed and operated under the name of the Chinese Com=ist 
Party of Thailand. In the same year., the Vietnamese Commmist Party 
moved its headquarters from Vietnam to North-East Thailand to seek the 
co-operation of the Vietnamese who lived'there. The commist, parties- 
are said to have been successful in finding sympathisers among the Thai- 
Vietnamese, overseas Chinese and some Thai students. 
1 Around thisýtime, 
probably about 1932, the Thai comunist conmittee which later became the 
For detail about, the development and activities of communists in 
Thailand see., forýexample: Anan Senakhan et all-Kom thi, Rak (Dear 
Communists) (Bangkok: Pho Samton, 1974); Suchart Sawadisi; Krabuan 
'kan'Konmmit (Communist Movement in Thai] 6nýF- 
(Bang o: Phikkhaanet, 1974); -Thongbai Thongpoud, 'KommunitIardyao 
(The La ao Communists) (Bangkok: Phikkhanet, 19M -. 
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Commist Party of Thailand (CPT), was established and propagated 
Marxist-Leninist ideology through its publications. Its activities 
were suppressed after the goverment passed the first anti-conmmist 
law in 1933. As a result the coummists went underground and did not 
re-emerge publicly until 1946 when the anti-communist law was repealed. 
But this period of tolerance was short-lived. After 1947 the govern- 
mentagain began to suppress the ca=mists and they were driven under- 
ground once more. Anti-communism. reached its climax when the goverment 
adopted a policy of suppression of communists as a key stone in maintain- 
ing national security. It passed a second Anti-Com=ist Law in 1952. 
Thereafter the com=ists made three major changes in tactics. Having 
been denied the right of freedom of expression, they abandoned the 
political arena and took to guerilla warfare; having failed in the 
capital they turned to the countryside; and having been rebuffed by the 
integrated communities of the Chao Phraya River, they turned to Thailand's 
minority groups and dissident peoples living in outlying areas which had 
long been neglected by the central government. 
' Successful com = ist 
activities in neighbouring countries since the 1950s have encouraged 
the Thai comLuiists to advance their cause by armed resistance and to 
seek territorial control through protracted warfare in suitable areas. 
In the North-East the commists were successful in controlling 
remote parts of Nakomphanom and Sakonnakorn provinces during 1961-1964, 
and from then onwards they used these areas-as support bases. After 
1964., the commists also adopted a strategy of infiltrating into the 
cities and used urban areas to support their activities in the country- 
side. At the same time their fighting units were increased; and 
I 
Alessandro Cassella, 'Commnism and Insurrection in Thailand', -The 
'Wbtld'T6day, May 1970, pp. 200-201. 
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territorial expansion through armed struggle was encouraged. There-' 
after, localized and limited warfare frequently occurred between' 
various commmist fighting units and goverment forces in remote 
villages throughout the countryside. ' Little by liitle, com=ism 
expanded into the rest of the Nbrth-Eastern region. From 196t onwards 
thecommunist insurrection was so active and widespread'that police 
forces alone could not contain it and the army had to be brought in to 
support them. 
In the North, the insurrection in the beginning was concentrated in 
the provinces of Petchabun, Nan, Tak, and Chiengrai. The hard core of 
the com=ist fighting forces is said to have been the hill peoples, 
especially the aggressive and mobile Meo who were supported by Vietnamese 
and Chinese com=ists, both in training and logistics. Before 1967 
there was little evidence of insurrection among the hill peoples. Then 
the conr=ists were able to turn the hill peoples' grievances against 
the government to their advantage. The grievances included official 
restrictions on traditional economic activities, including opium 
growing and trading, and swidden agriculture. The hill peoples had 
not responded to economic and social incentives provided by the govern- 
Ment to induce them to resettle among the lowland rice-growing peoples. 
The goverment sent the police forces to implement its policy. This 
harsh measure only caused animosity and improved the chances of commist 
infiltration. Sporadic clashes with the police occurred and gradually 
increased in frequency and violence. It became clear to the government 
that the hill peoples were not fighting alone,, but were receiving 
logistic support from communists in Laos, Vietnam, and China. They were 
Anan Senakhanq-OP-*cit-, especially appendices A, B and C; see also Ross Prizzia, 'Evolution of the Thai Commmist Movement'- th at .% 
Ra as -Nithet (Political Science Review), Vol. 10, No. 2,1975, pp-. --95--IU7. 
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given guerilla training by commnist instructors and indoctrinated 
with commmist ideology. From 1967, the Northern insurrection began 
to expand and became second only to the North-East in the extent of 
its activities. 
1 The goverment reacted by sending military forces 
to support the police. This involved bombing and included the in- 
discriminate use of napalm. The misdirected air strikes only helped 
the dissidents to gain more sympathizers and to recruit more guerillas. 
2 
By 1973, the insurgency had expanded to cover several areas in the 
provinces of Pitsanulok, Loei, Prae, and Uttaradit. Since then the 
insurgents have made it impossible for Thai security forces to enter 
3 the special insurgency zones, ýexcept as large and heavily armed units. 
In the South, comnunist disturbances emerged as early as the late 
1940s in the four provinces of Yala, Pattani, Satun, and Narathiwat 
bordering an Malaysia. Here again the com=ists managed to exploit 
an existing secessionist movement and grievances against the goverment 
among Thai Muslims. 
4 
The early commist organization is believed to have come from 
the remants of the Malayan Conmiunist Party (MCP) who fled the Malayan 
government during 1948-1958 and came across the Thai border for sanctuary. 
Since 1958 the NPC had used the Thai-Malaysian border zone as its base 
Frank C. Darling, 'Rural Insurgencies in Thailand: A Comparative 
Analysisl, ''Southea-ý, t'A! ýiaii'Soectruin, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 1975, 
pp. 15-16. 
2. Cassella, op-cit., p. 204. 
3. Darling, -op. 'cit., p. 15; Prizzia, *'op. 'cit % p. 94; see also David Morell.. ITH-al-I-and ... ', *A8-iaTi*Surv6y-, Vol: 13, No. 2, February 1973, 
pp. 170-172.1 
4. For more detail see: Apai Chandawimon., 'Panha'si'ChanVat'Phak Tai 
(Problems in the Four Southern Province-sy7opburi: Pra-Narai 
Regiment Press, 1963); Darling, *ibid. 
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for conducting operations against, the Malaysian goverment. it is 
believed that'the MCP has co-operated with the secessionist movement 
in activities against the Thai goverment. However, it is not clear 
whether the Thai-Muslim separatist movement is committed to communist 
ideology. As the MCP was overwhelmingly Chinese, it is difficult to 
know how much support they could gain among Muslims of Malay stoýk. 
' 
David Morell is of the opinion that there is little genuine sympathy 
2 
or co-operation between the MCP and the separatist movement, while 
Suhrke maintains the opposite. 
3 Whatever the case, the Thai govem- 
ment has seen it as a threat to national security which had to be 
suppressed. However, by 1970 the insurrection had expanded, to the 
mid-southern provinces of Trang, Surathani, Pattalung, and Nakornsitham- 
marat 
4 
where it became evident that insurgents were Thai Buddhists) 
motivated by Leninist-Maoist ideology and operating under the direction 
of the Commist Party of Thailand. By 1973,, this insurrection had 
penetrated northwards into areas just south of Bangkok in the provinces 
of Prachaubkirikan, Petchaburi, and Ratchaburi. 
In sumary, in most cases the commmists have concentrated their 
subversive activities in the rural areas where, there were already deep- 
seated grievances against the central goverment. 
1. For more detail about the MCP, see Anthony Short.. ''The Commmist 
'IrL, ýurrOctibii'iTi'Malayd; '1948--ý1960 (London: Muller., 1975) 
2. David Morell, 'Thailand: Military Checkrnate'.. ''Asian'Survey, Vol. 12, 
No. 2, February 1972, pp. 158-162. 
3. Astri Suhrke, 'The Thai-Maslim: Some Aspects of Minority Integration'., 
. 'Pacifid'Aftdirs, Winter 1970-1971, p. 541. 
4. - Darling, ''op. *tit., p. -13. 
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3. ' The*Problem*of'National'Iritegration 
Thailand has a high degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. 
Some 85 to 90 per cent of the population follow a substantially 
similar way of life based on Buddhist traditions and values. Even so 
the ethnic and cultural differences of the minorities combined with 
regional and dialect differences among the majority have been seen as 
creating a need for a programme of national integration. By national 
integration I mean the bringing of the various parts of the nation into 
an integrated whole - to the minimum value consensus necessary, for the 
maintenance of a socio-political order - so that the government can 
exert its authority throughout its realm. 
1 
The lack of an integrated nation has long been seen in Thailand 
as a threat to the security of the nation's bo-iders. The Muslims of 
the South with their kinship to the Malays, the hill peoples of the, 
North with their links to peoples in Burma., China and Laos, the Lao- 
speaking peoples of the North-East with ties to Lao across the Mekong, 
the KI'Mer of the South-East and their affinity to Cambodia and even the 
urban Chinese and Vietnamese with their sympathies to their homelands 
have all been coerced at one time or another to become more Thai in 
their loyalties. In a sense, there has always, been a national policy 
of integration for these minorities, but of recent years there has been 
increasing recogaition of goverment neglect of minorities in rem'ote 
areas through the spread of dissidence, and the realisation that 
Commmism is seeking to subvert the central goverment by exploiting 
For elaboration of this concept see, for example, Myron Weiner, 
'Political Integration and Political Development', Claude E. Welch 
Jr. (ed. Pbl itiddl 'Mbdemizatiori: 'A Reader * in Comparative * Pol itital 
''Change (Calitornia: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1971) pp. 180-196T 
fbward Wriggingsq 'National Integration', in Myron Weiner (ed. ), 
(New York, Basic Books, 1966) 
pp. 181-191. 
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ancient grievances among the minorities. For this reason, the Thai 
goverment since the 1960s lids given the policy of national integration 
a high priority. In this study we will be concerned only with the 
areas in which the Sangha. has been directly involved in government 
policies of integration, i. e. the North and the North-East. 
(a) 'Minorities 'in the *North 
v 
There are six major hill peoples in the North of Thailand. 
These are, with their estimated populations in 1965-1966: (i) the Akha, 
6442; (ii) the Lisu, 9440; (iii) the Lahu, 15,994; (iv) the Yao, 16,119; ' 
(y) the Meo, 53., 031; and (vi) the Karen., 123,580.1 They differ from 
one another considerably in language and culture, and can be further 
divided into sub-groups by language and dialect. 
2 Most of them li ve 
in the hill country on the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos, while 
a few are found in the provinces of Kanchanaburi, Petchaburi, and Ratcha- 
buri. Some are indigenous, but the majority are believed to have 
migrated to Thailand from. Southern China during the past century, while 
a few have moved froin turbulent areas in Burma and Laos during the past' 
few decades. 3 
These peoples consciously maintain their own identity withiý Thai 
social, religious and political life. Most of them are illiterate and- 
have little access to Thai language, 
I 
Economically, the hill peoples manage to be self-sufficient'with 
.......... 
1. The United Nations; *A*Rdpott*on'the*Economic'and'Socidl'Needs'of'the 
-9211ýýroddcing'ArOas in'Thailand (Bangkok: Goverment Printing House, 
1967) p*- 8. 
mers in, 2. For further detail see: Anthony Walker (ed. ); 'Fd 'ýnthe*Hills: 
lahd'Pd North'Thailand (Georgetown, Pulau Pinýng: Phoenix 
s, 19'/b); Peter, Hin an (ed .)* 'TribegmeIi « and'Peäsants - üi'North (Cheingmai: 'Tribal Research Center, 1969). 
Kachadphai Burusphat 'Panhd'chon (Problems 
Arising from Minorities in Thailand), Vangkok: Rimgruang Tham Press, 
1972) pp. 65-66., 
't 
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regard to food. They grow rice, maize, millet, and vegetables., 
Opium, produced for trading, is the most valuable dash-crop. Their 
main method of agriculture is swidden or shifting cultivation. 
They are organized in village connunities, each with a headman 
who is recognized by the goverment. He is usually selected by adult 
male members of the village. He is responsible for the administration 
of village affairs, the maintenance of public peace and order, the 
selection of new sites for settlement, and the adjudication of local, 
disputes. At the sene time he is the intermediary between the villagers 
and the government linking the administrative structure of the hill , 
peoples to that of the goverment. A headman tends to be selected by 
virtue of his experience, age and wealth. His authority is often 
balanced by the great authority vested in the elders of the cormnunity 
and in some cases in the ritual leaders. 
2 
Most of the hill peoples are animists. They accept thq, existence 
of a nultitude of good and bad spirits: spirits of natural phenomena, 
spirits of dead and living people;, guardian spirits; locality spirits 
and many others., Taoism and ancestor worship are part of the religious 
ideology of some peoples, notably the Yao and the Meo. Buddhism hardly 
penetrates into the religious belief of those who have little contact 
with the lowland people, but is not uncomon among those who have more, 
frequent contacts and those who live in govenment settlements. This 
also applies to Christianity. ' However, these more orthodox religions 
in no sense undermine local tradition and culture. In almost every 
............ I 
F. G. B. Keen; *! hýland'Tenure*and'Land'U8e'in'Nbrth*Thailand (Bangkok: 
SEATO Publication', 1973) pp. 21-22; Kachadphai, ' op. cit., pp. 68-70; 
Walker,, *'op. 'Cit.., pp. 9-10. 
2. Kachadphai''ibid.; Department, of Public Welfare; 'Hill'Ttibd8'and 
'Welfate in Thailtid"(Bangkok: 1971) pp. 7-8; Walker, ''ibide, P. 11. 
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village, the religious specialists, the shamans'(22DLhi ) are important 
in tribal religious life. A shaman, who may be a male or female, 
acquires this status by virtue of his or her special supernatural 
powers. They are invested with high status and are in a position to 
command respect and obedience from the villagers. Their main func- 
tions are to officiate in the worship of spirits and ancestors., to 
interpret the spirits' intentions to the people, to cure sickness, and 
to conduct various seasonal rituals. The religious goals are health, 
fertility, economic prosperity, consensus among men, and harmony between 
men and the supematural world. 
1 
Apart from the few who are partially assimilated into Thai culture, 
the hill peoples are entirely different ethnically, culturally and 
linguistically from the Thai. They have neither a consciousness of 
being Thai nor a sense of belonging to the Thai social structure. They 
have not been given Thai citizenship, nor was there any atternpt to inte- 
grate them into Thai society before the 1960s. Under these circum- 
stances, it is very hard to conceive of any motive for loyalty to the 
goverment on the part of the hill peoples. On the contrary, they often 
pose difficulties to the goverment in many respects. Notably, they are 
seen as a threat to national security. The main threat to national 
security, as noted earlier, is commist infiltration, both in the form 
of ideological indoctrination and logistic support for insurrections. 
Other problems caused by these people arise from shifting cultivation 
and opium production. 
2 In an atteinpt to remedy these problems the 
goverment, in addition to suppressive measures, launched a propaganda 
............ 
Walker., 
2. Prapat Charusathien., General; 'Thaila'nd's'Hill'Tribes (Bangkok: 
Department of Public Welfare, 19-66) pp. 4-127. 
iso 
campaign and a development programme for the benefit of the hill peoples. 
The objectives in promoting the development, and welfare programme. 
were as follows: 
1. To prevent the destruction of forests and sources of streams, 
by encouraging sedentary agriculture to replace shifting 
cultivation. 
2. To end opium poppy growing by promoting other means of livelihood. 
3. To improiýe the economic and social conditions of the hill people, 
so that they may contribute to national development, by promoting 
community development among hill peoples grouped in settlements. 
4. To induce the hill peoples to accept the role of helping to main- 
tain the security of the national frontiers, by instilling in 
2 them a sense of belonging to the nation. 
To effect the latter goal in 1965 the govenunent, through the Depart- 
ment of Public Welfare, launched a programme of ý Buddhist missions to the 
3 hill peoples. The Sangha was assigned to carry out this, programe 
which attempted to achieve closer integration of the Thai nation through 
conversion of the hill peoples to Buddhism. lye' shall discuss this in 
detail later. 
1. ''Ibid.; The Goverment has also at times armed 'loyalists' among 
tHe-Till tribes,. and it is possible that some of thdse weapons, are 
now being used against it. 
2. 
_ 
Suwan Ruanyot., **Krong'kan'PzLtthana'lae'Songsem Chaokhao nai, Prathet 
'Thai CMe Development and Welfare. Schemes tor the Hill-Tribes in , 
=ailand), (Bangýok: Department-of Public Welfare, 1967) pp. l6-19. 
3. 
.. 
Department of Public Welfare; *Raingan'kmi'Phoeyphrae'Phraphutthasatsana 
kae'Chaokhao*thahk*phdk'niia'nal-phi ZS1U (Report on Buddhist Mission to 
Triba1People in the North in 1967) (Bangkok: Department of Public 
Welfare, 1968) p. 28. 
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(b) R6giondlism'iTi'the'Nbrth-ýEast 
Among the Thai-speaking people of Thailand, dissidence is most 
widespread among the Thai-Lao or'Isan people of the North-East. These 
people, who are in some senses ethnically defined, in others regionally, 
are tied to Thai society by two institutions - Buddhism and the monarchy. 
For only two decades has the goverment realized that their regional 
grievances against central control were becoming a threat to national 
integration and security. Therefore, since the 1960s, the Thai govern- 
ment has tried to make use of the two linking institutions as a means to 
integrate these North-Easterners into Thai society. It is inthis 
region that the feeling of regionalism is the strongest; that an 
organized dissident movement has been most effectively deployed against 
the central goverment forces; and that the commist movement has been 
most successful in winning the support of the people and establishing 
its strongest bases. 
The factors inducing the local feeling of regionalism, the dissidence 
and rural insurgency, as well as making the region susceptible to 
comamist ideology, lie in the following supposed characteristics of 
the Isan region: (i) its ethnic distinction from Central Thailand and 
its similarity to Laos; (ii) the appeal of the Lao separatist movement; 
(iii) the relative economic deprivation of the region; (iv) the isolation 
of substantial parts of the population from central government authority; 
(y) the susceptibility of the Laos and Cambodian borders to the infil- 
tration of hostile elements, Thai or otherwise; (vi) the occurrence of 
a number of recent acts of violence which are seen as having political 
motives; and (vii) a history of political dissidence. 
' 
.......... 
David A. Wilson, 'Introductory Coment on Politics and ihe North- 
East'J, -A8i, 6n'SUrv y, Vol. '6, - No. 7. July 1966, p. 632; and, by the 
same author; The United'Statos'and"Future of Thailand (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1970) pp-. 80-81. 
152 
The great, majority of Isan, people shovra high degree of conscious- 
ness of their regional and ethnic identity. ' They possess linguistic 
and cultural traits which are similar to the Lao of Laos. -They are 
native speakers of a Lao dialect which is different from Central Thai. 
Sometimes these people call themselves Lao, but in the sense of being 
indijenous to this region they refer to themselves as Fhon Isan (people- 
of Isan), as using thd'Phd. ýa'Dgan (Isan language), and as living in the 
Phak'I8an (Isan region). In distinguishing themselves fromIthe rest 
of the population, the Isan people refer to the others as the Thai. 
Charles F. Keyes suggests that such a self-identification indicates the 
sense of regional and etbnic identity of the Isan people. ' 
With regard to the. relationship with the Lao of Laos;, the Isan, 
people and the Lao have shared a common historical heritage and culture. 
According to John F. Cady, the Isan people were a segment of the Lao 
people who migrated from what is now Southern China during the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries and settled in this region and in present-day 
Laos. For most of the period between the mid-fourteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries they lived under their own rulers. After the 
Thai conquered the Lao in 1827, a large number of these people'were 
forcibly absorbed into the Thai kingdom. The Thai govenment controlled, 
the Lao until 1904 when it lost all Lao areas on the, left bank of the 
Mekong'to'France. 2 
1. Charles F. Keyes,, 'Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers in 
Northeastern Thailandl; 'Agian'Survey,, Vol. 6, No. 7., July 1966, pp. 
362-367, and'Itti. ' (Cornell- ' 
University: ( mell-lhailand Pro-ject., Interim Report Series No. 10, 
Data Paper No. 65., 1967) pp. 12-20. 
2. John F. Cady$'Southe. -Lýt'Asia: 'Its'Historical'Development (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964). pp. 143-149. 
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Geographically, the Isan region is separated from other regions, 
and especially Bangkok, by chains of, mountains. Direct commmication 
between the capital and the region has always been difficult, though the 
I 
frequency of contact was increased first by a railway constructed in 1890., and 
more recently by the American-built highway completed in the late 1950S. 
In comparison, communication across the Mekong between the Isan region and 
Laos was much easier. The Isan and Lao people maintain their close 
cultural and ethnic ties through migration, intermarriage, and trade. 
The Thai government views these links as partly compromising their efforts 
to effect stable and enduring national integration. , They also see 
it as 
likely that elements opposed to them will use these factors to undermine 
Thai influence and control over the Isan people. 
' 
Keyes suggests that the superior attitudes adopted by the Central 
Thai, especially Bangkok people, towards the Isan people help to increase 
the feeling of Isan regionalism. He points out that the Isan, people who 
had contacts with Bangkok people discovered that the latter thought of 
them as unsophisticated and uneducated provincials'(khon'ban no who 
were their social and cultural inferiors. 
2 
Until recently., the ineffectiveness of the public services in the 
Nbrth-East was another factor that reinforced the alienation of the Isan 
people from the central government. 
3 In addition, maladministration' 
and abuse of power by govenunent officials have long been among the 
grievances of these people. As a result, they tend to view goverment 
-officials with suspicion and apprehension. 
4 
1. Keyes., 'Isdft'., *IZ6gibiidlism'. '..,, p. 24. 
2. --Ibid., p. - 39. 
3., Michael C. Williams, 'Thailand: The Demise of a Traditional Society', 
'Journal'of 'Contemporary *, ALSia., Vol. - 3ý No. 4,, 1973, p. 432. 
4. Stephen I. Alpern, 'Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A Cause for 
t--A, - 'SurVey, Vol. 15., No. 8., 1975t p. 689. Alarm ; 1an 
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Economic deprivation has been one of the most significant sources 
of Isan's grievances. Poor soil and the lack of effective irrigation 
systems result in production of rice and other cash-crops below the 
national averages. Prior to the 1950s, the goverment's objectives 
in this region were focussed on full incorporation of the region into 
the administrative structure of the kingdom. Little attention was 
given to plans for economic development. Average per capita income 
was less than one-half that of the rest of the country. Only after the 
Second World War was Isan's poverty brought into focus. Isan MPs since 
then have become increasingly vocal about local poverty and the neglect 
of their region. ' But it was the rising strength of the separatist 
movement at the time of communist incursions into neighbouring countries 
in the 1950s, followed by signs of ccummist infiltration, that made 
the area a central concern of the goverment. Anticipating further 
separatist and conmmist political developments, the government attempted 
to forestall them by introducing a special plan for economic and social 
development of the Isan region in 1961. * 
The Isan politicians have long shown a tendency to oppose the 
central govenment. 
2 Since the 1940s several NPs from this region have 
had a reputation of radicalism and thus have been regarded as being 
leftists. 3 These MPs consistently brought out Isan's grievances in 
parliamentary debate and showed strong hostility towards the military 
and/or authoritarian rule of Phibun (1947-1957). They often demanded 
a radical improvement in the economic and social conditions of the Isan 
people. After 1947, the goverment began to move against some leading 
1. Keyes; 'op. *cit.,, pp. 14-21., 48-49. 
2. Wilson, '*The*Unitod'States*aiid*Future'of'Thailand, pp. 80-81. 
3. Wilson., 'Introductory Coment. ... 1, pp7.633-634. 
iss 
Isan NPs and their sympathisers. In 1948 many were arrested and 
I initially charged with having conspired to subordinate Thai national 
identity to a larger commist-dominated South-East Asian Union, and 
to establish a Siamese republic. Five'of them were parliamentarians 
from Isan and one from the central plain. During their detention, in 
I 
March 1949, four of them were found dead of gunshot wounds. Some 
other MPs and sympathisers disappeared in later years and were believed 
2 to have been killed in 1952. 
Keyes suggests that this brutality deepened the resentment against 
the goverment by the political leaders and people of Isan. It was 
also critical in shaping subsequent political attitudes in the Isan 
region. 
3 Their aspirations were openly demonstrative. For exanple, 
in December 1949 four Isan MPs, among others, proposed that Thailand be 
divided into six autonomous regions of which. Isan would be the largest. 
4 
During the late 1940s to 1950s there emerged a small group of 
political parties in Thailand which represented various shadings of 
what David A. Wilson called 'Thailand's new left parties'. The two 
most important of these leftist parties-were founded by Isan MPs. These 
were the, Setthakorn (Economists) and Seriprachathipathai (Free Demociats). 
5 
1. For detail see John Coast, 'Some Aspects'of'Siamese'Politics (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relati-ons, 1953) pp. 4Z-53; see also KeyesP* op. tit., 
pp. - 31-35. 
2. Keyes. "ibid., p. 34; Darling, *op. *cit'., p. 16. 
3. Keyes, ''ibid.., p. - 35. 
4. Jbid.,, p. 40. 
David A. Wilson, 'Thailand and'Marxism', Frank N. Trager (ed. ), 
Marxism'in*Southeast'Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press., 1959); 
see also Keyes; *ibid. ' pp. 46-49. These parties became the fore- 
runners. - of 
thie-Tafter Socialist Party* (S Rkomnii ýZd Socialist 
Front'Party of Thailand'(Ndbruam'Sanftomýyom) of the lP70s. 
f 
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During 1957-1958, the majority of Isan MPs were in agreement that only 
through socialism could conditions in the North-East be improved. 
' 
The socialism of the Isan leaders, the regional aspirations of 
their people, and the economic deprivation of the area combined were 
seen by the central goverment as the 'Isan problem', and as a threat 
to national security and integration. The Isan problem was also seen 
as providing the best opportunity for co=unist elements to advance 
their cause. Since 1958 the 'Isan problem' and its solutions have 
become a major preoccupation of the Thai goverment. They came to 
the conclusion that suppressive measures by the armed forces and political 
repression of Isan political leaders alone could not pacify the dissid- 
ents and solve the 'Isan problem'; rather, they recognized that it 
encouraged further alienation. It became clear to them that to resolve 
the 'Isan problem' the first priority was to 'win the hearts and'minds' 
of the Isan people, i. e. to secure the people's loyalty to the nation 
through drastic programes in social and economic development. The 
first major goverment progrmme designed specifically for the develop- 
ment of the ýbrth-East came in 1961 when the govenment promulgated a 
Five Year Plan for the development of the region. One of the six 
objectives of this plan was to promote commmity development, educational 
facilities', and a public health scheme at the local level. 
2 To effect 
this objective the Sangha was called upon to give assistance. 
1. Keyes, 'Lbid. 
2. See National Economic Developnent Board., *'The Devel2pment Plan For 
'thd'Northed-c; teiý, ii'Rogibn, *1962-ý1966 (Bangkok: National Econom3-c 
Development Board, 1961). 
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4. ' 'Jtistifiedti(iris'for'the'Polititdi *Mobil itation'bf 
In the early 1960s the goverment became increasingly aware that 
its secular development schemes were insufficient to counter, its 
problems of subversion and regionalism. Over time evidence had 
accumulated of its own remoteness from the rural populace and the 
barriers between its, officials aild the people.. The direct employment 
of the Sangha in development schemes came to be seen as one solution 
to these difficulties. This new policy seems to have been based on 
the following presuppositions: the great majority of the Thai population 
is Buddhist; the Sangha is held in esteem and enjoys great prestige; 
the -rural monks are-known to be influential in village affairs; and 
the Thai put their trust and confidence in their Sangha. For these 
reasons the political leaders believed that the Sangha was the best 
possible agent for the extension of goverment policies of welfare and 
national developmentp and national integration; and for the mobiliza- 
tion of support and encouragement of loyalty to the government. At 
the same time the Sangha was under fairly tight goverment control. 
Through patronage the goverment could secure the co-operation of the 
high-ranking monks in the Sangha, and as the Sanghawas hierarchically 
organized from state to village level, it was hoped that this would 
ensure loyal assistance at village level. The argument, that conmmism 
jeopardizes Buddhism and threatens the position of the Safigha no less 
than it does the national interest was a powerful one. For these 
reasons one can see how the Sangha might be manipulated to effect the 
goverment's political ends. 
'Although the Sangha had been involved in goverment policies before 
the 1960s, it was only after'1964-65 that its role in this respect was 
Discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
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institutionalized and becwne conspicuous. The participation of the 
Sangha ifi policies which were instigated for political reasons is 
generally regarded by the Thai, as inappropriate and inconsistent with 
. popular Buddhism. - It is not, surprising therefore that the leaders 
of the Thai governments during the 1960s and 1970s were careful in 
introducing this innovation. Their justifications were as-follows: 
1. According to the speeches of Sarit Thanarat, the Prime Minister 
from 1958-1963, the Sangha should co-operate in government plans, because 
the prosperity of the Sangha and the faith were closely related to that 
of the nation and the government. Ih emphasized that: 
"The prosperity and security of the religion could be 
. realized only 
if national security is achieved and 
economic progress is realized. This goverment 
emphasizes national development and unity, and will 
work for it. The Sangha can help the goverment in 
many ways*9. *9 For example., the Sangha should select 
only particular Dhamma in teaching the people. That 
is the teachings that encourages the people to work 
hard, be self-dependent and honest, and that encourage 
national unity ..... The teachings that hinder progress 
and undermine national unity should be discouraged-1 
2. In the process of national development the Sangha, should adjust 
its roles to help the govenment. 
2 
3. The Sangha should help in promoting or building the people's 
moral-values, while the govenment concentrates its efforts on social 
1. Sarit Thanarat, ''San'khong'Nayok'Ratthamontri*thung'thi'Prachum 
sannantana'Phra'Fanathikan thua RatEHH-anachak (The Prime Minister's 
Message to Administrative Monks' Naflonal ýonference) 18, ýpril 
1960. Virtually the same arguments about the kinds of teaching 
suitable for the people (and hence useful for the promotion of govern- 
ment policies) were being put forward by Prime Minister Thanom in 1972 
in his speech considere .d later in this section. 
2. See,, forýexample, Praphat, Charusathien, Minister of the Interior (1958- 
1973), 'Botbat khong kana Song nai kan patthana chumchon' (The Sanghals 
Role in Community Development) in'Rain&an'kitkam. khong kronkan'Songsorm 
'kaxi, Pdtthana'Chum(thon'khorijý'Kana'SZTng (Report on Activities of the 
Training Programme for I aging the Participation of, Monký in 
Community Development) k: Krung Sayam, 1969) pp. 42-44. 
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and economic development. In essence this argument was that the 
people were becoming materialistic and neglecting their religion. In 
consequence., ties of kinship and comrmmity were weakening, rendering 
village society more prone to commmist infiltration. 'A new assertion 
of religious values would do inuch to strengthen the commity base of 
Thai society in its fight against conrmism. 
1 The fear of commism 
and the need to strengthen the people's attachment to Buddhist values 
was dramatically expressed in a speech to the monks in 1969 by Ihanom. 
Kitthikachorn, the Prime Minister from 1963-1973: 
"At present people in some parts of the country are 
threatened by comamist terrorists, and some people 
are particularly vulnerable to the propaganda of 
insurgents ..... It is obvious that the enemy wants 
to enslave us., to destroy our freedom., our religion,, 
and our king. They are advancing their purposes by 
inciting the people not to pay respect to and not 
believe in the Sangha and Buddhism. These really 
jeopardize our national security and unitysi. 2 
What the monks could do in warding off the 'communist danger' was 
later elaborated by the Director of the Communist Suppression Operations 
Command (CSOS): 
'IS.. If the people believe and understand Buddhism 
superficially, it is dangerous to both religion and 
national security. This is because the conmmist 
has made a great effort to spread the idea that belief 
in Buddhism is irrational and not responsible to the 
needs of modem society. To safeguard our national 
1. Puang Suwaimarat, 'Tatsanakati'thor'Botbat'khong'Phrasong nai kan 
Patthana'Chumchon. (Attitude towards the Sanghals Participation in 
Commmity Development) (A Letter from the Under Secretary of Ministry 
of Interior to the Secretary General of Mahachula Buddhist University., 
4 August 1970). 
2. Thanom Kitthikachorn, 'San khong'Eqok'ratthamontri'thung'Phra'Dhamatuta 
(The Prime Minister's message to Dhammatuta Monks) 8 January 1969. He 
had in fact been advancing this kind of argument for some years 
previously; see, for example, ''Kam*PrAsai*khong'Nayok'ratthamontri nuang 
nai-6kat'ftRah'anus6rn khonRMahachulalon mraiavidyalai 
e Prbne-Minister's Spýech 6na- the 1 
Buddhist University) 18 July 1966. 
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security the monks should help the government by 
promoting the people's morality by teaching them 
a positive and creative-Dhamma., True under- 
standing of Buddhism and the possession of high 
morality will contribute to public, peace and ward 
off communism. - Moreover, the Sangha should help the government because the villagers trust the monks 
more than they trust government officials. Thus, 
they are in a better poiftion to create an under- 
standing between the gove = ent and villagers, and 
to make the. ýeople comprhend the danger of 
communists" I 
4. The government in its policy was following the teachings of 
the Buddha that goverment should always be alert to promote the well 
being of the governed and the faith. This argLunent was clearly 
expressed in a speech by Prime Minister Thanom in 1972: 
11... The Sangha has played an important role in 
national development. The Revolutionary Council 
has always held Buddhist principles as its guide 
in government ..... It prepares to sacrifice itself for the protection of Buddhism and security thereof. 
... The Revolutionary Council follows the teaching 
of the Buddha in that it is always alert to promote 
national development, and to a&dnister for the, 
benefits of the people. This teaching is applicable 
to every member of every institution ..... Life can be 
valuable only if one is directed by two aims: to 
strive for one's own good (or benefit) and to render 
services for the benefit of the whole society. The 
latter is very important because if one thinks only of 
oneself and does not care for society as a whole, one 
will be regarded as selfish and.. as a result,, may be 
alienated fran society. Therefore these two bbjec-. 
tives must go together .... 112 
These four justifications were interrelated in a single argument. 
The government as protector of Buddhism expected the co-operation of 
............ 
1. Saiyud Kerdphon; ý'Tat8anakati'thor'kan'mee'suan'ruam'Patthana'chumchon' (Attitude towards the Monks' Participation in Mm--munity 
Development) Official Document., CSOC., daied 31 July 1970. 
2. Mahachula Buddhist UniversitY, *''Kam'prasal g'Qýýhqn'Thanom 'kittikhachbrn (Field Marshal Thanom Kittikhachom's Speech) (BKK: 
Ratchaborphit Press,,, 1972) pp. 5-9,11. 
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the monkhood in ensuring national security, by them adapting their 
roles so that they could promote the morality of the people and the 
welfare of the state. The spiritual goals put forward appear 
perfectly honourable in themselves. But in-fact the goverment was 
suggesting to the Sangha that it should select for teaching those 
parts of the Dhamma which accorded most closely with government 
interest. For example, the doctrine of'Santbsal which urges people 
to be content with what they have, though it accords with the views 
of the government on the correct submissiveness of the people, was 
felt to induce conplacency towards national development. Instead the 
2 doctrine of self-reliance became the basis of the development programme. 
The goverment, in pushing the Sangha along the path It desired, 
faced the possibility of alienating the Sangha from itself on the one 
hand and from the people on the other. Presuming thA this could 
happen then why did it not occur? The reasons. included the fear of 
repressive measures from the authoritarian goverment against those 
disturbed by the suggestions, the general complacency of the population, 
the implied threats to the monkhood by the mention of how their 
privileges depended on the goverment, the accep, tance of the government's 
stance and of the measures necessary to combat communism, and the close 
integration of the Sangha leaders into the establishment. As we shall' 
see in the next sections and later chapters, the reaction of the Sangha 
I 
was muted up until 1973, when the emergence of a democratic goverment 
allowed true opposition to these policies to become public and division 
. to. appear within the apparently solid edifice of the Sangha. 
1. See Phra. Rai lavaramunil', 'A'Dictimaa'of 'Buddhism (Bangkok:, Mahachula. Buddhist University, 1915) p. 336. 
2. See'ibid., p. 85. 
S. * The Sanghal. 8'Response8'to*Political Mobilization 
In-the period 1960 to 1973., the Sangha's responses to the govem- 
ment's attempts at their political mobilization assumed different 
dimensions at different levels of the hierarchy. I consider these 
in tum below. 
At the top administrative level, the members of the Mahatherasamakom 
were of the opinion that the monks should take part in government 
policies of national development and national integrationg because these 
brought progress and security, to the nation. Their reasons were as 
follows: 
First, they saw it as consistent with the Sangha's responsibility to 
render services to society. The ideological legitimation for this 
decision was alleged to be found in the teachings of the Buddha that, 
because monks depended on the material support of the laity, they are 
therefore morally obliged to render their services to promote the well- 
being of laymen. Consequently if the monks do not contribute some- 
thing to the well-being of society, they will be regarded as social 
parasites. 
2 
Second, it was maintained that the monks were also morally obliged 
) and com- to help the layman by the virtues of loving-kindness'QI2ýta 
passion*(karma). 
3 These two virtues established the duty of the 
monks to be always joyful so that they can take another's miseiry as their 
1. See'Pali'Pitaka, Vol. 25., quotation 287., p. 314. 
2. Phra Ubalikunupamacharn, 10wart thor Phra Dhammajarik' (Address to 
Dhamajarik Monks) in'Rdport'bn'tho*P-t2pdgdtion'of'Buddhism*Among 
-thd'Hill'Ttibes-(Banglýo-k: Department ot Public We-ITa-re, 1972) p. 12. 
3. For elaboration see Phra Rajavaramuni. -bp. cit., pp. 291t 326, ' and, 
Siddlýi'Butr-In; '6p. 'eit., pp. 123-130.1 
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own, and express their concern by helping them. 
Third, it was maintained that the goverment and the king gave 
the Sangha patronage, support, and protection which enabled them to 
enjoy the satisfaction of the monkhood. In return they should render 
every possible assistance to these institutions and be loyal to the 
interests of the nation. 
1 
Fourth, according to Somdet Phra Wannarat, 
2 there were obvious 
threats to Buddhism. These were: the animosity of hostile forces, 
e. g. conmunism, against Buddhism; the invasion by hostile foreign 
countries (i. e. North Vietnam, China, and Communist Pathet Laos); the 
so-called Buddhists who perverted the Dhmma in their teachings; and 
those materialist Thai who did not adhere to Dhamma and exploited others. 
All these elements jeopardized Buddhism, so the Sangha's involvement in 
national development and integration prograumes would help defeat the 
internal and external subversion of the faith and help to restore 
Buddhism. 
Fifth, the Sanghals involvement in integrating the hill peoples 
was seen to be especially meritorious. It was asserted by Somdet Phra 
Wannarat that the hill peoples had always needed Dhamma, but no one could 
teach them. Thus bringing'Dhama to them was meritorious, and the 
missionary monks were regarded as following the Buddha's example. In the 
1. Phra Ubalikmapamacham, 'op. cit., p. 13. 
2. Ib was then an influential member of the Mahatherasamakom and the 
Director of Phra Dhammatuta Division'QlLekong Ng-AA'Phra Dhamatuta). 
He subsequently became the Supreme patriarch in 191Z. 
3. Somdet Phra Wannarat, 'Phra Owat hai kae. Phra Dhammjarik' (Address 
to Phra Dhamaj arik) , in, Rdi: ngan'kan'PheoXftrde 
mu chaokhao (Report on the propagation of Buddhism Among the 
Trlb-eýs -in North Thailand) (Bangkok: Department of Public Welfare, 
1967) p. 16. 
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same way merit would accrue to the govenment who sponsored the programme 
while the hill people, being exposed to Dhanm would also gain merit. 
ýIbreover, the propagation of Buddhism to these people not only 
strengthened their morality, but also helped to ward off other undesir- 
able forces (i. e. counmism). 
2 
., 
the Sangha's participation in goverment policies, especially Sixth 
as manifested in the Phra Dhamatuta programe, 
3 
was seen as a means to 
strengthen and restore people's loyalties. This was clearly stressed 
by Somdet Phra Wannarat: 
*** through the strengthening of the people's attach- 
ment to Dhamas the'People will be loyal to the nation.. 
the king, and the goverment; by adhering to Buddhism 
the people will better understand each other, thereby 
promoting national integration; through national integ- 
ration people will be unified. Moreover, the monks will 
lift up the villagers' morale and will help them in their 
development. 4 
Finally, the Sangha's involvement was necessary because of rapid 
social changes in Thai society, and the Sangha had to take part in order 
to maintain its status. In other words the monkhood had to accept and 
take part in social change or they would become obsolescent and injure 
the faith. These views were promoted by some prominent monks who were 
the architects of plans employing monks in commity development 
1. 'Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
2. Phra Ubalikunapamacham, 'op. 'cit., p. 13. 
, 3. This programe 
is to be discussed in later sections. 
4. Somdet Phra Wannarat, Thra Owat hai kae. Phra Dhammatutal (Address 
to Phra Dhannatuta) in'PhrdThamattita, Vol. 1,1969'ý p. 9. 
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, programmes. 
1 
The, administrative monks at provincial level (Chao kana Changwat) 
in particular were reported to have shared similar attitudes to those 
of the top level administrative monks. According to Ruangdej Srimuni 
and Klausner the administrative monks at this level enthusiastically 
co-operated with the government. They organized the programmes 
2 
to 
train village monks, such as the abbots and teachers as leaders- and 
to teach them technical subjects and camiunity development teclMiques. 
Religious instruction was also provided. These training courses, 
lasting from one to three weeks, offered, for, exanple, instruction in 
3 
a variety of secular subjects as well as practical classes in the 
making of wells, water jars, and water seal'latrines. They provided 
several thousand rural monks with an increased technical competence so 
that they could more effectively carry out new fmctions in their village 
communities. 
Details of their views and arguments can be found in their articles. 
See, for example, Phra Maha Prayut Payutto, (now Phra Rajavaramuni ' 
who was one of the founders of this programme and'who is the Deputy, 
Secretary of Mahachula Buddhist University) 'Problems, Status and 
Duties of the Sangha in Modem SocietyI, -Visakhd'Pdja*B. E. 2511 
(Bangkok: 1968) pp. 58-72; and 'Botbat kE-on-g-M-rasong nal -ýg-kom 
.. 
Thai' (The Sanghals Role in Contemporary Thai Society) in Phuttha- 
satsana *kap * Sangkom'Thai'Patchuban (Buddhism and Contempor-aTT=ai 
Society) (Bangkok: Sivaporn Press, 1970) pp. 14-22,56-68; see also 
Phra Maha Chai Aphakaro, 'Kan Prubprung botbat khong Pbrasong'-(The 
Adjustment of the Sanghals Roles) in'Kalapruk, Vol. I, No. 1 (Bangkok: 
1972) pp. 1-3; and 'Phrasong kap kan-PERRTFma thongthin' (The Monks 
and Community Development, in'Buddhachak, Vol. 26, No. 5, July 1972, 
pp. 19-30. 
2. These were the establishment of Sangha Education and Development Centres 
in. many provinces in the North and I\brth-East. They also administered 
the Phra Dhammatuta and Phra Dhammajarik programmes in their areas. 
For details see William J. Klausner, 'Buddhist Universities Under Royal 
Patronagel, *Visakha'lkijd'B. E. '2516, pp. 13-16; Ruangdej Srimuni, op. 
cit., pp. 70-76; and Somboon SUksamran., -op. cit. 2 pp. 77-79. 
3. Forelaboration of courses and subjects in the training see Somboon 
Suksamranl, ''op. 'cit. 
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It was only at the village level that a lack of wholehearted co- 
operation became clearly apparent, though whether the monks involved 
objected to the policies themselves or their own involvement in them 
i, s uncertain. Based on a survey of 23 villages in the North-East,, 
Patthaya Saihoo reported that 25 per cent of the leading monks could 
be relied on for their active support; 50 per cent could be moderately 
relied on; and 25 per cent could not be expected to help at all. The 
survey also indicated that some monks who supported the government 
programmes did so of their awn accord without any clearly defined 
policy direction from the central Sangha administration. 
' 
Although the govenunent policies and progranms appear to have 
ýeen largely supported by the adninistrative Sangha, there is evidence 
I 
Of strong opposition from the younger, rank-and-file monks. According. 
to Mulder who interviewed a number of junior monks living in Bangkok, 
and to Ruangdej-Sr: hmmi who did the same in monasteries up-country, most 
of the monks they interviewed were opposed to the idea of monks' 
participation in government programmes. They saw their roles as con- 
sisting of religious activitieSper se, and., in relation to lay society, 
as religious teachers and specialists. Involvement in goverment prog- 
rames. was seen as incompatible with the discipline (VinaYa) of monks 
See: Patthaya Saihoo, 'op. cit., pp. 269-300. Unfortunately neither Ingersoll, this study nor other slldlla_rýýtudies (e. g. Malder, 'op. 'clt*l 
op. . cit. ) have made clear the degree to which abbots and monks at 
village level were required by the higher level Sangha administration 
to participate in these-programes- There is evidence that they were 
requested to participate, but not of the sanctions on non-co-operation 
or grudging assistance. For example, the Mahatherasamakom through 
the, Department of Religious Affairs sent letters to the provincial, 
Sangha authorities calling on them to support the government programies 
and to give co-operation. (Letter from Mahathefasamakom to Chao kana. 
Phak., Chao kana Changwat, and Abbots concerning the Objectives and 
Implementation of the Phra Dhanmatuta Programme, 14 March 1964). 
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and as, leading to the moral degradation, of the monkhood. . In their 
opinion, successful propagation of the religion by the Sangha was all 
that they needed to contribute tp secure the welfare of the people, 
and ultimately to achieve the welfare of the state. ' I 
A survey carried out among 324 monk-students in Mahachula Buddhist 
University to ascertain their attitudes to their roles in modem society 
2 produced similar findings to Mulder and Ruangdej's. However, it is 
su-rprising to find in the same survey that these monks did not seem to 
be aware of the political motives of the Phra Dhammatuta programme. 
The survey revealed that 93.2 per, cent of the same sample approved of 
this programme because they saw it as promoting religious 6nds. 
3 
in sumary, then, the goverment appears to have had considerable 
support from the Sangha for its development programes in the-period up 
to 1973. Part of the reason for this support must lie in the Sangha 
seeing communism as a threat to its own existence; a view which, though 
not expressed openly., is certainly implied in some of the speeches of 
the members of the mahatherasamakom considered earlier. Thus an 
identification with the Thai state becomes a strategy for self-preser- 
vation, which casts a rather different light on'the Sangha apparently 
co-operating, willingly with what might well be to them a rather unpalat- 
able goverment in Bangkok. Clearly the goverment policies were 
sufficiently well thought out to have considerable appeal on spiritual 
grounds, even to the extent that some monks did not recognize any political 
motivation or object to government interpretations. This may also relate 
1. For fuller details see Mulder, * op. cit., pp. 11-14; and Ruangdej 
Srimmif'op-cit., pp. 98-100. 
2. Tambiah, 'World Conqueror*and*World'Renouncer, p. 421. 
3. * jbid., p. 452. 
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y 
to the ability of the monks to distinguish their own Buddhist sentiments 
from their Thai sentiments. 
The whole problem of the degree to which the Sangha should view 
itself as the servant of the state as opposed to being the servant of 
the people was nevertheless raised by some monks . and later we shall 
see it becoming an increasing problem. - At this stage it is difficult 
to see if their objections to the programmes clearly distinguished., 
between the policies themselves and the Sangha's involvement in them. 
The critical monks appear to have been a tiny minority at the lower, 
level and it is not surprising therefore that they had little influence 
at the top. On the contrary., what emerged here was a powerful-interest 
group of monks from the middle and upper levels of the hierarchy who saw 
opportunities in the programmes and became loyal supporters of them-, and 
perhaps even had parts to play in the instigation of some of the policies. 
-Recent 'Institutioml ized'Roles of 'the Sangha'in Govenunent Policies 
In this section I discuss the Sanghals roles in implementing the 
goverment's policy of national development and integration. The out- 
line of the schemes. given here derives basically from a previous wor, k of 
mine to which the reader is referred for more details, togetherwith 
some more recent data. 
In the 1960s the government and the Sangha instituted a series of 
schemes 'to win the people's hearts and minds' in the rural'areas of 
Thailand. The basic aims of the schemes were identical - namely, to 
use the Sangha to promote Buddhism in conjunction with socio-economic, 
I 
development as a buttress against subversion, particularly communist 
. subversion. They 
differed mainly in the enPhasis placed on Buddhism 
1'. --Political-Buddhism-in-Southeast-Asia. 
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as contrasted with socio-economic development; in the degree of control 
exercised by the Sangha authorities as contrasted with the government; 
and in the kinds of communities at which they were aimed. Separating 
the achievements of the programmes and assessing their effectiveness is 
difficult for three reasons. First, the same personnel were often 
employed at various times in more than one scheme. Second, the prog- 
rammes themselves were constantly changing as new ideas appeared for 
their improvement. Third, the Sangha administration had a habit of 
only reporting on the schemes for which they were responsible, rather 
than on all activities of the Sangha in goverment schemes. 
Chronologically, these schemes began with the Sangha setting up 
the Buddhist Study Centres in 1963-1964, which soon became involved in 
the Com=ity Development Programme via the Training Project for Encour- 
aging the Participation of Monks in Commmity Development (1965-1966). 
Alongside this development came Buddhist schemes from goverment depart- 
ments - the Phra Dhammatuta programe instituted in 1964 by the Depart- 
ment of Religious Affairs which was soon followed by the Phra Dhanmajarik 
programe (1965) which came from the Department of Public Welfare. These 
were matched by government secular programes such as the Accelerated 
Rural Development scheme, which, though instituted by the Prime Minister's 
Office in 1964, did not draw directly on Sangha personnel until 1970, when 
the Development Plan for Co-operation between the Sangha and the State was 
set up. All these schemes continue in the same general form up to the 
present. 
(a) 'The Sarighal s 'Role 'in *the, Com=ity Development ProEaimne 
The goverment programe of commity, developnent was designed 
as part of the counter-insurgency measures in sensitive areas, especially 
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the North and North-, Eastý Its hiplementation is thought to avert 
commist subversion, and to secure the villagers' loyalty to the 
central government. 
2 The socio-economic rationale for the adoption I 
of the principles and methods of community development was the belief 
that important human resources in rural society had been ineffectively 
utilized, and that the rural populace lacked initiative in resolving 
their own problems. The community development programme has the 
following objectives: increasing the production and income of the. rural 
populace; expanding rural public works; promoting health, sanitation, 
education, recreation and youth training; preserving the culture of 
villages; and extending the services of the goverment to reach the 
people more effectively than previously. 
3 
The implementation of the programme is based on the following 
principles. ý First, it is a joint undertaking of the villagers, arld the 
govemment. Ideally, in each project the initiative should come'from, 
the villagers. The gove=ent provides technical assistance and 
materials that are beyond the ability of the villagers to provide for 
themselves. Where the villagers lack initiative and/or willingness, 
the government officials (the community development workers), urge them 
to be enthusiastic about their own responsibility for the future of 
their own com = ity, and educate them to the extent of familiarizing 
............. 
I 
1. This has been clearly stressed by the goverment. See Department 
of Counmity Development, 'This'i: -ý*CommuniýX'Development'in Thailand (Bangkolk: Connunity Development Press, 1971) pp. 16-19. For more 
details see, for example, J. Alexander Caldwell; 'Ameridan*Economic. 
Aid'to'Thailand (ýIassachusetts: D. C. Heath & Co., ID720 pp. 13,59. 
pp. 85-88, -132-149. 2. Caldwell p 
3. Department of Community Development (1971), op. cit., 'pp, 20-21. 
I 
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them with modern ideas and tecImology, and the advantages and disadvan- 
tages of introducing changes. Second, com=ity development is expec- 
ted to introduce self-help projects at the village level; to mobilize 
local resources in the most useful way; to assist in establishing a 
training ground for democracy; and to create a national consciousness 
among the rural populace. Third and most importantly., it was meant 
to be a means to change people's negative attitudes towards the govern- 
ment, and to secure the villagers' loyalty by eliminating conflicts 
among them and between them and the government. 
1 
(i) Buddhist'Studies Centres 
The first programme was begun in the Nbrth-East in 1964-1965 under 
the auspices of provincial Sangha authorities with the support of the 
Buddhist universities. Today, such centres are in operation in every 
province in the North-East and in Cheingmai. The initial justification 
for establishing the Buddhist Studies Centres in the provinces was to 
serve two main purposes; first, to train local monks to familiarize 
themselves with gove=ent policies of community development so that 
they could contribute to the government and people's development efforts; 
and second, to improve the standards of education for monks in adminis- 
trative and teaching positions. With regard to the first purpose, the 
main idea was for monks to work closely with the government officials 
and give all possible help to them in rural development. At the same 
time efforts would be made to supply the government with accurate inform- 
.. ation. a. 
bQut the needs of the villagers. , 
Phat Buriyarataphan,, 'Community'Develgment*in'tho'Country (Bangkok: 
Community Development Press., 1975) pp. 1-9; see HIýs-oDepartment 
of Community Developwnt; TijnCtion8- *of 'Department'of 'Community 
'Development (Bangkok: Community Development Press, 1975). 
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These centres give periodic fomal training courses to village 
monk leaders, such as abbots and teachers, in secular subjects. In 
preparing these courses, relevant goverment agencies were consulted. 
Instructors were mainly provided by the two Buddhist universities and 
goverment departments concerned with commity development programmes. 
The training lasts frcm one to three weeks. The Buddhist universities 
also provide personnel to help in the administration of the centres. 
Many hundreds of rural manks have been trained by these centres. 
1 
(ii) The Trdining*Project for'Encouraging the Participation'of Monks 
'in'Commmity'Development 
In response to the government's request for the Sanghals help in 
community development, this project was established by the Sangha in 
1966. The Sanghals reasons are. given below: 
It is apparent that at present national development 
is a principal policy of the goverment ..... To fulfil this end the government has to depend on, and have the 
co-operation of other institutions. The Sangha .... is one of those institutions and has taken part in 
promoting the progress and prosperity of the nation ... 
.. In an age of accelerated development, the Sangha 
. will 
be an even greater asset to the nation. Only if 
the monks acquire substantial knowledge,. and only if 
they clearly understand the philosophy, objectives and 
methods in development laid down'by the goverment, 
will the Sangha's co-operation be fruitful. 2 
Such a familiarity with the government's policy, and methods in couummity 
development would further enable the monks to be more effective leaders' 
.. of. the. people in development, 
both materially and spiritually. 
3 The 
1. For fuller detail about the nature of the progranme, training and 
the participation of rural monks, see Sornboon Suksamran, 
pp. 75-78. 
co 
2. Mahachula Buddhist Universit 
r in=FTT'ý 
6 IgK u1 
setni'kari 'Pdtthand'Thohgthin 
YCOeTra 
g ro ec 
PC 
0 UTrF gq 9 
the Participation of Monks in Con=ity Development) (Bangkok: Knmg 
Sayam, 1969) p. 3. 
3. Phra Thepkunaphorn, 'Yam-. k1ao. *raingan (Report to the Supreme Patriarch 
I on the Opening of Training Project for Encouraging the Participa- 
tion of Monks in Coummity Development) dated 26 December 1967. 
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assertion that the Sangha is an asset to the nation, and possibly will 
be the best apparatus for the govenment policy of commmity development 
I is said to be based on the following assumption: 
* Up-country, the people put their trust and con- Kdence in monks; obedience and co-operation in any 
activity becomes automatic if the request comes from 
the monks ..... coummity development pTogrammes are 
sure to be effectively accomplished with monastic 
help and co-operation. Having this in. mind and in 
line with the national development policy of the 
government, the (Buddhist) University deemed it 
advisable to initiate projects for the training of 
monks in the promotion and coordination of comnmity 
development activities, with an aim to contribute to 
týe. gove=entls efforts in raising the standard of 
living of our rural population. 1 
The objectives of the training project were described as follows: 
(1) To maintain and promote the monks' status as the refuge of the 
people by providing them with religious education and general 
knowledge, concerning conmmnity develolpment. 
(2) To encourage monks and novices to participate : JLn com=1ty 
developi mnt and thus help existing development programmes to 
achieve their aims. 
To promote unity among the Thai people and thus help to promote 
2 
national and religious security. 
The administration of the project has been the responsibility of 
the Sangha Administrative Comittee in co-operation with a Lay Adminis- 
3 
trative. Comittee. The implementation of the project has been under 
mahachula Buddhist University 'General 'Information (Bangkok: Mahachula 
Buddhist Universitys 1967) p. 89. 
2 'Ibid. 
3. For fuller detail see Somboon Sukswnran. ' pp., 80-82. 
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the supervision of two joint committees; the Sangha Advisory Committee 
consisting of the office holders of the Mahatherasamakom whose respon- 
sibility is to give advice and to coordinate with government in planning 
the project. 'Ihe Lay Advisory Committee consists of Heads of the follow- 
ing departments: Religious Affairs, Community Development, Provincial 
Administration, Public Welfare, Public Health, Medical Services, Fine 
Arts, and Teacher Training. The President of the Buddhist Association 
of Thailand is included in this committee. The committee also serves 
as the point of co-operation between the Sangha and the gove=ent. 
That the approval of the Sangha's involvement in this government prog- 
rame came from the highest Sangha authority is mmifest in the member- 
ship of the Committee of Patrons. This committee is chaired by the 
Supreme Patriarch and all Somdet Phraracha kana are ex-officio members. 
The trainee monks are divided into two categories, Group A and 
Group B. according to the training they are to receive, and the respons- 
ibility they are to assume. 
Group A are monks who are selected and sent to receive training by 
the Chao kana Changwat of their respective provinces, or mnks considered 
qualified by the committee of the training project. They mast have 
passed at least*Nak'thmn grade 3 or Barian of any grade; have been in 
the monkhood at least five years, but not more than 25 years, and must 
not be over 50. Generally, those monks selected to receive training 
during 1966-1973 held a salaried adndnistrative office in the Sangha 
Mahachula Buddhist University * 'KuriOtd * lae kan Faitkýý.; 
n Thongt Orl an an 'Obrom'Phtd'Phiksd 
Tasks of the Training Project for Encouraging the Participation of 
Monks in Commity Development) (Bangkok: Prayoonwong Press, 1967) 
pp. 2-4. 
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hierarchy or office as an ecclesiastical teacher. 
Group B are monks who have graduated with the BA degree from 
Buddhist Universities and who satisfy the following requirements: 
have behaved themselves properly; have shown abilities in religious 
functions; have been ordained at least five years; and are willing 
2 
to go and perfom religious duties in assigned areas. Group B are 
the better educated, young monks based in Bangkok who are expected to 
assune higher posts in the future through their ability and education. 
The duration of training and the courses taken vary betwe6n the 
two groups. They are designed to suit the academic background of the 
participants and the types of responsibility they are to undertake. 
In drawing up the syllabi and ensuring that the monks are well equipped 
for their tasks, both lay and Sangha advisory committees are consulted. 
Courses are aimed at meeting both educational and working fieeds and the 
assigned tasks of each group. Thus, a close look at the syllabi will 
reveal the roles that these monks are expected to assume. 
For Group A the-training is three to four months. The first part 
of the training includes classroom lectures. The subjects taught are,: 
Buddhism and its application to daily life; Structure of Rural Society; 
Thai History; Public Health; Sanitation; Ibme Economies; Commity 
Development, its principles and methods; Rural Development Policy, its 
principles and methods; Vocational Promotion; Educational Guidance; 
Leadership; Public Relations; Applied Psychology; Preservation of 
Artistic works; Wat Development; Sangha, Law and Regulations; Selected 
. Laws;. and Preventive 
Medicine (or First Aid). 3 
1. For more details see Mahachula Buddhist University (1969), ' op. tit., 
pp. 14-15, and Somboon Suksamran,: op. tit., pp. 82-83. 
2. Mahachula Buddhist University (1969)'Lbid., pp, * 15-16. 
3. Elaboration from the Training Schedule for Monks Group A 1967-1973; 
see also Somboon Suksamran, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
e 
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This period is usually spent in Bangkok, and lasts from one to six weeks. 
Instruction,, apart from Buddhism, is provided by the civil departments 
concerned with coummity and rural developments. At the same time 
related govenunent policies are imparted in the lectures by government 
officials. 
The second period of training, ranging from three to five weeks, 
has a practical emphasis. Classes are usually held in Buddhist Studies 
Centres in the provinces. In the first phase, provincial officials give 
instruction specifically relating to the actual problems encountered in 
their daily work in rural areas. Such lectures include a study of 
-problems in co-operation between goverment officials and villagers, 
the nature and causes of crime, the problem of comunist subversion 
and propaganda, and problems of public health, sanitation, and hygie4e. 
Simultaneously, demonstrations of how to achieve improved levels of 
hygiene and nutrition; how to use fertilizers; how to make latrines 
and water jars, etc. are included. ' After finishing this phase, the 
trainees commence practical field work which has the following objec- 
tives: / 
To propagate Buddhism by applying the kno-kedge, they have 
learnt. 
To study the nature and structure, of the village comwnity 
in order to gain first-hand experience. 
To observe the methods of comiunity development in a real 
situation and to appreciate the obstacles that may occur. 
During the practical field work the trainees are advised to make coments 
m the following aspects of conmmity life and suggest remedies for 
1. * Jbid. 
"I 
177 
problems they encounter in them. 
The people's understanding of religion, culture, and 
traditions. 
(ii) Their level of nutrition, health and hygiene. 
(iii) fbw the people use their leisure, their habits and character, 
and their sense of conmunity. 
, 
(iv) Adult education and education for children. 
(v) People's occupations and incomes, and the advantages and dis- 
advantages they find in engaging in their present Occupations. 
(vi) The measure of people's initiative in self-help and co- 
operatim,. their attitudes towards the goverment's policies 
of comiunity development and social welfare. - 
(vii) Village economy and commmications; affecting the villagers' 
well-being. 
(viii) Village leadership and public order. 
(ix) Wat welfare and its develolxnent. 1 
The third period of one to four weeks in duration involves the 
evaluation and conclusion of the whole training programme. It is 
usually organized in the form of seminar or discussion groups, and each 
group is expected to produce a report. At the, end these monks are given 
certificates and go back to carry out their assigmnents in their 
communities. 
As the monks in Group B are usually assigned to instruct local monks 
Elaborated from Training Schedule, Period 2, for Monks Group A, 1970; 
for further detail see Somboon Suksamran, ''op. tit., pp. 84-85. 
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in ecclesiastical education and in techniques of conrmmity development, 
and are not expected to stay permanently in the rural areas, their 
training courses, though similar, are not as intensive and as broad as 
those for Group A, and are sh orter in duration, jasting one to two 
months. Practical training may be involved, if it is deemed necessary. " 
After finishing the training, they are sent to communities as requested 
by the. Sangha governors of provinces. 
These trained monks are expected to lead, advise and mobilize the 
rural populace for the. accoinplishment of the com=nity development prog- 
ramme. Such an accoinplishnent is believed by the Sangha and goverment 
authorities to contribute eventually not only to the enhanced welfare of 
2 the society but also to the defence of the country against commism. 
The tasks that they are advised to carry out can be summarized as 
follows: 
M The primary duty of the recruited monks is the propagation and 
promotion of Buddhism. They are to strengthen the people's attachment 
to Dhama by teaching them moral-principles based on Buddhist ethics, 
1. For more details see'Somboon Suksamran, ''ibide, pp. 85-86. 
2. These expectations were made explicit in the statements of high 
ranking monks and govenunent leaders. See, for example, Somdet 
Phra Wannarat, 'Phra Owat hai kae Phra Phiksu ruam Saumar kan 
Patthana. thongthin' (Address to Monk-participants in Community 
Development). -BLIddhddhak, Vol, 23, No. 7 (July 1969) pp. 92-93; 
Phra Sasana SoUana, 'Kam Klao Perd kan Obrom' (Address on the 
opening the-Seminar) ''ibid., pp. 12-14; Phra Ariyamethi, 'Kam 
Klao-ThonrupI (Welc'&ý6; ýýess); 'ibid., pp. 18-20; Sanya 
Thannasak., 'Tatsanakati thor Phraýýo_ng kap kan Patthana Chumchon' 
(Attitude towards the Sanghals Activity in Conmmity Development) 
in-Rainý, an, kitkam, khong Patthana'Chumchon 
RF-Nýa-, 'Song (Report on Activities of, the Training Project -khonF- Tor 
Encouraging the Participation of Monks in Copmunity Development) 
(BaT, gkok: . Krung Sayam Press, 1970) pp. 10-11. 
179 
and by establishing Buddhist Sunday Schools for the young. They are 
also advised to arrange meetings with local monks and give instruction 
to them on how to maximize their roles as moral, spiritual, and social 
leaders in the interests of the promotion of Buddhism and community 
development. 
(ii) In the sphere of cormamity development they are advised to 
teach Dhamma that encourages the people to participate in communal 
activities which are for their own benefit. For example, they should 
emphasize in their teaching the principle of'DAna (giving) so that 
villagers will acquire a greater willingness to sacrifice personal 
interests for communal interests. They should encourage them to 
strive for better economic welfare by diligently pursuing the right 
means of livelihood, by saving and using their wealth economically. 
They should encourage the villagers' co-operation and unity by teaching' 
them the principles of loving-kindness and compassion, honesty, and co- 
operation. The monks are advised to lead, as well as encourage, the 
villagers' participation in such village developments as the construc- 
tion of bridges, roads, wells., rest houses, and other public properties., 
and in repairing the old ones. With regard to the villagers' health, 
the monks are expected to advise the villagers to eat nutritious food, 
., give. advice concerning sanitation, public 
health, and hygiene. 
1 In 
See Mahadmla Buddhist University (1969), op-cit., pp. 19-20; Office 
of Accelerated Rural Developnentf''NaeWthang at ibat kan Patthana, -ruamkan 
''La . *Phutthachak'Ua 'anarchak (Direction of Co-operation in Rural 
. 
Kang 
Development between the Sangha and State) (Bangkok: Office of ARD, 1970) 
pp. 32-33; Phra Maha Sathein Thirayano, INaew thang kan chai thamma 
nai kan Phatthanal (Recomendations on the Application of Dhamma for 
Developnent), ''Buddhachak, Vol. 26 (July 1972) pp. 17-19; see also Phra 
Maha Chai Apakir-o, -TPUr-asong kap kan Patthana thongthin' (Monks and 
Community Development)'Buddhachak, Vol. 26 (May 1972) pp. 24-28. 
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addition, they are to teach the local monks the techniques oý community 
developnent. 
(iii) For the promotion of the villagers' livelihood'the monks 
give advice on, and educate the people in, modernagricultural technology 
and techniques concerning, for exarnple, new methods in faming, the idea 
of crop-rotation, and the use of fertilizers. It is enteresting to. 
note that some monks even advised the villagers to use particular brands 
of fertilizer, weed killer, and pesticide. 
(iv) The monks are also advised to encourage and instil in the 
villagers a sense of loyalty to the nation, government, religion, and 
the king. In addition, they are expected to act as intermediaries 
between the goverment, its officials and the villagers. In so doing, 
the monks pass on the goverment's policies and its concern for their 
well-being to the villagers. They assess the villagers' needs and 
attitudes towards the government and feed this information back to the 
government. They also advise the people on the procedures to be 
followed in contacting the goverment agencies. 
2 
(v) While the monks are encouraged to involve themselves directly 
with the villagers, they are also required to improve their own wat, 
for it will be exemplary to the villag6rs in development, and strengthen 
the people's attachment to religion. It is prescribed that: the wat 
should be clean and tidy and be a proper place of sanctuary; those who 
live in the wat should be well treated; each wat should provide the 
people with the facilities for merit-making, practicing Dhamma, and per- 
forming other religious activities. The goverment regards it as I 
Personal comwnication from a monk who participated in the commity 
development programme. 
2. Mahachula Buddhist University (1969)*Oý. 'Cit.,, pp. 19-20. 
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a? ciomatic that if the wat is well developed it will attract people to 
it and thus enhance a corporate sense among the people. Moreover, 
attacIment to an effectively run wat by the people makes it easy for 
the monks to teach them, and people may incidentally learn lessons of 
I 
development for themselves -1 
(yi) In education, apart from. teaching the local monks., the trained 
monks also help in teaching school children; give advice on further 
education; and help mobilize funds and labour for the extension of 
2 schools. They also encourage the people to preserve and adjust local 
culture and traditions that are beneficial to their way of life. 3 
In carrying out their tasks the monks are required to observe the 
rule that they should not force information or knowledge upon the people 
directly. Rather they should seek to infuse the infomation or know- 
ledge they wish to impart into their teaching, preachings and conver- 
sation with the villagers. Ritual gatherings and religious occasions 
are sometimes used to help in promoting and supporting new schemes of 
development introduced by the government. fbwever, it is not uncommon 
to see some active monks physically helping the villagers in the cons- 
truction of mads, digging wells, and the erection of new buildings. 
It is interesting to note that although the com wn ity development 
programme is politically inspired, monks involved in the programme are 
instructed-to avoid teaching the people politics. Even so there are 
I 
.. some. independent minded monks who are of the opinion that they should 
1. Department of Religious Affairs -Annual 'Report of 'Religious 'Activities. 
Idt'1969 (Bangkok: Department of Religious Affairs, 1972), p. 87., 
2. Phra Maha Chai Apakaro , -op. *cit., pp. 
24-25. 
3. ''Ibid., pp. 28-29; Phra Maha Sathien Thirayano. -Op. *eit. p. 20. 
4. For more details. see Ingersoll. -op-'cits., pp. 62-63; Ruangdej Srhmmi 
'Cit., pp. -78-80; Flausner, 'Popular Buddhism in'Northeast Thailand'. 
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educate the people in some aspects of politics. For example, to mention 
only one, a learned monk suggested in his lecture to monks in Udom 
province that they should advise the people to vote for a good politician 
and not allow themselves to be deceived by a corrupt candidate. He 
said that: 
'... Although the law forbids the monk to become involved 
in politics, monks have to be involved, one way or 
another ..... Politicians have exploited the monks and 
used them as ari instrument. For exanple, if in an 
election the candidate makes donations to the wat, the 
monks consider him as a good man and praise him. This 
may lead the people to. believe he is a good man (and 
vote for him). Following this, we will have corrupt NPs 
who do nothing and know nothing ...... if it is so, it means that monks do not understand their responsibility, 
and encourage corruption -from the beginning ..... How then could political development be achieved? Monks must not 
ignore this problem., but have to do something within the 
bounds of the monkhood. Therefore, we should teach the 
people to be critical, not to be deceived. If we ignore 
this responsibility, we can forget about development 
efforts and let things take their natural course. 1 
After the recruited monks have worked in their assigned areas for 
me year, they are requested to send reports to the centre. In the 
reports they assess the accomplishment of their assignments under the 
fbilowing headings: education, propagation of Buddhism, social welfare 
and development activities. 
2 
(iii)''The'Sanghals'Role in'Accelorated'Rural'Development 
The Accelerated Rural Development programme (ARD) was begun in 
1964. It was also a programme designed to check counter-insurgency 
when the Thai government felt that the other development schemes might 
not be enough to offset communist activities. It aimed to reinforce 
other development schemes and to complement various projects of the 
1. Phra Maha Sathien, ''Op. 'cit., pp. 19-20. 
2. For more details and evaluatim, see Somboon Suksamran, op. cit., 
pp. 88-89. 
I 
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government in rural areas. Its principal purposes were to accelerate 
rural development and thus increase the economic, social and educational 
standards of the : rural people. While the cornmunity development prog- 
ramme emphasizes-the principles of self-help, co-operation among the 
villagers themselves and between the villagers and the government, the 
ARD programme concentrates on activities in which almost everything is 
provided by the government. The idea was to produce immediate concrete 
results so that the villagers could see the advantages of co-operation 
with the government. They therefore put their efforts into schemes 
employing heavy construction equipment, modem techniques and skilled 
personnel, all brought in from outside, including foreign advisors and 
military units. Thus, its main emphasis was on the building of the 
infrastructure of the country in economic, social and political spheres. 
This involves the construction of main roads connecting remote areas 
with cities.. country roads connecting villages with villages; provision 
of water supplies both for agricultural purposes and domestic consump- 
tion; the construction of other public utilities such as schools; and 
the provision of medical centres, village clinics and mobile medical 
staff. These efforts were particularly intense in areas threatened by 
commist subversion and insurgency. . 
They aimed to 'win the hearts 
and minds of the people' without the use of warfare. 
' 
Connected with the ARD schemes are several other programmes, but 
the most important one is that of the Mobile Development Units RU). 
Its activities, like the community development programme, have a direct 
counter-insurgency purpose. The central theme of the MDU is to promote 
Office of Accelerated Rural Development, -Ngan Rengrud Patthana Chonbot 
(Accelerated Rural Development Work) (Bangkok: ARD Office, 1970) pp. 
1-4; see also Caldwell, -bý. cit-, 56-57,85-88, and 135-138. 
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closer relationships between the goverment and rural population 
through demonstrated goverment interest and action concerning the 
people's well-being and security. The NDU, composed of military 
personnel, a medical team, and other goverment agents., moves from 
village to village in selected areas. They offer basic medical treat- 
ment, sometimes food and clothing, and instruction through films and 
lectures on improving agriculture and sanitation. They also promul- 
gate anti-communist propaganda. 
1 
In their efforts to secure the loyalty of the, country people to 
the govenment, in 1970 the Office of ARD requested the co-operation of 
the Sangha. The thinking behind this appeal was that in rural areas no 
one could do better than the local monks in mobilizing the villagers' 
co-operation and in increasing their sense of loyalty and attachment to 
the govenment and the nation. 
2 The Sangha agreed to co-operate. 
Accordingly, a new 'Development Plan for Co-operation between the Sangha 
and State' was drawn up in 1970 with the following objectives: 
To coordinate the goverment development plan with people's needs 
as a mearis of winning their hearts and minds through Sangha co- 
operation. 
To co-ordinate and consolidate the efforts of the government and 
the Sangha in order to gain maximum results from development policies. 
(iii) To create unity and social stability and security. 
(iv) To balance material progress and spiritual development. 
1. For detail about the operation of the MDU see, for example, Richard 
Nelson 'Thd'M6bilb'Developmeiit'Uiiit*Pr6ject (Bangkok: USCM, Office 
of Field Operation., 1969); USOM, 'Joint*lhai-ý-USCM*Evaluation'of, the 
Mobile 'Unit 'Con-ýtrudtion 'Company Project gkok: Thalý- 
Americ Audio-Visual Services, 11 October 1965); see also Caldwell, 
op. cit.; and Somboon &iksamran, *6p-'Cit.., pp. 90-91. 
2. Office of ARD.. -op. 'dit., pp. 1-2. 
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(v) To promote religious activities and public well-being in rural 
communities. 
(vi) To strengthen understanding and good relationships between govern- 
ment and people. ' 
The Plan for Co-operation between the Sangha and the government 
agents in Accelerated Rural Development programmes was described as 
follows: 
(i) The Sangha should provide trained monks to participate in the 
project. 
(ii) Some high ranking administrative monks were invited to be advisors 
to the Secretary-General of the ARD office. They were consulted 
by the government on the areas and activities in which the Sangha 
could contribute to the programe. At provincial and district 
levels the Chao kana Changwat and Chao kana Amphur were requested 
to participate as advisors to the goverment agents who were res- 
ponsible for this programe in their jurisdictions. These monks 
were expected to give advice on development plans for the commi- 
ties in their areas. They were also to help the goverment agents 
in a primary evaluation of the probably outcome of the project, and 
to co-operate with them in running the project at the district 
level. 2 
(iii) In implementing the project, the monks were advised to concentrate 
their teaching efforts on economic and social matters, morality 
and ethics. They were to encourage religion and avoid political 
issues in their teachings. 
3 They were encouraged to participate 
in material developments that strengthened the people's trust and 
1. ''Ibid., p. ' 9. 
2. 'Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
3. Ibide, p. 4. 
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confidence in the government. They were also asked to pass on to 
the villagers the government's policies and its request for local 
co-operation and participation, and encouraging the people to 
facilitate the extension of the progrwme was seen as a desirable 
objective. The monks themselves were also to lead the people to 
participate in the programe. 1 
It is interesting to note that in the plan for the 1970 programme, 
there was also a prescription issued by the goverment for the guidance 
of the monks as to which Dhamma should be taught to the people. In 
short, the Dhamm selected for teaching should emphasize the bonds of 
social unity; principles of self-reliance, right means of livelihood; 
virtues conducive to benefits and leading to temporal welfare; virtues 
Of loving-kindness and compassion; honesty, etc. The Dhamma taught 
should also induce the idea that development efforts are for the benefit 
Of the family, community, and the nation. The monks should interpolate 
in their teaching the inportance and indispensibility of the institutions, 
2 of religion and the monar 
This programe of co-operation between the Sangha and the ARD 
Office was first tried out in one of the most sensitive areas,, namely 
Thatphanom district in the North-East, and was claimed, to be satisfactory. 
k 
At present the programme is under way in other many sensitive rural areas, 
but the reports of its achievements are subsumed within broader reports 
on rural development and it is difficult to estimate its effectiveness. 
In sum, then, the'1970 programme consolidated the goverment's 
1. -. Ibid., pp. -8-11. 
2. For detail seeJbid., pp. 32-36. 
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efforts to pull the Sangha into its rural development schemes. Whereas 
previously the monks had voluntarily taken part in conimunity development, 
they were now asked to take up much larger roles as part of a grand 
national developmnt plan under more direct goverment control. 
Phra'Dhamatuta'Progrwnme 
This programme was initiated with a number of underlying 
assunptions. First, the goverment and the Sangha authorities seem to 
have believed that while development schemes had produced material 
progress satisfactorily, spiritual progress had not kept pace with it. 
They held that material progress well-being and spiritual progress 
should go hand in hand if national development was to be fully success- 
ful, and if social order and solidarity based on Buddhism and morality 
were not. to be undermined. They also believed that morality and social 
solidarity not only ensured fruitful social interactions, but also 
resulted in the kind of integration which would counteract commmism. 
Second, they maintained that the people's attachment to Buddhism 
provided a safeguard against the incursions of communism,, and that this 
attacIment could be capitalized on in the promotion of national. develop- 
ment and national integration. Following these underlying suppositions, 
they argued that those who were not adherents of Buddhism or whose 
attachment to the faith was weak were likely to pose a potential threat 
to national security and integration in that they became vulnerable to 
.. the. propaganda of subversive elements. 
' 
l.. Details of their views and arguments have partly been taken up in the 
earlier sections on Justifications for Political Mobilization of the 
Sangha, and on the Sanghals Responses to Political Mobilization, pp. 157- 
167. In addition to this, see Prapat Charusatien, ''Rath'lae kana Song 
(State and the Sangha) (A message from Minister of UFFE-terior to 
Dhammatuta Monks on the Opening of Orientation, 1967; an official docu- 
ment of Ministry of the-Interior, 1967); Thanom Kitthikhachom, 'San 
112ng*Nayok'tathamontri'thung*Phra*Dhamatuta (A Message fr6m the Prime 
Minister to Dhammatuta Monks) (of al doc=ent of the Prime Minister's 
Office, 8 January 1969); Pin Mudhukantap'Naenam Phra*Dhammatuta (Intro- 
ducing Dhammatuta programme) (Bangkok: Department of Religious Af airs, 
Printing House, 1965)- Somdet Phra Wannarat., 'Nam Dhamma sue Prachachon' (Bringifig Dhamma to tAe People), Phra Dhammdtuta,, Vol. 1,1968, pp. 8-9. 
Buddhadasa Bhikku, 'A-nu-mo-tanal (Appreciation), Phutthasatsana kap 
*-Sangkojq thaj, i)-D. x-xj. I- 
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It was for these reasons that the Department of Religious Affairs 
established the Phra Dhýmmatuta programme in 1964. The objectives 
actually put forward were: 
(1) To restore Buddhism and protect the prestige of the Sangha 
from deterioration, and to save the people from democratiz- 
ation and vulnerability to commist propaganda. 
1 
To follow the Buddha's footsteps and to carry on his purpose 
by teaching Dhamma to the people. 
(iii) To mobilize people's loyalty to the nation, the goverment, 
and the king. 
(iv) To create a better understanding among the people and 
between the people and the government,, thereby promoting 
national integration. 
(V) To strengthen the villagers' morale and help them in develop- 
ment. 
2 
For the first two years (1964-1965) the Department of Religious 
Affairs was directly responsible for the administration and planning of 
the Programme, the financial ýnd personnel administration, the, selection 
of areas where the Dhammatuta monks were needed, and for coordination 
and publicity. It decided on specific objectives to suit particular 
designated areas and the length of time needed for carrying out the 
relevant tasks. In this process the administrative monks at high level 
were closely involved. By 1965 the prograrme appeared tolbemrking, 
quite well. However, the government and the Sangha authorities began 
1. Elaborated from Pin MudhukantaI_8'_ . port to His Majesty the'King'on 
'the *nLr 
, 
22sd'6f'Phtd'D tLitd *Pro rame (Official docLunent of Depart-, 
ment ot Religious Affairs, 5 Febiuary 64). 
2. Somdet Phra Wannarat the Director of Phra Dhamatuta work, namely 
speeches given to Phra Dhammatuta monks during 1966-1969. 
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to be worried that the work of the monks would be undermined by the 
Sangha being seen as a govemment'agent in the areas of cammnist 
influence. Control of the programe was passed to the Mahatherasam- 
akom, and a Division of Phra Dhammatuta Work was set up under the 
supervision of the Mahatherasamakom in that year as part of the Sangha 
administrative structure. However, the Department of Religious I 
Affairs continued to closely supervise the Phra Dhanmatuta programe. 
Although the Division of Phra Dhammatuta work in the Sangha had more 
freedom in the selection of Dhamututa monks, the civil department still 
played an inportant role in the programe planning and in training the 
recruited monks. The administration of the programe and methods used 
to accomplish its ends largely follow the model laid down by the Depart- 
ment of Religious Affairs in 1964 and 1965. 
The selection of monks to participate in the Phra Dhammatuta, programme 
is done jointly by the Department of Religious Affairs and Maýathera- 
samakom. The Dhammatuta monks are chosen from devoted, volunteers who 
have the following qualifications: 
Willingness to be loyal to Buddhism and the nation., and not 
to distort the teachings of the Buddha. 
Willingness to be tolerant of difficulties and all kinds of 
offensiveness. 
(iii) Willingness to work with dedicated minds,, and having good- 
will towards, the religion and the nation, without expectation 
wam pen ma khong Phra Dhanmatutal, (Develolxnent of Pin MxUnflmta IK 
-PhraTharmiiatuta, Vol. 1,1968, pp. 40-41; Phra Dhammatuta-Programme)t 
see also Somboon Suksamran,, ' ý-cit., p. 97. 
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of material or non-material rewards, or even praise. 
(iv) Having good personality, wisdom, persuasive ability, and 
sufficient knowledge of Dharnma. 
(V) Ability to speak the local dialect is also considered 
I desirable. 
The majority of the Dhammatuta monks have been recruited from 
Bangkok. They are learned monks and monk-students of the Budiihist 
universities. The local monks have been mainly recruited from Chao 
kana. Anphur and respected abbots by the Chao kana Changwat who are ex- 
officio heads of provincial Dhwmatuta monks. 
' Since 1966 the number 
of Dhammatuta monks has increased year by year until in 1975 there were 
2,196 monks participating in the programme. The programme has been 
extended to cover 70 provinces. 
2 The heaviest emphasis has been on 
the sensitive areas in the North and North-East. 
3 
The numbers of Dhammatuta monks between 1964-1975 are shown in 
Table 8. 
1. Elaborated from Kong Ngan Phra, Dhammtuta (Division of Dhaimatuta 
Work). *Rdhigti*Wmn'kaona'khong'ktoiigkan'Phrd'Dhammattita (Reports 
on the Progress of Phra Dhammatuta Programme, 1969-1974). 
2. 
. 
'Ibid.;, Department of Religious Affairs, 'Annual'Rep2rts'oh Religious 
=ciVities (Bangkok: Department of Religious Aftairs_rrinting House, 
1976) pp* 74-77. 
3. Department of Religious Affairs, ''ibid., pp. 75-76. There were 757 
Dhammatuta monks working in the Nor-T-East and 462 monks in the North 
in 1975. 
I 
191 
Table 8 NLunber8, '6f 'Monks'iii the'Dhamrftatutd 'Programme 
. 
Year 
. ..... 
NLmber. of. Dhammatuta. Monks ... ..... .. 
N. B... 
1964 183 Covered 13 provinces 
1965 751 Covered 49 provinces 
1966 1,730 All provinces 
1967 1,384 it 11 
1968 1,654 it 
1969 1,773 
1970 1,879 
1971 1,900 (approx. ) 
1972 2,, 088 
1973 2., 240 
1974 2., 285 
1975 2,196 
............ ....... 
'Source: Division of Ecclesiastical Education, -Department of Religious Affairs, 'S Phonfigti'khong Thrd'Dharmnatutd * B. E. ' '2 518 (Report 
on Phra Dhwmatuta Progrwnme, 1975)'(Bangkok: 1975) p. 64. 
The Dhanmiatuta monks have been divided into nine groups since 1966. 
Each gro-up has a group leader who is selected from well-known and res- 
pected monks of the high ranking administrative level. Before they 
commence the work in designated areas, the group leaders, deputies, and 
Bangkok-based recruited monks are given a short period of orientation 
aimed at familiarizing them with the goverment policies of national, A 
development and integration, and with social, economic, and political 
situations in the assigned areas. The instructors are mainly goverment 
officials representing various departments. - At this point,, the monks 
are told the problems which the government is facing, and how they can 
help to-solve them. The objectives and the appropriate methods of 
implementation of the programe are taught by senior officials and 
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senior administrative monks. Another short period of orientation 
with a similar content is provided by local goverment officials 
within the assigned areas. This time local Dhammatuta monks are 
required to attend so that they clearly understand the purpose of 
the progrxme and the methods for carrying out their tasks. 
1 
The Dhammatuta monks begin their work in the dry season, from 
February to May or June of each year. Means and methods for the 
implementation of their assignments are mainly determined by group 
leaders, depending on the characteristics of the assigned areas. How- 
ever, the programme has laid down a set of general guidelines for the 
monks to apply in their work. They are described in the Handbook for 
Dhammatuta Monks produced by the Division of Phra Dhxmatuta Work. 
2 
The monks are advised to teach villagers the basic tenets of Buddhism 
and the application of Buddhism to everyday life, including the rele- 
vance of religious practices to the. development goals of the nation. 
For example,, they should persuade the people to adhere to Panca Sila 
(Five Precepts 1, the principle of 'Dana (Giving), Netta * YArdna (Loving- 
kiridness and Compassion), and the toleration of physical and mental 
suffering. They should teach them the Buddhist principles of right 
livelihood, the correct forms of ritual, worship, and meditation 
practi ces. They should encourage the people to take vows as Buddhists. 
For those kho have never made a commitment to the religion, the monks 
perform a ceremony roughly equivalent in function to confirmation in the 
Christian religion. -For those who are already confirmed Buddhists, the 
.. monks. are. to encourage them to become lay 
disciples. Through their 
1. For more details see Somboon suksamran, op. cit , pp. 95-97; and also Pin Mudhukanta (1965)*op. cit. 
2. Division of Phra Dhammatuta Work, ''LATdthibat'samrap PhraThamatuta 
(Handbook for Dhammtuta Monks). 
193 
teachings the Dhammatuta monks-are, advised to inculcate in the people the 
values of good citizenship and loyalty. Apart from this main task of 
strengthening the people's attachment to Buddhism, the monks should 
help and lead the people in connunity development activities by teaching 
them the need for and values of comunity development, by encouraging 
them to observe proper sanitary conditions, and how to improve health 
and so on. Those experienced and trained Dhammatuta monks should 
also teach the local, monks the tecImiques of development work. The 
Dhammatuta monks are-also advised to interpolate Dhanna in their 
teachings concerning, the principles of self-goverment; self-reliance; 
modern education; the principles of co-operatives, the necessity for 
unity; and the application of national traditions and customs to daily 
life. 2 
In carrying out their assignments, the Dhammatuta monks travel in 
groups or separately on foot, in cars-or on buses from village to village. 
They stay-in the village for a few days up to a week giving sermons and, 
talking to the'villagers. The initial approach of the Dhamatuta monks 
is of interest, for in a sense they adopt the methods used by the Mobile 
Development Unit. Generally the village abbot and village hea&an are 
informed of the arrival of these monks in advance. They in turn 
inform the villagers and organize meetings. At the meeting the monks 
give a semon or lecture, 'which concentrates on the explanation of the' 
Dhamma; but through the Dhamma the monks are expected to impart matters 
concerning specific government policies, to inculcate in them the duties 
of good citizenship, loyalty to the government, nation, and the king, 
For more details see'Ibid., and also Somboon Suksamran, 'op. cit., pp. 
99-100. 
2., Sandet Phra Maha Wirawong,, 'Lak Pathibat Dhamnat (Guidelines for 
Practice in, Buddhism); 'Phrd'Dhammatuta, Vol. 1,1968, pp. 9-20. 
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and to educate people about develolxnent efforts. The lectures are 
usually accompanied by distribution of medicine, text books on Dhamma, 
and other commodities. Films are shown about govenment programes, 
I 
those involving the Royal Fmnily, visiting the people, opening new 
buildings, and carrying out state ceremonies being the main diet,. 
Sometimes, the Dhammatuta monks in co-operation with local 
government officials and village leaders organize a village Committee 
for the Promotion of Buddhism. This joint comittee is responsible 
for the promotion of morality and unity among the villagers, encouraging 
better understanding between the goverment officials and villagers., and the 
promotion and revival of local traditions and custom. This programme is 
claimed to be conducive to the Phra Dhmmtuta work. 
In the cities where there are prisons, the monks teach the Dhamma 
to the inmates in order to inprove their moral standards and prepare 
them to assume good citizenship. The Police Department has also asked 
the monks to inpart in their teaching to the villagers the message that, 
such crimes as manslaughter, robbery, drug trading, prostitution, and 
involvement in illegal lotteries not only cause social disorder, but 
also are acts of great demerit* Q2Lb) .2 
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness and the accomplishment 
of the Phra. Dhammatuta programe, since its work is claimed to be concer- 
I ned with 'spiritual or moral improvement', a rather ambiguous and abstract- 
............. I 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 19-20; Somdet Phra. Wannarat, 'Bringing, Dhamma to the 
People', pp. 8-ý9; see also Somboon Suksamrant''6p. -eit., pp. 99-101. 
2. Police Department, *Nangsue'Krom'Tmnruat'thung'Phra'Dhamatuta'nai'kan 
(Letter from Police Department to Dhamatuta 
Monks Ask3ng tor Co-operation for the Prevention of Crime) (Official 
document of Police Department, 16 February 1969). 
195 
concept. The Sangha has so far evaluated its accomplishments and 
the effectiveness of the programme in several ways. These include 
subjective estimates by the Dhammatuta monks of the degree of interest 
people have shown in their sermons and lectures; counting the atten- 
dance at sermons and meditation practices; counting the number of 
people taking vows as Buddhists; and counting the number of times 
they have led or taught people in community development. There seems 
to be a reliance on quantification of activities undertaken by the 
monks as an assessment of success. 
Though in general both the govenunent and Sangha appear to have 
2 been satisfied with the results they felt they had achieved, there 
was criticism of the programe by some of the monks involved. This 
is well illustrated by the frank reports of the 1971 and 1972 seminars 
of the Dhm=tuta monks, which made clear that Buddhist teachings had 
had little success in areas of great poverty. Here they felt material 
improvements had to have priority if cowunism was to be countered and 
Buddhism was to be successful. In some areas of Nan, Cheingraij, Petchabun, 
Narathiwat, and Surathani provinces they had not been able to enter the 
villages, and two monks were assassinated in Petchabun province in 1969. 
Perhaps this might be taken as a measure, albeit distasteful, of their 
success, along with the increase in co=fiist threats against them which 
said if they were monks they should stay in their monasteries; if they 
.......... 
1. For more details about the achievements and the method used in the 
assessment of, -thd-, 'effectiveness of the programme reported by"the 
Sangha. see'Division of Dhammatuta Work's Reports 1969-1974., and the 
Reports of Phra Dhannatuta Work in Department of Religious Affairs' 
-'Annual'Report*bf*ReligioUs'A(ttiVities 1969, *'1971, and'1975; see 
also Suksamran., ' op. cit., pp. 101-102. 
2. Department of Religious Affairs (1975). pp. 73-74. 
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chose to be government-agents, then they would be treated assuch. 
Apparently they were becoming effective enough for the coMrMMists to 
consider them a serious threat. 
I 
(c) Phra'Dhammajarik'Programme 
The-underlying suppositions on which this programme was 
initiated were almost the same as those for establishing the Phra 
Dhammatuta programme., i. e. attachment to Buddhism provides a safeguard 
against conmmism and those who are not adherents of Buddhism pose 
2 potential threats to national security and integration. As we have 
considered earlier, the Thai government has, since the 1960s, considered 
the non-Thai and non-Buddhist hill peoples as posing these threats to 
3 the nation. To counter them the government in 1965, through the 
Department of Public Welfare, initiated the Phra Dhammajarik programmes, 
the Buddhist mission to the hill people,, and the Sangha was called upon, 
to carry out this programme. 
The main reason for using the Sangha in this cmtext was elaborated 
by Pradit, Disawat, a senior official in the Department of Public Welfarq, - 
tIMS: 
The propagation among ýhe hill people would be likely 
to promote administrative and development aims among 
the, hill people. This is because the integration of, 
our people into a larger community depends upon the 
ties of customs and religion. 4 
1. For detail see Division of Phra Dhammatuta Work, 'Raingan kan sammanar 
kan Pathibat ngan Pho-sor,, 2514-25151 (Reports on the Phra Dhammatuta 
Activities'., -1971 , -l972), 'Phrd'DhammatUta,, Vol. 1., 19729, pp. 50-71; see 
'cl ciý'. -102. - also Somboon Suksamran, pp. MT 
2. See pp. -159-160,164, and 187. 
3. See pp. 147-150. 
4. Department of Public Welfare''Rzl: Lngan*kitkam'khong'Phra Dhammajarik 
(Report on the Activities ofPhra Dhammajarik Programme) (Bangkok: 
Department of Public Welfare, 1965) p. 10. 
I 
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From this idea, the Department of Public Welfare in consultation 
, with Phra Dhamakithisophon,, the Sangha regional supervisor of Region 
(Phak) 6 which comprises-the provinces of Chiengrai, Lampang, Nan, 
and Prae, worked out the Phra Dhammajarik programme in detail and sub- 
sequently submitted it to the Mahatherasamakom for approval. The 
Sangha authority approved the programme on the grounds that i: t would 
not only serve as an effective means for the propagation of Buddhism 
but also promote national integration. 
The main aims of the programe were to integrate the hill people 
into the Thai social order, administrative structure, and Thai culture; 
to strengthen the sentimental ties (of Thai) with the hill people, and 
to create loyalties among them to the nation, religion and the king 
1 
through development of strong belief in, or conversion to, Buddhism. 
The Phra Dhanmajarik Programme has been run since 1965, as a joint 
endeavour of the Department of Public Welfare and the Sangha. Pradit 
Disawat and Phra Dhammakithisophon were appointed co-directors of the 
programme. The goverment provides financial and material assistance 
necessary for the operation of the programme. The Sangha has been 
responsible for recruiting and providing the monk persomel who are to 
implement it. By and large, the majority of the Dhammajarik monks are 
recruited-from Bangkok-based monks on a voluntary basis. The monks 
recruited should be under 40 years of age and have passed at least 
Barian, grade 4. Local monks who are chosen to participate in the 
programe should be under 45, but no educational qualification is 
specified. Both categories inust have good health, and a knowledge of 
........... 
k 
Ibid. 2 pp. 10-13; see also Department of Public Welfare-Report 'on the*Ptopdgation, of, Buddhism (1968) p. 28. 
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tribal languages is desirable. 
Before being sent to the project areas, the monk recruits are 
given an orientation course for five to seven days. This includes 
instruction by government officials on the socio-economic backgrounds 
of the hill people, the immediate problems confronting the goverment 
arising from the hill people, and the gove rm ent's policies to solve 
these problems. Senior monks teach them the techniques and methods 
of propagating Buddhism, and how to carry out their assignments. Each 
Dhammajarik monk is given an allowance of 10 to 15 baht per day when 
he is in the field. 
The Dhammajarik monks are divided into groups of three to five 
members and sent to live 'in various hill communities, but for security 
reasons they are mainly stationed in the goverment welfare settlements 
for the hill people. Monks from Bangkok are required to spend two 
months in the mission stations, while local monks spend four. They 
begin their work in January or February and continue until April or May. 
The number of monks participating in this programme varied between 100- 
200, during 1970-1976*. 3A few monks of tribal background are included, 
ostensibly to act as interpreters. 
4 
Department of Public Welfare, *Raingan'kan Phoeyphrae*Phutthrsatsana 
'Aai*rii'Chaokhao (Report on the Propagation of Buddhism Among the 
Hill People in : the North) (Bangkok: Department of Public Welfare, 
1971) pp. 26-27. 
'Ibid. 
Department of Public Welfare, ''Raingan kan'Phoeyphrae Phutthasatsana 
nai*mu*Chaokhao (Report on the Propagation ot Buddhism among the 
M-11 People, 1971) (Bangkok: 1975) pp. -6-10. 
4. Keyes, (1971), pp. 562-563. 
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Table 9 shows the numbers of monks participating in the Phra 
Dhammajarik programmes between 1965 and 1978, and the numbers of 
'tribal' villages in which the monks have carried out their work 
between 196S and 1978. - 
Table 9' Numbers*of'Monks*iii'thb'Phrzi'Dhammajatik Programe 
No. of Year Numbers of Monks Numbers of Villaaes Mission ....................................... . ...... 
1 1965 so 10 
2 1966 60 12 
3 1967 100 20 
4 1968 100 20 
5 1969 100 20 
6 1970 100 20 
7 1971 iso 30 
8 1972 150 30 
9 1973 150 30 
10 1974 200 40 
11 1975 200 40 
12 1976 200.40 
13 1977 200 40 
. 
14.1978 
... 
200 40 
Total 1.960 392 
'Source: Department of Public Welfarep''Stdtistics'of Monks'Participating 
'in'Phrd'DhammdjArik'Ptogrxm (1965-1978) (Bangkok: 1979) 
The emphasis of the prograume's effort has been on the Meo. Despite 
the small proportion of the Meo population (11 per cent of the total 
population of the hill people), there were 11 groups of 55 monks working 
.. with. them. 
in 1971.1 This concentration on the Meo was obviously a 
1. Ibid. 
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consequence of the great concern which had developed over the'past f6w 
years when the Meo had shown more and more hostility to the Thai govern- 
ment, and increasingly became faithful allies of the commmists. But 
the number of missionaries stationed among the Meo has since declined. 
This reflects perhaps the fears regarding the security of the monks in 
these areas. 
The main task of the-Dhamajarik monks is to convert the hill 
people to Buddhism. The methods employed by the monks include 
familiarizing the hill people with religious customs; teaching them 
basic tenets of ]Buddhism, how to pay respect to the Triple Gems, and 
how to make merit by giving alms to the monks; encouraging them to 
I 
take vows as Buddhists, and to be ordained as'novices or monks. In 
carrying out these tasks the monks are advised to follow a set of 
general guidelines which are as follows: 
(i) Among the hill people who have not been adherents of 
Buddhism, the monks are to make daily visits to them in 
their homes and in the evening arrange a sermon or 
informal conversation for those who come to visit them. 
They should also make contact with the children and teach 
them basic Dhamma and simple Thai language. 
Among the hill people who are already adherents of 
Buddhism, besides following the above guidelines, the 
monks should go round the village for alms-receiving in 
the morning. In the evening, the monks should teach them 
religious-practices such as how to pay respect'to the 
Triple Gems properly and how to apply Dhanna in their daily 
............. 
Depar6ient of Public Welfare (1965) op. *dit.., pp. 19-20. 
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When the monks consider that the hill people have enough faith in 
Buddhism, they encourage them to take vows as Buddhists and perform a' 
confirmation ceremony for them. At this point, the monks are advised 
to record and film the activities for propaganda purposes. On the 
Sabbath day, the monks are to encourage those confirmed as Buddhists 
to make merit by giving alms to monks and listening to their sermons. 
Significantly, they encourage the hill people to be ordained. 
A At-art from attempting to convert the hill people, the monks are 
advised to teach them good hygiene, for example, encourage them to bathe 
regularly, to have their nails and hair cut, to clean and tidy their 
houses. They should also teach the people how to develop their community. 
In helping promote good relationships between the people and goverment, 
the monks seek to make them understand the goverment's care for them, 
and impress on them that the government policy towards them is for their 
benefit. They teach the hill people elementary facts about the govern- 
ment organization, Thai language, customs and tradition, and their duty 
and responsibility towards the goverment and the king. The monks 
distribute medicine and other commodities, and tell them that these 
gifts are provided by the goverment. Before and after giving them 
these .. things, the monks instruct them to pay respect to the Triple Gems. 
' 
The practice of giving things to them is said to constitute a very 
2 
effective means of approach to the hill people. 
The success and effectiveness of this programe of Thai acculturation 
is very difficult to-assess. The official report of the accomplishments 
of the programe is usually something of a stereotyped statement that the 
............. 
1. For more. details see Somboon Suksamran, -op., tit., pp. 106-107. 
2. Department of Public Welfare (1971)'op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
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monks have established a better relationship between the goverment 
and the hill people and the hill people's attachment to Buddhism 
appears to have increased year by year. The number of people who 
have taken vows as Buddhists and, more inportantly, the number of the 
people who have been ordained, are claimed to be indicators of the 
success of the scheme. 
1 
Table 10 shows the numbers of male hill people who were ordained 
as novices and monks between 1965 and 1978. 
'Tabld *10 'Ordiiidti6n'amrig'the 'Hill 'Peoples 
- -Year -- NLnber -of novices ....... .. Nuniber-of monks. 
1965 93 
1966 14 4 
1967 42 4 
1968 30 3 
1969 14 2 
1970 24 1 
1971 ill 6 
1972 119 13 
1973 104 22 
1974 135 22 
1975 65 19 
1976 83 18 
1977 145 is 
. 1978 ................ ... 121 . .... ..... 
23 
Total 1,016 
..... ........... 
155 
For more detail and caments. see Somboon Suksam-ran .0. cit. 1 pp. 107-108; see also the Departnent of Public Welfare, ' eports'on 
'the of 'BUddhist'among *the 'Hill 'Pdoljle , '1967 ' 1968 
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However,, the Department of Public Welfare has not given information 
about the duration of the sojourn in the monkhood of the hill people, 
ordained, nor the number of those who dropped out. Instead, it tends 
to emphasize the achievement of these novices and monks in religious or 
secular education. This is shown in Table 11. 
. Table 11 (1965-1978) 
Religious 
Education 
(Dhanna 
Study., 
.. grade. 
1-3) 
395 
-Secular -education 
Primary Secondary Pre- College University 
Education Education University Level Level 
Level 
922 194 51 40 6 
I 
'Source: Department of Public Welfare; Ngan'Patthana'lae'Son 
(Develojxnent. and Welfare SchenFes tor the Hill Pe-o-p-l 
1978) 
: kroh*Chaokhao 
e ang 
The Department of Public Welfare claims that those who have been 
ordained and later disrobed have better employment opportmities. Also 
that these people have become more useful manpower for the government 
0 
and tIms contributed to the welfare of the society as a whole. Occupa- 
tions the ex-monks; and novices have taken up are shown in Table 12. 
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Tabl6'12 ''FNPIOymerit'amona'ek-ýmonks'and*n6Vices 
OccLipations 'Numbdr 
Radio broadcasters 
(in Tribal languages) 
Teaching in Settlement Centres 
Hill People 
for 
Interpreters 
Border Patrol Policemen 
Voluntary Teachers in Ministry of 
Education 
Village Heachen 
. '. Source: Department of Public Welfare (1978). 
Conclu8ion 
9 
145 
200 
24 
7 
5 
I 
Much of the data presented speaks for itself. What is clear is 
that during the period 1960-1973, the Sangha became increasingly drawn 
into goverment schemes. The monks became subject to greater govern- 
ment direction at all levels, and their teaching and other activities 
became more secular than spiritual in content. Even the Dhanina itself 
became more narrowly interpreted in accordance with the goverment prog- 
rammes. Though the Sangha generally appeared to support these prog- 
rames, there are signs of discontent over both their changed roles and 
the, goverment policies. This will become clearer in the next chaptýr. 
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CHAPMV' ' SOC I040LITICAL'CHANGESAND 'THE* EMERGENCE'OF 'POLITICAL MONKS ' 
In Chapter IV we noted that since the 1960s the Sangha has been 
I 
mobiliZed to serve the govenment in particular schemes by the need for 
national security and integration. We have demonstrated that within, 
the Sangha higher level administrative monks apparently have co- 
operated with political leaders to a remarkable extent and the Sangha 
in general has apparently willingly accommodated to a new institution- 
alized role, acting as goverment agents. 
Taking the definition of politics put forward in Chapter 1,1 then 
the activities of the monks involved in government. schemes at all levels 
are clearly political actions. Yet, curiously, the term 'political 
monks' which has achieved some currency in Thailand in the 1970s is not 
applied to such monks. The assumption of new roles by them was recog- 
nized by the government and Sangha authorities and thus became 
institutionalized, legitimate and outside public controversy by the 
beginning of the 1970s,. 
In contrast., there were exceptional monks who developed personal 
responses to the political mobilization of the Sangha. Since the 
early 1970s, they have overtly shown an' interest in and made aI response 
to political and socio-economic issues which have had effects on the 
V 
Sangha and society as a whole. These effects may directly or indirectly 
threaten, commmal interests or personal status and position. Their 
response to these issues or threats has resulted in the formation of 
new roles, some of which are so unconventional as to be almost a reversal 
of traditional roles ascribed to monks. In this respect their'roles are 
not recognized by the goverment and the Sangha authorities and thus are 
. ......... . 
1. ý See pp. 3-4., 
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independent of their direction. Whether a monk, then, i's 'political' 
is determined by his involvement in secular politics.. by the style and 
method he employs to advance his ideological position, causes, and 
activities whether they be religious or secular. In this study we 
follow the popular usage and confine the tem 'political monks' to 
this new phenomenon of the 1970s. In fact we consider two kinds of 
monks as 'political monks'. First, those that espouse a, cause, that 
demands political action, such as campaigning for the underprivileged, 
Buddhism or nationalism, and second, those that undertake political 
action in response to what they conceive of as threats to their personal 
status, privilege and position. Of course, it is not always possible 
to clearly distinguish between these kinds of motivation in political 
actions, particularly as the latter tends to be concealed under the 
guise of the fomer. 
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when, why, and in what ways 
the monks became politically active. It is my assurnption that modern- 
ization has significantly contributed to the development of their 
political and social awareness. The improvement of com=iqations 
such as mass media and transportation during the last two decades has 
enabled the monks to broaden their horizons and to familiarize them-, 
selves with socio-political milieux outside the monastery. The modern- 
ization and expansion of education in the same period must have, widened 
the monks' secular learning. Since the 1960s,. for example, the 
B uddhist universities have modernized their courses. , Such secular, 
courses as Social Studies, Political Thought, Economics, Education, 
Sociology, Anthropology., Psychology, Asian Studies, and Public Adminis- 
tration have1een included in Buddhist university curricula. These 
factors are., to a certain extent, responsible for the new dimensions of 
the monks' socialization and, possibly, politicization. in the 1970s. 
., On the one hand we may'attribute the monks' involvement in'gove-nment 
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policies and programes to their growing social and political conscious- 
ness. On the other hand, we can also note that they became involved 
because they were manipulated or directed by the govenment. Most 
important, the absence of 'political monks' during the 1960s may be 
attributable to the fear of political repression which had dominated 
the comtry's political life. 
The demise, though temporary, of military or authoritarian rule in 
1973 permitted political freedom of a kind not previously known in 
Thailand. This included freedom of expression, freedom to redress 
grievances, to organize public rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. 
Within this political atmosphere, monks became more intensively 
politicized by competing groups embracing different ideologies. As a 
consequence, ideological polarization also affected politically conscious 
monks. I therefore propose to divide political monks into the two 
broadly-defined categories of left and right wing monks. Nevertheless,, 
such a division does not mean that all political monks fall into either 
of the two groups. My definition of left and right wing ideologies is 
modelled after the policies of left and right wing political groups and 
activists in secular politics described below. 
' 
Thus, in a broad sense, political monks who espoused changes in 
socio-economic structures, and-who identified with the secular left wing 
movements are classified as left wing political monks. Included in this 
category are monks who attempted to introduce changes in the organization 
and administration of the Sangha. Their ideology of reform and their 
attempts-to effect it required the displacement of the old positions of 
power and status in the Sangha. In contrast,, I identify monks who 
opposed changes in socio-political and economic structures, and who re- 
. ....... I 
See pp. 229-30, see also p. 249. 
I 
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acted against the displacement of vested interest's in the Sangha as 
right wing political monks. These monks shared a common ideology 
with the conseivatives and right wing movements in secular politics. 
In their efforts to promote their ideologies both right and left wing 
monks sought legitimacy for their efforts by claiming that they were 
the vanguard of Buddhism, that their involvement in politico-economic 
issues was compatible with the teachings of the Buddha, and that their 
actions and ideologies were for the benefit, materially and spiritually, 
of Thai society as a whole. Both right and left wing political monks 
attempted to capitalize on the dynamic of socio-political change to 
mobilize support for their ideological positions and actions. 
With the assunption that the dynamic of socio-political-change has 
produced political monks, it is now necessary to consider further aspects 
of socio-political changes in Thailand, especially in the 1970s,, which 
led to their emergence. 
1. , TolitiCal 'the *Sangha 
Although the socio-political changes of the, period 1973-1976 were 
the immediate causes for ihe emergence of the political monks, the view 
that-it was political repression in the previous periods that contributed 
to their emergence in opposition to authoritarian rule should be con- 
sidered. Whereas military rule was accepted as necessary for the preser- 
vatign of Thai society by conservative elementst it was rejecied by the 
opposition who saw it as unnecessarily repressive. Their view of events 
antecedent-to 1973 was on the following lines. 
For, almost'thirty-four. of the forty-sIx years'since the 1932' 
Revolution,,, Thailand had been under the direct or disguised rule of 
military governments. Under the long and direct domination of Phibun. 
Songkram (19477: 1957), of Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963). and Thanom 
I 
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Kitthikachom (1963-1968 and 1971-1§73), ' the Thai people were deprived 
of freedom of speech, of the press, of Assembly, and of political 
parties. Civil liberties were restricted and frequently violated. 
Political repression had been an effective means of removing opposition 
and perpetuating military rule. Political murder and arrest of 
members of the opposition and of people who criticized authoritarian rule con- 
stituted a major element in the political repression. 
During Phibun's rule several politicians and opposition figures 
were brutally murdered. Hundreds were imprisoned without trial. 
Thailand during this period was regarded by several contemporary Thai 
writers and the liberal opposition as being in a 'dark age' uk ued ,2 (Y m 'D 
Under Sarit's dictatorship, thousands of people were arrested for commit- 
ting crimes ranging from hooliganism to com-nunist acts and high treason. 
Hundreds were accused of being ccummists, tried by military courts, , 
found guilty and imprisoned. Several of them were executed. Only the 
pro-government press survived closure and even these newspapers were 
subjected to heavy censorship. Labour unions were banned. 
3 Sarit 
was succeeded by his supporters, Thanom and Prapat, who followed closely 
in his footsteps. Thanom, by assimilating potential rivals for power 
into his set, by the monopoly of power and wealth, by exploiting the- 
............ 
1. Absolute military rule has been reimposed twice since 1976, i. e. 
October 1976 to October 1977, and from 1977 up to the time of 
writing (April 1979). 
2. For 'more details see, for example, Witheskorani (pseud. ), Yuk Tamin 
(The Dark Age of Brutality) (Bangkok: Prachakom Press, 1960); 
Kathadham (pseud. ); * 
, 
Sdk-iTi'Ndk'KannitIdng (Politicians' Crematorium) 
(Bangkok: Phanfa Press, 1963); and Chitr Sangkhadum, 'Phao'Saraphab 
(Phao's Confession) (Bangkok: Phrae Phittaya, Press, 1DZZU-. 
3. For more details about the harsh measures Sarit used to suppress 
opposition see, for example, Thak Chaloemtiarana''The'Sarit'Rogime, 
'1957-ý1963,.; 'The'FbiiftatiV-d'Ydars*6f'M6cleni'Thai Po tics (Un ubI d 
Ph. D. thesis, Comell University, 1974). 
L7' 
_p 
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enormous prestige of the throne, by pursuing a vigorous economic develop- 
ment programme, by retaining the military and economic support of the 
United States., and above all by perpetuating political repression and 
holding the freedom of the people in abeyance, managed to maintain his 
power fbr another decade. It temporarily relaxed the curbs on the 
freedom of the people during 1968-1971 and reimposed military rule 
again in 1971. Ib was overthrown by the student-led upheaval of 
October 1973. Within the Sangha, opponents of authoritarian rule could 
point to specific cases which they saw as political repression. Two of 
these cases, from the period 1958 to 1966, can be taken as examples. 
First, three learned monks 04akorn, Manas, and Sangwien) of the 
Mahanikai order were suspected of being commists. This incident began 
in 1956. During September to October of that year, these three monks 
were invited to attend a seminar organized by the Buddhist Association 
of Chinese People's Republic in Peking. There, the three monks were 
said to have made speeches on. Peking Radio praising the commmist regime's 
auspicious attitude towards Buddhism and its progressive and national 
development of the country. One of them wrote articles published in a 
Thai newspaper about the prosperity of China under the communist regime. 
Upon their return home, they were arrested and accused of being cammists. 
They were unfrocked in 1960 and tried by court martial. The trial took 
four years to complete and eventually the three accused were declared 
not guilty and were released in 1964.1 
The other incident was the Thra Phimcndhmnl case. This was to be 
so important in the events under consideration - it was in fact the cause 
For detail, see Nakom Elemphali, ''Kadi*Prawatsat (Historical Cases) 
(Bangkok: Burapha Sankikki Press, 1966) pp. 4-140 108-165. 
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11 % celebre o the 1960s - that an initial account will be presented here, 
and further aspects will'be exmined in later chapters. 
Phra Phimondham (Ard Duangmala - secular name) was born in ]Khon- 
kaen in the North-East about 1901. He had entered the monkhood in 
his youth as a member of Mahanikai order. He attained the Pali ' 
qualification Barian grade 8 in 1929. In 1932 he was appointed deputy 
abbot of a royal monastery in Ayudhya and was promoted subsequently, as 
abbot and deputy Sangha governor of Ayudhya. In the meantime the 
honorific title of', Phraratha*kana Chan rath was also conferred on him. 
In 1943., he was promoted to higher rank and was appointed the Chao'kana 
Phak. Two years later he was appointed a member of'Kana Sangha Montri 
in charge of Ecclesiastical education and became responsible for the 
Pali exanination of the Thai Sangha. He was promoted to'Phraracha'kana 
', Chan'thep, in 1946 and*Chan Tham in 1947. In the same year he moved to 
Wat Mahathat where he was the abbot until 1960. In 1949 he was the 
holder of the highest grade of'Phrdrddhd'kAna'chan Tham and became the 
Sangha Montri in charge of Ongkan Pokkhrong, i. e. head of the department 
of Sangha achinistration. He acquired a reputation both inside and 
outside the country for his wisdom, and his abilities in meditation, 
administration and the propagation of Buddhism. 
During the early 1950s Phibun's goverment, worried that the 
communists might be operating in the Sangha, directed the Sangha 
authorities to issue a decree forbidding the ordination of communists. 
The majority of the members of the Sangha Montri agreed with the govern- 
ment for they believed that the communists were enemies of Buddhism. 
But-Phra Phimondham who was responsible for implementing the resolution 
opposed the idea on doctrinal grounds. He argued that such a decree 
was inconsistent with Buddhist principles, for it discriminated against 
people who might wish to enter the monkhood. He deliberately delayed 
212 
the, implementation of the Sangha Mntrils resolution, in a sense 
challenging both Sangha and government authority. As a result he was 
suspected of being a com=ist sympathizer and was interviewed by the 
Director General of the Police Department. Although there was no 
concrete evidence to -prosecute him, his reputation was impaired and 
he suffered from this stigma when Sarit came to power in 1957. In 
April 1960, Sarit convened a meeting of all administrative monks in 
the country and impressed on them the good intentions of the government 
in its policy towards the Buddhist religion and, the Sangha. He told 
them frankly that since they depended on the state's support they should 
adjust their role to accommodate the objectives of the government and 
that the Sangha administration should be remodelled on the structure of 
2 
the secular administration. A few months later the existing Sangha 
Montri was dismissed and a new one was appointed which excluded Phra 
Phimondham. 3 The new Sangha Montri subsequently declared that its 
adadnistrative policies were., first, to follow the policies of the 
goverment; second, to oversee and prevent the communist infiltration 
of the Sangha and monastries; third, to prevent any attempt to use the 
monasteries for the propagation of communism; fourth, to direct the 
improvement of the monasteries and to oversee the behaviour of the 
monks; and finally, to detect and get rid of those monks who expressed 
opinions that undermined the healthy condition of the religion and that 
were opposed to goverment policies. 
4- This declaration was widely 
criticized by the monks, especially by those of the Mahanikai order. 
. Anonymous letters were circulated among monks and laymen urging them to 
1. For more details s ee Thirachon Cpseud-) .' Tdanglanglan 'Plod Phra 
*Phimandham Vol. I (The Facts behind the Demotion of Phra Phimondh=) 
ýýngkoff: '-'Aamit Press, 1973) pp. 48-54. 
'ýmbly, of Administrative Monks, 18 April'1960. 2. Sarit's Address to the Ass 
3. The majority of the members of the new Sangha Montri werb'Thamayut. monks. 
4., Thirachon.,, ' ep pp. - 34-35. k, 
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protest against the appointment of the new Sangha Montri and accusing 
the Sangha Montri of being the lackey of the goverment, of using its 
power to oppress the majority (i. e. Mahanikai monks), and of being a 
dictatorship. Policemen were sent to search many monasteries. Phra 
Phimondham was suspected of being the architect of this anti-government 
movement. 
Further misfortunes fell upon Phra Phimondham. In July 1960 he 
was accused of indulging in homosexuality, a serious Vinaya offence 
which entailed expulsion from the monkhood. He pleaded not guilty and 
appealed to the Prime Minister (Sarit) and the Supreme Patriarch, but 
his appeal was rejected. Handreds of his followers both monks and lay-' 
men saw this accusation as a plot to get rid of him. They organized 
demonstrations protesting against the decision of the Sangha authorities 
and'appealed to the Prime Minister to order a re-investigation. The 
government sent the police to surround Wat Mahathat where the demonst- 
ration took place. On 25 October 1960 the Sangha authorities removed 
Phra Phimondham from his abbotship. 1 This caused further discord. 
The government then issued a special announcement warning the Sangha 
authorities that if they could not settle the matter themselves, the 
2 
government would intervene. And so it did. On 11 November 1960 
the government announced to the public that, by His Majesty's Grace, 
Phra Phimondham was stripped of his honorific title and demoted to the 
status of ordinary monk. Nevertheless, his popularity remained intact. 
However., it was a great shock to him and his followers when in 1962 he 
was arrested and accused of committing communist acts. He was forced 
.. to. 
disrobe and detained-from 1962 until 1966. He was brought to trial 
1. ''Order, of"the'Supreme'Pdtriarch, 25 October 1960. 
2. The Prime Minister's Office; 'Announcement of'the'Goverment'Conceming 
'the'Disput6s-Withih'the'Sdngliýi, 28 October 1960, 
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by court martial in 1962. According to the charges made by the 
military prosecutor, his misdeeds extended over the period from 1946 
to 1962. The accusations were: he condemed the Buddha as a 'great liar' 
in 1946, an act that aimed at destroying Buddhism; in 1953 and 1962 he 
had attacked the monarchy as a 'useless institution and a waste of money'; 
during the 1950s he had sent monks from his following to receive training 
in Marxism in India, including the three monks mentioned earlier; in the 
same period he was the leader of'OAghan*Song'Kuchdrt7hai (The Thai 
Sanghals Organization for Liberation) which coordinated the ConmMist 
Party of Thailand operating in the Thai Sangha; between 1957 and 1960 
he had assembled men and weapons with the intention of provoking the 
public to revolt against the goverment; he had had his men trained for 
guerilla warfare and revolution; in 1962 he had publicly accused Sarit 
and his government of dictatorship, corruption, repressing the Sangha 
and exploiting the people; and he had urged the public to revolt against 
the goverment and replace it with a cammist regime. 
' 
The trial dragged on until 1966, when he was declared innocent and 
released to resume his monkhood. However, he was not reinstated in 
his honorific title or given any administrative post until 1975. It 
was revealed in court that Phra Phimondham would not have been in 
trouble, nor have lost his title, had there not been jealousy and power 
2 
-struggles anong the members of the Sangha. 
It was also suggested by 
1. The Court Martial of Bangkok, ''Kamphiphaksa*Sam'Thahan: Ajyakan Sam 
Ard'DLitigmala. WLe Verdict of the Court Martial: Military 
Prosecutor v. Nai Ard Duangmala) 30 August 1966, pp. 1-11 (typescript). 
2. A testimony given to the court martial by Phra Dhau=kosacharn on 10 
August 1965. The allegations revealed here refer to the widely held 
belief among Phra Phimondham's supporters that hIs a pointment to the 
post of head of department of Sangha administration 
Kad 
been hotly con- 
tested by an ambitious rival Phra Maha Weerawong of the Thammayut order. 
They accused this monk of jealously drawing to the attention of the 
authorities various alleged misdemeanours by Phra Phimondham, including 
the charge of homosexuality. Phra Maha Weerawong was himself well con- 
nected and successful, and ultimately became the Supreme Patriarch in 
1965. He died in a car crash in 1972. 
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Phra Phimondhmn's followers that Sarit himself was jealous of Phra 
Phimondham's popularity. It is also interesting to note that at 
the conclusion of the trial, the court asked Phra Phimondhmn to note 
I 
that all that had happened to him was the consequence of his previous 
bad, kama., and that those who had wrongly accused him would receive 
the fruits of their misdeeds (bad kanma) either in this life or the 
next life! 
2 
The Phra Phimondham case was seen by many monks as an act of 
great injustice. But few spoke out against the government at the 
time for fear of reprisals. It remained me of the number, of grievances 
which were to be made public in the 1970s. The major cause of dis- 
satisfaction with the goverment in the 1960s in the Sangha was however 
the new Sangha Act of 1962. After it was passed, the danger of 
conumism continued to be the justification for the goverment tighten- 
ing of control of the Sangha. For example, in April 1964 the Director 
General'of the Department of Religious Affairs claimed that the govern- 
ment had every reason and clear evidence to believe that the comunists 
had been attempting to undermine or even destroy Buddhism for political- 
3 
purposes. Ironically., any wrongs occurring in the Sangha, such as 
.. the-conflicts among administrative monks, criticism of government and, the 
1. Take, for example, the story told to me by Mr Anan Wongseta, a former 
close disciple of Phra Phimondham. When Sarit visited Khonkhaen, not 
long after he cane to power, he, was surprised by the small number of 
the people who came to greet him at the airport. He learnt latef that 
the majority had gone to greet Phra Phimondham who had arrived at the 
nearby toun at almost the same time. 
2. The Court Martial of Bangkok, *-'o1i. 'cit-, p. 24. 
3. Some monks were arrested for communist conspiracy, during 1964-1968. Jn 
1964, nine monks were-arrested and charged with provoking, the people to, 
disobey the government and undermining the'mmarchy'(Dhammachaksu., Vol. 
49, No. 12, September 1964) p. 65. In 1966, Somdet Wannarat revealed 
to the press that there were communists within the nonkhood who in the 
guise of Buddhists taught com=ism-to the people in the North-East. Some 
of them had ' 
been arrested by the pqlice'(Dhammachaksu, Vol. 51, No. 7, 
1966). p. -73. Also in 1968, eight monks were arrested while trying to 
enter a restricted official building. They carried arms. '(Dhammchaksu, 
Vol. 53, No. 7,1968) p. 71. 
I 
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Sangha by monks etc. were construed as part of a communist plot to 
destroy Buddhism and to induce people to lose faith in the religim 
and the Sangha. The government, ordered the Sangha authorities at all 
levels to keep a close watch and even spy on. the activities of suspec- 
ted monks. I 
2. 
- 
' Pol itital 'and* Etonomid * DdtoridtatioTi 'and 'Monks I' Criticism'of 
'Authotity 
While military rule continued and modes of govenment remained un- 
changed, socio-political changes were taking place rapidly in Thailand. ' 
Political and social consciousness had developed appreciably among the 
population, notably among the more articulate sections of society, such 
as the university and college teachers and students, journalists, 
politicians, progressive bureaucrats, and monks. These intellectuals 
in turn were able to make the general public smewhat more aware of the 
values of freedom,, civil liberty, and demcratic rule. The deterior- 
ation in political, economic, and social conditions was often attributed 
by them to military rule. 
In 1968 Thanom's regime loosened control of political activities 
by promulgating a new constitution which reinstated political parties 
(except the commist party), permitted a free press, and promised a. 
general election in 1969. However, the constitution, as had been the 
case in the past, was designed primarily to facilitate the aim of the 
existing regime. 
1 Thus, the 1969 general election returned the Thanom 
clique to power. However, socio-political circumstances had changed 
.. greatly. since the early 
1960s. More people demanded a greater share 
For'example, it allowed the Prime Minister and other members of the 
goverment to take office without being elected members of Parliament; 
for more details see the Constitution, 1968. 
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in politics, and the growing popularity of elected MPs allowed their 
powers in parliament to move increasingly away from the ruling clique's 
manipulation and control. In November 1971 Thanom staged a coup dletat 
against his own govenment. 
. 
Absolute rule returned and lasted until 
October 1973. 
The period 1971-1973 saw a rapid political and economic deterioration. 
Political repression and restrictions on the freedom of expression were 
restored. The new regime centralized power in its own hands, excluding 
civilian technocrats and politicians from high-level decision-making. 
At the same tijne factionalism within the ruling military clique increased 
and led to the shattering of the unity of the military high command. The 
military leaders were so preoccupied with the task of ensuring the 
support of their clients that attempts to solve the immediate economic 
difficulties produced by inflation-vere neglected. The informed public 
became aware of the weaknesses of the military oligarchs and began to 
judge them as corrupt and self-serving. In up-country areas, despite 
I 
massive suppression, conmmist insurrections and rural insurgency. 
increased, and in the increasingly violent fighting the goverment 
suffered losses. 
2 
Economic deterioration accelerated the public loss of confidence 
in the ability of the military to govern, though in fact it was probably 
due, more to extemal factors such as world-wide inflation, than to govern- 
ment policy. After a long period of economic stability prior to 1970, 
the rate of inflation rose alarmingly, reaching 15 per cent in 1972-1973. 
Clark D. 
, 
Neher,, Stability and Instability in Conteuporary Thailand1l, 
'Asian'Su'rve , Vol-, XV., No. 12, December 1975, pp. 1099-4100; see 
nry ienen'and David Morell, 'Transition from Military Rule: 
Thailand's-Exp*erience. ',, Catherine M. Kelleher (ed. ), ''Political- 
' 
-Military'Systems:, 'qonparativ-d'PerspectiVes, (London-: -Sage, 197u'pp. 3-25. 
2. ' David Morell, 'Thailand .... I; *Asian*SLirveY. Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1973, pp. 173-174; see also Anan-Te-n-aIUTH57ýt al. ' Ibmthi Rak (Dear 
Commists) (Bangkok: Pho Samton Press, 1974), anCý-aýnMuýan (A Thai daily, 
newspaper) 24 March 1977. 
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The price of rice doubled in 1972, while rice production dropped some 
12 per cent. The economic growth rate dropped precipitously from. 
11.8'per cent'dur-big the latter half of the 1960s to 2.8 per ceni in 
1972.1 The'country's overall balance of payments showed a deficit 
- for the first time. 
Among the urban population uneinployment rose sharply adding to 
the misery of the already lowly paid industrial workers. 2 In the 
farming sector, land was the central problem. While the amount of 
usable land increased only one per cent per year, the population growth 
I 
was about 3.3 per cent. Landholdings, as a consequence, had become 
smaller over'time as they were divided among, an ever-increasing 
population. The average land holding per family was 25 rai in 1950; 
by 1970 the figure had been reduced to 15.8 rai. Inequalities in terms 
of land tenure and in rent, the insecurity of tenant famers and rural 
indebtness were other serious problems. 3 The deterioration of the 
national economy described above added. to these problemso and the 
standard of living for the majority of farmers dropped sha-rply. 
Neher, 'op. Cit., p. 1100. 
2. Already an exploited category whose low, wages-meant they lived-in 
considerable poverty. For them working conditions were often sub- 
standard, pension and-sickness benefits did not exist, and there - 
was no provision for job security or legal redress for wrongful dis- 
missal. For fuller details see, for example, Phichit Chongsathit- 
watthana, ', *Krabuan'k; jii'kammakom 'ndi'Prathbt*thai (Labour Moverent in, 
Thailand) (Bangkok: Phikkhanet, 1974),, and Suphachai Manatsaphaibun 
"rabob'nai'thm (Thai Labourers in a Capitalist 
Economy) (Bangkok: Somphong Presso 1974). 
3. For details see Chaiyong Chuchart and Suthiporn Chirapanda., Chan es 
p 'in*Agrdridn'Sti-dcturci*in'Central'Thdil-tid'1965--ý1971 (BangkoIPPeDa&-,,, 
ment of Land Development., 1974); Chaiyong Chuchart, *Princiýles'and. 
'Praeticd8'of'La: rid*Plartiirig'and'DOV61opment'iri'Thziiland: Land Economies 
Report'No. ' 6 (Bangkok: Ministry of National Development, 1971); Depart- 
ment of Land Development. 'Porcorit6ge 'Compdri. ýons letweeri'Land Owners 
and"Tenaýnt. 8'in'1963'dnd'1968-; 1969, (Bangkok: Mimeograph, 1969); and also 
Ndational-Student Centre of TE-al7aind., . 'Pdthi-rup*thi'din? (Land Reform? ) 
(Bangkok: Phikkhanet, 1974). 
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The changing economic conditions also greatly affected the so- 
called 'new petit-bourgeoisie', who had emerged as a result of the 
Vietnam war boom of the 1960s. This new class had been apolitical 
and concerned only with their economic betterment. By 1971 or 1972, 
the boom was fading and resulted in a certain uneasiness and dissatis- 
faction amongst its beneficiaries. They blamed the goverment for 
its inability to sustain the boom. 
These economic setbacks were also shared by the salaried bureau- 
crats. The combined forces of inflation, and--recession made it 
difficult for them to maintain the standard of living they expected. 
They too placed the blame for their falling living standards on the 
military regime and attributed their difficulties to its economic mis- 
management. 
Despite goverment repression, it became evident that the tolerance 
of some sections of the public had reached its breaking point. Criticism 
of the wrongs of the military goverment was frequently expressed. At 
the forefront of the opposition were liberal-minded intellectuals, such 
as university lecturers, students and journalists. To a large extent, 
2 
opposition to the government appeared in the form of published articles. 
To a minor extent., it ranged from the distribution of leaflets to street 
demonstrations. The critical articles involved, for example, gentle 
. -appeals. to end repressive military rule and to restore representative 
1. A good detailed analysis of this 'new class' is offered by Professor 
Benedict R., O'Gorman Anderson, 'Withdrawal Symbols: Social and Cultural 
Bases of the 6 October 1976 Coup in Siam' , ''BUllotin'bf'Concorned'Asian 
'Scholars, V61.9., No. - 3 (July-September 1977) pp. -13-30. 
2. These critical-articles mostly appeared in the prestigious monthly 
revieW*S, tigkomsdt'Pdtithat (Journal of Social Science Review) during 
1970-1973; and in Chao'Ban*(Comorier), a magazine published by a 
group of university"Te-cturers over the same period. 
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government. Also the uneven'application of the economic development 
policy was fervently criticized. During 1970-1973 the critics directed 
their attacks to the theories and modes of economic development which 
closely followed the examples of capitalist societies, especially the 
United States of America. They said that such development plans 
promoted the monopolisation of the economic wealth. of the nation by the 
elite, exacerbated exploitation, and widened the gap between the rich 
and the poor, the urban and rural sections of society. The American 
domination of the Thai economy and capitalist system were blamed for 
the economic and social hardships of the peasants and labourers, corrup- 
tion and abuse of power by political leaders and government officials 
2 
were also said to be a major cause of alienation. By 1973, demands 
for the withdrawal of the American military bases, from Thailand increased 
rapidly. 
3 One critic warned the goverment in 1970 that its existing 
policies needed a drastic change, 'if it wants to avoid a popular up- 
rising ,. 
4 This sort of opposition, though limited to educated 
sectors, did have enormous influence on the mass of university and college 
students. Some of them became the architects and leaders of change, 
and several thousands were militant in overthrowing the military regime 
in October 1973. 
The growing alienation from the military regime also pervaded the 
young and educated monks. In the same period (1970-1973) there 
1. The most influential one was an open letter entitled 'Chotmai chak'nai 
'khem (Letter from Mr Fhem) written by Professor Puay UH-g-pHHR&M. 
2. These views originally appeared in'Sangkomsat'Parithat during 1970- 
1973. Later they were published in Suchart Sawatdisi (ed. ), 'Ybrft'Prakat 
'khong'kwam'td8, uk*riai CDeclaration of New Feelings) (Bangkok: Phikkhanef, 
1975), see especially pp. 5-10,21-290 93-105. 
3. ' Ibid., pp. 201-209., 
4. 'Ibid., 'p. 29. 
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occasionally appeared criticisms of military rule from some monks. 
The stages by which'this happened can be best traced in the critical 
articles published ii! 'Bdddhachak, a monthly journal of Mahachula Budd- 
hist University. This journal began in 1946 and its main contributors 
have been monks. Before 1969, it had concentrated on topics such as 
Buddhist studies, Pali, the history of Buddhism, and limited its items 
of social concern to the activities of the university and events within 
the confines of Sangha affairs. In 1969 there was a special issue 
devoted to the discussion of political, economic, and social problems 
which the monks themselves had experienced when they participated in 
the government programmes of community development and the Phra 
Dhammatuta scheme. This was the first time that monks openly critic- 
ized the military government for its repression of the people. For 
example, on the problem of communist insurrection, one monk maintained 
that it was the indiscriminate measures of suppression that had forced 
the people to become communists. Moreover, the abuse of power and 
maladministration of local government officials was also another impor- 
tant factor which made the people feel insecure and led them to seek 
help from the communists. Another monk pointed out that the govern- 
ment would never secure the villagers' loyalty if it could not remedy 
the problems of rural poverty and the corruption of officials. 
1 
Other direct criticisms2 of military rule became more pronounced 
during the period 1970 to 1973. For example, one monk expressed his 
detestation of the goverment's limitations on freedom of expression, 
its repression and corruption by identifying the corrupted politicai 
..... ........ 
1. For more details sed', BLiddhachak, Special Issue, July 1969. 
2. These criticisms were mostly anonymous. So it is difficult to 
establish the precise quarter from which criticism was coming, 
other than from the provenanceof the joumal, i. e. Mahachula 
Buddhist University. 
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leaders with wild beasts. Another author warned the government 
that its repressive rule only stimulated national discontent. He 
stated that 'people will leave their farms and cattle and take to 
2 
arms, for revenge' .I They appealed to the political leaders to end 
repressive rule and to have more dare for the people. 
Many monks also began to express their great concern about the 
deterioration of the country's economy. Their central concern was 
the economic plight of the peasants. They appealed to the goverment 
to pay more attention to the farmers' grievances by giving development 
priority to them. One article, for example, stressed that the economic 
plight of the fa-mers was a result of capitalism in which the political 
leaders had a part. This author also conceived of the economic develop- 
ment policy of the government as an 'evil device' which aggravated the 
misery of the famers, while enhancing the fortunes of the rich. 
3 
Several articles attributed the social ills of the country to the 
4 
political leaders' imoralitys and to corruption within the goverment. 
Also during this period, the monks' concern for the healthy con- 
dition of Buddhism and correct behaviour of the monks became pronounced. 
The authoritarian character of the Sangha administration was blamed as 
....... I. i 
Phra, Maha Sathienphong Punnawanno, 'Krungthep sibsong (roi) Phi 
khangnal (Bangkok in Twelve (HLmdred) Years from now), 'Sangk6msat 
.. 
Vol. 7, No. 4 04arch-May 1970) p. - 3. 'Parithat, 
2. Anon., 'Rath PhilarbI (Voices of People's Grie-yances), Buddhachak, 
Vol. 26, No. 12 (December 1972) pp. 15-16. 
3. Yotmuk (pseud. ), 'Lamam Chonbot' (Voices from the Countryside), 
'Buddhachak, Vol. 26, No. 10 (October 1972) pp. 30-31. 
4. See, for example, 'Editorial Notesl., 'Buddhachak, Vol. 26, No. 8 
(August 1972) and"Vol. 27, No. 4, (Apiýirl -1973). 
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having undermined Buddhism and having caused injustice within the 
Sangha. The misdemeanours 
1 
of sme administrative monks were 
strongly criticized. Discontent with the Sangha authority and its 
treatment of Phra Phimondham began to exert its effect. Phra Phi- 
mondham's supporters persistently petitioned the govenunent and the 
Sangha authority to investigate the possibility that this monk had 
been wrongly accused and unjustly tried. They also appealed to 
the authorities to return his honorific title. This movement became 
apparent in 1971 and lasted until 1976.2 In November 1972,16 Sangha 
provincial governors of the North-Eastern region acting on behalf of 
the whole body of administrative monks of the North-Eastern provinces 
sent a letter to the government informing it of their determination to 
demand justice and reinstatement in office for Phra Phimondham. A 
similar letter was also sent to the Supreme Patriarch. 
3 In September 
1973,4,580 monks and novices asked the Sangha authority to reconsider 
Phra Phimondhmn's case. Their demand was similar to that already made 
on previous occasions. Although the demand was not met until 1975, the 
movement clearly demonstrated a challenge to the Sangha authority. It 
also suggests that when the civil government was weak and unstable, so 
was the Sangha authority. 
Thus before October 1973, the political and economic deterioration 
had already created preconditions for rapid, possibly violent change. 
.. A. by-7product of this situation was the emergence of political monks. 
1. Such as practising occultism'(ýýýjt), blessing mercenaries who 
were going to fight in Vietnam-md-Laos,, presiding over the opening 
ceremonies of massage parlours or night clubs etc. 
2. For details about the emergence and the development of this movement 
see Phra Maha Sawat Chartmethi khanibat'najan'Atok (The 
Great Sangha Convention at Lan Asok) (Bangkok: Krung Sayam Press., 
1975) pp. 2-91. 
: 3. Letters from 16 Chao kana Changwat to the Secretary General of the 
Revolutionary Council, and the Supreme Patriar6h, dated 15 November 
1972. 
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What was needed were incidents, that would spark an upheaval. This 
is the subject to which we will now devote attention. 
. 3. ' The'1973 'Political Upheaval'and 
In the early part of the year there were a variety of incidents 
which accelerated the 1973 uph6aval. One of the most significant of 
these began in June when nine students of Ramkamhaeng University were 
t 
expelled for writing a satire on the decision of Thanom and Prapat to, 
extend their tems of office for yet another year. Students under 
the leadership of the National Students Centre of Thailand (NSCT) 
organized'a demonstration in which about 50,000 students from all over 
the country took part. They demanded the reinstatement of the nine 
students. 
Over the two days of the rally the students realized that they-Were 
well supported by the urban masses. The demonstration became a form 
for spelling out grievancesagainst the military goverment. Soon 
they also called for an end to military rule, the stopping of corruption, 
and measures to restore the sagging Thai economy. Most importantly 
they asked for a new constitution within six mnths, not three years as 
2 Prapat had promised the week before. 
The demonstration was a success in one. respe6t. The nine expelled 
students were reinstated. However,, the government gave no promises 
about an early promulgation of the new constitution. Eýit the students 
.. had. already determined to fight for it, as the student leader, the 
Thai newspapers-reported that they were supported by people giving 
them money and food. - Bus conductors and taxi drivers gave them 
free rides. Many non-students joined in the demonstration. 'See, 
for exainple, ''ThaiRdth, 22-23-June 1973, and alsO'Bangkok Post, 23 
June 1973. 
2. ", Bangkok'Pbstl-23 Jme 1973. 
Secretary General of the NSCT declared: 
this (demonstration) is only a beginning ..... iust win ...... We must fight for the constitution because the government of our comtry must be run by 
the people, notAhe military. 1 
fb also called on the people to join or to support ýhem in their fight 
. 
against the milita-ry oligarchs. 
After this event the student mvement won considerable support 
'from the Bangkok working class, middle class, and intellectuals. They 
became the voice of the people and the principal opposition to the 
'military regime. I 
The imediate cause for the October 1973 political upheaval was 
the arrest of thirteen political activists, coinprising student'leaders, 
university lecturers, politicians, and journalists, during 6 to 8 
October 1973, for distributing leaflets calling for an early promulga- 
tion of the new constitution. They were accused by the goverment of 
involvement in a comunist plot to overthrow it. The NSCr called a 
mass demonstration in protest, and on 12 October they demanded the un- 
conditional release of the arrested men, and that the constitution'be 
promalgated within six months. In this demonstration many thousands 
of students from all over the country took part. On: 13 October they 
took to the streets and marched to the Democracy Monument. They were 
.. 
joined. by great crowds of sympathisers. 
3 On the same day the goverment 
1. 'Ibid. . 
2. Ross -Prizzia. and Narong Sinsawasdi; 'Thailandt' 'Stucldnt'Adtivism'and' 
'P6litid, ql*ChdAge (Bangkok: Allied PrInters, 157 7-4)pp. 40-42. 
3. The ntunber -of demonstrators was estimated at between 400,000 an 
500,000;, see.. for example; 'Thdildth, 14 October 1973. 
I 
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agreed to release the men under arrest unconditionally and promised 
to promulgate the new constitution in October 1P74. 
Although their demands were not totally met, the student leaders, 
following the king's intervention, agreed to call off the demonstration. 
But a large nunber of the demonstrators refused to disband, unless the 
goverment could produce a guarantee that the promises would be kept. 
These discontented crowds marched to the Palace to seek the king's 
guarantee in the early morning of 14 October. Through his represen- 
tative the king advised them to disband and go home. While the 
demonstrators were trying to leave the palace, there was some confusion, 
and clashes between the crowds and police occurred. Many demonstrators 
were injured, and it was rwnoured that three girls had been beaten to 
death by the police. When this rwnour spread to other crowds who were 
still in the streets and on Thammasat University campus, the demonstrators 
sought violent revenge. The government sent in the armed forces equipped 
with M. 16 and tank-machine guns to suppress the demonstrators and blood- 
shed began. The violent confrontation lasted for two days. Throughout 
it, the govenunent, using radio'and television, distorted the situation. 
It announced that the demonstrators were not students, but conmmists 
who wanted to overthrow the goverment and destroy the monarchy. It 
warned the people not to go out. But hundreds of thousands did come 
out, and many joined in the battle. The violence ended when the king 
dismissed the government and Thanom, Prapat and Narong were forced to go 
into exile. The price for bringing the military regime down was high: 
over 50 people were killed and hundreds wounded, and several public 
buildings were devastated besides. 
Although the success in ending the long period of military rule 
was, primarily credited to the student movement, it Dust be recognized 
that it was the massive support from people in many walks of'life which 
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ensured their victory. A new-govenunent was established, predominantly 
civilian. The king's selection and appointment of the new goverment 
headed by Sanya Thammasak gave the caretaker goverment legitimacy and 
it was accepted by the students and the public alike. A National 
Assembly was established through a, selection process and with the 
blessing, of the king. It comprised a variety of leading personalities: 
civil servan ts, intellectuals, professionals, a handful of famer and 
labourer leaders, businessmen and military, with an overall civilian 
majority. A Constitutional Drafting Committee was also set up, 'with 
due attention to student wishes, comprising lawyers, political scientists, 
and joumalists. 
The new governmnt promised to promulgate a new. Constitution 
within six months and to hold a general election as soon as possible. 
It also promised to draw up plans for remedying economic and political 
problems. It was an era of hope and anticipation during which the 
people expected to see things change overnight. In fact their expec-, 
tations had gone so high that it was beyond the ability of the caretaker 
goverment to satisfy them, as we shall see later. 
I 
Several politically oriented groups and voluntary associations 
were now fomed in Bangkok and other communities and began to exert 
themselves as pressure groups. Their emergence was clearly in response 
to the long, suppression of freedom of expression, and to the lack of 
means by which various occupational groups and the common people at 
. large could express their grievances and induce change. , The mushroom 
growth of pressure groups and of a free press in this period contributed 
to the development of the most genuinely free political atmosphere 
Thailand, had ever experienced. 
, 
Among the politically oriented groups and associations that emerged - 
I 
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after October 1973 were, for example., the People for Democracy 
(Prachachon*Phad Prachathipathai - PDG) and the Federation of Indepen- 
dent Students of Thailand (FIST). These two pressure groups., 
together with the NSCT, later became strong leftist movements. Among 
the liberal associations was, for exanple, the Union for Civil Liberty 
(UCL). There were also occupational groups such as the National 
Centre for the Protection of Teachers' Rights and a limited number of 
similar occupational associations. Apart from these, an Environment 
Protection Club and Consumer Associations were formed. 
This period also witnessed the consolidation of the urban workers 
and farmers. The urban labourers had progressed from an initial spate 
of wild-cat strikes in late 1973, to more coordinated groups of unions. 
Notable among them was the radical Federation of Labour Unions of Thai- 
land (FLUT). 1 The rice farmers in many provinces successfully 
organized themselves into collective bargaining groups. The most 
radical one was the Federation of Famers of Thailand (FFT). A number 
of organized groups of-monks for various purposes also emerged in this 
period., The most articulate one was the Federation of Buddhists of 
Thailand (FBT) which will be discussed in more detail later. 
In the process of political and social change, it was hardly 
surprising that the outburst of political activity should give rise 
to factionalism within and between the various groups. In the process 
of conflict, too, people tended to divide themselves into opposing 
.. sides,. 
in the broadest sense, between conservatives and those who wanted 
For more detail about the development and membership of labour 
unions in-Thailand between 1973 and 1976 see Bevar D. Mabry., 'The 
Thai Labour Movement' , ; *A-ýian'Sarvey, Vol. XVII, No. 10., October 1977, pp. 935-941; see also Suphachai Manatsaphaibun, -6p. Cit., 
and Phichit Chongsathitwatthana; '61j. cit. 
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to bring change to the existing, social, political and economic structure., 
One of the most significant developments was the ideological polariz- 
I ation and confrontation between the, left and right wing political groups. 
4. ''Ideological'Polaritation and Confrontatim: 'The Left versus the Right 
The use of the concept of left and right wing political polarity in 
this study is not intended to suggest that the whole society is polarized'. 
Rather the concept refers strictly to political activities in Thailand 
during 1973-1976, and the political groups who tried to persuade the 
majority of the people to support them, or at least to be sympathetic 
to their ideas., causes and activities. I must stress that the left and 
right wing labels are being strictly confined to the Thai perception of 
the left and the right at this period, and therefore may not coincide with' 
the usage that prevails in the West or elsewhere. 
In Thailand the left and right labels are relative, depending on 
the conception of one wing's ideology by the other. Between 1974 and 
1976, leftists ranged from 
liberals to communists. Rightists included 
middle-of-the-road and ultra conservatives and military strong men. 
For the leftists, the rightists were Icapitalists''QLaL_Lhun 
lmilitaristsljjýjun suk), limperialists''(thakkawat'ni ! feudalists 
or aristocrats''(ýakdina), lfascistsl'(faýScDt , and those opposed to 
social, economic and political change. The rightists were also . 
identified as the exploiters, the oppressors, and in extreme cases the 
enemies of the people. The leftists, 'as regarded by the rightists, 
included activists and agitators such as the communists, conwmist 
sympathizers, socialists and liberals. Leftists were identified as 
the enemies of the nation, religion, and the monarchy, the IscLm of the 
earth''(khon'rok'phaendin) who caused social and political disturbance 
and national disintegration, and those who hindered and undermined 
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economic and social progress. 
Since there were numerous shades of left and right there were 
inevitably overlaps to be found in ideologies and activities between 
groups and among individuals. Broadly speaking, the ideological' 
position of the Thai left wing was support for significant political, 
economic and social changes. Their ideological conunitments ranged 
from liberalism and reformism to socialism and revolution. It was 
the leftists' ideas about the methods of bringing about change that 
inevitably caused uneasiness, and antagonized the rightists, for they 
invariably involved an attempt to overthrow the established elite. 
The ideological direction of the rightists had consequently crystallized 
primarily in reaction to the threat of their displacement from positions 
of power and status. 
(a) 'The'Lofti8ts 
Although the leftists could not agree on all matters,, they 
appear to have shared a minimal common set of beliefs which set them 
apart from the rightists. This consisted of: a belief in freedom, 
especially freedom of the press, speech and assembly; a belief in 
equality, minimally equality before the law; sympathy with the, oppressed 
and the exploited; opposition to imperialism and any kind of foreign 
domination; and willingness to be servants of the people. The more 
radical leftists also agreed that the power struggle in Thailandwas 
between the people and groups identified as feudalist-capitalists, 
inperialist-backed' militarists and dictatorial rulers. 
The relaxation of censorship of the press from 1974 to 1976 
allowed the emergence or revival of publications in which their leftist 
stance was, revealed to the public. It is through these daily news- 
papers, weekly magazines, monthly journals, and irregular pamphlets, 
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as well as paperback books that we are able to appreciate, although 
not comprehensively, the leftist standýand their common identification. 
Representing progressive liberal attitudes and values were such 
daily newspapers as the*Prachathipathdi ('Democracy), the Prachachart 
('Nation') and thd'Siangmai ('New Voice). They were by-products of 
the October 1973 upheaval. Within 
ihis 
category were also the weekly 
magazines. Prachachart ('The Nation'), Jaturat ('The Square'), and' 
the monthly magazine, ''Sithi'Seriphap ('Civil Rights and Liberties') 
which was published by the Union for Civil Liberty. These magazines 
concentrated on the quest for social justice, economic equality, the 
removal of corruption among public officials, an end to goverment Mis- 
appropriation of funds and the like. ''Chao'Ban ('Commoner'), a periodical 
published by a group of university lecturers, concentrated on rural 
problems and brought peasant grievances to the attention of the govern- 
ment, and urban readers. 
Socialist trends were clearer in such weekly newspapers as 
Maharath ('The Masses') which focussed on explaining to the masses 
basic socialist principles and the nature of the class struggle in 
Thai society; *'Asia, ''Mahanikhon ('The Multitude'), and Mahachon ('The 
People') took an anti-American stance and concentrated on the imperialist 
role of the United States in Latin America as well as in Asia. 
Reflecting the ideological orientation of the labour movement which was 
also radical, were such journals as'Raeng Ngan'Thai ('Thai Labour') and 
Raeng'Ngan'Parithat ('Labour Review') which pointed to the economic 
plight, oppressed conditions and exploitation of Thai urban labourers. 
They also sought to encourage the solidarity of the labour movements 
and gave opinions on how to fight the capitalists. The more influen- 
tial publications of students and intellectuals who formed the core of 
urban radical opposition were the fortnightly'Soon ('The Centre') and I 
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the weekly 'Athipat ('Sovereign') published by ihe NSCTO Both of them 
gave reports and commentaries on Thai social'and political issues from 
a radical viewpoint. In, particular they dealt sympathetically with 
the problem of farmers and labourers, ethnic minorities and regional 
dissidents throughout the country. ý More radical and revolutionary 
were the monthly', P., Ch--P. *Ch. (an abbreviation for Phrachon'Phua 
'Prachathipathai - People for Democracy), put out by the PDG, 
Phithuphum (La patrie) published by the Socialist Party of Thailand, 
and periodical publications such as the FISr's'Khonchon ('The Poor'). 
I 
In these papers, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideas were the main 
I 
inspiration. They qmployed a -pervasive vodabulary of struggle on behalf of 
the oppressed and exploited labourers and farmers. They uncompromisingly 
declared war on imperialism and capitalism. 
All of these leftist publications were, in direct conflict with the 
well-established popular newspapers and magazines which typically avoided 
social issues and laid stress on lurid crimes, sex and sensationalism. 
The more respectable newspapers and magazines, which did cover social and 
political problems in a conservative fashion were dismissed by the'leftist 
press as elitist.. 
I 
This was also a, boom period for left wing paperbacks. Mass 
production had made them cheap in price and hence availableto almost 
everyone. They exposed the Thai people to influences which had previously 
been stifled. The paperback publications ranged from a sort of To-It- 
Yourself' revolutionary mmual to the profoundly intellectual works of 
Marx,, Lenin, and Mao. ' Sympathetic studies of the thoughts and lives of 
these figures and of such people as Chou-En-Lai, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen 
Giap, 'Norodom Sihanouk, Keo S ampan, Supmýuwong, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro 
and so on were available in abundance. Their published works were 
widely-translated into Thai. The works of martyred Thai Marxists such 
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as Chitt Phumisak, Kularp Saipradit, Pridi Phanomyong and so on Te- 
emerged and were carefully studied. All these publications had a 
profound influence on the thought of the young leftists of the day. 
Contributions in paperback from contemporary Thai leftists were 
also numerous. Their themes were, in general, the extension and 
elaboration of the ideas expressed in the periodicals described earlier., 
Among them there were also leftist exposie's of individuals as exploitat- 
ive capitalists, militarists, feudalists, and so on. Many dealt with 
social questions such as peasants, land, and labour problems, and 
international problems relevant to the Thai scene. To a major extent, 
socialist approaches were put forward as the best alternatives for 
remedying what were seen as the social, economic, and political problems 
of the country. On the extreme left, popular revolution was recommended 
as the only means to remove the capitalist and militarist classes'and to 
end exploitation. In both domestic and foreign affairs, the USA was 
seen as the major villain, and it was suggested that Thai links with 
the United States should be. broken and new friends such as China should 
be cultivated. 
The ideologies of the left reached the rural masses through a 
number of chamels. In 1974 and early 1975 the NSCT with the, government 
co-organized and financed a progranne called the Democracy Propagation 
CaTnpaign in the rural areas. The official objective was to teach 
democracy to the people. The students were organized into groups and 
sent to villages throughout the c9untry. They lived and worked with 
the villagers for short periods of one to two weeks., Among thousands 
of volunteers were a nunber of left wing studentsWho took the opportunity. 1 
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1 
to pass on leftist ideas to the rural masses. ' There were also 
groups of students who rejected the Democracy, Propagation Campaign 
as right wing propaganda and who went on their own to the villages 
and worked on comnunity 6velopment projects. For example, in a 
village in Khonkhaen province, a group ofýstudents helped the villagers 
to organize self-help programmes, such as further education for school 
leavers, co-operatives, a village road and well construction. 2 
Similar movements were also found in Nakornsawan and some other, 
provinces in the North. 
Before. the end of 1974, some leftist organizations were ready to 
bid for political power in the parliamentary system. On the far left, 
they consolidated into the Socialist Party of Thailand'(Sangkomiyom 
haeng Prdthdt'Thai). This party advocated a thoroughgoing socialist 
policy of nationalizing banks, unused land, and all key services and 
industries, and of providing better social welfare. Anti-imperialism 
and anti-foreign influence were further themes in their manifesto. In 
the middle of the left, there emerged the United Socialist Front of, 
Thailand* (NaewRuam Sangkomiyom'haeng Prathet Thai It offered a 
more moderate programme than the Socialist Party by claiming to respect 
private property rights and accommodating to the strong Thai sentiments 
of reverence for the monarchy and religion. More moderate still was 
the New Force Party'(Palang MaD . However, in the 1975 election all 
of the left wing parties together gained only 37 seats out of 269. They 
.. thus. came to serve together with the centre party, the Democrats, as 
This assertion is supported by the author's own experience when he 
was, the instructor to volunteers in Phitsanulok, Fhonkhaen, Petchaburi, 
Songkla and Narathiwat during 1974-1975. He also participated in the 
campa3. gn. 
2. T. Sawanajinda et al,, ''oD., eit. I 
I 
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opposition parties. The five. main right wing parties took the lead 
in foming a coalition goverment. The ieft, wing parties got'even 
less seats in the subsequent general election (1976). ' Althougý the 
coalition goverments both offered to accomodate certain demands of 
1 the left wing parties, these offers were not taken up. In the 
eyes of the leftists, these governments were the pres, erve'of the 
capitalists, militarists, and feudalists who would never uýderstand 
the grievances and misery of the masses, and only prolong the oppres- 
sion. Outside of Parliament, the left wing activists publicized 
their doubts about the sincerity of the goverment among the masses. 
They organized and led a series of rallie s, protesting, against the 
government throughout the country. They claimed to be the vanguard 
of the oppressed and exploited and sought rapid relief for them 
through strikes, demonstrations, public exhibitions or public speeches. 
The following examples will serve to illuminate the activities of the 
leftists as well as their ideologies in these matters. 
In 1974 the PDG revealed to the public the activities of the 
goverment troops in their communist suppression campaign in Ban Nasai, 
a North-Eastem village, as atrocities. This village had been alleged 
by the-govenunent to be communist infested and had been burnt down. 
The PDG launched a nation-wide campaign, mobilized a mass protest 
against the goverment and demanded compensation for the villagers. 
In 1975, another group led by the NSCT followed up by publicizing another 
alleged atrocity, the Red Drm case, committed by the goverment ý 
-authorities 
in Pattalung, a Southern province. According to the 'Red 
For more details see Somporn Sangchai, - *Observations On Elections 
'and *Coalition Tormation, iTi *ThailaTid- -1976 (Singapore: Institute oy 
Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 43, May 1976); and 
also Jeffrey Race, 'The January 1975 Thai Election: Preliminary Data 
, and Inferencesl, -Mian'ýýurvey, Vol. 15,1975, pp., 375-381. 
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Drum' story, hundreds of commist suspects were tortured and brutally 
killed by having them soaked in a 200-litre drum of petrol and set on 
fire. 1 In these campaigns the leftists appeared to base their case on 
humanitarian rather than partisan grounds and used the alleged incidents 
to demand a critical review of the com=ist suppression techniques as 
well as the abolition of the Coummist Suppression Operations Command 
(CSOC). However, in both cases no independent inquiries were conducted. 
The CSOC was not abolished but changed its name to the Internal Security 
Operations Comand (ISOC). 
The difficulties of the famers and labourers were another central 
concem, of the leftists. As we have noted earlier, the period 1974- 
1975 produced a multiplicity of organized famers' groups and labour 
unions. Under the leadership of the radical Federation of Farmers of 
Thailand (FFT), famers staged a series of demonstrations protesting 
against the govenment policies concerning land reform, land tenure and 
rent. The unprecedented rallying of peasants began in May 1974 and was 
followed by others, one in June, and another, the biggest, in November, 
and a few smaller ones in 1975. The farmers in their demands sought 
the re-allocation of land taken from them by loan-sharks and large 
landlords; immediate aid for landless peasants; a speeded-up investig- 
ation into the illegal or unfair seizure of land by loan-sharks, large 
landlords, and govenment; investigation into unfair rents; and an 
early introduction of land reform legislation. In the course of 
demonstrations, it became clear that many peasants did, appreciate the 
the leftist ideologies. For instance, at the rallies a number of 
............ 
Ruangyot Chantharakiri,, 'Rai ngan Chak Pattalung: theep long khao 
phao long thang daeng' (The Red DrLm Victims: A Report from Pattalung) 
-Sadgkomsdt'Patithat, Vol. 13, No. 1,19752 pp. 41-73. 
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peasant leaders'addressed their followings in revolutionary Marxist 
tenns. They used phrases such as 'class struggle', 'the exploiters 
and the exploited', 'power to the peoplel, "people ulmost in the land',., 
'capitalism'is the social ill of, mankind', and so on. The most 
remarkable demonstration was the occasion on which hundreds of farmers 
marched to Parliament in June 1974 and returned their identification , 
cards to the President of the Parliament, a symbolic gesture indicating 
the abandoment of Thai citizenship. It was also the first time that 
monks led farmers in a march. 
For the labourers too, this period saw a series of strikes, unpre-, 
cedented in size, the amount of violence involved, and the extent of demands, 
made. 
Anti-American imperialism protests were another notable form. of 
activity by the leftists. Between 1974 and 1976 there were a whole 
series of demonstrations demanding the withdrawal of American bases from 
Thailand. These effectively culminated-with two massive demonstrations-. 
,2 
The first was over the Mayaguez incident in late 1975. This pressed 
the government into an agreement with the United States to withdraw most 
of its forces from Thailand. On 20 March 1976, a second demonstration 
was staged to ensure the government honoured this agreement. 
3 
It is interesting to note that in these demonstrations and protest, 
-activities, despite their various shades of radicalism and, their 
differ- 
1. Over 1,000 strikes occurred between 1973 and 1975; see Department 
of Labour, 'Ybar*Bbok*bf'Laboiir'Statistics. (Bangkok: Departme I nt of 
Labour., 1975) pp. 118-119. 
2. In this the US marines used a Thai base without permission to 
rescue an American ship, the Mayaguez, captured by the Cambodian Navy. 
3. For details, see, for exampýe, The University of New South Wales Thai 
Society, 'Thai, No. 2 (Victoria: Walker Press, 1976) pp. 3-5., 
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I 
ences, in opinion on other matters, the leftists showed their solidarity, 
and gave expression to their shared ideas. From my own experience, as 
the Executive Member of the Union for Civil Liberty between 1974 and 
1975, there was always consultation between various leftist movements 
upon plans and strategies in the organization of protests. In 
practice, a group would be responsible for a certain cause and would seek 
support from other leftist groups. Support., in general, ranged from 
issuing a declaration or joint communique, to mass mobilization. 
Thus, the period 1974 to early 1975 was the period in'which the 
leftists were allowed to gather momentum. To some extent-they dominated 
the political arena outside the institutionalized politics of Thailand. 
Their growing strength and increasing activities particularly alarmed 
the rightists, Yet the goverment was reluctant to use suppressive 
measures against the leftists openly because several of them were the 
'heroes and heroines' of the October 1973 upheaval, whose prestige 
acquired from that event still remained high. The government could 
neither pass any law forbidding their activities, for this would hardly 
be 'democratic', nor could it send any troops or police to repress them, 
since the memory of the anti-military antagonism following October 1973 
was still too fresh. The rightists therefore felt they had to operate 
a counter-campaign outside the institutional framework by setting up, 
counter-balancing right wing organizations. 
(b)'The'Right'Wing Reaction 
There were several factors that fostered the consolidation of 
the anti-leftist activities of the entrenched and still politically 
and economically powerful rightists, whose leaders had had to assume 
more cautious roles in dealing with popular opposition after the October 
1973 upheaval. 
0. 
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After 1973 the structural underpinnings of power remained intact; 
there was merely a vacuum at the executive level. This was filled by 
the king's selection of the government. Although the govenunent 
derived its legitimacy from the monarchy, it still relied on the tacit 
support and co-operation of the military. Because the military had 
suffered a considerable humilitation in October 1973, they chose not 
to exert their power in the subsequent year and a half, but were more 
concerned with quietly strengthening their position. However, from 
mid-1975 they began overtly to support and to ally with the rightist 
parties, in which they found favour, notably the Chart Thai and 
Dhamasangkom. Several military leaders were given a major role in 
the coalition governments of 1975 and 1976.1 
The events of October 1973 did not appreciably affect the powerful 
position of the conservative civilian establishment, comprised of top 
level bureaucrats, the aristocracy, and businessmen. 
The bureaucrats' power, in brief, comes from their access to coveted 
resources: contracts, prestige, and money. 
2 The bureaucrats are in a 
position to give or withhold favours for their clientele and business 
interests for material or other returns. At any level of the Thai 
bureaucracy, the system had long been characterized by the use of public 
resources for personal gain. 
3 Thus, when the leftists campaigned 
against bureaucratic corruption, they were detested by the bureaucrats, 
-military, businessmen and other groups whose 
fortunes depended on the 
1. Race (1975)'Op. cit.; Somporn Sangchai, op. cit.; Neher (1975) op. cit. 
2. For a good description and analysis of the political role of the 
bureaucracy see Fred W. Riggs, ''Thdiland: 'The'Modemization'of a 
'Aireauttatic'Pblity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966). 
3. David Morell, ''Legislature'and, Politica1 Development: the Problem 
of'Cbrruption., Unpublished paper, JanuTry 1975. 
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perpetuation of graft, kick-backs, embezzlement, bribery, nepotism 
and other forms of corruption. The persistent questioning by the 
leftists of the unaccountability of the goverment officials inten- 
sified the bureacucrats' hostility towards them. 
The businessmen detested the leftists not only for their inter- 
ference in their relationship with the bureaucracy and military, but 
also for their instigation and support of strikes. Furthermore, the 
general socialist approach to the ecmomic. system gave them much cause 
for alarm. 
The aristocrats who were generally wealthy, highly educated and 
conservative, often held high-ranking bureaucratic positions and 
possessed big estates. Their prestige stemmed from the deference 
traditionally accorded to the royal circle, and their power from the 
large clientele they controlled through their economic holdings or 
their high level administrative positions. The leftists who campaigned 
against the'Sakdina-naithun (feudalist-capitalists) were anathema to 
them. For these people the leftists' criticism of the validity of the 
monarchy and their socialist and radical approaches to the economic 
system, such as proposals for land-redistribution and state ownership 
of banks and key industries, caused them great uneasiness. 
In sum, the consolidation of rightist activities came as a reaction 
to the threat of their displacement from power and status implicit in the 
changes proposed by the leftists. Since amongst themselves they could 
agree that the leftists were a common enemy., they attempted to find 
support and allies among the masses, particularly the urban public. In 
general, the urban public were apolitical and were attracted to support 
right wing movements for siEple reasons. They were becoming annoyed 
by the frequent demonstrations and noisy protests, inspired and organized 
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in almost every case by the leftists. They were tired of traffic 
jams caused by street demonstrations. ' and with the many strikes which 
resulted Im personal inconvenience such as those affecting electricity 
and water supplies, bus and taxi transport, and so on. These people, 
began-to suspect that the activities of the left wing movements were 
threatening democracy, and that they were being used by foreign 
coimunist powers for their own interests. In this way the leftists, 
by their own actions, began to lose their support and sympathy while 
the rightists found more allies. 
The inability of the elected governments to meet the rising 
expectations of various sectors of society, and the recurrence of 
factions struggling for personallgain within the government and Parlia- 
ment led many moderate pe9ple to become sceptical of representative 
government. On the extreme right the illusion rapidly took root that 
the elected governments, which compromised with the left on some issues,, 
were the cause of the sudden epidemic of subversive ideas among'the 
young. The demand for tough measures to maintain law and order was 
heard increasingly through the right wing press and radio. Simul- 
taneously, propaganda was mounted against the left wing movements. 
The right wing elements planned a strategy to counteract the leftist 
movements. This involved several steps. First, from mid-1974 onwards 
through government controlled radio stations and the capitalist press, 
the right wing movements persisently accused the radical students, , 
farmers, and labourers of using 'mob rule' to undermine law and order, 
of causing economic deterioration, of threatening foreign investment,, 
and of being lackeys of commist imperialism. 
Second, for almost every leftist organizations, they set up their 
own counterpart organization. To counteract the students' radical 
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organizations such as the NSCT and FISr. the Armed Forces set up a 
para-military right wing group, the Red Gaur*(Krathing'Daeng). The 
Red Gaur comprised uneinployed juveniles including tecImical school 
students and some drop-out students, and ex-mercenaries returned from 
Laos and Vietnam. The Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) 
not only founded the organization, but also trained the members in 
the use of arms, armed them, and paid them out of a secret fund. 
1 
They were used to break up students and farmers' demonstrations, and 
labourers' strikes. Violence was their means, using arms or explos- 
ives to terrorize or kill their opponents. For example, in August 
1975 they attacked Thamnasat University for housing radical students' 
organizations. In the 1976 general election, the Red Gaur was rampant. 
The New Force Party office was ransacked and bombed, and the candidates 
they labelled leftists were attacked with guns, grenades, and explosives. 
They often threw bombs into the left wing demonstrations. In most 
instances there were a number of people killed or wounded. 
Similarly., to comteract the radical farmer's organizations such 
as the FFT, and to resist leftist activities at the village level, 
rightist organizations were set up in the villages. The most important 
one., and it is still growing, was the Village Scouts (Luksua'Chaoban 
with the rich and independent fanners as its core. It was modelled 
on the South Vietnamese 'grass roots' defence organization against 
c0ownists. 
2 The Village Scouts were organized into small cells headed 
by urban right wingers. They were taught to resist radical elements 
. and-to-mobilize peasant support. Their ideology involved the protection 
1. Puay Ungphakorn; Violence and-Coup-de-etat'6'October'1976 (Londow, 
Mimeograph, 1976) p. 6. 
2. Border Police Comand, ''Kumae'kan'obrom'Luksua'Chaoban (Hand Book for 
Training the Village Scouts) (Bangkok: 1973); see also 'Luksua 
Chaoban: khabuan kan samakkitham, (Village Scouts: A Movement for 
National Unity)p''Prachachart (magazine) Vol. I, No. 34,11 July 1974, 
pp. 37-43. 
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and upholding of the Nation, Religion, and the Monarchy - obviously 
still potent symbols in Thailarld. The Ministry of the Interior was; 
and still is, directly responsible for this organization. Rich urban 
as well as rural people were invited to be chief scouts and pay for 
the rallies. Most importantly, the king was their patron. He gave 
them scarves, and unit flags. Periodically, the Village Scouts were 
called to emotionally-charged rallies in support of Ithe 
king, nation 
'and religion. They were also mobilized to counteract the leftists on 
various occasions. For example, at the rallies demanding1the'total 
withdrawal of American bases in March 1976 and the anti-Prapat-Thanom 
demonstrations in August and September 1976 thousands of them were told 
over the radio to gather at major strategic spots in every major city. 
The clearest inpact of the Village Scouts was the rally against the 
leftists which led to the bloody coup of 6 October 1976. It is very 
clear that this organization with over three million numbers in 1976., 2 
has been and will be a most effective instrument for the suppression of 
the leftist movements. 
No less important than the Village Scouts was NAWAPOL, another 
ultra-right wing organization. The basis of its ideology was yet again 
the symbols of the Nation, Religion, and the Monarchy, but in'its 
manifesto these concepts are elaborated at length into 'strengths? or 
Pforces' grouped into nines. 
3 From these it derives its name NAWAPOL, 
4 
which means literally 'Nine New Forces'. 
Prachachart, ibid. 
Ibid. 
3. E. g. the new religious 'forces' derive their strength from nine 
religions (Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Confucianism, 
Taoism,, Zenism, Shintoism, and Judaism) though exactly howis not 
explained, and from nine principal teachings of the Buddha (which are 
set out in detail). 
4. For detailszee NAWAPOL-Yajmue'NAWAPOL (Hand Book for NAWAPOL) (Bangkok. ' 
Mimeograph., 1975) pp. 340.7-7-Fese pages comprise a lengthy definition of 
the name which effectively spells out the aims of the movement. The name has considerable symbolic potency as the number nine is very auspicious in 
Thai belief and ritual, and'one of its symbolic meanings is progress. - 
- -- 
- 
. 
----- - 
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According to its manifesto, NAWAPOL was created to prevent the 
development of subversion within the country. It was founded in 
August 1974 by a group of generals, lea4ing, businessmen and civilian 
bureaucrats who took an oath in front of the Triple Gems to sacrifice 
themselves in the defence of the Nation, Religion, and the King. 
' 
NAWAPOL advocated a nationalist unity free from the antagonisms 
of right and left ýhich would express itself in stability at home and' 
a non-aligried, neutralist foreigri policy. National security would be 
achieved by virtuosly following the Buddhist Middle Way to political, 
economic and social prosperity. 
2 
NAWAPOL pledged itself to mobilize the support of all classes to 
achieve these aims, to educate people with a comon understanding, and 
to fire them with a comon purpose. A key part of its policy was 
that every member made a pledge that he was willing to sacrifice himself 
in the manner of the f6unders. 
3 This pledge is taken as an oath in, 
front of the Triple Gems, and all sacred Thai entities, 
ihe spirits of 
the great Thai kings and heroes. The member swears, "If I betrýy the 
oath, let me be punished, let all catastrophies fall on me within three 
days or seven days. And if I keep strictly to my oath, please bless me, 
.. save. me. 
from all enemies .... 
A 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 1-3; see also NAWAPOL's report to the Supreme Patriarch, 
Fn-the opening ceremony of it. ý'Semihar'on Monks*-ý'Peoplelbr'the 
'Pres(irvdti6ii'6f*the'Ndtion, *Religim, anU the Monarchy at Chittapawarl 
College, 23-25 July 1975. 
2. For details about the political and economic ideology of NANAPOL see 
mah Watthana Keowimol'ý, Kwam-*mmkong'khong'Chart Sdtsaha, 'Phra akasat 
(The Security of t1i7e Nation, Religion, and the Monarchy) (Bang k: Aks-orn 
sophon, 1975), and'Saha*Setthakorn (Co-operative Economy) (Bang ok: 
Sawaengsithi, 1976); see also 'Watthana Keowinol kap NANAPOM (Watthana 
Keowimol and NAWAPOL), 'Rdthasaphasan Wicharn, Vol. 1, No. 7,26 August 
19759 pp. 49-53. 
3. Hand Book for NA-WAPOL, pp. 3-10. This was also stressed in its 
'Constitution'ahd *Regulations, p. 1. 
4. Hand Book for NAWAPOL, p. - 38. 
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Leading members of NAWAPOL, were high ranking military and police 
officers, for example the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the 
Fourth Regional Army Conmmder, the Director of the ISOC, and the 
Border Police Patrol Commander; the principal civilian bureaucrats; 
and top businessmen. The Ministry of the Interior, through provincial 
governors, police chiefs, and district officers, provided NAWAPOL with 
facilities such as meeting places, transport and accommodation, and 
officiated at their meetings and orientation programmes. Goverment 
officials in this Ministry were permitted to join, and also to attend theý 
meetings and orientation functions as if they wereon goverment duties. 
The ISOC supported the scheme by providing NAWAPOL with, for example, 
secret information and office personnel. 
2 Financial support cam 
mainly from strongly anti-communist businessmen, military officers and 
Kitthiwuttho., and to a lesser extent from members' subscriptions. 
3 
Thus at the top, NAWAPOL was a combination of the military, capitalists, 
and bureaucrats. In the middle range, it arew members from the lower 
level of government : ftmctionaries and clerks, the urban petit-bourgeoisie 
and village and commme headmen. The rank-and-file came from labourers 
and peasants. More importantly NAWNPOL attracted a number of monks, of 
whom Kitthiwuttho was the most important and influential member. 
4 Whether' 
there was support from the throne is far from clear. However, one of 
.......... 
Lists of names of leading members of NAWAPOL appeared in Department 
of Central Intelligence NAWAPOL 
(Bangkok: Department of Central Intelligence, 1976) pp. 11-15 and 
Appendix K, pp. 1-21. 
2. ''Ibid., p. 11. 
3. 'Ibid., p. 15. Curiously, NAWAPOL itself did not make this explicit, 
but claimed that its financial support came from its members. It was 
also widely thought that they were funded by the American CIA. 
4. Kitthiwuttho claimed that lover, ten thousand monks joined the movement', 
-Phuttha8at, Parithat, vol. I, No. 1,1975, p. 20. 
i 
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NAWAPOL's leaders, Watthana Keowimol, claimed that he and KitthlWuttho 
once were given audience by the king who encouraged the activities of 
NAWAPOL and said: 
There are many cowards in Thailand. But we must not 
give in, we must continue fighting. Otherwise the 
country will be JLn grave Jeopardy like Laos and 
Cambodia. Do not listen to the criticism of those 
who do nothing in defence of the country. NAWAPOL 
has been doing the right thing for the, nation. Do 
not be discouraged, but be patient because the 
situation is worsening. 1 
Of all the right wing movements, NAWAPOL was the most articulate, 
and best defined in its organization, ideology and policies. Its 
organization extended hierarchically from national level to village 
2 level. By 1976 its leaders claimed to have 30,000 - 50,000 active 
', 3 members. 
Though the central purpose of NAWAPOL was to educate the people, 
4 
the counteracting of the leftist movements was given high priority. 
This involved mass mobilization; propaganda against communism, socialist 
parties and leftist movements; distribution of leafl ets and published 
speeches; criticism of leftist activities by accusing them of being 
communists or communist lackeys, and of'endangering or even destroying 
the nation, the monarchy and religion; violence and, threats; and theý 
creation of affiliated organizations to cobnter the leftist organizations. 
NAWAPOL also worked closely with the Village Scouts. 
5 
1. A'Coftfidential*ýMort'on the'Activities of'NAWAPOL distributed among 
th-e-le-a-cfi 
* 
lng-m-em-5ers,, dated Z7 July 1976., cited in Department of Central 
Intelligence, ''op. *cit., p., 14. 
2. For details seo'Harid'Book'for. *NAWAPOL, pp. 15-35, and also its 
-constituti(jii*and*Regulations. 
3. Sornit Yhemthong, -Chindaen&: 'NAWAP0L (Red China and NAWAPOL) (Bangkok: 
Preecha Press, 197b) pp. 29-30. 
4. This was clearly stated in the Hand Book and the Constitution of 
NAWAPOL. 
S. Department of Central Intelligencep-op. cit., pp. 14-17,19-22. 
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One weapon used against the leftist movements was political 
assassination, an activity in which NAWAPOLwas said to have been 
involved. From mid-1974 several farmers' leaders were murdered. 
Next came some student leaders and socialist politicians. In these 
cases the public was led to believe that the murders resulted from 
internal conflicts among the leftists, 
1 
and that the government for 
lack of evidence had never been able to make any arrest. In marked 
contrast when there was any attempt on the life of a right wing 
politician the culprits were soon identified. 
Perhaps the most effective means employed by the rightists to 
alienate the masses from the left was the use of goverment-controlled 
radio and television stations. Since 1975, they have stepped up their 
broadcasts of jingoistic songs and anti-leftist propaganda. Two 
frequently aired songs listed the students who went into the countryside, 
the workers who staged strikes, the farmers who demonstrated demariding 
that the govenunent should solve their problems, and the press who 
criticized the goverment policies-as being nak phaendin (Burden of 
the Earth) and as being rok phaegin (Scum of the Earth). The Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in the Kukrit regime (1975), who 
was also the leader of the Chart Thai Party, used his ministerial power 
over state-controlled radio to launch openly the slogan 'Right Kill 
Left ' (Kiwao *Phikhart'Shai). 
Thus, between 1973 and 1976, the forces of change and conflict 
had great impact on every section of Thai society in one way or another. 
Their most explicit effect was that the public became more politicized. 
Ideological polarization had also emerged and gradually pervaded the 
-infomed and politically conscious public. It is impossible to know 
Puay Ungphakorn. %''OP. *cit. 
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how far it had penetrated the masses. But it had certainly reached 
into the Sangha. As a consequence, this period saw for the first 
time the overt involvement of several monks in political issues. This 
is the subject to be discussed in the following sections. 
5. 'The*Emergencd'of'Political Monks 
Though, as I have shown, some monks had engaged in political 
activities prior to 1973, their actions had either been pro-goverment 
and therefore commended by goverment and Sangha authorities, or anti- 
goverment and therefore minor and restrained. After 1973 the unleashed 
torrent of political debate and activity could not fail to invade the 
Sangha. The monks were intensively politicized between 1973 and 1976 
when political activists increased their efforts to attract support and 
sympathy from all sectors of society. At the left wing political 
meetings, demonstrations,, rallies and protests, which in most cases 
involved criticism of goverment, several groups of monks were seen to 
have attended and participated. At the right wing rallies,, a few monks 
were also seen observing the events. Political and social issues of 
the day were reported to have been frequently discussed by monks in, 
monasteries. 
' In time some monks implicitly and explicitly advocated 
particular ideologies publicly and identified themselves with the 
secular political activists. In order to articulate their views and to 
influence the direction of change, whether it was on secular issues or 
on Saiigha affairs, some groups of politically and socially conscious 
monks formed special organizations outside of the institutionalized 
Sangha organization, thus operating as a sort of pressure group. In 
/ 
Anon., Thrasong kap kanmang' (Monks and Politics), ' Buddhachak, 
Vol. 28, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 2-3t 51-52. 
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these efforts, they adopted the techniques of mobilizing mass support 
employed by lay activists. Because of their political activities 
these monks came to be regarded as 'political monks'. 
As several kinds of political monks emerged after 1973, in an 
attempt to identify them and appreciate their ideologies, they will be 
broadly divided into two categories: the lefi wing monks on one side 
and the right wing monks on the other. Relatively few monks became- 
political monks, and the labels are used to designate broad differences 
in the ideologies, identification and activities of political monks 
corresponding to the distinction between left and right wing activists 
in secular politics described earlier. Thus, the criteria adopted for 
categorizing these political monks involves: (a) their ideological 
stand on social, political and economic issues, (b) their association 
or identification with secular left and right wing movements, and (c) 
the methods used in advancing their causes. Although these monks were 
Politically active, their behaviour was nonetheless constrained by 
their mmkhood,. both by their vows and duties in the Sangha and by the 
pressure of public expectation and opinion. 
(a) 'The 
The political monks on the left of the spectrwn first attracted 
public attention. in October 1973. During the students' political 
rallies in Thamasat University campus and in street demonstrations a 
few young monks were reported to have participated in the events. Some 
of them were so emotionally involved that they went up on the platfom 
and made speeches condeming the goverment for arresting 13 political 
activists. At the conclusion of the October 1973 upheaval a young 
monk was killed by the armed forces. In late 1973 the Department of 
Central Intelligence reported that some young monks had clandestinely 
organized themselves into about 20 groups. At that time their 
ideological stand was not yet clear and they appeýred to be making ad 
hoc responses to particular issues. It became clea rer by mid- 
1974 that these groups of monks identified with and supported the 
movements that were fighting for equality and justice in economic, 
political, and social matters. For example, members of a group called 
(The Organization of Sangha Brotherhood) made speeches 
supporting the demand for larld re-distribution at the peasant demon- 
strations in 1974. Another group issued a statement in support of the 
labour unions' demand for higher wages and better working conditions. 2 
Some took a stand against American imperialism. For example, a, group 
called'Kana'Song'Phu'rak, Ekkarat Prachathipathdi'lae Kwam, Pen'tham 
(Monks for Independence, Democracy and Justice) distributed leaflets 
condemning the American govermnent for using bases in Thailand to wage 
war in Indo-China. 3 Some monks were also reported to have helped 
-the Socialist Party in the 1975 and 1976 electoral canpaigns. 
4 
Although'these leftist political monks varied in their degree of 
radicalism and their approaches to particular issues, they were united 
in their dissatisfaction with the existing structure of the Sangha 
adininistrqtion. They accused it of being undemocraticý over-centralized 
and corrupted. The administrative monks at the highest level were 
regarded as dictators, self-serving and servants of dictatorial govem-, 
.. ment... They were also accused of having oppressed the rank-and-file, 
Department of Central Intelligence,, 'Sathanakan'kana song thai 
(ýIovements in the Thai Sangha),, a Co idential Document, n. d.,, p. -3. 
2. 'Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
3. A leaflet distributed at the demonstration in protest against the American government over the Mayaguez -incident t 15 July 1975. 
4. Department of Central Intelligence, ''op. eit. 
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obstructed positive changes, and of being responsible for the lack of 
progress of Buddhism. A radical change was advocated in the Sangha 
so that the majority of monks would have a part in the administration. 
Greatest in number and most articulate in purpose and organization 
was a group of monks who called thýmselves'Yuwasong, (Ybung Monks). 
This group had the definite objectives of reforming the Sangha in 
various respects and restoring the healthy condition of Buddhism. It 
declared that its activities were confined within the boundaries of 
the Vinaya and Sangha affairs, and that they would not be involved in 
secular politics. Nevertheless, the Yuwasong maintained that if 
secular political methods were deemed necessary for effecting its 
purposes, they might be utilized with great caution. 
With these objectives defined, the Yuwasong came to realize that the 
overt secular activities of the groups of monks described above would 
undermine the strength of the whole movement and alienate the majority 
of the monks. The Yuwasong therefore called a meeting of every group 
in early November 1974. At this meeting, the majority agreed that their 
activities should be confined to three main issues viz. (i) the refom of 
the Sangha administration, (ii) the campaign for the reinstatement of 
Phra Phimondham to his honorific title, and (iii) Sangha education reform. 
They also agreed that an amalgamation of the various groups which had 
common objectives and whose styles and tedmiques for achieving their 
causes were similar would increase the effectiveness of their movement. 
As a result the Federation of 13uddhists of Thailand (FBT) was established, 
in November 1974. 
(i)**The Federation of, Buddhists*of Thailand (FET)l 
The FBT is the only unofficial Buddhist organization that continues 
1. In Thai, 'Sahaphan Phutthasasanik haeng Prathet Thai. 
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up to the present day. Its survival can be attributed to its 
moderate approaches to problems, and to its refraining from overt 
involvement in secular politics, confining itself mainly to San 
, 
gha 
affairs. 
The purposes of the FBT are as follows: 
1. To promote the unity of the Thai Sangha. 
2. To strive for the reform of the Sangha administration. 
3. To strive for and promote a democratic Sangha administration 
by introducinga Sangha Parliamentary system (Sangha Sapha).. 
4. To strive for and uphold justice. 
S. To promote educational reform in the Sangha. 
6. To instil (in monks) the necessary attitude of social 
sacrifice for the benefit of society. 
1 
The activities and functions of the FBT are governed by its cons- 
titution. This specifies three categories of membership: (i) 
ordinary members consisting of monks and novices, (ii) lay members, and 
(iii) honorary menhers consisting of high-ranking monks in the-institution- 
alized Sangha hierarchy and laymen whom the Central Connittee of the FBT 
agrees to co-opt. General meetings are to be held monthly, but special 
sessions can be called if asked for by me-third of the members. 
2 
At its inception, the FBT was a loosely organized conglomeration 
of several left wing groups. Some of these had a very small membership, 
such as the radical Ongkan Saha*Dhammik and Kana Song*Phu rak Ekkarat; 
1. Trachathipathais 9 December 1974. 
2. ''Ibid. The FBT itself has not revealed the names of its members, 
except those who are members of the Central Committee. It, 'however, 
claims that "many administrative monks" belong to the FBT. Thus 
it is impossible to make a sociological investigation into the 
membership of the FBT. 
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others such as the moderate'Yuwasong and'Kana'Song*Phu rak Kwam 
Yutthitham (Monks for Justice) had a fairly large membership. The 
total membership of the FBT, in the beginning was estimated at about 
200 to 300 monks, 
1 
of which the majority were the monk-students of the 
two Buddhist universities. By 1976 the membership had grown to 3,000, 
and the active members were monk-students and graduates of the-Buddhist 
universities. 
2 Nbst of the F13T members were not, and still are not, 
office holders or titled monks in the Sangha hierarchy. They are 
young men, whose average age is in the early 30s and'most of them are 
well educated. In general, as I was told by a member of the FBT 
Central Comittee, they come from peasant stock, but have been living 
in the cities for a few years. In terms of institutionalized power, 'they 
are not part, of the Sangha establishment. 
The organization of the F'BT is highly personalized in'nature and 
ad hoc in character. The 25-member Central Committee is elected by 
the general meeting who in turn elect a Secretary General, the most 
important and influential figure in the organisation. . The term of 
office of the Secretary General is two years. Although the activities 
of the FBT are supposed to be administered by the Central Committee,, in 
practice only the Secretary General and another four or five members 
actually make decisions. The first Central Committee was dominated by 
the moderate Yuwasong faction, and only two members of more radical 
groups were elected. 
This organizational alignment gave rise to factionalism. 'While 
the Yuwasong and the Monks for Justice members insisted on refraining 
from secular political involvement and confining their activities to 
1. ' Jbid. 
I 
2., Department of Central Intelligence, op-cit., Appendix 1. 
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Sangha affairs, the leaders of the radical groups persistently tried 
to establish contact with the lay leftist movements and socialist 
parties,, and to involve the F13F in political, economic and social 
issues. Disintegration was thus unavoidable. Being obstructed by 
the moderate majority, the leaders of the radical groups denounced 
the FBT policies and promoted their own ideas without leaving the 
organization. 
1 
Later they made an atteupt to consolidate their 
following into one group, but this was unsuccessful because they them- 
selves could not agree as to which of them should be leader. However, 
in early 1976 they founded two separate organizations and agreed to 
offer each other mutual support. 
0 
These two radical groups were Ongkan Saha Dhanmik which later 
became'Soonklang'Phrasong'lae*Sammanen'haeng Prathet*Thai (Monks and 
Novices' Centre of Thailand - MNCT); and Kana Song Phu Yak Ekkarat 
'Prachathiliathai'lae'kwam'pen'Tham'haeng'Prathet, Thai, which became 
'Neaw Ruam Yuwasong'haeng'Prathet'Thai (Young Monks' Front of Thailand - 
YM). 
The two groups had much in common. Both of them were poorly 
organized and not very articulate. Each was highly personalized in 
the sense that it consisted of the followers of a leader, rather than 
being composed of adherents to a particular set of policies., They 
overtly identified with the lay leftist movements and advocated radical 
socialism as the most appropriate political and economic system for 
Thailand. They also advocated radical reforms in the Sangha adminis- 
tration., Both of them were short-lived, disappearing after the 6 October 
. 1976 coup dletat. 
This intense conflict was revealed by the FBT only when the radical 
groups disappeared after the coup dletat of 6 October 1976. See 
-, Siang'Yuwasong., Vol. 2. No. 23,16-31 January 1977, pp. 8,13. 
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Monks aiid*Novices"Centre'of Thdiland WT)' 
The MNCT was officially established in March 1976, having previously 
operated under the name of Ongkan Saha Dhammik. According to the 
Department of Central Intelligence, the MNCT was so poorly organized 
as to be almost structureless. It had a small membership which was 
not well educated., Essentially the members were followers of the 
founder, a young monk called Jud Kongsook. 
1 
Jud was born in 1952 to a poor peasant family in the southem 
province of Surathani. He was ordained at the age of 13, and resided 
in a lodal wat in Kanchanadit district for a few years. Later the 
abbot, who was also his teacher., saw talent in him and encouraged, him 
to go to Bangkok to further his studies. In Bangkok he resided at 
Wat Dusitaram under the supervision of its abbot who was a friend of 
his f6mer teacher. He was ordained as a monk in 1973, and passed the 
Barian examination. Although Jud was a talented student, his new 
abbot was not pleased with his monkly conduct. He was said to have 
been disobedient, too independent, and to have failed to observe Vinaya 
strictly and to have violated the Sangha regulations frequently. 
Jud was reported to have been politically active from 1972 onwards. 
He was often, seen attending political meetings and was fond of discus- 
sing political and social issues with other monks. He was also very 
critical of the Sangha authorities and showed no respect forthem. After 
1973 he became an active participant in political rallies and demonst- 
rations. He was a frequent and vocal critic of goverment on many matters. 
3 
.......... 
1. Department of Central Intelligence., ''op. cit.,, Appendix III. 
2. 'Siam*Rdth, 4 December 1974. An interview with Phra Wisuthisophon, Juals 
abbot. 
Ibid. 
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Ib became widely known in 1974-for two actioAs. The first was when 
he made statements at a left wing seminar on the state of Buddhism in 
Thailand in August 1974. The press reported that he had said Thailand 
could not be seen as a true Buddhist state while it supported American 
troops and allowed capitalists to exploit the fanners; and labourers. 1 
The second was when he led the farmers in the November 1974 farmerst 
demonstration. He was expelled from his monastery for the latter act 
and moved to reside in Wat Mahathat. His action in the farmers' 
demonstration won him a reputation among the leftists as being the monk 
of the people'.. His expulsion also won him sympathy and was regarded 
as being an act of social sacrifice. At Wat Mahathat Jud fouad a number 
of radical associates who shared with him a belief in socialism, and 
some of whom were from the Southern provinces. 
2 
Jud was also active in founding the FBT, but was not elected to 
the Central Co=Littee and was not given any active role in the organiz- 
ation. In his position as the leader of the Ongkan Saha Dhamik he 
had tried to persuade the cosmittee to ally with the secular leftist 
movement, and to follow a radical approach on the Sangha reform issue. 
It was a vain atteinpt. He denounced the FBT and withdrew his org. -ýqiz- 
ation from it in early 1976, establishing the MNCT as a new group in 
march. I 
Perhaps by then Jud may have realized that explicitly radical 
approaches to issues had adverse results. Thus, in fonmlating the 
overt policies of the NNCr, he modified them to attract the support of 
., less. radical monks. 
The stated policies of the NNCT were: 
His statements were fully reported in Thanunasat Students I Organiz- 
ation , ''Phatat*Phutthasatsana (Operation of Buddhism Week) (Bangkok: Hongpharbsuwan, 1974) pp. 47-49. 
2. Department of Central Intelligence, -oý-'cit., Appendix III. 
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I. To propagate the 'truth' of Buddhism. 
2. To -render services to the people. 
3. To act as a centre for exchanging ideas. 
4. To oppose the authoritarian Sangha administration. 
S. To promote and support the establisbment of a democratic 
Sangha administration. 
' 
At the begirming the NMT had about 20 to 30 members, but, they 
were extremely radical. Jud himself was the Secretary General and 
actually made decisions on policies and carried them out with another 
three associates. 
2 
Despite its seemingly moderate and limited policy, 
the ýMT was mainly involved in lay political issues. In several 
instances, Jud took the liberty of claiming that the activities of the 
NNCT were endorsed and supported by other monks' organizations. 
3 We 
shall consider the MCT activities in the next chapter. 
(iii) *The Young'Monks' Front of Thailand CYI&7) 
The YM developed from another faction of the extreme radical 
monks who separated themselves from the FBT. Before it was officially 
established in January 1976, this group of monks clandestinely pursued 
their activities under several names, for example, Monks for Independence, 
Democracy and Justice., '*Klum Yuwasong lae'Prachachon (Amalgamation of 
Young Monks and People), and Neow ruam. Song Phu rak kwam pen tham. (The 
Thai Sangha Front for Justice). Its founders were Phra Maha Banchong 
.. Sukprasert and Phra Songkram Suthiwong. Both were fonnerly founding 
1. '' Ibid. 
Ibid. 
3. Yet the FBT for exmnple made statements that certain activites of 
the MNCT had nothing to do with it: see'. Siang*Yuwaso , Vol. 2, No. 23,16-31 January 1977 for their coment on s part in the 
famers' demonstration of November 1974. 
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and Central Comdttee members of the FBT. Like Jud,, Banchong and 
Songkram. denounced the moderate and limited policies of the FET and 
withdrew their organizations from it. 
Apart from being widely known for their radicalism and unequivocal belief 
in socialism, they were little'known to the public. Both of them-výere in 
their early 30s and came from peasant stock in the North-East. Banchong 
had moved to Bangkok in 1970 and passed the Barian examination. He 
resided in Wat Yannawa where the majority of the monks were from the North- 
East. Songkram came to Bangkok some time in the 1970s and took up 
residence at Wat Sangkachai. 
1 
Banchong and Songkram held a comon view with Jud abou t the position 
and role of the monkhood. They thought that monks could not turn their 
back on the society,, and should not limit their role solely to religious 
salvation, but should render their services to the people. ýbnks, in 
their view, should give priority to the underprivileged in their services. 
To them, the underprivileged were those farmers and labourers who were 
oppressed and exploited by feudal and foreign-backed capitalists who 
were already well protected and given privileges by the state. 
- 
They 
had a very strong anti-American and anti-imperialist stance. They con- 
ceived that the United States dominated Thailand's economy and politics 
and that this was the main cause for the social and economic ills of the 
underprivileged. In these respects, they closely identified with the 
radical leftist movements and shared with them a belief that only 
I 
through socialism could the country recover its prosperity. They 
believed that the main cause of the decline of Buddhism and the Sangha 
was the authoritarian character of the Sangha administratip. Therefore 
11. Department of Central Intelligence. 'ýopxit., Appendix II. 
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a radical reform was needed, in accordance with the general reform of 
society. In order to'achieve these objectives, the monks should 
operate through political means by co-operating with the secular 
political movements of the leftists and the Socialist Party. 
1 
The stated objectives of the YM were: 
1. To strive for and create justice in the Thai Sangha. 
2. To support the movement for democratic and just Sangha 
a&ninistration. 
3. To fight against political and social injustice and 
inequalities. 2 
The membership of the YM was 10 to 20 young monks, not well 
educated and mainly from the North-East. 
3 They were essentially 
personal followers of the two leaders. 
In the course of pursuing its objectives, the YM worked closely 
with the MNCr and often submerged itself in the more powerful NMT. 
It also had a close association with the secular leftist movements and 
socialist party. We shall discuss its activities in the next chapter. 
(b)' The Right Wing'Political Monks 
The inmediate causes for the appearance of right wing political 
monks can be sought in the religious and political crises they saw as 
I 
having been engendered by the left wing political monks. The Sangha 
was essentially conservative and the top of the Sangha, hierarchy was in 
many ways closely linked to the monarchy and government in power. 
Jbid.; - see also'Operation of'Buddhism Week, pp. 61-63, for Banchong's 
1ý 1 eological position. 
2. Department of Central Intelligence, op. Cit. 
Ibid. 
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There were fears at the top that the left wing monks were under- 
mining the faith, creating schism in the Sangha, and giving support to 
the enemies of religion. This was further seen as weakening the 
moral basis of Thai society in such a way as to ultimately lead to the 
destruction of Buddhism, the nation, the monarchy, and the government. ' 
The problem for the top monks lay in moving from the active-religious and 
social lead given in the 1960s to an active political policy in the 1970s. 
For these deeply devout and conservative men to do so would be to become 
too similar to what they wished to destroy, and they did not wish to take 
that step. They attempted to bring the left wing political monks into 
line by applying the sanctions available to them. These were limited, 
but included making warning speeches which appealed to basic Buddhist 
principles and stressed the importance of adhering to the Vinaya, instruc- 
ting those in charge of Buddhist monasteries and training establishments 
to make sure their rules, were more strictly adhered to by the younger 
generation, and ultimately disrobing disobedient monks. This last 
. 
action was, of course, extreme and therefore distasteful: it was also 
likely to increase the solidarity of the left wing monks and spark off 
confrontation with them and the more liberal minded. It was therefore 
rarely employed. It was left to others to take a more active and 
public political role, albeit with tacit encouragement from the top. 
The reactionagainst the left when it emerged can be envisaged as 
coming from three directions. 
First, apparently spontaneously organized groups., small in numbers, 
would react to a particular demonstration or issue by producing and 
. 
distributing leaflets condeming the left wing stance. 
' These groups 
For exainple a group called'NuýX'PhonsLan Sathaban Phrasatsana 
, (Organization for the Protection ot Buddhism) distributed leaTlets 
countering every leaflet produced by the left wing monks. ' 
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were notable for their limited organization, their shifting personnel, 
and the absence of regular spokesmen. Those involved were political 
monks by virtue of their activities, but they were unwilling to be 
labelled as such, even though they were not discouraged from the top. 
Second, there was a doctrinal reaction, most influentially expressed by 
Buddhadasa (Phutthathat) Bhikkhu. 
1 He rejected any kind of involve- 
ment by monks in nundane affairs, whether they be social, economic or 
political. He stressed that they should be more concerned with the 
moral and spiritual uplift of the people in the strict serise as set out 
in canonical Buddhist scriptures. However, between 1973 and 1976 when 
ideological conflict was immensely intensified, Buddhadasa published 
his formulation of Dhamma Socialism' (Dhannika'Sdrigkomn ,a very 
complex and closely knit set of Buddhist ideas. It was intended to 
provide a Buddhist compromise between secular left and right wing 
ideologies. Though his ideas were exploited by both left and right 
wing political monks to suit their goals, essentially he had a conser- 
vative viewpoint which emphasized the duties and responsibilities of 
individuals to their religion, goverment., nationt and their fellows. 
2 
Third, there was a form of reaction which combined the virtues of the 
two kinds outlined above in the person of Kitthiwuttho Bhimu, a 
widely respected m1nk who had already built a national reputation for 
himself by his work in the religious and social programmes of the'1960s. 
He offered the strong and unequivocal leadership lacking in the spon- 
. taneous. protests and a straightforward 
form of Buddhist philosophy 
Buddhadasa is a well-]known exponent of Dhamma with an international 
reputation among sophisticated Buddhist scholars. He has a considerable 
body of published work, but his level of thought is such as to limit its 
circulation to intellectuals. Though widely respected in Thailand as a 
saintly man who has divorced himself from the nmdane concerns of Sangha 
a&ninistrators, he is not essentially a political figure and does not 
comand a political following. 
2. For details of Buddhadasa's idea of Dhauma Socialism see, for example, 
-, Dhamftika*Sangkomniy6m'b; ieb*Phadbtkan (Dhmmna Socialism: A Dictatorial 
Wle) (Bangkok: Hanghunsuanchamkat, 1974); *'Prdchathipathai'bdeb'San 
niyom (Democracy: A Socialist Style) (Bangkok: Somchai Press, 1974). 
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readily conprehensible to monk and layman alike. He publicly called 
on Buddhists to oppose the leftists and wage war on commists. He 
thus assumed a novel role in Thai history; never before had a monk 
played such a leading and overt part in Thai politics. In the 
following sections we shall atteinpt to understand his ideologyj activities, 
and connections with the top Sangha and national establishment which 
legitimized his actions and established his reputation, as well as the 
political events that led to his public espousal of a right wing position. 
Kitthiwutthols'Social'Attion. "Sotli-tes'of*Fame'and*Iiifltience 
According to his own statements, Kitthiwuttho was born in 1936 in 
Nakornpathom province, some, 55 kilometres north-east of, Bangkok. His 
father was a Thai-Chinese who owned a small shop. After finishing his 
compulsory education, he helped in the family business until he was 21., 
In 1957 he was ordained into the Mahanikai order, intending to be in the 
monkhood for only three months, as a gesture of gratitude to his-parents. 
Then he recognized his vocation and remained in the order. ý In the 
second year of his monkhood he moved to Chumporn province where he lived 
in a cave for 9 months, practicing meditation and studying thd, 'Tripitaka 
until he could claim he was thoroughly cognizant of it. He also claimed 
that the villagers there who came to listen to his teaching looked upon, 
hhn as if he were an'Arhat (a Saint). 
1 He then went back to Bangkok 
and took up residence at Wat Mahathat. 
At Wat Mahathat he began to develop a reputation as an eloquent 
public speaker and radio broadcaster of Dhamma. In 1965 he laid claim 
to being a significant interpreter of Buddhist scripture by reviving the 
Abhidhama Foundation (an organization to foster'the study of the Abhi- 
.. dhama-Pitaka) at 
Wat Mahathat. Kitthiwuttho himself has been Managing 
An interview given tb'Phutthasat'Parithat, Vol. 1, No. 1,1975, 
pp. 13-15. 
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Director of the foundation ever since. Although he has not had a 
regular Buddhist education, Kitthiwuttho is widely recognized as a 
good preacher who makes Dhmma easy to understand and relevant to 
everyday life. 
While the Abidhwma Foundation has remained an important institutional 
outlet for the spread of Kitthiwutthols ideas, it has not achieved the 
reputation of Chittapawan College, a teaching organization founded largely 
on his initiative. The name 'Chittapawan' was. given by the king and 
according to Kitthiwuttho it means 'elevating the mind or developing the 
mind, improving it through moral practice'. 
' The overall objective of 
the college is to train monks and novices for the propagation of Buddhism. 
Kitthiwuttho himself has been the Director General of the college since 
it was established in 1965. 
Although Chittapawan College has neither a formal place in the 
organizational structure of the Thai Sangha nor the financial support 
of the goverment., it has grown at a prodigious rate since 1967. It is 
situated on some 100 rai of land near the sea in Chonburi province. The 
campus today consists of several halls of residence for monks and novices, 
colleges, administrative offices, libraries, assembly and preaching halls, 
a printing house, rest houses for visitors, a hospital, a bot built in 
the sea, and many other buildings. All are equipped with modern 
facilities. The entire complex is worth about 500,000,000 baht. The 
ruming expenses alone, for the upkeep of the facilities and the subsis- 
tence of the residents are 10,000 to 15,000 baht per day. 
2 There are 
.. plans. to establish university level work at Chittapawan as well as 
1. Kitthiwuttho Bhikkhu, -Chittaýawan Anusom (Chonburi: Chittapawan 
Press, 1976), p. 13. 
2. -Ibid., pp. 20-21,37-49 and 64-69. 
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opening a branch similar to it in Northern Thailand. The fLmding of 
all these projects will be discussed later. 
The college has two main official activities: education for 
novices, and a training progrxme for monks in religious and social 
action which is embraced in the Programine for Spiritual Development 
(Patthana thang Chitt). 
The education of novices is based on a twelve year curriculum which 
is further divided into four levels in ascending order: primary-(3 
years), secondary-(3 years), pre-university (2 years) and university (4 
years) levels. Prospective candidates are young boys of 10 to 12 
years. Once a boy is admitted to the college, he nuSt be ordained as 
a novice, and =st reside in the college and strictly observe its 
regulations. 
1 In 1976 there were about 650 novices attending the 
college at all levels. According to Kitthiwuttho., 90 per cent of 
these students come from very poor families all over the country. The 
majority of them are from peasant stock. 
2 
These students are instructed in both religious and secular subjects 
as well as given practical training in crafts such as carpentry,, building 
construction, mechanics, and agricultural work. 
3 The reasons given for 
teaching secular subjects and offering practical training, as elaborated 
by Kitthiwuttho, are that the monks or novices must have an understanding 
of all aspects of society, if the propagation of Buddhism is to be 
carried out successfully. Second, the practical work and training is 
-vocational preparation 
for those students who may leave the monkhood for 
1. -Ibid., pp. 18-20,29-35. 
2. ''Phutthasat'Parithat, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1975) p. 18. 
3., ' Ibid., pp. 18-19., 
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the secular world. Kitthiwuttho also argues that the well-being of 
Buddhism depends on the well-being of society and viceýversa. Thus, 
the prosperity of Buddhism depends upon a healthy economy, i. e. 'if 
the people are poor, Buddhism will deteriorate. He also maintains 
that the college not only helps elevate and develop the morality of 
_ 
the people, but also prepares good and useful citizens for the nation. 
2 
Essentially, Kitthiwuttho maintains that the Sangha must be an 
active force for good. Thus the monks must not remain in their wat 
seeking their own personal salvation and waiting for the laity to seek 
them out for the purposes of merit-making, but as people of the world, 
they must get out and help the world too. He reminds people that the 
Buddha said of the lazy monks 'the one who eats the food of the people 
but contributes nothing in return, should feel guilt burning into his 
stomach like molten metal for he is indebted to the people of the world,. 
3 
For Kitthiwuttho, to be worthy, a monk should propagate the teaching of 
the Buddha, guide the people in understanding the moral base for their 
actions, and render any service that is conducive to the happiness and 
prosperity of the people. 
4 
1. ''ChittEawan'Anusbrn, pp. 24-26; see also Kitthiwuttho$, Phutthasatsanat 
*La2 Chivit'PrdthamWan (Buddhism in Daily Life) (Bangkok: Wýkornsamphan., 
1974). 
2. Kitthiwuttho (Kitthiwutthols Words) (Bangkok: Aksornsaniphan, 
1970) pp., -7-8. 
3. .. Chittapawan*Anu. 86rn,, p. 23. 'Bhikkhu thi kaitkran mai tam prayot kae 
ton lae phu aun pen phu boriphok khao khong Chaoban yang plaoprayotý 
Bhikkhu phu prathibat ton chen nan dut kluan lek thongdaen khao pai 
nai thong ton cha thong-pen nie chao lokI. 
4. **Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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The, active type of Buddhism promoted by Kitthiwuttho is called 
, 
the Programme for Spiritual Development*(Nuay'Patthana'thang Chitt). 
This began in 1967 as part of the propagation activity of the Abhi- 
dhamma Foundation. Each year about 350 monks 
1 from every province 
are selected by the provincial Sangha authorities, to undergo a training 
progranme at Chittapawan College for about three months. The courses 
are similar to those of the training programme for Phra Dhannatuta and 
the Training Project for Encouraging the Participation of %nks in 
Comitmity Development described in the previous chapter. When they 
return to their native villages these monks are expected to perform the 
following activities: 
A. Religious activities 
i. To propagate and strengthen people's belief in Buddhism. 
ii. To promote the education of local monks'and to develop the 
local wat as a meaningful institution for the'villagers. 
iii. To coordinate propagation efforts with other goverment- 
sponsored programmes such as the Phra Dhammatuta and Monks, 
Participation in Community Development programmes. 
iv. To collect information on the people's standards of morality 
and report their assessments to the central office. 
B. Social Welfare activities 
'i. To advise and help the community in youth education, 
communication, and public hygiene. 
ii. To encourage the community to set up their aw, n security 
organization to protect themselves against thieves and 
robbers. 
ill. To promote unity among the v#1agers. 
According to Kitthiwuttho, the monks recruited are 'leaders of týe 
community'. Presumably they are the village abbots and respected 
monks. I 
I 
I 
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iv. To instil in the people a sense of gratitude, affection, 
and loyalty to the nation, -religion, the king and the 
goverment. 
C. Economic activities 
i. To teach the people the means of right livelihood. 
ii. To encourage the people to be industrious. 
' 
By the end of 1975, the college reported it had trained about 3,700 monks 
who were working in the prograrnme throughout the country. 
The Spiritual Development Progrmne is reinforced by the Mobile 
Spiritual Development Units which cormenced work in 1972. Monks working 
in this programme are recruited by the college mainly from their own 
students. Between December and June these monks, in groups of three 
to five, travel to designated areas throughout the country. They are 
joined in the field by already trained local monks. Each mobile unit 
is equipped with audio-visual aids and travels by car from village to 
village to propagate Buddhism. The villagers are informed in advance 
of their coming and the events involved. In the village, the people 
gather in the evening and the team leader leads the people in paying 
homage to the Triple Gems. Then a sermon is delivered for about 20 
to 30 minutes. This is followed by a film which is mainly concemed 
with (a) the activities of the king and the royal family, (b) the 
activities of Chittapawan College, (c) modem agricultural technology, 
(d) stories about the Buddha, and (e) other film that are considered 
conducive to the elevation of the people's morality. In the inter- 
the*Ptirfte Mini-8ter'on*th6'bcdasion*of'the'Opening . of'the 
Trfa-ining'Programme for M6nks partiEi-Fpp-=t1ng in Spiritual Development 
'programme*8th Misgion., on 8 January 1972., at Chittapawan College. 
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missions, the monkspreach Dhamma to the people. The message of the 
government's conceim for the well-being of the people is usually woven 
into'the teachings. Photographs of the king and royal family, books 
and pamphlets on Dhamma written by Kitthiwuttho, medicines, and other 
small gifts are distributed to the congregation. Finally, donations 
for the furtherance of the programe are accepted. Kitthiwuttho 
claimed in 1976 that these mobile units had propagated Buddhism to no 
less than three million people per annum and that the figure was expec- 
ted to increase in the future. 
2 
In 1976 Kitthiwuttho stated in the annual report on the activities 
of Chittapawan College that the Spiritual Development Programme had 
fulfilled the following objectives. They had: 
i. Helped people to understand the responsibilities. and duties 
of good citizenship. 
ii. Elevated the morality of goverment officials thereby enabling 
them to know how to apply Dhama in their public functions. 
iii. Strengthened people's adherence to Buddhism, thereby discour- 
aging wrongdoing. 
iv. Restored and promoted national traditions and customs, thereby 
, 
creating sentiments of patriotism, ýand loyalty to the nation, 
the king, and the goverment. 
V. Raised the people's confidence in goverment and promoted 
better understanding between the people and the goverment. 
vi. ý Helped the people in material development which resulted in 
their iTroved well-being. 
1. see also Boorunan S. Noppakul, ', Ban kap Wat OF1ouseholders and 
monastery) (Bangkok: Somchai Press, 1973) pp. 182-188. 
2. ''Chittapai4an'Anus6m, pp. 60-61. 
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11 
vii. , Led the people to a proper conception of national security, 
and the need forself-sacrifice to uphold the monarchy and 
religion. 
1 
Although it is impossible to evaluate objectively the accuracy of 
this claim, it is certain that through these programmes a large number 
of monks have been instructed in Kitthiwuttho's own particular version 
of Buddhist social action. As his messengers to the masses., they have 
become his power base. It is hardly surprising that his influence is 
widely felt and that he was well kaown long before 1973 for this kind of 
work. 
The ideas of Kitthiwuttho are, moreover, transmitted to the public 
through two'channels - nxnely,, publications and radio and television 
broadcasting. He has a considerable body of published work. I 
The 
Abhidhamma Foundation publishes at least two journals.. ' the monthly 
-Chofa and the fortnightly'Wutthidhm, to both of which Kitthimuttho is 
advisory editor and regular contributor. Chofa aims at propagating 
Buddhism and KitthiwutthoIs interpretation of Dhamma to an adultreader- 
ship whileWutthidham serves similar purposes for the young. But it is 
through radio broadcasts that Kitthiwutthols religious and social actions 
have reached large audiences. Since 1967 the goverment has allowed 
him to use Armor Radio Station*(Yankroh'720) for Dhanuna propagation 
regularly. 
2 In 1973, Chittapawan College set up its own radio station 
and it has been fully active in the propagation of Buddhism ever since. 
1. ''Ibide, pp. 60-62. 
2. A military broadcasting station;, *ibide, p. 52. 
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Kitthiwutthols'Comectim'with'the'E8tablishment 
The grand scale of Buddhist and social activism promoted by 
Kitthiwuttho has prompted several questions. For example, how could 
a monk who has a modest honorific title and a minor position in the 
institutionalized structure of the Sangha, independently handle such 
big programmes? Where did he get the financial support? 
There is no simple answer to these questions. His charisma, the 
ability to lead and inspire by sheer force of personality and conviction 
without the aid of material incentives and coercion, played an important 
part in attracting his following. But this is insufficient as an 
answer in itself. What is clearly the most important element cont- 
ributing to the success and fame of Kitthiwuttho is his connections with 
persons in positions of power, namely, the influential individual monks 
high in the Sangha hierarchy, as well as the throne, the economic 
establishment, and the key figures in political authority. These 
connections work in combination, each supporting the other and produce 
an influential network. 
Patron-client relationship in the Sangha played an important part 
in Kitthiwutthols early success as well as in promoting his Buddhist 
activism and social actions in later days. In the early years of his 
monkhood Kitthiwuttho found his patron in Somdet Phra Wannarat, the 
abbot of the prestigious and famous royal Wat Phra Chettuphon. Somdet 
Phra Wannarat was at the same time one of the most senior and influential 
members of the Mahatherasamakom, and President of the Abhidhamma Found- 
ation. From 1967 to 1972 he was responsible for institutionalized 
propagation activities, and was himself the Director of the Phra Dhammatuta 
programme. He became the Supreme Patriarch in 1972. This monk was 
much respected by monks for his devotion to the propagation of Buddhism and 
his uncorruptability. Moreover, he was highly respected by the royal 
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family, the political, economic and bureaucratic establishment, as 
well as the general public. 
Hefirst met Kitthiwuttho at the Abhidhamma Foundation and found 
they had a inutual interest, indeed zeal for the prosperity of Buddhism 
and propagation of the faith. On this basis, their relationship 
developed. Somdet Phra Wannarat was impressed by young Kitthiuuttho's 
intelligence, his devotion and tireless industry in the propagation of 
Buddhism, and his skills as an organizer. In 1965 he made Kitthiwuýtho 
his personal aide and secured his appointment as managing director of 
the Abhidhamma Foundation. He wholeheartedly supported Yitthiwuttbols idea 
of setting up Chittapawan College and saw him appointed as its Director 
General. In 1972, as Supreme Patriarch, he nominated Kitthiuuttho 
for the honorific title of'Phrdracha*kaha ChatiRdth, the title that 
Kitthiwuttho presently holds. 
Somdet Phra Wannarat's patronage also enabled Kitthiuuttho to secure 
connections in the upper strata of Thai iociety. Among the political 
establishment, Kitthiwuttho was able to secure support from several of, 
the most influential families. Among them, for exanple, the family of 
the Prime Minister and Ministerýof Defence (Thanom Kitthikachorn), that 
of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior (Prapat 
Charusathien), and the family of the Minister of Public Health and 
2 Director General of the Police Department (Prasert Ruchirawong). Their 
I 
importance in Kitthiwutthols activities is clearly reflected in the 
1. ''ChittaPawan'Anusom, pp. 37-38. 
2. These -three 
families not only controlled the amed forces, adn-dnis- 
trative, and political planning, but also the economic life of the 
country during their authoritarian rule (1963-1973). 
I 
I 
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positions they held in the Abhidhanna Foundation and Chittapawan College. 
For example, Prapat was the Vice-President of the Foundation; Thanom's 
father-in-law, Prasert's wife, other wives of lebding generals and 
generals who were followers of the three families were all included 
in the Executive Comittee of the Foundation. ýbst of the samie group of 
people constituted the Founding Committee and Patrons of Chittapawan 
College, and the Prime Minister Thanom and his wife were Presidents. 
2 
The aristocratic establishment, top businessmen, and bureaucrat 
millionaries were and still are patrons of the Foundation and -the College. 
They donated land and money for the early part of the construction and 
contributed considerable funds for Chittapawan activities. They., too, 
were included in various administrative and patron committees. 
3 
The king and royal family have sho-vm their support from the 
beginning. The king gave the name to the college and with the queen went 
to lay the fbundation stone in 1967. They returned to perfom the official 
opening ceremony of the college in December 1969. On the first occasion 
the king spoke of his appreciation of Kitthiwutthols propagation efforts, 
and commended him for his energetic concern for the prosperity of Buddhism. 
Kitthiuuttho has also said that they have occasionally made unofficial 
visits to the college. In October 1967 and 1968, the king's mther 
went to lay the foundation stones of college and hospital buildings. 
4 
She also sponsored an ordination of novices from Laos in 1968. 
Abhidhamma Foundation; Twan 4n ma khong monithi (History of Abhi- 
dhamma Foundation) (Bangkok: Abhlctt=um I-oundation,, 1972) pp. 1-15. 
2. Chittapawan'Anusom, pp. 11-12. 
3. For details about significant donors and patrons of Chittapawan 
College sed'Ibide, pp. 11-12,37-38v 41-42. 
4. Chittapawan College, "Krongkan khong ChittUawan lVitLhjaalai (Report 
Development Plari for LfUttapawan Lollege) (Chonburi: Lhlttapawan 
Press, 1976) pp. 10-13.1 
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In examining Kitthiwutthols Buddhist and social activism and his 
connections; with the establishment, it is not difficult to understand 
why he closely identifies with conservative elements in Thai society, or 
uhy he has become me of their leading spokesmen. We can postulate 
that his ideological convictions have developed along similar lines to 
theirs. When he became politically active after 1973, his connections 
to and identification with the establishment were valuable assets which 
could be exploited to advance his cause. By contrast, the lack of these 
assets on the part of the left wing monks suggests reasons for their 
ineffectiveness in certain of their activities. 
I 
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I 
MAPTERTI ''THEROLES, 'ACrIVITIES, 'AND* IWOLVEMENrý'OFIEFTVING 
POLITICAL'MONKS'IN'SOCIO-ýECONCMIC'ISSUES'(1973-ý1976) 
In Chapter V we noted that socio-political changes and conflicts 
had affected the Sangha, and resulted in the formation of various 
groups of 'political monks'. Some groups had overtly shown their 
interests in secular politics and actively involved themselves in 
socio-political issues by supporting certain political movements and 
their ideologies. Others capitalized on these socio-political, changes 
by promoting causes which were not necessarily political in nature. 
In this chapter we shall investigate the role, activitigs, and 
involvement of the left wing political monks in various socio-ýpolitical 
issues. Our discussions involve: the ideological conflictibetween 
the high level administrative monks and political monks regarding 
traditional modes of BLiddhist behaviour; the socio-political issues in 
which the political monks engaged; the strategies which were adopted 
by these monks in their cainpaigns; and the criticisms of the left wing 
monks advanced by those of the right wing. 
1. 'Should'Monks'Participate'iTi Political Issues? ' The Debate 
Thailand's socio-political life between 1974 and 1976 was dominated 
by political rallies and meetings, public speeches, demonstrations, 
strikes, and, public exhibitions. ' Two general elections were held 
during this period too. In these events, many monks had been seen 
-participating as observers, and 
in some cases as active participants. 
Tublic exhibitions were staged mainl, at Thammasat University. They 
would cover various topics such as 
gina 
Week, Anti-American Week, 
Anti-Capitalism Week, etc. with exhibitions of photographs, public- 
'ations and films backed by lectures and discussion groups. 
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Such behaviour was frequently criticized by certain non-political monks' 
*and some laymen as inappropriate conduct for monks. There was also a 
call by the press to the Sangha authorities to forbid the monks' 
involvement in political activities. 
' A very strongly worded 
cament cmne from the Supreme Patriarch who said: 
Many monks and novices today do not observe the Vinaya, 
strictly. They do not behave according to the rules 
for monks prescribed by the Vinaya. Some of them 
behave as if they were half monk-half layman. 2 
He maintained that such inappropriate behaviour brought shame on the 
Sangha, and undermined the faith of the people both in the Sangha and 
Buddhism. Ihe Supreme Patriarch, requested the abbot of each wat to 
control strictly the monks under his supervision. Moreover, he asked 
the laity to discourage undisciplined behaviour by the monks by repor- 
ting to the Sangha and government authorities any monk who becanýe 
involved in such activities and by stopping merit-making with such a 
raonk. 
In August 1974, the Department of Religious Affairs called a, meeting 
of the Mahatherasamakom. At this meeting the question of monks' 
involvement in political activities was raised. It was agreed that, 
although politics embraced all fields of human activity, a certain section 
of the society, namely the monkhood, should not involve itself in politics, 
The Mahatherasamakom set up an ad hoc committee headed by the Director 
1. For example., 'SiaTARath, 16 July 1974ý It stated that if the Sangha 
authorities let this (sort of behaviour) go on3, it will ensure the 
rapid decline of Buddhism. 
2. Pramol (pseud. ), Thra Damrat Somdet' (The Supreme, Patriarch's 
coment). Taddhachak', Vol. 28, No. 8, August 1974, pp. 8-11. 
3. An interview given to the press, cited in'Dhamwchaksu; Vol. 59., 
No. 4,1974, p. 105. 
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General of the Department of Religious Affairs who was also ex-officio 
Secretary General of the Mahatherasamakom to consider the scope and 
the nature of political activities in which the monks and novices 
might participate. In November the cannittee submitted its 
recomendations; to the Mahatherasamakom. The latter agreed to the 
proposals which rejected the idea that monks and novices should 
participate in politics. Doctrinal Buddhism was invoked to justify 
the Mahatherasamakom's action. This is clearly stated in the 
'Principles and Reasons for Forbidding the Involvement of Monks in 
Politics'. Parts of it read as follows: 
Monks are regarded as persons who lead an ascetic, 
austere and self-disciplined life ..... Political 
activities such as electioneering and voting are 
strictly confined to the secular world and the 
laity ..... It is not appropriate for ascetic life. 
The monkhood is beyond politics ..... Involving 
oneself in political affairs is wrong and brings 
about the moral deterioration of the actor himself 
as well as of the whole Sangha community and 
religion ..... The monks must be impartial and demonstrate toevery pious Buddhist without discrim- 
ination their loving-kindness and compassion. In 
a political election, for example, there is a 
winner and a loser ..... Taking sides in any political 
election would only be haraful to the presti e of the 
monks. People would no longer respect them. 
ý 
On these grounds the monks were forbidden (1) to present themselves at 
any political rally for the purposes of electioneering or for other 
political ends, (2) to advocate directly or indirectly political parties 
or candidates, (3) to participate in any rally, demonstration or protest 
for the purpose of demanding certain civil rights, for example, lowering 
1. Reported in*Dhammachaksu, Vol. 60, Maha Puja Issue, 1975, pp. 96-97. 
2. The Mahatherasamakom; ýKansang'ham'Phra'Song'Keokhong'kap Kannuang 
'Por. '"Sor. ''2517 (The Order of the Mahathersamakom on the Prohibition 
of Monks' Involvement in Political Activities) 21 November 1974. 
E 
the age of majority, wage increases, (4) to take part in public speech- 
making or political discussion whether it be held-inside or outside the 
I 
monasteries. The order laid the responsibility of passing these 
instructions to the residents of each wat on, the abbot who was to 
enforce the order and who was empowered to punish any'offender. 1 The 
sanctions. available ranged from reprimand to expulsion. This order 
came into force on 21 November 1974. 
The order was received unfavourably among the progressive minded 
and left wing monks., One of the replies to'the order appeared in an 
editorial of*Buddhachak entitled 'Monks and politics1.2 The, editorial 
argued that politics was not merely concerned with goverment, adminis- 
tration and elections but combined all economic and sociaf activities, 
It was naive to say that monks and novices were beyond politics. Being 
governed and conditioned by politics, like other sections of the society, 
monks and novices had to adjust their conduct according to'socio-political 
changes. The editorial argued forcefully that in electioneering the 
monks should have the right to guide the people as to which candidates 
were deserving of their votes. This was justified by the assertion 
that if Thai society was to progress it needed good and moral politicians. 
As part of society, the monks should not be forbidden to give advice to 
the people, if that advice was conducive to the public welfare and 
progress of democratic goverment. The editorial also disagreed with 
the prohibition of monks' participation in demands for civil rights 
and protests against injustices. It asserted that such activities 
occurred onlywhen people were deprived of their rights and when social 
Anjustice prevailed. On humanitarian grounds, it argued, it was 
I 
Ibid. 
2., 'Editoriall-Buddhadhak Vol., 28, No. 12 I, December 1974, pp. 1-3. 
I 
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I 
legitimate for monks to support the people and help them relieve these 
sufferings. The Mahatherasamakom's prohibitions were seen as a 
denial of the real world. The editorial asserted that monks and 
novices in an ever-changing society should attempt to familiarize 
themselves with the social and political conditions of the secular 
world. It helped them broaden their horizons and was advant . ageous 
in the propagation of Buddhism. 
1 
These points of view were shared by several left wing monks. The 
leader of YMFT, Banchong, for example, argued that politics was one of 
the natural phenomena regulating all fields of human activity. 
. 
He 
maintained that if the monks' involvement in politics was conducive to 
the well-being of the greatest number of people who materially supported 
them, it was fitting that monks identify with such activities whether, 
they be called political or otherwise. He went on to say that-the, 
Mahatherasamakom, repr9senting the high ranking adndnistrative monks, 
had itself been involved in politics much more than ordinary monks. 
After all, it had been incorporated into the civil goverment structure. 
The goverment co-opted the administrative monks into the sysýem of 
secular politics and used them as political instruments. Banchong 
drew attention to the Mahatherasamakom's active co-operation in govern- 
ment-sponsored programmes, such as the Phra Dhammatuta, Phra Dhammajarik 
and the like, and he accused it of hypocrisy. ' He, however, regarded 
any political involvement directed by the gove = ent as 'dirty politics!. 
ý 
More fervent criticism came from Jud Kongsook who viewed the 
Mahatýerasamakom as an agent responsible for the repression of civil 
1. 'Ibide, p. 4. 
2. Thammasat Students' Organization, ''Phatat Phutthasatsana, (Operation 
of Buddhism Week) (Bangkok: Hongpharbswan., 1974) pp. 89-91. 
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rights and liberty, and as the representative of the authoritarian 
Sangha adainistration. He also criticized high level administrative 
monks because they only identified with the privileged class and used 
their power to maintain the st=s quo and to perpetuate dictatorial 
e. 
The challenge to the Sangha authority was not only verbal but 
also practical. The order of the Mahatherasamakom was ignored, and 
the 'unconventional' acts of monks continued. 
2. Electiondering'and'the'Monks' Involvement 
A challenge to the prohibition on electioneering by monks arose 
seven days after the promulgation of the order of the Mahatherasamakom. 
It was reported in the Thai press that among the candidates standing 
for election in January 1975 in Nakornsithammarat was a monk who had 
sent in his application under the label of the Socialist Party of 
Thailand. The monk in question, Phong Chirapunyo, came from peasant 
stock. 2 In the same general election, there were reports that the 
Socialist Party had approached certain other radical monks and asked 
them to help in the canpaign. One source of information was the Depart- 
ment of Central Intelligence. It asserted that the deputy leader of 
the Socialist Party had asked Phra Maha Sakol Panyaphaso, the President 
of the Students Union of Mahachula Buddhist University, and who was also 
in charge of Public Relations of the FET, to mobilize support for his 
party from the FBT and monk-students. In return, Sakol was promised 
.. 
by the party that it would put him forward as one of their candidates. 
1. Prachathipathai, 9 December 1974. 
2. Thai'Rath, 29 November 1974. 
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Sakol disrobed and ran for election in a North-Eastern cmgtituency. 
1 
j 
It is not clear to what extent these two monks had absorbed or 
understood the ideology of the Socialist Party. Sakol and Phong 
siniply explained that socialist ideas were the most appropriate 
ideology for Thai society, and that'socialism was not anathema to 
Buddhism. 2 They said that if they were elected they would follow 
the socialist practices of the party and that they would try to elevate-- 
the morality of other NPs so that they would sacrifice their personal 
-interests 
for the benefit of the people. 
3 However., neither of them 
were elected. 
It was in the 1975 election that the interest of certain radical 
monks in the Socialist Party and socialism crystallized. A number of 
monks affiliated with the FBT, notably Jud,, Banchong., 'Songkram and, their 
followers., had organized themselves into groups and travelled up- 
, country 
to help in the Socialist Party's campaigns. For example, in 
the North they assisted the party's candidates in canvassing in 
Cheingmai constituencies, and they did the same in Nakornsithammarat 
and Khonkaen in support of Phong and Sakol respectively. 
4 In the 
by-election of June 1975, four monks led by Songkram activelyhelped 
the Socialist Party's candidate canpaign in Cheingmai. These four 
monks approached the villagers and the local leader of the Federation- 
.. of. Farmers' of Thailand. They harangued the villagers aboutltýe need I 
Department of , 
Central Intelligence.. ' Sathanakan kana song Thai 
(Movements in the Thai Sangha) (Report No. 1) n. d., pp. 6-7. 
2. -Ibid., see also*Thai*RathS*OPO*C1tO 
3. ' Thai'Roth,. 29 November 1974. 
4. Department of Central Intelligence. ' op. 'cit.., p. 7. 
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for radical land reform, the evils of capitalism, and suggested to 
them they should elect the Socialist candidat e. They also made 
visits to local monks and urged them to support the socialist candid- 
ate as well as to defy the order of the Supreme Patriarch which forbade 
the monks' participation in political activities. They were arrested 
by the police on suspicion of being conrmist agents,, but were later, 
released, though not before their activities had been reported to the 
Sangha authorities. On this matter the Supreme Patriarch reprimanded 
them as 'having forgotten their yellow robes'. 
In helping in the campaign, the monks also travelled with the 
candidate in the constituency and on occasion made speeches supporting 
him, an unusual event on the Thai political scene. I discussed this 
matter with a member of the Socialist Party and a monk who particpated 
in the canpaign. They explained that the presence of the monks was 
a gesture of assurance to the people that the Socialist Party revered 
Buddhism and the Sangha as much as the other parties. This explanation 
was plausible because, during the 1975 and 1976 general. election cam- 
paigns, the right wing parties made great play of their claim that the 
Socialist Party was the enemy of religion. 
The commitment to socialist ideology of the radical monks was well 
manifested, in their efforts to propagate 'socialism'. Between 1975 
and 1976 a small number of these monks organized themselves in 'Truth 
Propagation' groups*(Nuay Phoeyphrae*Satchath and travelled to rural 
areas of the North, North-East, and the South. They concentrated their 
propagation effort in 'conmmist infiltrated areas' ani remote commities. 
I am not, certain how many monks were involved in this programe. According 
', Thanmchaksu, Section 3. Asalaha Puja Issue, 1975, pp. 1ý-17. 
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to the Department of Central Intelligence, there were about 10 to 15 
radical monks from Bangkok, most of them belonging to the MNCT and 
the YWr. 1 The 'Truth Propagation' groups adopted the Phra Dhamma. - 
tuta methods in propagating their version of Dhamma. They went from 
village to village and made contact with the villagers and taught 
them Dhanna. In the words of the Department of Central Intelligence 
"the Dhanma of these monks was coloured with socialist ideas". 
2 In 
their propagation of 'Truth', they interpolated socialist ideology 
into their teachings and often misled the people into believing that 
the govenunent had unjustly treated the villagers and brought the 
country under the domination of American imperialism. 3 
3. 'Peasant'Agitation and the Monks' Involvement 
Another unprecedented challenge to the Sangha authority involved 
the participation of monks in peasant demonstrations in November 1974. 
Between 19 and 30 November., several thousand farmers from many provinces 
led by the Federation of Famers of Thailand (FFr) and supported by the 
radical student organizations, NSCT and FIST, and the radical labour 
union, FLUT, staged the biggest peasant rally Thailand had ever seen. 
They gathered in Thammasat University campus. The peasant rally was 
attributable to the increased discontent of the farmers over the appar- 
ent lack of direction in government agrarian policies and its inability 
to solve imediate difficulties of the farming population. 
4 In-this 
1. Department of Central Intelligence, 'op. cit., p. 7. 
2. 'Ibid. (Report No. 2) pp. 4-5. Part of these ideas at least stemmed 
from the-works of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu mentioned in Chapter V. These 
monks would often back up their argLments at public meetings by 
handing out copies of his works. 
3. Ibid. 
4. For details and analysis of the position of farmers in Thai society, 
government policies towards the agricultural sector and the formation 
of farmers"groups see, for example, Andrew Turton, 'The Current 
Situation in the Thai Countryside', Andrew Turton t. Thailand: 
Roots'of*Coriflict (London: Spokesman, 1978) pp. 104-135. 
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rally the farmers demanded: (i) the immediate help f9r landless farmers 
to enable them to earn a living by working m unused public land; (ii) 
the speeding-up of investigations into the seizure of land by loan- 
sharks by appointing an investigation comittee in which the represen-' 
tatives of the FFT had a part; (iii) that land which had been taken 
from them by forgery and other unlawful means be restored;, (iv) that 
persons who were involved in illegal acts be punished; (v) that the 
goverment allocate funds to relieve farmers' indebtedness; and (vi) 
the early introduction of land reform legislation. 
In this ten-day rally monks participated. Many were invited to 
receive alms from the demonstrators in the morning and then'retumed 
to their monasteries. A few of them remained with the demonstrators. 
Some monks even took the platform and made speeches supporting the 
2 famers' demands. After waiting in vain for a positive response from 
the gove=ent for ten days, the demonstrators decided to stage a street 
demonstration on 29 November. As they were discussing how to organize, 
the march, and how to avoid violence and harassment from the Red Guars 
and govenment troops, a group of monks announced that they would 
participate in the march to protect the demonstrators frcm harm. At 
about 6 p. m. the march began, heading towards the Prime Minister's 
Office, and it was later joined by a crowd of sympathizers. The 
I 
participants numbered between 40,000 and 60,000. Frm my own obser- 
vation, it is worth noting that in the demonstration the symbols of the 
Thai nation, religion and the monarchy were fully exploited. This is, 
clearly demonstrated in the order of the march. The front line was 
.......... 
I 
The Federation of Farmers of Thailand, A Leaflet mimeo, ý7 November 
1974. 
2. The Thai press covered this event well; see, for examplef* Pracha- 
'thipaihai, *, Bangk6k'Pbst)''Thai'RjLth, between 19 and 30 November 1974. 
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made up of about 50 monks who linked their arms together as a protbc- 
tive gesture. About 20 old female farmers made up the front of the 
second line.. They held pictures of the king and queen in a reverent 
manner. The third line couprised farmers holding Thai national 
flags symbolizing their identification with the Thai nation. The 
fourth line consisted of farmers who-held*Dhmmachak flags represen- 
ting Buddhism. These were followed by the mass of farmers, Students, 
labourers and sympathizers. The demonstrators also carried placards 
stating the farmers' ditcontent with goverment agrarian policies, and 
their grievances against capitalist exploitation. , 
As they marched., the demonstrators sang moving songs such as', Khon 
--kap-Kwai (Man and Buffalo), ''Klinklon'Sap*Kwai (The Scent of, the Earth 
and the Scent of the Buffalo), ''Sami'Thoy (Fight Without Retreat)'. The 
lyrics reflected the common identification and grievances of the peasants. I 
As the march progressed more and more sympathizers joined. At me point 
a few monks came to join and they were applauded by the crowd who shouted 
loudly that 'these are the monks of the people'. In the end, the govern- 
ment announced that it yielded to most of the farmers' demands. -, 
The public later learned that the leader of the monks in the demons- 
tration was Jud Kongsook. Afterwards he gave the following reasons for 
the monks' participation in the event: 
We take pity on the farmers who are the backbone of the 
country and who toil and shed their sweat to feed the 
world. They are poor and neglected by the privileged 
classes. But they-are contributing to the prosperity 
of Buddhism no less than the rich. Now they are, 
miserable and suffering social Jinjustice. We (the 
monks) mst help them because,. firstly, they feed us 
and are our. benefactors; helping them in time of 
difficulty is thus'an expression of gratitude; secondly, 
monks and farmers are related as kin by religion and by 
social ties. Being the children of the farmers, we 
.......... cannot turn our 
backs on them when they need help. 1 
Excerpts from a leaflet, *Thalaeng*kan*Phiset (Special Declaration)- 
distributed in protest at Jud's expulsion from his monastery, n. d.; see 
also Prachathipathai, 9, December. 1974. 
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Jud also maintained that the monks' participation in this demonstration 
was a means to affina the misery and suffering of the peasants. He 
interpreted the monks' action in this matter as a contribution to, the 
elevation of humanity and social justice, and to the promotion of a 
better society and a happier existence for mankind. Ib denied 
allegations that the monks' participation in the demonstration was 
political and that, it brought shame on the Sangha. 
2 
Though this unconventional act was well received by the leftist 
movements, there was strong reaction from other quarters. The leading 
members of the gove = ent were shocked by the march. For example, 
General Kris Sivara., the strongest military leader of that time, was 
reported to have said that the monks' action 'was the end of everything 
3 there is nothing more serious than this' Prime Minister Sanya 
Thammasak, who was also the President of the Buddhist Association of 
Thailand, said that the event signified that Buddhism was under serious 
threat as the moral base of the nation. He suggested that the challenge 
mainly came from new radical ideas associated with the growth of. unlimited 
freedom in the country and the abuse of civil liberty. What he meant 
by 'radical ideas' in this context was a political ideology which was 
aimed at the destruction of religion. 
4 The Minister of the Interior 
described the action of the monks as inproper and a violation of the 
5 
.. Sangha-Act. The Director General of the Department of Religious 
1. ''Prachathipathai''ibid. 9 
2. -Ibid. 
3. The'Nation. - 3 December 1974. 
4., The-Prime Minister's Address at the Opening of the 22nd Buddhist 
Association of Thailand Conference at Wat Sothorn., Chacherngchao 
Province,, 7 December 1974. 
5. ''Prachathipathai, 3 December 1974o' 
I 
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Affairs said that he was so gravely distressed by this incident that 
he cried in pity for the religion. His deputy blamed the monks for 
causing a social disturbance and having brought politics into 
religion. 
' 
The government also expressed its great concern. At the Cabinet 
Reeting on 2 December, the question of whether or not the monks" 
participation in the farmers' demonstration was instigated by 'the 
third or hidden hand', i. e. by commists, was discussed. However, 
the cabinet knew that it was difficult to prove the validity of such an 
allegation. It concluded that it would not take imediate action, but 
would wait on public opinion. 2 
Outside the govenmient, public opinion varied. For example, the 
President of the Young Buddhist Association condemned the monks who 
participated in the demonstration. He maintained that disobeying the 
order of the Mahatherasaniakom was in effect disobeying the government. 
The monks concerned, especially Jud, should be disrobed. He urged 
goverment and laity to take a tough line in dealing with disobedient 
monks. If the goverment and the Sangha authorities were not firm, 
it would seem as if they were condoning this laxity and worse would 
follow. 3 
A cross-regional opinion survey on this matter by the editorial 
ý4 staff of'Damrong suggested three lines of argument were current. On 
the one hand, it was argued that the demonstration was not just a secular 
1. ''Thdi'Rath, 2 December 1974. 
2. ''Siam'Rath, 3 December 1974. 
3. 'Ibid., 4 December 1974. 
4. A monthly magazine published by Academic Section, Department of 
Archaeology, Silapakorn University. 
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activity, but also a political act. Participating in the demonstration 
was inconsistent with Buddhist doctrine and only defiled the monkhood. 
The monks should confine their activities within the boundary of Vinaya 
and concern themselves only with their traditional functions, i. e. 
performing religious ceremonies and rituals, teaching and studying 
Man=, and being a spiritual refuge for the people. On the other 
hand, the survey team found that many of those interviewed were of the 
opinion that monks' participation in demonstrations was morally and 
, socially legitimate for the following reasons. Tirst, doctrinally 
speaking, such an activity was not against the Vinaya, but was an. 
act of sacrifice in the interests of the people. Second, socially 
speaking, within Thai society famers constituted an exploited class 
and the monks were materially dependent on them. Helping to alleviate 
the farmers' suffering was a moral obligation and a legitimate, duty of 
the monks. 
Between these opposed views, the survey team found that the 
greatest number of those interviewed believed that monks should not 
totally confine themselves to monastic activity but should also -render, 
services which were conducive to the well-being of the society. 
However, they were of the opinion that the action of the monks in the 
farmers' demonstration had gone too far, because it undermined the 
prestige of the Sangha. 
1 
The findings of the survey team were similar to opinions revealed 
in my own discussions with various individuals. These were not part 
of a structured survey and I do not claim they were representative of 
.. opinions in all sections of Thai society. I have included them to fill 
I 
I 
I 
Editorial Staff, 'Chao Ban Wicham Song' (Laymen's Criticisms of the 
Sangha), ''Damrong., Vol. 1., No., 2, January 1975., pp. 10-15. A similar 
survey caTf-I-ed-out by*Prachathipathai (3,9 and 15 December 1974) 
gave similarýfindings., However, neither survey specified the size of 
, sample or their methods of investigation. 
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some of the gaps in the survey and to give an, indication of other 
kinds of opinion. A group of liberal-minded students and certain 
radicals held that there was nothing wrong with the monks' participation 
in the demonstration; it contributed to the well-being of the society, 
'especially of the underprivileged farmers. They disagreed with the 
idea that monks should confine themselves to monastic activities'and 
the search for personal salvation. As one student put it to me: 
It is unrealistic to think of 'Nirvana while the, great 
majority of the people are suffering from injustice 
and exploitation., We (monks and laymen) must unite in 
mind and body to bring an end to these immediate 
sufferings before thinking about'NirVana. 
A sharp contrast to this point of view came from a member of the Red 
Guar who told me that the monks who participated in the demonstration 
had committed a serious Vinaya offence because the demonstration was 
political in nature. Moreover, the monks' action was a crime because 
the demonstration was part of the communists' activities. Many 
individuals suggested that they did not mind the monks' involvement in 
secular affairs for the benefit of the people, provided. that they kept 
in line with the Vinaya and the conduct expected of monks. For 
example, 'a middle-aged senior lecturer in a university said that in 
the farmers' demonstration the monks should have restricted their role 
to that of-intermediary between the government and farmers, without 
participation in the demonstration. 
Whatever the state of public opinion, Jud and three other monks 
were expelled from their monasteries bytheir abbots on the day follow- 
ing the farmers' demonstration. Jud was not satisfied'with the reason 
for his expulsion and appealed against it to the Mahatherasamakom. At 
the same time, he was quick to capitalize on his popularity within the 
leftist movements in his response to the Sangha authorities. He con- 
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tacted the radical students and farmers I organizations and informed 
them of the expulsions. They-reacted promptly and organized a 
protest rally on the afternoon of 30 November 1974. A crowd of some 
300 to 400 people marched to Wat Ddsitaran where Jud had formerly 
resided. There, they demanded to see the abbot,, but he refused to 
speak to them. The demonstrators accused the abbot of treating Jud 
unfairly, of being a tyrant, and a lackey of the CIA. 
' - They also 
brought Jud's case to public attention by organizing further protest 
rallies in public places. These rallies involved making public 
speeches and distributing leaflets. They went on for a few days 
and attracted a great number of sympathizers, including the farmers' 
representatives from nearby provinces. The central theme of the 
public speeches and leaflets was as follows: Jud was a Imonk of the 
people' who had sacrificed himself in the interests of the 'oppressed'; 
the participation of monks in the demonstration was not political but 
an expression of the Buddhist virtues of compassion and loving-kindness 
- tta-Kuruna); their action was a declaration of the farmers' sincerity 
and served as a guarantee that the famers were not commmists. Many 
speakers criticized the high-ranking monks for holding authoritarian 
attitudes, and of being the instruments of corrupt politicians and 
capitalists. They said these administrative monks had sold themselves, 
to the exploitative class, and'that they were only good for finding 
fault with the minor monks but never cared to solve more serious problems. 
2 
tsit, 3 f Meanwhile, the congregation or' of Wat Dusitaram, angered by 
1. ''Prachathipathai, 2 December 1974. 
2. Detailed accounts of these events were published in most Thai newspapers 
during 2 to 4 December 1974; see also the leaflet called'Phra'Demkrabuan 
'tham, mdi? (Why Monks Participated in Demonstrations) n. d. 
3. It is difficult to provide an exact English equivalent of the Thai term 
'sit' which is used in this context. It includes monks and temple boys 
at present or formerly in a master-student relationship with the monks of 
the wat; -lay people in similar relationships, regular lay users of the wat 
including the lay wat committee; people in the local community who have 
sentimental ties to the wat and use it on occasion; and patrons of the'wat- I'employ the term congregation while recognizing its limitations. 
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the'affronts to the abbot and the wat by jud's demonstrators, organized 
an armed guard and human barricade around the wat. These people called 
themselves'Kong Tap Dhamma (Troops of Dhamma). They also organized a 
motorcycle intelligence unit to keep them informed of their opponents' 
activities., They made public speeches and distributed leaflets con- 
demning those monks who involved themselves in political issues. 
1 
The deep ideological conflict between the top Sangha and the young 
liberal-minded and radical monks rested on the question of what should 
be the proper role of the monks. The majority of the members, of the 
Mahatherasamakom held that the farmers' demonstration by its very nature 
was purely a secular affair, which had political implications. Any 
resolution of the problem should strictly be the business ofý the govern- 
ment and the famers. The monks should keep away; the best they could 
do, if they were sought, was sijnply give advice to the people. Such 
advice should be confined to the Vinaya and contribute to better under- 
standing and hannony between the members of society. Many condemed 
outright the monks who involved themselves in the demonstration. For 
example, me member of the Mahatherasaulakom, Phra Pronmmi, regaTded 
these monks as behaving as if they had no intention of remaining in the 
monkhood and possessing only ill will for Buddhism. 
2 Another adminis- 
trative monk, Phra Thepyanwethi, accused Jud and his followers, of 
'causing disaster to Buddhism'. He also urged the, govenunent to inter-, 
3 
vene and the public to reprimand them. A similar criticism came from 
the Supreme Patriarch who also suggested that the public should dis- 
For details sed'Dhamachaksu, Vol. 60, Maha Puja Issue, -1975, pp. 
107-109,112-113 and 119; the account is also based on my own 
observation. , 
2. Ibid. ,pý _101 -- ,. - 
3. Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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associate themselves from the monks involved. 
Responses from liberal-minded and radical monks to these criticisms 
appeared in the press, journals, and leaflets. In rnost cases, they 
maintained that monks' participation in the demonstration was socially 
and morally legitimate, because it was conpatible with the teachings of 
2 the Buddha, and it was an act directed to bringing an end to suffering. 
In retaliation for the allegation that 'they had ill intentions to the 
Sangha and Buddhism', ' the radical monks argued that it was the Sangha 
at the top themselves who had caused the deterioration of Buddhism and 
the Sangha. They alleged that many administrative monks indulged in 
occult and magical practices, and thus encouraged such false practices. 
They asserted that these administrative monks were-responsible for the 
rapid growth of social ills and people's moral deterioration by pointing 
out they had officiated at the opening ceremonies of night clubs, massage 
parlours, distilleries, cinemas, theatres and so on. They also said 
that the administrative monks should be equally cmdemed for conducting 
religious ceremonies at the inaugurations of political parties, for 
annointing, party offices, for blessing armament factories and soldiers 
3, 
who were going to war,, because these activities were political. 
However, despite the pressure exerted by Jud's supporters, and the 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
2. For details see, for example. -Damrong, pp. 14-15; Phra Maha Mek and 
Sanan Inthavaso, 11Khao nai na kap khao nai bat' (Rice in Paddy Fields 
and Rice in Alms bowl)-ýiank'Dhamma, Vol. '18, No. 6, November 1975, 
pp. 5-15; and the leaflet entitled'Phra'Dernkrabtian'tham*mai, n. d., - 
see -also I Phra Song kap kan Dernkrabuan M6riks - and D istration), 
Vol. 28, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 32-37. 
3. Phu Rak kwam Samakki lae Yuttitham (Group for Unity and Justice),, 
'Thalangkan'Phiýet (Special Announcement),, n. d.; a leaflet distributed 
between 5 and 15 December 1974; see alsb'Phra"Dernkrabuan'tham'mai; 
and 'ibid. 
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arguments of his syinpathizers, the Mahatherasamakom stood firm. Jud's 
appeal was dismissed and his ejection from the wat confirmed. Though 
now officially without a place in the Sangha, Jud was unwilling to 
admit he had done anything wrong or to pay any penance. He went on 
to live with friends at Wat Mahathat, officially as a temporary visitor, 
so that the abbot there could turn a blind eye to his presence. 
4. ''Thci'Monks' Phimondhmn'Case 
As the incident of the farmers' demonstration began to fade from 
people's memories., a more disturbing storm was developing in the Sangha. 
During the period 10 to 17 January 1975, many thousands of monks from 
all parts of the country assembled at the Lan Asok of Wat Mahathat. 
This was the biggest rally by monks in Thai history. The initial 
issue for the rally was the demand for the restoration of honorific 
titles to tuo monks, Phra Phimondham. and Phra Sasana Sobana. 
An introductory accomt of the Phra Phimondham case was given in 
Chapter V. The discussion here therefore concentrates on the develop- 
ment of the movement for the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham, the 
methods used to influence the govenment and the Sangha authorities, 
and their consequences. We shall also examine the extent to which 
the political monks, especially those who belonged to the FBT became 
involved. 
The movement for the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham began as 
early as 1970. It consisted of both the monk and lay following of 
Phra Phbnondham. From the beginning, the campaign was channelled 
through the Congregation of Wat Mahathat Association'(Samakom Sitmat 
1 Mahathat The objective was to make the Sangha. and goverment 
For the definition of 'congregation and Sit wat' in this thesis see footnote 3 on p. 289. 
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authorities recognize, or at least investigate the possibility that 
Phra Phimondham was wrongly accused and, if he were innocent, to 
restore his honorific title. 
In seeking redress during 1971 and 1972 Phra Phimondham's 
following concentrated on seeking favourable responses from key political 
leaders to petitions rather than using more direct action. The decision 
to adopt this strategy may be attributable to the fact that in this' 
period decision-making was centralized in the hands of a few political 
leaders. For example, in February 1972 instead of appealing to the 
Ministry of Education which was directly responsible for the matter, 
the President of the Congregation of Wat Mahathat Association, represen- 
ting the movement,, sent a petition to General Prapat Charusathien, one 
of the most influential political and military leaders. The petition 
provided detailed information about the unjust treatment inflicted on, 
and false accusations made against Phra Phimondham, by the previous 
Sangha and goverment authorities. It requested Prapat to order a 
reinvestigation and restore Phra Phimondham's honorific title. 
' Prapat 
promised to order the reconsideration of the case. 
2 The movement also 
3 
submitted two similar petitions to the king as the patron of Buddhism. 
It also put forward suggestions on specific issues, for example,, the 
composition of the committee_of enquiry. 
I 
After having brought its grievances to the'attention ofthe key 
-political 
leaders and the king and having received Prapat's promise, 
1. Letter from the President of the Congregation of Wat Mahathat- 
Association to General Prapat Charusathien, 11 February 1972. 
2. Letter from the Secretary to the Security Comittee to the President 
of the Conqreization of Wat Mahathat Association, 21 February 1972. 
3. ' Letters from Captain LuanR Satthayuthachaman to the Secretary- 
General of the Royal Household Office. 12 and-17 April 1972. 
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the association applied pressure on the Department of Religious Affairs' 
which was directly responsible for the -reinvestigation of the case. 
Being frustrated by the delay caused by bureaucratic procedure, the 
movement complained to Prapat and General Prasert Ruchirawong, another 
influential political leader who was in charge of the Ministry of 
Education. It accused the Department of Religious Affairs of delib- 
erately shelving the matter, and requested Prasert and Prapat to order 
the departments responsible to speed up the reinvestigation. 
' A 
similar complaint against the Department was also sent to the Royal 
Household 'office. 
mst important in this appeal of 1972 was the action of 16 provin-' 
cial Sangha governors (Chao kana Changwat) of the Isan provinces rep- 
resenting all the administrative monks of the region. 
2 These monks 
sent a petition to General Kris Sivara, another powerful political 
leader who at that time was the Secretary General of the Revolutionary 
Council and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. They ýleadýd 
with the goverment to see that justice was done and informed the, govern- 
ment of their intention to demand justice and the reinstatement of Phra 
Phimondham. 3 This action clearly demonstrated the strength of the 
movemefit. It also suggested that 'Isan regionalism' had pervaded the 
Sangha community, since Phra Phimondham himself was a North-Easterner. 
It is probable that these administrative monks realized, that the political 
1. Letter from the President of, the Conreization of Wat Mahathat Associa- 
tion to General Prasert Ruchirawong, 15 November 1972. 
2. Administrative'monks include abbots, commune and district Sýngha 
heads. In the whole region they numbered about 12,000 in a total 
monastic population of about 134,000, which was approximately two- 
fifths of the'national total. (Estimated from thd'Annudl Report*of 
'Roligious'A(ttiVitioq'for'1975, Department of Religious Affairs, 1976,, t 
pp. 14Z-lb9. 
of IsaTI'Region'iothe Secretary 
_ral'of*Revoltitionary'CoUncil, 
dated 15 November 1972. 
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,, sensitivity of their area might increase the potential influence of 
their plea. 
The-movement for the'reinstatement of Phra Phimondham also 
capitalized on the internal conflict of the ruling cliques., From 1972 
to late 1973, the struggle for power among the army factions was 
intense. At this-time a young colonel, Narong Kitthikachorn, son of 
the Prime Minister (Thanom) and son-in-law of Prapat, had risen to 
power. 1-b was the Deputy Secretary General of the Board for Crime 
Investigation and Suppreýsion of Corruption. In this capacity he was 
given enomous; power to deal with grievances against goverment officials* 
He was also apparently in conflict with General Prasert Ruchirawong, the 
Minister of Education and Director General of the Police-Department. 
Prasert was also a bitter rival of Narong's father and father-in-law. 
The movement for the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham attempted to 
exploit this situation. It complained to Narong in August 1973 about 
the delays in the Ministry of Education, and requested him to expedite 
1 
the matter. . Whether this tactic would have been successful 'is 
iinpossible to know because the government was overthrown in (ktober 1973 
before anything happened. It seems likely that the generals would have 
treated the whole matter as trivial. 
By the autumn of 1973 the movement had extended its activitiesto, 
include'issuing press releases and statements in order to reach the 
public and to enlist their-support. With this aim a book stating the 
-case. was published. 
2 Despite the promises from political authority, 
1. An Open. Letter to Colonel Narong Kitthikachorn, published in'Thai' 
'Daily, 4 August 1973. 
2. 'Buanglang'kan'plod'PhraýPhimondham (Story Behind the Demotion of 
Phra. Phimmdham) by Thirachon (pseud. ) (Bangkok: Samit, 1973). 
i 
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nothing had materialized. The movement continued its campaign. 
Another important episode came in September 1973, when 4580 monks and 
novices signed a petition and sent it to the Supreme Patriarch reques- 
ting him to order the reinvestigation of the case and reinstatement of 
Phra Phimondham. The petition reminded the Supreme Patriarch that 
now Phra Phimondham's case had been publicized, the Sangha was coming 
under more and more criticism, so that for the sake of its reputation 
and unity he should take immediate action. 
' When there was no response 
from the Sangha authority, tension increased. 
When the military goverment was overthrown in October 1973, the 
movement for the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham once again altered 
its campaign strategy. Capitalizing on the popular dislike of military 
rule, the movement blamed the military goverments for committing a 
'serious crime against Phra Phimondham and bringing shame on the Sanghal. 
It labelled both Sarit's governinent and that of Thanom-Prapat as the 
'dynasty of tyrants'. It pleaded with the new Prime Minister to 'put 
things right'. 
2 
Having remained quiet for many years, Phra Phimondham now began to 
speak for himself. One of the most'interesting tactics in the campaign 
was that Phra Phimondham and his followers began to exploit the Buddhist 
concept of righteous ruler. The new Prime Minister, who was previously 
the President of the Supreme Court, the highest and most prestigious 
position in the Judiciary, was well known for being a devout Buddhist 
and a scholar. He had been the President of the Buddhist Association 
1. ''Letter'of'Petition'from'4, '580'monks and'novices tothe Supreme 
I. Patriarch. 5 September 1973. 
2. Letters of Petition-firom the President of Samakom Sit Wat Mahathat, 
to the Prime Minister Sanya Thannas all 23 October-19 y 
13 June 1974. 
'I 
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for many, years. Sanya had always held that a good-govenunent must 
be righteous and just. Now Phra Phiinondham himself wrote to the Prime 
Minister that the deterioration of govennnent and religion in the, past 
decades was a result of the unrighteousness of dictatorial rule. He 
asserted that the previous dictators were directly responsible for the 
decline in morality of the people and govenunent officials, the laxity 
in-observance of the Dhamma and Vinaya by the monks, and the diminution 
of national unity. He attributed the fall of the previous military 
government to its unrighteousness. He exhorted the Prime Minister 
using Dhamma as his guide to restore unity and justice'to society. Only 
when, it had done this, he claimed, would the government be held as' 
righteous, and having given esteem to religion and the monarchy. 
2 
another memorandum Phra. Phimondham. reminded the Prime Minister that 
the prosperity of society and the stability of the state depended on 
the good morality, juýtice, and righteousness of the ruler. In contrast, 
if the ruler was unrighteous, the people would-be in misery and might 
well revolt. In the conclusion, he said that his suffering and shame 
had been caused by the previous unrighteous rulers. Now it was the 
responsibility of the new govenment to restore justice. 
3 
By mid-1974 Phra Phimondham's case was frequently publicized and 
attracted considerable sympathy-in the press. Yet there was no positive 
response from the government or the Sanaha authorities. The latent 
resentment of a large number-of monks began to come to the surface. 
Capitalizing on t14S favourable situation, on 20 December 1974,, about' 
1. Phra Phimondham's Memorandum to the Prime Minister, 5 May 1974. 
2. Ibid. 
/ 
3. Phra Phimondhain's Memorandum to the Pr: bne Minister, 13 June 1974. 
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5,000 followers of Phra. Phimondham. sent a letter to the Sangha 
authorities and demanded that the Supreme Patriarch and the Mahathera- 
samakom. give them a reply. by 8 January 1975 as to whether or not the 
Sangha authority would organize a reinvestigation of Phra. PhImondham's 
case. They boldly stressed that if the Supreme Patriarch and the 
Mahatherasamakom failed to react they would: 
regard the Mahatherasamakom as deliberately ignoring 
the request with ill intention ...... The 4,580 monks 
and novices, who had previously petitioned the Sangha 
authority, and many others will regretfully do some- 
thing in order to assure that justice is achieved. 1 
By now it was clear that the majority of the militants of the move- 
ment for the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham. were monks who were 
associated with the newly emerged FBT and some other radical groups under 
the leadership of Jud. Banchong and Songkram. There were also 
significant changes in their tactics. Press releases and the 
distribution of leaflets to inform the public of their views and objec- 
tives were intensified. For example, on 23 December 1974 they issued 
a special announcement intended to qualify the rather blunt terms of 
their ultimatum of 20 December. It was addressed to monks at all levels 
and lay Buddhists. It stated their detemination to demand the re- 
investigation into the Phra Phimondham case, and at the same time asked 
everyone to support this cause. It also stressed that there was no 
intention to agitate against the goverment, or to cause schism in the 
Sangha, or disturbance in society. 
2 In the meantime a peaceful demons- 
tration-was planned. 
1. Letter to the Supreme Patriarch, dated 20 December 1974. 
2. A leaflet entitled'Thald6rigkti-Phiset (Special Announcement) dated 
23 December 1974. - 
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No reply was received to the ultimatum. So, on 10 January 1975, 
some 400 monks began a sit-in at Lan Asok at Wat Mahathat. 1 The main 
organizer was the FET with the assistance of Jud's Ongýan Saha Dhamik, 
the ad hogITIum SoTigkroh'Satsanasuksa Song'Phak'Isan Me Sangha Group 
of Isan for Ecclesiastical Education), and Banchong-Songkram's faction. 
Collectively, the organizations and individuals involved in this issue 
referred to themselves as *Kana'Phra'Song Phu Riakrong'Kwam'pen Tham 
(Monks for Justice), but were comonly known to -the public as Tuwasong 
(Young Monks). Thus, in effect the monks involved included both 
noderates and radicals. 
According to the Department of Intelligence, the involvement of 
the FBT and the Sangha Group of Isan in this sit-in was attributable to 
the personal relationships and common -regional allegiances between Phra 
Phimondhain and the leaders of these organizations. For example', in 
1973 some 30 young Isan monks who resided in various wat in Bangkok had 
come to pay their respects to Phra Phimondham, and laterthey regularly 
came to perform religious rites with him as well as listen to his 
teachings. In due course., monastic relationships of the master-pupil 
kind had developed. Among their followers were many monk-students of 
Mahachula Buddhist University who in turn propagated the reputation of 
Phra Phimondham as a good teacher and'a blameless monk. As a conse- 
quence, many more monks became supporters of Phra Phimondham. His 
most outstanding disciple was Phra Maha Sawaeng Chutthipunyo who in 1974 
was a founding member of the FBT. While their faith in Phra Phimondham 
This old established royal wat had considerable prestige. It was 
associated with the Mahanikai order and had a reputation for 
liberality, or at least toleration of a diversity of opinion among 
its monks. Most importantly in this context Phra Phimondham had 
been abbot there from the 1930s until 1962. It also houses Mahachula 
Buddhist University from which many of the political monks considered 
in this study came. 
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was growing, his supporters became increasingly suspicious of the 
previous allegations against their teacher. After having made inves- 
tigations into the case, they were convinced that Phra Phimondham had 
been wrongly accused and unjustly punished. They came to the con- 
clusion that the previous movement to clear the name of their teacher 
had not done enough and decided to use more drastic measures. It was 
this group. which mobilized the 4,580 monks and, novices to sign the 
petition in September 1973. When they officially established the FBT 
in November 1974, the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham was. adopted as 
an urgent issue in its progranme. 
1 
In order to appreciate the roles of the political monks in the sit- 
in, we shall concentrate our discussion on the organization of this 
demonstration and tactics used by them to realize their goals. 
I 
The demonstration was presented as justifiable on two grounds - 
-religious and humanitarian - as follows: 
(a) Taking the unjust treatment of Phra Phimondham as a case in point, 
the Monks for Justice claimed that the Sangha authority, past and 
present., had not kept Buddhist doctrine to the pure and original 
. 
teachings of the Buddha. Instead, in the past they had shmele, ssly 
abused and distorted the doctrine to satisfy personal desires and 
to please unrighteous rulers. Not only that, the Sangha authority 
had violated the Sangha Act of 1942 on which the Sangha adminis- 
tration at that time was based by not following the procedures of 
investigation and punishment decreed by law. As a result, Phra 
Phimondham had not only been wrongly accused but also unjustly 
punished. The present Sangha authority knew very well what had 
Department of Central Intelligence, 'op. 'cit. (Report No. 2), pp. 
ý 
1-2. 
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happened was wrong and inconsistent withthe Buddhist doctrine, 
the Vinaya, but it never cared sufficiently to put it right, in 
spite of the peaceful requests of large numbers of monks and laymen. 
(b) The Monks for Justice argued that the treatment inflicted on Phra 
Phimondham humiliated him,, placing a shameful stigma on his person'. 
Although, in practice, he was allowed to remain in the monkhood, 
he was debarred from taking part in certain religious activities. 
If the Sangha authority did not rectify the injustice Phra Phimondham 
would be deprived of the rights and liberty due to him under the 
Vinaya forever. Moreover, the Sangha community would still be 
doubtful of his purity. 
With this rationale, the Monks for Justice asserted that their action 
was doctrinally and hunanly legitimate because it contributed to the 
, restoration and maintenance of 
justice and the purity of the Vinaya. 
1 
The central puipose of the demonstration was to demand the repeal of all 
orders of the Sangha authority which wrongly accused and'unjustly 
2 
enforced punishwnt on him, and the reinstatement of his honorific title. 
As far as the organization of the demonstration was concerned the 
ýbnks for Justice adopted the non-violent policy (Ahingsa - Thai, 
Ahimsa. - Pali) of a sit-in and, if necessary, fasting. 
3 Other aspects 
of the demonstration, according to my own observations, were patterned 
on the proven techniques of previous successful demonstrations such as 
those organized by the left wing movements - the NSCF, FIST, FFT, and 
.......... 
Monks for Justice; 'Hetphon Ide *Lakkan nai kan'Riakrong Kwam 'lien tham 
(Rationale for the Demonstration). A press release and leaflet, 
dated 10 January 1975. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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FLUT. In this sit-in, the demonstrators divided themselves into groups 
for specific tasks. There were, for example, divisions responsible for 
public relations and publicity, medical care, receiving donations and 
supplies, and acting as guards. 
Most of the participants in the demonstration were young monks from 
all parts of the country. The lay participants constituted a tiny 
minority which helped to prepare meals and drinks for the monks and 
dealt with cash donations. The laymen who wished to join the sit-in 
had to be approved by the monk-guards at the perimeter. The idea was 
to prevent the infiltration of the sit-in by outsiders who might have 
different motives. I realized this when I tried to get inside. 
Instead of being welcomed in customary fashion by the monks, I was stopped 
and asked of my intentions. However, I was eventually allowed to enter. 
Spectators were asked to keep outside. 
The first two days of the demonstration were generally peaceful. 
On the second day the demonstrators numbered between 1,000 and 1,500. 
The monks within the perimeter sat talking and meditating. They perfor- 
med morning and evening chanting'(tham wat chao, 'tham*wat yen), the 
conventional routine for monks. Posters and placards expressing their 
discontent with the Sangha administration, and demanding the reinstate- 
ment of Phra Phimondham. were displayed. 
As the news of the demonstration spread, a growing crowd of 
sympathizers, both monks and laymen, came to join and observe the 
demonstration. Other monks travelled from the provinces to join. In 
my estimation the participants might have gone up to 2,000-2,500 on the 
third day and increased further on subsequent days. , 
Donations in the 
fom of cash and other necessities such as food, drinks, and medicines 
had poured in from the laymen. 
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A-art from the demonstration within the perimeter, the Monks for 
Justice intensified their appeals to the public and to the monks for 
their support. They put various pressures on the Sangha authority, 
and made personal visits to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
The public relations and publicity division frequently issued 
press releases and statements to the public. A series of leaflets 
were also distributed throughout the country. In these efforts, the 
Monks for Justice manipulated Buddhist doctrine to legitimate their 
actions. For example,, one statement attempted to arouse the people's 
pride in Buddhism. It asserted that Buddhism had long been the symbol 
of justice. Buddhist ideology had flourished because a sound and un- 
corrupt Sangha had kept it alive by its exemplary behaviour. However, 
Thai Buddhism since 1961 could no longer be proud, because the Thai 
Sangha had ceased to uphold justice. The Monks for Justice then cited 
Phra Phimondham's case. The statement went on that it was not too 
late to make amends. In the conclusion, it justified the monks' action 
by claiming that the sit-in was an effort to resurrect the spirit of 
justice in Buddhism. It also equated this activity with the Buddhist 
traditional practice of'Sangkaymna or Sangiti, a general convocation of 
monks in order to settle questions of doctrine and to fix the text of 
the scriptures. ' 
In another statement the Monks for Justice appealed to the 1,250 
monk-students of Mahachula Buddhist University to give their support' 
to the campaign and participate in the sit-in. In this connection 
the Buddhist virtue of*KatannukdtdV6di (the quality of being a grateful 
-person) was 
invoked. The monk-students were reminded that it was Phra, 
I 
Monks for Justices'Thalaengkan'chabab thi 1 (Declaration No. 1) 
10 January 1975. 
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Phimondham'Who had made a greater effort than anyone else to modernize 
this university. It was also he who had given monks a greater oppor- 
tunity to broaden their horizons and improve themselves whether they 
remained in the monkhood or not. As beneficiaries of Phra Phimondham's 
devotion, the monk-students should show their gratitude by rendering 
help to him when he was in difficulty. They were also asked not to 
take their examinations and to defy the Mahatherasamakom's order. 
' 
The statement addressed to the monks throughout the country 
stressed the authoritarianism of the existing Sangha administration as 
being a threat to their socio-economic status. The Monks for Justice 
asserted that under the existing administration the rights and liberty 
accorded to the monks in the Vinaya were ignored; that the high level 
administrative monks were a menace who ruled the great majority of 
monks by terror and oppression. They claimed that Phra Phimondham's 
case was only one of many. Moreover, they asserted that the authorit- 
arian rule of the Sangha brought deterioration to its prestige. if 
this continued the Sangha and Buddhism would no longer be the moral 
pillar of the nation. It was therefore the responsibility of the whole 
Sangha to unite and fight for-justice and liberate themselves from 
authoritarian rule. 
2 This kind of emphasis frequently recurred in 
statements throughout the demonstration. 
Then a rumour spread about an assassination plot on the life of 
the Supreme Patriarch and four other prominent members of the Mahathera- 
samakom. The threat was said to have come from the demonstrators, 
1. Monks for Justice, ''Thalaengkan'chabdb thi 2, (Declaration No. 2) 
10-11 January 1975. 
2. Monks for Justice, Thalaengkdn'chabab'thi 3 (Declaration No. 3) 
11 January 1975. 
3. *Dhamachaksu, Vol. 60,1975, p. 100; it is possible that the Monks 
for J55-stice spread the rLmour to pressurize the Sangha authority to 
react. 
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although-the latter denied this allegation. The police were sent to 
protect the targets. As a result the tension was exacerbated. The 
top executive monks became more unyielding and refused to have any 
dialogue with the representative of the Monks for Justice. From the 
fourth day of the demonstration onwards, the demonstrators extended 
their tactics to making critical speeches and fasting. The originally 
passive demonstration became increasingly. turbulent. The demnstrators 
now took to the platform and made critical attacks on the Mahathera- 
samakom. They accused the Mahatherasamakom of intending to perpetuate 
authoritarian rule, of being tyrannical, and of using their power to 
suppress the great majority of monks. The Department of Religious 
Affairs was also similarly attacked. Some speakers suggested that the 
top Sangha did not want to reactivate the Phra Phimondham case because 
they themselves had been directly responsible for his wrong accusation 
and some of them were involved in corruption. They were afraid that 
if this case was exposed, their prestige, status and position would 
suffer. To my astonishment., the behaviour of some speakers almost 
left them with no vestige of the monkhood, - other than their yellow robes 
and shaven heads. Their gestures and vocabulary resembled that of the 
furious lay protestors. The event was further dramatized when many 
mnks began fasting. / 
On 11 January 1975 the ýbnks for Justice gave'another ultimatum 
to the Supreme Patriarch. They demanded a written reply-as to whether 
or not the Sangha authority would meet their demands within 24 hours. 
If they got no positive response, they stated that they would then resort 
to more radical measures. 
1 The Mahatherasamakom reacted by issuing a 
Monks for Justice. ' Letter'to, the Supreme Patriarch, 11 January 1975. 
I 
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statement condeming the demonstrators for issuing such an ultimatum, 
which was an unprecedented insult to the Supreme Patriarch. It pointed 
out that it was neither legitimate nor seemly for monks to use such a 
measure to force an action on the Mahatherasamakom and reminded the 
demonstrators that in Buddhist doctrine the Sangha was govemed by the 
Vinaya and by reverence, in which honour and respect was paid to senior 
monks by their juniors. Moreover, it blamed the demonstrators for 
causing a disturbance when the government and the Sangha authorities 
had many more serious problems to handle. However, it promised to 
speed up consideration of the matter on condition that the demonstrators 
dispersed. 1 
The response of the Sangha authority only exacerbated tension, 
bitterness and anger among the demonstrators. The speeches attacking 
the top Sangha became more emotional and fervent. Four fasting 
protesters collapsed 'with sorrow and anger'. Many became ill from 
starvation and were taken to hospital. Nevertheless, they refused to 
take any food and were said to have declared: 
We are fighting not for individuals but for the justice 
entailed in the Vinaya and Dhanma ..... If we are to die', 
let it be known that we die for right and justice. We 
will sit here until we win. 2 
The situation became more explosive and the pressure on the 
authorities escalated accordingly. More provincial monks came to join 
the demonstration. The greatest number apparently came from the Isan 
region, where monks of all ranks had organized themselves into groups 
and. travelled to Bangkok. The first wave included between 1,000 and 
'The Mahatheragamakomlg'Memorandum'to*the Monks for Justice, 13 
January IM. 
2. Thai Rath, 14 January 1975. 
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1,500 monks from Loei and Sisaket provinces led by their Chao kana 
Changwat. They were followed by monks from Ubol, Udorn, Nakorn Phanom 
and the remaining Isan provinces. I am uncertain of the total number 
of monks involved, but the press reported that 'there were so manythat 
it caused alarm in government circles I and that I the government ordered 
government officials to intercept the monks' movement'. Mofiks, who 
could not come to join the demonstration for any reason, sent letters 
and telegrams in support of the demonstration. By 16 January the 
number of demonstrators had increased to between 20,000 and'25,000. 
Among the Isan monks, the holders of honorific titles now threatened 
2 
to turn in theirlonorific fans to the Supreme Patriarch. This was 
not just a threat of resignation. It was important because symbolically 
it not only reproved the Sangha authority but was also a gesture of with- 
drawing loyalty from the state, for honorific titles and fans were confer- 
red upon monks by the king. It also inplied the strong possibility of 
the Isan Sangha separating itself from the domination of Bangkok. 
In the meantime there was a widespread rumour that the sit-in was' 
part of a communist conspiracy to destroy religion., According to the 
Department of Central Intelligence, the rumour originated with a 
mysterious organization calling itself*Nuay'Pongkan Sathaban Phrasatsana 
(Organization for the Protection of Religion). This organization 
distributed various leaflets in Bangkok calling on Buddhists to turn 
against the Monks for Justice. It also urged the government to deal 
vith-the demonstrators as they were communists. 
3 In, order to clarify 
Dhanmachaksu, 'op'cit., pp. 137-139; see also Prachathipathai, 'Thai 
Eý2ýt 7 ill 12-16 January 1975. ýan 
2. Dhamachaksu, 'Ibid. 
3. For example, the leaflets entitled'Chichaeng Thalaenglan khong Lý 
'Kand Yuwasong (Facts about the Yuwasong), n. d., and Prakat Me-claration) t n. d. 
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their position, the Monks for Justice made contacts with gove I rrment' 
leaders. For example, their representatives visited the Prime 
Minister on 13 January to inform him of the authentic aims of the 
demonstration and to assure the government that their action had 
1 
nothing to do with politics and had nopolitical inspiration. 
The monks' ýsit-in came to an end on, 17 January when the Supreme 
Patriarch came to meet the demonstrators and announced that the Sangha 
authority agreed to repeal the orders of the previous Sangha authority 
and to restore Phra Phimondham's honorific title. The demonstrators 
disbanded and retumed to their wat. After having achieved their 
goals, the temporary coalition between active organizations of monks 
ended. The factions led by Jud, and Banchong and SmgkraTn continued 
i 
their activities in various political issues, while the ad hoc Sangha 
Group of Isan merged into the articulate F13T which now concentrated 
its efforts on Sangha -reform. 
5. ' The'FBT'and tho'Sangha'Reform 
During the sit-in the FBT had raised another iuportant question - 
that is, what were the fundamental causes of conflict and deterioration 
in the Thai Sangha? The Monks for Justice were in agreement that 
the most fundamental cause was rooted in the structure of the Sangha 
administration, and that it needed drastic reforms, if the p-Fosperity 
2 
of Buddhism, the unity and the prestige of the Sangha were to, be restored. 
The principal arguments for, reform put forward by the FBT were as 
. 
follows: 
Dhamachaksu,, 'OP. *cit S, p. 138. 
2. , 
The FRT, *ThalaengkaA'Rtiam (A Joint Commique), 11 January, 1975. 
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First, the present administrative system derived from the Sangha 
Act 1962, which was a product of Sarit's authoritarian government, and 
had been designed to serve the oppressive purposes of the wielders of 
power at that time. As a result, the Sangha administrative system 
was also oppressive and undemocratic. 
1 Second, the power to regulate 
and govern the whole Sangha was so totally centralized in the office of 
the Supreme Patriarch and the Mahatherasamakom that the rest of the 
monks had no part in a decision-making process which directly affected 
their personal interests and the welfare of the whole Sangha. The FBT 
described the centralization of power in the Sangha administration as 
Ia ritual to transform the monks into donkeys I-2 Third . the FET 
interpreted the system as the means by which the government intended to 
subordinate the monks to its authority and to minimize the autonomy of 
the Sangha. Finally, the FBT maintained that the existing Sangha 
administration was detrimental to Buddhism, -for it was inconsistent with 
the Buddhist doctrine of Sangha government, i. e. the Vinaya, and there- 
fore a hindrance to the progress of Buddhism. 
3 
With regard to the direction of the reforms desired, the Monks for 
Justice, being aware that the FBT was better organized, more articulate, 
and had more members, agreed to place their confidence in the FBT to 
formulate the reform proposal. Thus, the FBT shouldered this respon- 
sibility from the beginning. 
1. 'Ibid. 
2. Quoted from an'Opeii'Letter of the'FBT'to ýbnks, n. d. The 
expression refers to the stupidity of the donkey, not to its 
capacity for work. It probably also suggests that the top Sangha 
consider the rank-and-file monks to be stupid and hence incapable 
of making decisions for themselves. 
3. ''Ibid.; ''The'Joint' Conmunique, and'Thalaengkan'chabab thi 1 
-UZ-claration No. -1) n. d. 
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I 
(a)' Thb'FBTls'Rbfonn'Propo9als 
The central theme of the - reform put forward by the FBT was the 
abolition of the existing authoritarian administrative system and its 
replacement with a democratic and decentralized system. Thisýwas in 
line with the organizational arrangements of the 'ideal' political 
system which was advocated by liberal and progressive-minded people 
between 1973 and 1976. The main aims of the FBT's reforms were: 
(i) The new Sangha organization should parallel the legislative, 
executive and judicial institutions of the (democratic)' 
secular govenment. 
Sangha organization should be liberated from the domination 
of political control. I 
(iii) The right to participate-in Sangha goverment and adminis- 
tration of monks at the lower levels of the Sangha adminis- 
tration and of rank-and-file monks should be recognized. 
These ideas were elaborated in the FBTIs proposed Sangha Act, 
which can be sumarized as follows: 
Although the Sangha would remain hierarchically organized, 'the-re 
was to be a shift in power structure. Govenunental and adminiS 
-trative power would be decentralized and shared by three main I 
institutions. ' They were the'Sangha Sapha (Sangha Parliament), 
the-Kana'sangha, montri (Sangha. Cabinet), and the Kana Winaithorn 
(Ecclesiastical Court). These three institutions, in effect, 
corresponded to the secular legislature, administration or- 
executive, and judiciary respectively. 
Parallel to the secular political system, the Supreme Patriarch 
would be the head of the whole Sangha. His position would be 
similar to that of the king. He would be appointed for life 
311 
by the king with the advice of the Sangha Sapha. The Supreme 
Patriarch would exercise legislative, executive and judicial 
power through and with the advice and consent of the Sangha 
Sapha, the Sangha Montri, and the Kana Winaithom respectively. 
1 
The radical changes here were that the goverment would no 
longer monopolize the authority to appoint the Supreme Patriarch 
and that the powers of the Supreme Patriarch were much reduced. 
He became the ceremonial head, rather than the 'actual' ruler 
of the Sangha. 
The democratic principles of 'majority rule' and 'representative 
govenunent' were clearly demonstrated in the proposed composition 
and powers of the Sangha Sapha. The Sangha Sapha would consist 
of two categories of members. Category 1 would be comprised of 
members elected by monks who held the administrative positions 
of abbot and above. Prospective candidates should have two 
qualifications. Firstly., they must be ordained monks with at 
least ten years' monastic service. Secondly, they should hold 
at least either Dhamma study grade three (Naktham, Ek) or Pali 
study grade three (Barian Prayok 3) qualifications. 
2 Each 
province would be entitled to have one representative, except 
Bangkok - Thonburi., which would have five representatives. on, 
this basis, there would be 76 elected members. 
I 
The second category of membership of the Sangha Sapha should 
consist of not more than 45 members. They would be appointed 
by the Supreme Patriarch from monks who had at least me of the 
........ 
following qualifications: the honorific title of Phraracha, kana 
1. Articles 5-9. 
2. Articles 11,13. 
312 
chan'tham and above; a Pali qualification; a RA degree. 
The tenure of office of both categories of-members of the 
Sangha Sapha would be four years. 
1 
The main function of the Sangha Sapha would be legislative. 
It would be responsible for producing the ecclesiastical 
decrees, rules and orders which regulate the whole Sangha. It 
would have the power to determine the modes of practice and 
conduct of monks in accordance with the Vinaya, including the 
power to settle any matters where there were ambiguities. 
2 
More importantly, the Sangha Sapha would be able to eject its 
own members and those of the Sangha Montri on a vote of not less 
than two-thirds of its total membership. 
3 The secular parlia- 
mentary mode of practice would be adopted for the execution of 
the Sangha Sapha's functions. This involved, for example, an 
ordinary convention and special sessions. Special meetings 
might be called, if these were requested by one-third of the 
members or by the Sanjzha Nayok. 
4 The Sangha Sapha meetings 
would be presided over by its President who would be appointed 
by the Supreme Patriarch on the advice of the Sangha Sapha. 
5 
Resolutions of the Sangha Sapha would be decided by vote, each 
member having one vote,. and the majority vote would prevail. 
Half the total membership would be sufficient for a quorum. 
6 
1. Article 13. 
2. Articles 22 to 24. 
3. Articles 30,34. 
4. Articles 18,20. 
S. Article IS. 
6. Articles 17,22. 
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The legislative power of the Sangha Sapha was, to be almost 
absolute. This is clear in article. 25 which provided for the 
Supreme Patriarch to be able to withhold his approval of 
ecclesiastical decrees submitted for his signature by the Sangha, 
Sapha; but after two submissions, his veto could be overridden 
by the assembly. Moreover, the Sangha Sapha would have thec, 
power to select and appoint ordinary and special committees for 
performing any activity, or investigating or inquiring into 
, matters within 
the scope of the work of the Sangha Sapha or 
matters concerning Sangha affairs. 
(iv) The central administration of Sangha affairs would be the 
responsibility of thb'Y, 6Ad'SaAghd*Montri which would correspond 
to the civil cabinet. This executive body would consist of a 
Sangha Nayok and not more than 14 Sangha M6ntri, corresponding 
to the civil Prime Minister and ministerial positions respectively. 
The Kana, Sangha Mntri would also be the decision-making and 
policy-ýwking body concerned with the Sangha affairs as a whole. 
The members of this body would be appointed by the Supreme Patriarch. 
The Sangha, Nayok and at least six Sangha Montri must be members 
of the Sangha Sapha, while 
ýhe 
rest might be appointed from monks 
of outstanding scholarship and experience from outside. Every 
member ofýthe Kana Sangha Mntri, whether or not he was appointed 
to administer a designated department, would be jointly respon- 
2 
sible for the general activities of the Kana Sangha Montri, Le, 
there would be collective responsibility. 
(v) The administration of the Sangha affairs would be divided into a 
.......... central and a provincial administration. The central administration 
1. Article'27. 
2. Articles 31 to 33. 
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would be functionally composed of six departments*(21ýýan 
namely*P6kkhr6ng (Administration); ''Sdtharanupakan (Public 
Works); *Suksa (Education); ''Ph6dyphae (Propagation); 
Vithdtsanpan (International Relations); and*KijPqt8ana 
ftditation or Ascetic Practice). Each department would be 
headed by a Sangha Montri and a deputy might be appointed to 
help him if it was deemed necessary. 
1 
The provincial administration was largely to remain hier- 
archically organized and parallel the civil administration, as 
provided by the previous Sangha Acts of 1941 and 1962.2 The 
prime feature which differentiated the FBTIs proposed reform 
from the centralized system of the Sangha Act 1962 lay in the 
rearrangement of the power structure. According to the Sangha 
Act 1962, the Supreme Patriarch directly controlled the provin- 
cial Sangha. But the FBT's version of provincial administration 
was more decentralized. The provincial Sangha administration 
would now be responsible to the functionally differentiated 
departments. 
Judicial power would be vested in the Kana Winaithorn. It alone 
would be empowered to adjudicate and settle disputes within the 
Sangha in accordance with the Vinaya and the Sangha Sapha's 
legislation. The rules concerning the appointment of the Kana 
Winaithorn and regulations on judicial procedures would legis- 
,3 lated by the Sangha Sapha. The Kana Winaithorn would consist 
of three levels of ecclesiastical court. viz: Kand Winaithorn 
1. Article 35. 
2. See Chapter III, pp. 124-126, and 131-133. 
3. Articles 54 to 56. 
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chan thon (Court of First Instance); ''Kand Winaithorn chan 
utthorn (Court of Appeal); and Kana'Winaithom chan dika (the 
Supreme Court). 
There was also a provision regarding the administration of the 
wat, the lowest level within the Sangha hierarchy. This provision 
aimed at giving a wider opportunity to the rank-and-file monks to 
participate in the administration of the wat. Thus, Article 46 provided 
that in a wat which had more than 20 monks, wat affairs would be adminis- 
tered by a comittee. Such a comittee would be elected by the monks 
themselves. 1 
(b) The FBTls*Sanghd'Refom'Cjnpaign 
The proposed Sangha reform, if it succeeded, would undoubtedly 
result in the destruction of the existing Sangha administrative structure. 
This would also inevitably produce unfavourable effects on conservative- 
minded monks and laymen who had been the main beneficiaries of the 
existing system. The FBT well understood that its success largely 
depended on obtaining the support of the lay-public, the monks at all 
levels, and the politicians. It therefore worked outývarious 
strategies to influence public opinion and to mobilize support. 
Initially, the FBT established its own publication,, the fortnightly 
newspaper'Siang Yuwasong (The Voice of the Young Monks) which first came 
out in late 1975. Although its editor was a layman, 
2 
the editorial 
staff-and regular contributors were predominantly monks. Its office 
was in Wat Mahathat. served as the FBT's instrument for 
1. Article 46. 
2. Who was apparently a loyal follower of Phra Phimondham and who had 
been very active in the movement for the reinstatement of Phra 
Phimondham from the beginning. 
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transmitting its reform programmes to., and soliciting support from, 
various sections of society. Since it was operated on a voluntary 
basis, ''Siang Yuwasong relied on donations and subscriptions. It is 
through this paper that we can appreciate the stand of the FBT, its 
efforts to restore and promote Buddhism and the Sangha, and its 
strategies in the Sangha reform campaign. 
In its campaign efforts, the FBT capitalized on the existence of 
a public opinion favourable to democratic rule, and it attempted to 
manipulate public resentment of dictatorial rule. Through Siang 
'Yuwasong the FBT repeatedly drew the attention of the public to the 
deterioration of Buddhism and the Sangha, and attributed it to the 
authoritarian Sangha administration.. The main attack was on the 
centralization of power in the hands of 'a handful of oligarchs' i. e. 
the Supreme Patriarch and the Mahatherasamakom. The F13T asserted 
that this was inconsistent with the wishes of the Buddha who had wanted 
Sangha affairs to be administered democratically, and it also denied 
the rights of the majority of monks to participate in decisions affec- 
ting the welfare and progress of Buddhism and the Sangha. Rather, 
the present structure gave rise to greed for power and possessions, to 
immoral consciousness and jealousy, and thus caused schism within the 
Sangha. This allegation was based on the argument that the centraliz- 
ation of power in the hands of a few monks made the top positions in the 
Sangha hierarchy desirable, because whoever attained them wielded 
enormous power over the whole Sangha. The positions were accorded 
prestige, monetary reward, and contacts, especially with political 
For details, see, for example, Samachiksong, I Kanathipathai nai Kana 
Song' (Oligarchy in the sangha)--Si ... y- I ang ýwasong,. Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1976; Phra Maha Sawat Chartmethi, 'Khral nae thamlai 
Satsana? l (Who put Buddhism in Jeopardy? )"Siang Yuwasong, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, '1.15-FebTuary 1976. .4- 
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authority. It was also argued that the appointment of top executive 
monks to higklevels by the political authority made them subservient 
to the latter. This encouraged intrigue, boot-licking, and similar 
practices, which shamed the Sangha as a whole. Moreover, the system 
gave rise to the struggle for power which caused factionalism in the 
Sangha. Once a person had attained a top position., then he tended 
to be more concerned with maintaining the status quo than with promoting 
the prosperity of Buddhism. In this way political intrigue, manipul- 
ation, and favouritism. became important ingredients of power within the 
Thai Sangha. ' I 
Besides, the FBT capitalized on the monk-students' dissatisfaction 
with the Mahatherasamakom's education policy. It accused the Sangha 
authority of obstructing the progress of monks' education by advising 
the government not to recognize the status of the aiddhist universities 
as equivalent to those of the secular universities. The obstruction 
of the Mahatherasamakom in effect meant that monks were not qualified to 
get a job in goverment service should they leave the monkhood. 
2 
Changes in the political system frequently were used as an argument 
to justify the need for Sangha reform as well. The FBT pointed out 
that dictatorial goverment had been proved to be the most undesirable 
and humiliating, so Nuch so that the Thai people had sacrificed them- 
.. selves to put an end to 
it. And now the secular goverment was a dem- 
For elaboration, see, for exanple, Phra Maha Sawat., ibid.; Chalong 
Chuthimanta, I Krabuan kan Sathaban Song I (Authoritarianism in the 
Sangha) 
'* 
''Siang*Yu Ong., Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4,1976. Formore details 
about political intrigues within the Sangha see Thirachon, ' op. dit.; 
Phra Maha Sawat Chartmethi (conp*). %''Mahd'Sanghanibat'na'Lan Asok 
-(Bangkok: _Krung 
Sayam, 1975), and also Samanen Wat Thittnawirlyo, 
'Khor'Tetchiný*K6raiii'Phrd'Phimondham (Facts about Phra Phimondhmn's 
2. 'This-issue had been frequently raised in almost every issue of 
- 'Siang'Yuwasong. 
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cra, tic one,, the Sangha as part of that democratic society must also 
be changed. Only with democratic administration, the FBT claimed, 
could the Sangha regain its prestige, and Buddhism prosper. 
I 
Personal attacks on high-level administrative monks were another 
strategy of the FBT's reform campaign. This involved allegations of 
abuse of power and corruption against certain individuals. These 
regularly appeared in the social gossip colunui, ''Bukkhon'Phainai wongkan 
(Personalities in Religious Circles), of'Siang'Yuwasong. This 
colum constantly accused the majority of the members of Mahatherasamakom 
of abuse of power, for personal gain, fostering the practice of 
favouritism,, oppressing rank-and-file monks, flattering political 
authority, setting monks against each other, indulging in shameful 
activities such as having sexual relationships with women, and practising 
false doctrines such as occultism. 
2 
Some of these issues were occasionally fully reported in*Siang 
*Yuwasong in order to substantiate the FBT's allegations. Some of the 
examples given are presented below. 
Conceming possible corruption and mismanagement of Sangha property,, 
Siang Yuwasong, in May to July 1976, gave an account of a dispute between 
the abbot and the tenants of the prestigious royal wat Mahamakutkasatthi- 
yaram. Through'Siang*Yuwasong, the FBT accused the abbot, who was, also 
a member of the Mahatherasamakom, of having unkindly evicted the watlsý 
-tenants in order to lease the property to a construction company. 
The 
1. 'The Edito'rial', 'Siang'Yuwasc g, Vol. 1. No. 19,16-30 November 1976; 
see also Chalong Chuthimanta, op-cit 
2. See, for' exanple, the colums 'Bukkhon Phainnai wongkan Satsanal in 
'Siang*Yuwasong, V61.1 (1976) nos. 4-5,, 8-9, and 11-18; and also 
Vol. 2 (1977) nos. 23-25. 
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company was planning to build a commercial centre from which the wat, 
would gain more financial benefit. It also alleged that the abbot 
and other high ranking monks were bribed by the company. This 
action was presented by the FBT as inconsistent with the Buddha's 
teachings in that it was an act of greed for the accumulation of wealth. 
Moreover, the eviction of the poor tenants in favour of capitalists was 
an act of exploitation which again was not in line with the Buddha's 
teaching, or morally and humanly sound. The FBT warned that such 
cruel treatment of the poor only encouraged them to join the comLinists. 
Cases of political intrigue within the Sangha and the monks, 
manipulation of political authority for certain purposes were repeatedly 
reported by*Siarig*YWasong. One of the best examples was that of the 
appointment of monks to higher honorific rank. In this case, the FBT 
asserted that some members of the Mahatherasmiakom had deliberately 
obstructed the rightful nomination of Phra Phimondham and Phra Sasana 
Sobana t6'Somdet'Phrardchd'kana rank by manipulating the political 
2 
authority to favour less deserving monks. 
The FBT had also devoted its efforts to the question of unjust 
appointment of monks to administrative posts. It asserted that the 
Mahatherasamakom had not strictly observed the principles and procedures 
. regarding the appointment of ecclesiastical officials 
but often abused 
I 
Fuller details had been, reported in'Siang'Yuwasong, Vol. 1., Nos. 10.. 
12 and 14., - and also in Sýecial FreeVolumes, 16-31 May, and 1-15 
June 1976.1 
2. For elaboration see 'Thalaengkan chabab thi l, - Ruang kan Sathap'ana 
Somdet Phraracha 
- 
kanal (Declaration No. 1., On the Appointnent of 
Somdet: Phraracha kana), and 'Thalaengkan chabab thi 2, Ruang kwam 
nai pen tham nai wongkan kana so. ng' (Declaration No. 2, On Injustice 
in the Sangha), both declarations were published in', Siang'Yuwasong., 
Vol. 1. No. 1,1-15 January 1976. 
I 
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I 
or bent the regulations to serve its own interests. In many cases 
there was an air of corruption-and favouritism about the appointments. 
For example., the FBT suggested that the provincial Sangha governor of 
Ayudya had abused his power by appointing one of his disciples to the 
position of Abbot of an important royal wat instead of appointing a 
better qualified candidate. In spite of the protests of the monks 
and congregation of that wat, the Mahatherasamakom approved the action 
of the provincial Sangha govemor. The FBT claimed that such injustice 
was fostered because the provincial Sangha, govemor was 'the client or 
follower of one of the most influential members in the Mahatherasamakom. 
Partiality in the treatment of monks who were convicted of Vinaya 
6ffences was another charge that the FBT made against the high level 
administrative mnks. Most controversial of all was_the case of 
Kitthiwuttho. In January 1976, Kitthiwuttho led hundreds of commune 
and village headmen in a demonstration against local govenunent legis- 
lation, which also demanded drastic govenment, measures in suppressing 
commmist activities, resolving economic and corruption problems, and 
speedy land reform legislation. The FBT maintained that Kitthiwutthols 
action was no different from that of Jud. Yet Kitthiwuttho was neither 
condemed nor punished by the Sangha authority. Neither did the 
Department of Religious Affairs make any comment. The FBT claimed that 
action was not taken against Kitthiwuttho because he had intimate 
relationships with some influential members of the Mahatherasamakom, 
and because Kitthiwuttho had the protection of the political and economic 
establishment. 
2 
1. ''Siang Yuwasong., Vol* 1., Nos. 9-10,13 (1976). It also frequently 
reportea aneged abuses of power in various ways by provincial 
Sangha authorities. See, for exaEple, Vol. 1, Nos. 5,11,17-20 
(1976). 
2. Siang*YuWasong, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1976). 
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Proclaiming itself, as the vanguard of Buddhism, the FET also 
directed its attacks on the misdemeanours; of high ranking administ- 
rative monks'. It alleged that the increase in the practice of 'false 
, doctrine' was attributable to the irresponsibility of the top adminis- 
trative monks in that they encouraged such practices by not enforcing 
laws and regulations, and even worse, by practising these illegitimate 
and non-doctrinal activities themselves. 'False doctrine' in the FBT's 
sense included, for exmiple, beliefs in magic, miracles, astrology and 
faith healing, as well as the confusing of Buddhism with other religions, 
especlally Hinduism. 'False practices' followed from these beliefs and 
included giving charms and amulets, healing by touch or holy water, 
. casting horoscopes, perfonning rituals against evil spirits, and 
blessing imoral places etc. as mentioned earlier. 
1 Through'Siang 
the, FBT exposed to the public the top Sangha who themselves 
practised 'false doctrine' by publicizing their names and printing 
pictures of some of them performing a ritual invoking 'supernatural 
spirits'. 
2 
Soliciting the support of political parties and NPs constituted 
another strategy in the FBT's reform campaign. The FBT first sent its 
reform programme to them to sound out their attitudes to it. At this 
stage'there seemed to be no formal or direct contact between the FBT 
and the politicians. The channels of communication were mainly through 
general letters. The second stage commenced when the FBT felt relatively 
confident that certain parties or MPs would seriously and sympathetically 
.. take. up their cause. Only then would the leaders of the FET or its, 
See, for exxnple, Phra Maha Samruam Piyathanm, 'Saiyasat pen kamsorn 
khong Phutthasatsana rue mai? l (Is Occultism and Magic Buddhism? ), 
Vol. 1, No. 5 (1976), and by the same author ISaiyasat 
kamlang yamyee Phutthasatsanal (Occultism and Magic is Destroying 
Buddhism)., ' 'Siang *YWd-ý6ng, 'Vol. 1,, No. ' 13 (1976). 
2. 'Siang'Yuwaýong, Vol. 1, No. 13 (1976). 
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representatives directly approach syrnpathetic parties or individuals. 
They then put forward suggestions on specific issues, ýand ask the 
parties or NPs to speak for the FBT in Parliament. Lay sympathizers 
' lobby the politicians. 
1 
with the FET would also be asked to 
As far as the proposed Sangha Act was concerned, the FBT managed 
to secure the support of the United Socialist Front Party of Thailand, 
which in turn was seconded by the Socialist Party of Thailand and some 
NPs from other parties. During the preparation of the Sangha Reform 
bill the representatives of the FBT were invited by the United Socialist 
Front Party's legislative conwdttee to elaborate the FBTIs proposed 
reform. 
2 Significantly, the final draft by the United Socialist Front 
party encapsulated most of the FET's major proposals. The bill was 
submitted to the Parliament in the second session of the 1975 Parlia- 
mentary meeting and passed its first reading. The Parliament was dis- 
*3 
solved before the bill reached its second reading. 
Information about the interaction between the FBT and NPs and political 
parties is, mainly from my own connmmications with some members of the 
Central Cominittee of the FBT during August-December 1975. 
Ibid. 
3. parliamentary Report, 1975, Second Session. 
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CHAPTER VII THE'ROLES, ' ACrIVITIES, 'AND'IWOLVIMENrS OF'RIGHr WING 
'POLITICAL'MONKS'IN*THAI'POLITICS'DURING'1974-1976: A 
CASESTUDY 'OF'KITrHIWUTTID 
This chapter exwnines the roles, activities, and involvement of 
monks in the political crisis brought about by the student-led 
'revolution' of 1973, the Parliamentary system of goverment in Thailand, 
and the conmnist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975. 
Kitthiwuttho Bhikldm is taken as a case study of a right wing political 
monk because, unlike most other monks, he played a leading role in 
secular politics. KitthiwutthoIs ideological position was explicitly 
pronounced, his political role and involvement was conspicuous and 
novel, and more importantly his involvement was tacitly recognized by 
a large section of the conservative members of society as well as 
sympathetically supported by the right wing movements and militants. 
In Chapter V we'noted that Kitthiwutthols Buddhist activism, social 
action., and connections with the political and economic establishment 
had afforded him a reputation; and that he manipulated his connections 
to promote his programme of Buddhist social action. These activities 
in turn were important assets in advancing his ideological position when 
he later became politically active. 
In this chapter we shall investigate further the underlying causes 
which led Kit-thiwuttho to become a political monk, his ideological 
position, and his-connections with and his role in the ultra right wing 
movements I notably NAWAPOL. We shall also examine his skilful manipul- 
ation. of Buddhism and his mobilization of provincial monks and the masses 
to support his ideology and activities. ý 
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1. Kitthiwuttho 'aiid 'His 'Ide6logical Tositim 
Before 1974 there is no clear evidence to indicate that Kitthi- 
wuttho, was active in secular politics, nor that the Buddhist activism 
promoted by him had an explicitly political flavour. However, the 
political events following October 1973 led him as a Thai nationalist 
to become politically active, stridently anti-commist and a vehement 
opponent of the left wing movements, which he considered to be the 
enemies of the nation, religion, and the monarchy. He saw commists 
as foremost among the enemies; whether operating outside or within the 
country; indeed this proposition might be reversed, for he has tended 
to label all his enemies 'conmmists'. Within the country, he saw the 
most dangerous'threat as coming from the leftist movements operating as 
various organizations and within certain political parties. Among 
these movements, the students' organizations such as the NSCT and the 
FISr who led the October 1973 Irevolution' were the most important 
enemies. - For Kitthiwuttho the 1973 upheaval and the succeeding leftist 
activities were the result of a well organized commist plot to destroy 
the existing structure of Thai society. In addition to the lay leftist 
movement,, he', saw, the organizations of monks such as the FBT, MNCT, and 
YMFT as being conmmist-backed. 
1 
These views were inplicit in many of his public lectures during 
1975,. and became explicit in a number of his speeches in 1976, 
especially ih'Ka, 'Kbimiunit'hai 'Bab (Killing Conrunists is not 
Demeritorious)-(Bangkok: Aksorn Rimpan, 1976); see also 'Phuttha- 
satsana kap Latthi Kommunit' (Buddhism and Communism), 'Chofa, Vol. 
10, No. 12, December 1975, pp. 5-16 and Vol. 11, No. 1,75-nuary 1976, 
pp. 5-10; and 'Kan Pathiwat, khong Phra. Phutthachaol (The Buddha's 
Revolution)''Ch6fav Vol. 11, No. 12,, December 1976 and Vol. 12, No. 1, 
January 197i. 
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Kitthiwutthols-involvemnt in the NAWAPOL movement is a convenient 
starting point from which to begin the examination of his political 
role and activities. Near the end of 1974 the liberal newspapers, 
especially'Prachdthipilidthai and'Prachdthdrt, began to report that 
Kitthiwuttho had allowed NAWAPOL to use Chittapawan College for, its 
meetings and for mobilizing mass support. He himself began to inter- 
polate frequent injunctions to the public to support NAWAPOL in his 
2' 
semons on Dhamma on me of the Army Radio stations. By April 1975 
he had made clear that he was one of the most'important leaders and 
thinkers of the NAWAPOL movement through his public lectureý and in a 
number of interviews-with the press. For example, in a public 
lecture on the Army Television (TV. 5) he told the public that in the 
early stages of the -formation of NAWAPOL the founding members had come 
to seek his advice. He then told them that NAWAPOL should be organized 
as a popular force., not to seek political power, but to counteract the 
enemies of'the nation, religion, and the monarchy. 
3 At that time he 
was an advisor to the movement. 
4 
Although NAWAPOL did not claim to be a political party seeking 
parlimnentary representation, it was obvious to the public that it was 
a political movement. Thus, Kitthiwuttho Is involvement in NARAPOL 
was unquestionably seen as an involvement of religion and of monkhood 
in politics. Kitthiwuttho himself, though he did not deny that he 
I 
was involved inthe NAWAPOL movement, maintained that NAWAPOL was not 
The emergence of. NAWAPOL and'its ideology and activities has been 
detailed in Chaptor V., 
2. See, for example; 'Prachathipathai, 15,20 December 1974. 
. 3. The lecture was entitled 'Phutthasatsana kap Kwam Mankong (Buddhism 
and'Security). Later the text was published iri*Chofa, -Vol. 10, No. 
7, 'July 1975, pp. 5-16; see als6'Prdchdthipdthd-1, -1T August 1975. 
f 
4. Vol. 1,, No. 1 (1975) p. 20. 
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a political institution since it was not a political party and it did 
not bid for political power. To him, its members were tied together 
by a principle of nationalism whereby the movement took the Middle Way 
of Buddhism to solve problems of government, economics and society. ' 
In response to the allegation that he, as a monk, was involved in 
politics he boldly declared: 
"I have studied (Buddhism) and well understand my 
position. -I know very well what I ought and ought 
not to do ..... NAWAPOL is an ideology for the preser- 
vation of the nation, religion, and the monarchy. It 
is not a political party ..... I have never wanted to involve the yellow robe (monkhood) in politics, for I 
know very well that it is not proper (for the monk). 
If I really desired political power, I would have dis- 
robed. 2.... However, should anyone keep insisting that 
I take part in politics, let it be so. But, I want 
you to understand that I am doing so and will continue 
to do so because my only intention is to secure the 
country. I tell you this ... I love the country, I want to protect the nation, religion, and the monarchy, 
and I am ready, to sacrifice myself for this". 3 
Thus, the initial reason for his involvement in NAWAPOL was to 
preserve and protect the nation, religion, and the monarchy which, for 
him and NAWAPOL, were in grave danger of being destroyed by the com = ists 
and enemies who operated under various names but were in fact part of the 
cowunist movement. 4 
Kitthiwuttho's fear of, and hatred for, communists were exacerbated 
by the establishment of conummist governments in Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos in 1975. According to his own words, these events had made a 
1. pp. 12-16; see also his interview 
wiffi a weekly newspaper Ruam Mai., 19-25 July 1975, and his lecture 
on'Wam'Mmikong'khong'Chart Satsana'Phra'Mahakasat (The Security of 
th6 Nation, Religion and the Monarchy) later pub hed in Chofa, 
Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1976, pp. 5-14. 
2. -Ruam*Thai, 19-25 July 1975. 
3. A speech at the Seminar oTi'Monks*-; 'Pooplo'fot'the'PteýbrV; itibii'bf'the 
. 'NdtioTi; 'R61igi6ii; 'and'ýbiizLrc-Ny__ý, t Chittapawan'Coll9gle, 23-25 Wy 1975. 
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very strong impression on him. lb-told the monks andthe public about 
his visit to Cambodia before the fall of that country and described the 
terrified state of the Khmer monks-who dreaded the advent of conumist 
rule. After the fall of Cambodia he dramatized accounts of the 
destruction or desecration of monasteries, the brutalities communists 
inflicted on monks, and the indiscriminate killing of monks and ordinary 
people, including women and children. The incidents in Cambodia 
convinced him that communists and communism represented a formidable 
threat to the nation and religion. Moreover,, when the communist 
goverment of Laos abolished the Lao monarchy in December 1975., it was 
for him a clear affirmation that communism represented a threat to the 
institution of the monarchy. 
' 
It was probably on these grounds that Kitthiwuttho became politically, 
active as an anti-cominunist. He then made a major effort, in concert 
with NAWAPOL and very likely with others on the far right, to mobilizle 
all classes of the people and monks to wage war on conmunists and leftist, 
movements. 
Kitthiwuttho Is ideological position was me with, that of NAWAPOL. 
For him, it was the only stance that a true Thai nationalist could take. 
Anyone, who opposed it was therefore an enemy of the nation, religion,, - 
and the monarchy. To him the very survival of the Thai nation rested 
on the security and'stability of these three pillars. 
By 'nation' Kitthiwuttho meant the 'people. ' 'Thus, 
.. the. security of 
the nation was in effect the security ofthe people. 
This statement was reiterated from May 1975 onwards in his speeches 
-andvritingsý see, for examplel, 'Buddhism and'Securiýj; -Buddhism 
'and'Com=ism; '*Thb'SOWrity'6f'the*Natiori''Religion, '*and'the 
-Monarchy; tFe most illUStrate2l., ommmists is not, 
-i)emeritorious. 
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The security of the people produced happinessýand progress for them. 
Such conditions could be achieved only when the people had unity, 
cared for and helped one another, and shared their happiness and 
suffering together. Closely related to national security was the 
Buddhist religion which tied the Thai people together and served as a 
mechanism for moral and social control. It was the moral axis of the 
Thai nation. Without it, he postulated., the country would fall into 
anarchy and cease to exist. He also maintained that the Thai nation 
could hardly survive without the monarchy because the monarchy was 
the symbol of independence and unity and the morale of the nation. The 
king was the only true leader of the nation, who in the past had preser- 
ved the country and Buddhism for the Thai people, and who today led the 
Thai nation to progress and development. 
' 
Kitthiwutthols-stature as a distinguished monk, his reputation for 
Buddhist activism in-social action and Dhama propagation, and his 
leading role in NAWAPOL most certainly made the movement attractive, to 
many who otherwise might have been more wary of politicians with their 
close military connections. Not only was he a leader and thinker, he 
was also an energetic and enthusiastic promoter of NAWAPOL's cause, 
programes and ideology. He played an inportant role in designing 
the orientation courses and subjects for seminars and meetings for the 
members of NAWAPOL. On these occasions he was also one of the most 
inportant and indispensable speakers. In his efforts to propagate 
his 'national ideology' and'NAWAPOL's causes and programes, and to 
-mobilize support 
from various sections of society,, Kitthiwuttho made 
For elaboration se0'Bdddhhm and', c, 6curity; ''The'Security'of'the 
Nation -R61igion Monarc 3p hY; and NAWAPOL, 'Report of the 'S inar on monks People-for Th-e-Ptesorvatioh 'Of 'the Nation. 
'Religion'and'Monarchy (Chonburi: -Chittapawan College, 1975). 
ýI 
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extensive use of daily radio and weekly television broadcasts. He 
also gave frequent public lectures at the Abhidhama Foundation, at 
Wat Mahathat, at Chittapawan College, and at some, other places. 
Public meetings organized by his following and/or NAWAPOL afforded 
him additional channels of comiamication. He also made extensive 
travels to various parts of the country to, make speeches for the, same 
purpose. For example, on 29 June 1975 at the meeting organized by 
NAWAPOL in Petchaburi province, Kitthiwuttho gave a public lecture on 
National Security. On 25 November 1975 at a public meeting of NAWAPOL 
in Saraburi province; on 25 December at Chaiyaphum province; and on 
26 January 1976 in Cheingmai province; he gave lectures on 'Nation, 
I Religion, and the Monarchy' and how the people could preserve these 
institutions, 
Kitthiwuttho mobilized funds for NAWAPOL, but he himself had 
never disclosed the amount. However,, the Department of Central 
Intelligence suggested that it was 'substantial'. 
3 The weekly' 
Trachachart estimated contributions to Kitthiwatho. 's funds at 'many 
millions of baht'. The noney mainly came from public donations to 
Chittapawan College for its construction, upkeep, educational and 
propagation activities. ''Prachachart also reported that during 1973 
to 1975 Kitthiwuttho received donations of around 200 million baht, 
part of which was used for NAWAPOL. 
4 
Departnent of Central Intelligence; 'Confidential 'Report'on Activities 
of'NAWAPOL (BKK: Departnent of Central Intelligence, 191,6) p. IT-2 
Ed- Appendix N, p. 2. 
2. ''Ibid.., pp. 13-15,, and Appendix N., pp. 4-5. 
1 
-Ibid., 15. 
I 
4. ' Trachdchdrt (weekly), "NANAPOL: Rae Okbna chak Kwa! ', (NANAPOL: 
Emerging from the Extreme Right), Vol. 2, No. 29., 8 August 1975, 
pp. 30-31. 
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2. KitthiwLittho'and'Mass'M6bilizati6n'f6r'thd'Defenco I of the Nation, 
Rdli ibri, ' 'and* tho 'Mondythy 
Kitthiwuttho was articulate about the strategies and means to be 
employed in the fight against the enemies he had identified. The 
counteraction was to'be mounted simultaneously by monks and laymen, ' 
, each using different strategies and weapons, but acting in concert. 
hmediately after the camunist regimes were established in 
neighbouring Vietnam and Cambodia, Kitthiwuttho took the lead in 
organizing a special meeting at Chittapawan College. It took place 
on 23 to 25 May, and was called the "Seminar of Monks - People, for 
the Preservation of the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy". 
According to the seminar report and to Kitthiwuttho, himself, the 
meeting resulted from the worry and concern of 'people from all walks 
of life' about the risk of communist. aggression both from outside and 
inside the country. Many of them had personally e4ressed their 
worry and concern to him and sought his advice. 
The meeting was attended by about 2,500 people including monks, 
businessmen, goverrunent officials, high-ranking policemen and amy 
officers, farmers, students, and comamity leaders from 30 provinces.. 
Interestingly, Christian and Muslim leaders were also invited. 
Although Kitthiwuttho claimed that this meeting was organized as part 
of Chittapawan College activities, it was obvious that the majority 
of the participants and all the speakers were key members of NAkUDL, 
2 
. The. report of the seminar was also produced and 
distributed by NAWAPOL. 
1. Buddhism'and'Securit . ppt 6-13; see also NAWAPOL; 'A'Report'on'the 
of Monks -' eople'fbr'the'Preservation'of'tlie Nation, the 
'Religion, ''and'the Mbnarchy'(23-ý25 May 1975) (Chonburi: Chittapawan 
College, 1975T-. 
2. Department of Central Intelligence, ''op. eit., Appendix ý, p. 2. 
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It is also worth noting that the Supreme Patriarch was invited 
to officiate at the opening ceremony. On this occasion he was 
reported to have said that this meeting was 'a creditable attempt to 
bring peace to the country, thus it deserved praise and support'. 
' 
Other evidence suggesting that this was a NAWAPOL meeting was that 
the participants who were not NAWAPOL members were asked to take an 
oath vowing that they would sacrifice personal interest, even life., 
for the survival of the nation, religion, and the monarchy. 
2 
The-main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the threat 
presented by the connunists and camamist-backed organizations and 
to decide the means and strategies to counteract these enemies. The 
meeting adopted a resolution that 'the Middle Way' should be the means 
3 to preserve and defend the three institutions. 
The anti-communist strategies were firstly that the people must 
be informed of the nature of the threats and the identity and tactics 
of the enemies. Secondly, every effort was to be made to instil in 
the minds of the people the awareness of national unity, their national 
heritage, their pride of nation, religion, and the monarchy. Thirdly, 
the awareness of the link between national and religious security on 
týe one hand, and political, economic, and social stability on the other 
had to be strengthened or created. Finally.. the people had to be 
encouraged to unite in body and mind to strive for the above objectives, 
by fighting against the enemies. 
4 
J. NAWAPOL, 'op. cit. 
2. -Buddhiýift*aiid', Sddd-rity,, p. -13. 
3. NAWAPOL, -bp. cit.; Department of Central Intelligence, 'ojj. *cit. t p. 7. 
4. ''Buddhism'andsocurity, pp. 7-8,10-12. 
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For Kitthiwuttho, 'people' referred to every Thai regardless of 
their religious convictions, economic and social status, and occupations. 
Nbnks, as part of the 'people', could also have a significant part to 
play. If the monks and laity were unified, they could produce a most 
effective force to fight the enemies. He said that now unity was 
being undermined by the co=wnists and the leftists who conspired to 
turn people against each other violently. 'Thus, one of the most 
urgent tasks of every Thai nationalist was to create better understanding 
and restore unity among themselves 
In many of his speeches and public lectures, Kitthiwuttho pointed out how 
to achieve national unity anduhat role the Thai of different economic and 
social status should play in order to remedy peacefully the conflicts in 
society. Be invoked a number of the teachings of the Buddha to justify 
the relationships of the people in society. For example, the rich 
should follow the principle of'Dana'(Tan - giving) and Metta-Kardna 
(Compassion and loving-kindness) by helping the poor. The poor in 
return should be grateful to the rich as prescribed in the principle 
Of'Kataftnukatavedita*(Kat - Gratefulness) and they should not think 
that the ridi were their enemy as the cammists 'and the leftists main- 
tained. Also, the employees (labourers) should not regard the 
employers (the capitalists) as their enemy or as an, exploitative class. 
Both parties should consider their relationship as reciprocal. The 
monks should teach the people in such a way as to reduce the gap 
between -rich and poor, by emphasizing principles of Dana to the rich, 
and Katannukatavedita to the poor. They should teach the rich that 
giving to the poor was an act of merit which would enable them to be 
I 
1. * Jbid., pp. 
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bom happier and richer in the next life. He also called upon the 
monks to use their 'wisdom' (pann2) as a weapon to fight the enemies 
and to inspire the people. 
Ironically, while teaching the people to solve the problems of 
social conflict by peaceful means, Kitthiuuttho repeatedly launched 
attacks on the commists and the leftists and told the public who 
they were. He continually tried to disillusion the people with 
leftist ideology. I-b told the people about the 'devil' of commism 
and the 'blind madness' of those who cherished it. 
For Kitthiwuttho, the conmnists were'mara' CmLrn - the Evil One) 
and thus commism, was an ideology of Evil. It was the ideology that 
) and aimed at the destruction of society, the negated virtue, QLandi 
happiness of mankind, and religion. It was therefore the most 
dangerous and direct enemy of Buddhism. It was also in tum the enemy 
2 
of the monarchy. He waxned the people and students not to be misled 
or fooled by 'subversive ideology' and Iforlom hopes', spread by such 
figures as Mao-Tse Tung,, Marxj Lenin, Che Guevara, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Franz Fan. on and so on. He said that the propagation of such subver-ý 
sive ideas was a means adopted by leftists to sabotage the social 
relations of-brotherhood, and to undermine the social foundations of 
Thai society, i. e. religious and family institutions, the monarchy, 
1. - Ibid., 
' pp. 
8-11; see also Kitthiwuttho; Dhamma'hR Phanha 
-'-S=g om (Dhamma and Social Problems) (BKK: RFronprasit Press, g_ 
1974); 'Dhamma'kaP'kon', Rama! -mai (Dhanm and Modem Man) (BKK: 
Phrornprasit Press., 1914); and-ging thi kuan'Kamnung (1hings that 
me should think about) (BKK: Aksomsamai Press, 1975). ' 
2. For elaboration. of Kitthiwutthols perception. of conr=ism as 
distinct from Buddhism see his lectures on'Buddhism'and'Comwnism!; 
--Chofa, Vol. 10, No. 12,, and Vol. 11, No. 1 (December 1975 and 
Ta-huary 1976). 
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relationships between teachers and students, parents and children and 
so on. On many occasions he warned the people not to become prey 
to leftist 'mob rule' and 'mass mobilization', tactics. As far as 
the niral people were concerned, conrunist tactics, Kitthiwuttho 
elaborated, involved six stages. 
The first step i. 8'chan prabtook (open one's heart to me's 
misery). At this stage the leftists, mostly left wing students, 
organize such programmes as 'Democracy Propagation,, Community Develop- 
ment, Rural Reconstruction, and Retuming to the Countryside' and 
direct them at the villages. There they establish rapport with the 
villagers, asking them about their problems and offering help. In 
every case the leftists would lead the villagers to believe that their 
grievances were caused by the government. The second step is'chan 
*krachapmit (tightening relationships). The leftists give assistance 
with the immediate needs of the villagers. For example, they help on 
the farm. and provide medicine for the sick. Having been long neglected 
by goverment officials, the villagers naturally trust the students 
and regard them as I good kids I and as I their children (Luk an This Ln 
paves the way for the leftists to advance to the third step, 'chan*ijaklak 
(entrenchment). They move in and live with the villagers. This is 
followed by the fourth step., ''kan'obrom (indoctrination). The leftists 
agitate, cmspire, and indoctrinate the villagers with socialist and 
comumist ideas. The next step is'chan'chad tang (organization and 
mobilization). They now organize the villagers into, for example, 
farmers' associations, co-operatives and self-help groups. The final 
A lecture to students at Kasetsart University., 28 June 1975. The 
text was later published in*, Chofa, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1975, 
entitled Thanma samrap pIp)i-aiI(Dhanma for Adults) pp. 5-17. 
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stage, *chan*chakchuan, is to incite and eventually lead the villagers 
to revolt against the government and replace it with a com=ist 
system. 
1 
]Kitthiwuttho also infonned his listeners of the tactics of the 
leftists operating in the cities. He said that the enemies had 
infiltrated into schools, colleges, universities and labour organizations. 
In educational institutions, the enemies could be found among the students 
and teachers. These enemies not only spread subversive ideas but also 
incited the students to rebel against Thai traditions and the social 
order. As early as Novenber 1974, Kitthiwuttho in his public lectures 
on television had asked parents to warn their children not to be misled 
by 'bad friends' who took part in public rallies and political meetings. 
In this lecture he expressed his deep concern about the proliferation 
of 'subversive ideas' among the young. 2 
What worried him most was the rapid spread of the 'new left 
ideology' propagated by leftist students in colleges and universities. 
The 'new leftists-13 were even more evil than the camunists because 
'they would destroy all the foundations of society ... and build a 
completely new society'. 4 This ideology, according to Kitthiuuttho, 
was spread in colleges and universities by students and teachers who 
had received it from abroad. They would derogatorily label anyone 
1. Kitthiwuttho emphasized these points over and over in his speeches; 
see, for instance. %'The'SectiriýZ*of'the'Nation)''Rdligion, ''and'the Monarchy; is not 17e--meritorious; and Buddhism 
and Conrmirilsm. 
2. For details, seeThama'andSocial'Problems. 
3. He claimed, without giving details, that the new leftists' organization 
began in England in 1956. It is possible that this idea derived frm 
Thanin Kraiwichien, the future Prime Minister, who was in England at 
that time. 
4. A public lecture entitled', K6ri'Pathiwat'khong'Phrd'Phutthachao (The 
Buddha's Revolution) on Asalha Puja Day of 1976. The text was later 
published in Ch6fa, Vol. 11, No. 12 (1976) and Vol. 12, No. 1 (1977). 
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who wished to preserve the existing society 'dinosaur', 'tyrant's 
I 
leaving' or 'reactionary'. In fact, said Kitthiwuttho,, those who 
were blamed were our ancestors, who had sacrificed themselves-to 
preserve our nation, religion, ýthe monarchy, our culture and our 
heritage. 1 
Kitthiwuttho further stated that the communists would unrelent- 
ingly destroy religions, because religions were a major obstruction 
to the propagation of communism. The destruction of Buddhism had 
already begun in Thailand and involved a number of methods following 
Mao-Tse-Tung's teachings. For example,, he elaborated, the communists 
organize public lectures or seminars. The lectures and seminars con- 
centrate mainly on criticizing the behaviour of respected monks to dis- 
credit them, so that people lose their trust and confidence in monks, 
and on criticizing the teachings of the Buddha as irrelevant to the, 
needs and progress of society. In some extreme'cases the leftists 
even say that religion is the opium of the people, and that it was 
2 
created to serve the interests of the exploitative classes. Another 
tactic employed to destroy Buddhism is that they send their members-to 
be"ordained as monks. These enemies in disguise undermine Buddhism 
and the Sangha in varigus ways. For example, the disguised monks 
behave wrongly to make people lose faith in the Sangha. They organize 
themselves into groups and go out to teach Dhamma to the rural people. 
But in fact they, distort the Dhanna and spread commmism and socialism., 
These monks draw attention to everyday social, political, and economic 
1. Ch6fa, Vol. 11, No. 12 (1976) pp. 8-9. 
2. * Ibid. (Vol. 12, No. 1,1977) pp. 6-7. Kitthi-wuttho was referring 
TFere to actual lectures and seminars which were being given 
throughout Thailand between 1974 and 1976. 
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problems'which they say are caused and perpetuated by the existing 
system. Then, they urge people to demand an end to this system 
and its replacement by a new one. These monks, Kitthiwuttho asserted, 
distorted Dhamma by teaching that 'Buddhism and Socialism are the same' 
and that 'Buddhism and Communism are based on the sameAde6logy 
Moreover, these communists in diguise organize themselves into various 
associations, notably the FET, the MNCT, and the YMFT, for subversive 
activities. 
2 
Kitthiwuttho also saw com=ists as having-infiltrated labouring 
groups where they incited the workers to stand against their employers 
by using strikes, sabotage and picketing. Not only that, they also 
extended these industrial disputes into political demonstrations. Such 
a situation was also seen as developing in govenunent bureaucracies. 
Me coummists and leftists had tried to play low-level government 
officials off against their superiors. 
3 
The, liberal newspapers and magazines, especially'Prachddlidrt and 
'Chaturat, also cxne under attack. For Kitthiwuttho these publications, 
which were incidentally critical of him, were the'lackeys and mouth- 
I 
pieces of the leftists. They, too, were the enemies of the nation, 
4 
religion, and the monarchy. 
Having told the people who their enemies were and the kinds of 
tactics they used, Kitthiwuttho aroused fear and abhorrence of the left 
''Ibid., p. 7. 
2. -Killi ng'Conmunists'is not'Demeritorious, p. 39. 
3. Kitthiwutthol 'Pathakathal (Kitthiwutthols Speech)'*-Chofa, Vol. 11, 
No. 9 (September 1976) pp. 11-12. 
4. 'The'Buddha'8'RevOlution, pp. 13-14. 
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in the minds of the people by describing the consequences of communist 
rule. He told the public how the communists would humiliate and 
eventually destroy religion and the monarchy. He said that if the 
Thai did not stand against them now, then the Thai would face the same 
political and social turbulence as that suffered by the Cambodians, 
Lao and Vietnamese. The word 'Thai', always associated with 'freedom' 
would no longer be meaningful, for, under conrmist rule, people would 
be little better off than slaves or animals. Liberty and equality, 
the virtues that the Thai admired and had enjoyed, would no longer 
exist, and the institution of the family would be destroyed. 
Kitthiwuttho then called for an unrelenting and uncompromising 
attack on the communists. This was, he exhorted, the responsibility 
of every Thai, whether he be monk or layman, rich or poor. 
' In this 
effort he offered the people a plan of action which would lead to a 
marked alleviation of their troubles. His plan, in fact., set him 
directly against not only 'real' coummists (whoever they might be), 
but also the liberals and socialists who had committed themselves to 
creating a constitutionally-based democratic govenunent. 
--Kitthiwutthols'Mas--; 'Mobilization: Kitthiwuttho was well aware 
that the success of his plan depended to a large extent on the rural 
masses, and that if they were skilfully mobilized they would be the 
greatest and fiercest anti-conmmist force. 
2 According to Kitthiwuttho, 
the rural populace were politically naive and unaware of the commmist 
-threat. 
3 Because of this they must be directed by the government. 
1. Ibid.; see also Killing *Commmists is'not'DemeritoriOUS'; and 
2. ''The'Si6cilrity*bf'the'Nation, 'Rdligim, and'the Monarchy, p. 12. 
3. Killing'Commists'is not'Demeritorious, pp. 34-37; see also 
'ýOEhism and Security, pp. 10-13. 
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This was made cle'ar in a speech in Cheingmai in 1975: 
if our country is to, progress and the people are 
to be happy, the people nust put their trust and 
confidence in the goverment and they nust obey 
the goverment. CIhis is because) ... the people arq like the blind and the govenment is like a 
cripple but clever. They have to co-operate. The 
goverment knows what is good for the people and 
how to achieve it. As the goverment is a cripple, 
the people must shoulder it and go everywhere under 
its direction. Then the people will not fall down 
the hill. But if the people go alone they are 
likely to get into trouble .. "l 
For Kitthiwuttho, such a goverment must be 'good' and strong. But 
unfortunately, the goverment of the time (Kukrit's goverment 1975- 
early 1976) was not decisive enough and the Parliament was infiltrated 
by conmmists, i. e. socialists and pro-socialist NPs- Thus 'clever 
people' with good intentions had to intervene by mobilizing the ruiýal 
masses to preserve the nation, religion and the monarchy. I 
By the beginning of 1976 Kitthiwuttho had made major efforts, 
together with NAWAPOL., to mobilize the masses. This nation-wide 
mobilization programe involved a hierarchical mass organization; from 
village level upwards through conmme, district and province to the 
national level., with most emphasis on the rural population. 
According to this plan, the leading figures of the villages were 
recruited to receive training at Chittapawan College in the tecimiques, 
of mass mobilization and organization., They had also to undergo 
ideological indoctrination sessions and to make a pledge to sacrifice 
themselves for the nation, religion, and the, monarchy. Then they were 
sent home to'spread KitthiwutthoIs version of 'national ideology'. In 
his vill. age., *each leader was assigned the task of creating d kan nam. 
.......... 
1. , Personal conrunication from Dr Chai-Anýn, Samutwanit, (15 October 1975)., 
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(core organization,, or cell). This consisted'of at least 50 leading 
members, whose main responsibilities were to propagate 'national i*deo- 
logy' and recruit other regular members. Each new member was 
instructed to do likewise. In this way, Kitthiwuttho claimed, the 
membership would quickly expand, linked together by a comon ideology 
and purpose. 
1 Although Kitthiwuttho did not say at the beginning , 
that his plan was in fact congruent with that of NAWAPOL, it was-later 
clear that these laymen were also members of NAWAPOL. According to 
NAWAPOL's constitution, its village core organization was further 
divided into functional units, namely: (i) a Home Guard unit respon- 
sible for village security, acting as a defence against bandits and 
hostile elements; (ii) a Social and Sanitation Unit responsible for 
educating people on matters of social organization and hygiene;. 
including public relations; (iii) a Political Education Unit to 
teach villagers about political issues and to collect information 
affecting the security of the country. It Was also responsible for 
for mobilizing the members for certain activities as directed by the 
higher organization; and (iv) an Economic and Financial Unit assigned 
to study the economic and occupational situation in villages. The 
constitution also dealt'with co-operative activities and the manage- 
2 
ment of village finance. The organization at the village level 
was supervised by the higher levels of organization described in the 
3 NAWAPOL. Constitution., 
1. Buddhism*and'Security,, pp. 12-15. 
2. For mre detail, sed'The*Constitutioii of'NAWAPOL,, and*Hand Book'for 
Membdt8- *of 'NAWAPOL., 975. 
3. 
I 
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For his part Kitthiwuttho undertook lecture tours of villages. 
The general purpose of his lectures was to deepen the villagers! 
ideological commitment, to keep them infomed of social and political 
situations, to boost their morale, and to advise them about techniques 
of organization and mobilization. His major aim was to disillusion 
the people with conumist propaganda and inform the ignorant of the 
conmmist danger. He advised the people not to believe, listen to.. 
or associate with left wing activists, especially the students who 
went into the countryside. The villagers were also advised to report 
the presence of these students to government officials. 
In addition to building and expanding the dedicated lay opposition 
to conmmists, Kitthiwuttho also had a plan to imp-rove the people's 
social and economic position. According to him, Chittapawan College, 
was to undertake this responsibility. He planned to set up a kind of 
-occupational training centre 
in every province. The centre would 
enroll poor children who had no means to undertake further education 
beyond the years of compulsory education. The, training would, include 
such courses'as agriculture, carpentry, simple niechanical and electrical 
engineering, building, etc. The teachers would be recruited on a 
voluntary basis from local people who were specialists in these'subjects. 
This plan, he, asserted, had merit in that the childrenyould grow up 
as responsible citizens, trained for occupations, and be an asset to 
society. 
2 
Kitthiuuttho's organizational ability first showed its effects in 
early January 1976 when he and NAWAPOL mobilized a demonstration of some 
1. 
2. 
. 'Killing'Comumists'is not'Demeritorious, pp. - 36: -39. 
'Buddhism'and*SecLirity, pp. 14-15.1 have no information as to whether tEll-s-plan has been put into practice. 
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15,000 village and commune h6admen. Prior to this event the village 
and comwne headmen from all parts of the country travelled to Chitta- 
pawan and held a meeting ostensibly to discuss a positive policy for 
I 
national security on 3 January. 
1 Certain patriotic resolutions were 
adopted and the participants moved to Bangkok to present their demands 
to the goverment. Kitthiwuttho himself was conspicuously present at 
the demonstration. The demonstrators called for, amongst other 
things, the decisive suppression of com wn ists and the expulsion of 
certain Socialist and Democrat MPs from the Cabinet and the Parliament. 
If the goverment was unable to meet their demands, they asked that 
Parliament be dissolved and the goverment be turned over to a National 
Reform Council led by the military. 
2 About ten days later, the 
goverment did decide to dissolve the Parliament and call for another 
general election in the next three months. 
It is unlikely that the village and commune headmen's demonstration 
was critical in this decision. In fact, the govenment. had had to face 
a number of other fundamental problems. These were, for example, the 
unsettled disputes within the United Parties Coalition government, as 
well as within the opposition parties; a rapid rise in rice prices; 
an increasing number of labour strikes; and'the pressure of the military 
(which was strongly opposed to a leftist leaning coalition government) 
who feared that Thailand was being led'towards the same fate as Laos. 
3 
1. , Daily*Tinles,, 4 January 1976; see also Department of Central 
Intelligence; 'op. 'cit., Appendix N, p. 2. It should be pointed out 
that this 14pen-eT-to-coincide with the passage of a Bill through 
Parliament which would have forced all village and conrame headmen 
to stand down. The posts were thereafter to be elective. 
2. 'Daily Times, 4 January 1976; see also'Prachathipathai and Pracha- 
'chart,, 4-5 January 1976. 
3. For a more detailed consideration of coalition goverment, see 
Sornpom Sangchai. -C6alition'Behaviour in Modern'Thai'Politics 
(Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Occasional Paper No. 
4, May 1976) pp. 5-12. 
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, 
Nevertheless, Kitthiwuttho inplicitly claimed the credit for 
himself. In speaking to the public on a television programe, 
' 
while 
denying that he had led the demonstration, he admitted that the 
villagd and comme headmen had sought his advice as to what measures 
they should adopt to pressurize the govenunent. He said that the 
demonstrators had also asked him what to do with corrupt and irres- 
ponsible MPs. He pointed out that the village andý comme headmen 
were not stupid; they kiiew only too well that the'nation, religion,, 
k 
and the monarchy could not survive under the present kind of govern- 
ment. 
2 He had advised them to 'take appropriate action', but he did 
not elaborate on this. Moreover, ]Kitthiwuttho saw his role in the 
demonstration as a 'binding agentl*(tau'chuam) for the headmen and as 
a 'middle man' between them and the goverment. He went along with 
the demonstrators'in order to see that the affair remained-orderly. 
3 
Yet he maintained that the headmen had done 'a very good job'. 
Kitthiwutthols participation in the demonstration appears, to be 
in no way different to Jud's case two years previously - it was 
undoubtedly political. Thus, the liberal newspapers raised the 
question whether Kitthiwuttho would be punished for his actions, as Jud 
had been. The Mahatherasamakom announced that it was consideringthe 
issue, but no further action seems to have been taken. It isýdifficult 
not to assume that their disinclination to pursue the matter was the 
result of Kitthiwutthols connection with the political establishment 
. and. the 
influential sections of society. It also meant that the Sangha 
The speech was entitled 'The Security of the Nation, the Religion, 
and'the Monarchy' and was delivered on 17 January 1976, three days 
after the dissolution of Parliament. 
2. He was taken to refer here to a comparison between the Thai govern- 
ment and'the Lao govenment, which was seen as a coalition between 
neutralists and conmmists, and which was being widely made at this 
.. 
time by conservatives. 
The Sccu-ritY'df'the Nation,, -Religion. 'and-the-Monarc. 4y; see also his 
interview with Prachachart, 28 June 1976. 
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authority tacitly recognized his role. 
In fact, Kitthiuuttho was able'to turn the criticism levelled at 
him to his advantage, for it allowed him to make public an extended 
statement of his ideas about the role of monks. In it he was able' 
to justify his own political acts, and argue from the Buddha's 
teachings that the monks, - and indeed any Buddhists, - involvement 
in the nationalist activities he suggested was doctrinally and morally 
sound. 
3. 'KitthiwLitth(ils 'Call'to Monks'to 'PrdsOrve'. thd'Nati6ii, ' Religiori. ' 
the Ibndrchy 
As a Thai, Kitthiwuttho said, a monk was a citizen of the country 
and thus had a duty and responsibility, just as his lay counterpart, to 
protect the nation, religion, and the monarchy. He was also the 
2 'owner of the country'. In a normal situation, a monk performed his 
duty as a spiritual refuge for the people and sometimes helped them in 
secular activities for their material progress. This is ordinarily 
enough, -but in the face of commist 
danger, monks had to do more. They 
had to join with the laity to protect the country, because if the nation 
was destroyed, religion could not exist. Moreover, because commism 
was the enemy of'Buddhism, the monks as disciples Of'the Buddha were, 
obliged to protect the religion. 
Kitthiwuttho also euployed humanitarian and moral argLments. He 
argued that because cormu-mists were 'Evil' (mara), they caused suffering 
1. Buddhis6m'and*Security, pp. 6-7; ' The Security'of the Nation, Religion, "and'the monarchy, pp. 8-11. 
2. Thdo khong prathet', an emotive expression implying comon origins, 
loyalties, rights and duties, etc. -held by every Thai. 
I 
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to the 'People. One of the direct duties of monks was to alleviate 
the suffering of. the people. Socially speaking, since the monks are 
dependent on the laity, they are under a moral obligation to help the 
people too. The monks' 'political' action was therefore in accord- 
ance with the Buddha's teachings. Only those who did not thoroughly 
understand Buddhism would blame the monks for their action. 
To legitimate his own anti-communist action and justify the 
monks'-role in the defence of the nation, Kitthiwuttho also invoked 
the spirit of Thai heroism. He told of the heroic deeds of Archarn Mamma- 
chot, -a monk who led the villagers of Bang Rachan in battle against the I 
Burmese on the eve of, the fall of Ayudhya. He implied that what he 
was doing was the same as Archarn Dhammachot and he encouraged monks to 
I 
follow his example. 
2 Interestingly,, he also admired the rebellious 
-3 act of Phra Fang which was considered by most Thais as an unacceptable 
act for monks and as illustrating the darker side of the history, of the 
Thai Sangha. 
When Kitthiwuttho called on monks to launch an anti-communist 
campaign,. his well established Spiritual Development programme was 
probably the best instrument for transmitting his ideas to the rural, 
monks. Frm early 1976, hundreds of rural monks had been instructed 
at Chittapawan College in Kitthiwuttho's extended version of Buddhist 
social action., They were now to propagate Kitthiwutthols 'national 
ideology' and were urged to wage war on communists and leftists. 
1. pp. 7-9. 
2. A speech at the Seminar of Monks - People for the Preservation, of 
the Nationg-Religion, and the Monarchy. This story and its moral 
had been reiterated in many of his speeches. See also 111he 
Position of Monks in the-Defence of the Countryll, 'Chofa, Vol. 11, 
No. - 3, March 1976, pp. 14-15. 
3. ''Killing'Commmists is not Demeritoriou's, pp. 28-29; see also 
I chapter III. I 
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In speaking to an audience of monks participating in the Twelfth 
Spiritual Development Programme in late January 1976, Kitthiwuttho 
reiterated his argurnents about the commist threat to religion and 
the consequences of a communist victory. He reminded them of their 
moral obligation to society and their responsibility as Thai citizens. 
He reassured them that the monks' action for the preservation and ', 
defence of the three institutions was doctrinally and morally legiti- 
mate. He then said: 
We must decide now what we shall do in the face of 
commist danger ..... our nation, religion and 
monarcýy are in danger of-being destroyed ..... One thing is definite - the monks must not just sit in 
the monastery seekin personal salvation and waiting 
for the laity to seet them out ..... How can one sýýK 
aftet*Nibbana when a gun is pointed at one's throat? 
:,,,, Can -we sit and do nothing while the country 
is being destroyed and while the conmmists are 
constantly attacking Buddhism? Are we going to allow 
our country to be ruled by the communists by not 
helping? Are we going to let our people be enslaved 
as in Laos and Cambodia? l 
Thus, he argued, monks must prove that they are not social parasites., 
but are morally and socially benefactors of the people. They mast 
not only act as the spiritual refuge of the people, but also go out 
mnong them and teach them who are the enemies of the nation, religion 
and the monarchy. They should. attack the enemies with their special 
weapons - their moral wisdom. '(panna ) and the Dhamma of the Buddha 
In this and other speeches Kitthiwuttho laid down some tentative 
strategies for monks. They should emulate the tactics of the enemies, 
but use the Dhamma as a guide. They rust make more frequent visits 
.. to. the-villagers, ask them about their 
daily problems, offer possible 
The speech was later published in'Chofa, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1976) 
'Chootyuen naikan pathibat satsanaiiiýoýg sonjI (The Position 
of Monks in the Defence of the Country) pp. 5-16., 
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assistance, care about their difficulties, broaden their knowledge 
about the political and social situation and instil in them feelings 
of gratitude and loyalty to the national institutions. The monks 
should use a door-to-door approach, i. e. go to the people without 
waiting for the people to come to them. 
1 He claimed that these 
were the tactics employed by the Buddha when he fought against Mara, 
the Evil one. Monks taking this path must not care about criticism 
for they follow in the footsteps of the Buddha. 
Kitthiwuttho also suggested that monks should select and apply 
certain Dhaum in their teachings. For example, he said that national 
security was closely related to the economic well-being of the people. 
If the economy was healthy, happiness'QqLýa suk) and prosperity*(bLam 
'chareon) would follow for the people, and Buddhism would prosper. 
Therefore the monks should instruct the people in the Buddha's Dhaimia 
of'Ditthadhammikattha (Sources of Happiness in the Present Life). That 
is., they should teach them to be industrious, to be watchful of their 
properties, to associate only with good people and to live economically. 
2 
In order to encourage the people to do good in this life for greater 
benefit in the next life, the monks should stress in their teachings 
the consequences bf good and bad kama and about heaven and hell. 
3 He 
also emphasized that monks should make full use of the people's respect 
for and confidence in the monkhood to persuade them to their views. 
4 
.. iKitthiwuttho 
further suggested that monks should follow his own 
1. ''Ibid., pp. 7,11., 15; ''Killing'Commmists is not Demeritorious, 
pp. 36-37- 
2. --The, p(jsitioii*of Monks*in'the Defence ofthe Comtry, pp. 7-8. 
3. -Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 'Kill ing'Commmis tg * ig *Tiot Demeritorious , pp. 37-38. 
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example, ignore uninformed criticism, and be sure of the truths of 
their faith. He then laid out Buddhist refutations of leftist 
arguments. For example, he rejected the leftist idea that economic 
and social inequality was a result of exploitation as a false concep- 
tion. IL- justified inequality in terms of the Buddhist concept of 
kama, attributing differences of status, social and economic position, 
level of intelligence, physical strength and appearance to differences 
in individuals' past kamma. Thus, the leftists' promise of equality 
for everyone could not be fulfilled. Furthermore,. the socialist idea 
of 'commion property' was unrealistic and in itself caused social 
injustice because people were not equal in their contributions to 
society. The more intelligent and industrious people would obviously 
produce more than the less clever and the lazy. Thus, it was unsound 
to believe that everyone should enjoy equal privileges. Moreover, 
he claimed., the Buddha never taught that property should be communal. 
1 
He pointed out that the communist idea of 'equality' was destroying 
social equilibrium, because it undermined family relationships, religion 
and the monarchy. Thai society had been justly regulated because Thai 
people of all classes had followed the principles of social relations 
laid down by the Buddha. These included prescriptions for the 
relationship between husband and wife; parents and children; teachers 
and pupils; employers and employees; lay adherents and monks; friends 
and companions; and the rulers and the ruled. 
2 This Buddhist order 
1. For elaboration see 'Buddhism and Co=misml, ' Chofa, Vol. 10, 
2. 
Nb. 12, pp. 9-15. 
For an elaboration of Kitthiuuttho's ideas on the nature of society 
see * Ibid. ; ''Dhamm'for'Adtilts . pp. 6-144; ' Thamma'and Modeni Man , pp. 9--2-6; and'Ihe Buddhals'Revoltition. For a good fLmdamentalist 
analysis of the Buddhist tradition of social relationships, see 
Siddhi Butr-indr -The *Sotidl'Philosophy'6f 'BLiddhism (Bangkok: 
Mahanidkut Buddhist university, 1973) pp. 87-IZZ. --- 
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existed in Thailand, and the capitalists, the military, and the bureau- 
crats as part of it were benefactors of the nation. If there were 
no capitalists, who would invest and provide employment for the 
workers; if there were no soldiers, who would protect the'country; 
and if there was no, bureaucracy, who-would organize the state? 
Kitthi: wuttho also rejected the leftist notion of 'people 
sovereign in the land' * (Ptachdchon *penyai nai lihaendin - For, him 
such a slogan was a distortion and would destroy the institution of 
the monarchy. It was impossible, he pointed out. for everyone to be 
sovereign in Thailand. In every society be'it human or animal,, there 
must be a leader whom the people revere,, respect and obey. The Thai 
nation had survived because it had always had leaders, and it was the 
king who was really the only I sovereign in the land' He owned the 
land and generously gave land to the people. Kitthiwuttho invoked a 
2 
Buddhist sutta, the Digha Nikaya Atthakatha to justify his statement., 
He pointed out that even in com wn ist society there are the rulers and 
the ruled, but there the ruled did not have any rights to land. 
3 
1. See, for-example, his interview with*Ptachathiliathai, 9 July 1975. 
2'. A statement at the Seminar of Monks - People for the Preservation_ 
of the Nation., Religion, and the Monarchy; see also Dhamna for 
''Adults, p. 18. 
3. 'Buddhism and Commism'''Chofa, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1977) p. 8. 
I 
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Kitthiwutthols Ibly'War on'the Com=ists 
Kitthiwuttho reiterated his forceful but peaceable anti-conmunist 
argLunents until mid-1976. In June he dramatically escalated his attacks 
by advocating that 'Killing Commmists is not Demeritorious'. Thus 
began Kitthiwutthols 'holy war'. 
In an interview with the liberal magazine he pointed 
out that although the comunist danger was still less severe in 
Thailand than in neighbouring countries, over 10,000 Thai soldiers had 
already been killed in anti-comamist insurgency actions. When asked 
whether killing the leftists or cammmists would produce demerit'(p2Ma 
Or *hLb), he replied: 
"I think we mast do this (i. e. killing), even 
though we are Buddhists. But such killing is 
9. Because not the killing of persons*Q±on 
whoever destroys the nation, religion and the 
monarchy is not a complete person, but mara 
(evil). Our intention must be not to kill 
people but to kill the Devil. It is the duty 
of all Thai". 2 
He elaborated that while killing went against the Buddha's 
teaching in this case, the demerit was very small and the merit very 
great for an act which served to preserve national security. Thus 
the soldiers who killed commists for such a purpose gained more merit 
than demerit. 'It is like when we kill a fish to make curry to place 
in an alm, bowl for a monk. There is certainly demerit in killing the 
fish., but when we place it in the alms bowl of a monk we gain inuch 
-greater merit'. 
3 Then, on being questioned, he went further by 
''Chaturat, Vol. 2, No. 51,29 June 1976. Prior to the release of 
is issue, *'Pradiachart of 24 June had published part of the 
interview., 
2. -Ibid., p. - 31. 
3. ''Ibid., P. 32. 
, 
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replying positively to the inquiry if the great merit obtained by 
(illegal) killing of leftists prevented the killers being brought to 
justice. 
The interview caused quite a furore, and was widely discussed 
in the press and anong the concerned Buddhists. In most cases they 
condemed Kitthiwuttho for his statement, which was taken to mean 
quite unequivocally that he was in favour of killing. Fervent attacks 
came from the liberal newspapers such as'Prachachart and Prachathi- 
pathai; also the FBT, the NSCT, the Socialist MPs (especially Klaeo 
Norapathi, the leader of the United Socialist Front of Thailand), and 
'Flum SanthiWithi (The Non-Violence Movewnt), among others. 'In general 
the attacks concentrated on the violation of the monks' disc#line; ' 
for the act of killing was a negation of Buddhism, and the espousal of 
killing would lead to a civil war. The'Prachachart,, for instance, - 
2 
accused him of founding "a new religion", one predicated on killing. 
Many cartoonists illustrated Kitthiwutthowearing a grenade rosary in 
place of the customary Buddhist beads and preaching how to kill the 
comunists'. 
3A leading member of the'lCit Sangkom (Social Action) 
Party who was also a professor in Thammasat University, said that 
Kitthiwutthols interview only exacerbated violence, and above all, 
afforded the commists a justification for their attacks on religion. 
fie-also pointed out that these emotionally charged, anti-commist 
ýtactics of Yitthiwuttho and his 'stupid statement' were not conducive 
to the preservation of the nation, religion. - and the monarchy. Rather 
it would 'cause wild turbulence and bloodshed' and 'accelerate the down- 
Jbid. 
2. ''Prachachdrt,, 24,30 June 1976. 
-3. 
ý 
For example., 'Prachathipathai, 10 July 1976; Daily'Times, 28 June, 
1976. 
i 
. 
fall of national security I. 
1 
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Kitthiwuttho also came under an uncoupromising attack from the 
FBT. They called him 'a villam' in a yellow robe' and accused him 
of 'contaminating the religion and the yellow robe with, blood'. They 
also accused him of risking the survival of the religion and the 
monarchy solely to satisfy his own greed and lust. 
2 Certain 
individual members of the FBT anonymously extended these accusations. 
For example, Samachiksong (a pseudonym meaning 'a member of the Sanghal) 
said that Kitthiwuttho was extraordinarily ambitious and shamelessly 
sought reputation, wealth and power regardless of the best interests 
of the religion and society. He depicted Kitthiwuttho as Dewathat, 
an ininoral'monk (in a well-known Buddhist legend) who caused schism in 
the Sangha in Buddha's time and who caused misery to the Buddha'. 
Dewathat was subsequently punished for his deeds by being swallowed 
alive by the Earth Goddess (Phra Mae Thorani). Samachiksong also 
described Kitthiwuttho was a schizophrenic, and his action was inter 
preted as serving the interests of the exploitative classes. 
31 
According to Kitthiwuttho himself, similar condemnations of his 
interview were also expressed in many provinces. For instance, in 
Fhonkaen hundreds of people organized a hostile demonstration. Else- 
where, posters condemning him were widespread and there were also 
I 
1. 'Siam'Rdth., 26 Jme 1976. 
2. Phra. Maha Chalemchai Wisutjaro, 'Kitthiwuttho: Botbat thi, kuan 
Plianplaeng' (Kitthiwuttho Should Change His Role), - Siang'Yuwasong, 
Vol., l, No. 11 (1-15 JIme 1976) pp. 3, 'S; see also , the editorial 
of the same issue; and Kalawathi, Tae Kitthiwutthol (A Dedýcation 
to Kitthiwuttho)-Siang*Yuwas6ng, Vol. 1. No. 12 (16-30 June 1976) v 
p. 5. 
Samachiksong, Thak NAWAPOL Kitthiwuttho sue Mahatherasamakoml 
(Fr6m Kitthiwuttho to Mahatherasamakom)$'Siang'Yuwasong, Vol. 1, 
No. 12,16-30 June 1976., pp. 2,10. 
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leaflets distributed asking people not to make merit with Kitthiwuttho. 
IL- accused the left wing movements and the United Socialist Front Party 
of conspiring to produce these incidents. 
' 
Despite the vehement attack from these sections of society and 
the radical monks, the Supreme Patriarch appears to have tacitly recog- 
nized Kitthiwutthols action. In an interview with Prachathipathai, 
when asked of his opinion about Kitthiwutthols statement, he said: 
I cannot give an opinion on this matter, because 
I have only heard that Kitthiwuttho has said 
this,, but there is no evidence to prove it. 
Moreover, I myself have 
* 
never been to Chittapawan 
College,, nor been informed of its activities. 
However, from the religious point of view, any 
action taken in the interests of both the person 
and public is legitimate. But, if it is taken 
for only personal interest, it is definitely 
wrong ..... With regard to the behaviour of monks, 
some monks may do some things wrong. But the 
press should sometimes forgive them and not 
always blame them. 2 
He also said that the press, or any person or organization should not 
3 
'try to hamer the wedge into the wood' . 
The FBT requested that the Mahatherasamakom investigate whether 
or not Kitthiwuttho had been in violation of the Vinaya. The same 
demand was made by the NSCT, by Klaeo Norapithi, the Non-Violence 
ýJbvement, and some individuals. On 30 June the Mahatherasamakom 
was said to be considering the matter. 
4 
During the following weeks, despite heated attacks in the press 
on. his position, Kitthiwutho reaffirmed strongly his espousal of killing 
1. 'Killing Conmmists is not Demeritorious, pp. 20-24. 
2. Prachathipathait 14 July 1976. 
3. 'Ibid. 
4. Prachdchart, 30 June 1976. 
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COMMLMists. He seemed to be very sure that the Mahatherasamakom's 
decision, should there be one, would not affect his position. He 
lashed back at his critics in several uncompromising speeches to the 
monks, the public and goverment officials - even in interviews with 
the newspapers he most strongly distrusted. 
' In these speeches, 
while maintaining that killing commists was not demeritorious, he 
attempted to assemble a number of religious arguments to justify his 
position, and to manipulate the people's emotional ties to the nation, 
religion, and the monarchy, skilfully adjusting the tone of his 
speeches to suit his audience. 
The most extended use of Buddhism as a source of support for his 
position first appeared in his speech entitled 'Ka Kommunit, mai Bab' 
(Killing Communists is not Demeritorious) to which I have already 
referred extensively. This was delivered at Chittapawan College on 
2 July 1976 to about 3,200 monks belonging to twelve Spiritual Develop- 
ment Units, and the provincial Sangha governors or their representatives 
from all parts of the country. He told the audience that however much 
he had been attacked, he still maintained his views. As he said: 
I still hold the opinion that killing commmists 
is not demeritorious. This is'because for an act 
to be considered as killing and as thus resulting 
in demerit it must fulfil the following conditions. 
First there must be an intention'(S2tana). Second,, 
the animal mast have life'(pana Third,, one must 
know that the animal has life (panasannita). 
Fourth,, one must intend to kill (vadhakacittan). 
Fifth, one nust act in order to kill 
Finally, the animal mast die by that act 
(tenamaranan). 2 
Kitthiwuttho then continued to explain the methods used in killing 
according to Buddhist doctrine, and defended himself by maintaining 
i. e. Prachaýhart, **Prachathipathai, and'Chaturat. - 
2., Killing Cý. ists'is'not Demeritorious, p. 43. 
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that what he had said in the interview did not meet any of the above 
co . nditions. Thus, he argued, he-did not violate the teachings of 
the Buddha, because he did not comnit an act of killing or order 
anyone to kill. Rather,, it was an expression of his opinion. 1 In 
another place in his speech, Kitthlwuttho reaffimed his position, 
as follows: 
... it is true that I said killing commmists is not demeritorious, and I stick to it 
Now, let us understand what I mean by the 
leftists and communists. Both are the same.. 
** What I mean by 'commmist' is an ideology. it is the ideology-which uses killing as a 
means to attain govemmental, power, as Mao-Tse 
Tung said 'power must be attained through the 
barrel of a gun'. Wherever this ideology 
(communism) pervades, there'is massive killing. 
That is why over 62 million Chinese, over 7 
million Vietnamese ... were killed ... It is the communist ideology that causes killing ..... Comammism is a complex compound of false 
consciousness, delusion, greed, jealousy, 
malevolence and anger. It is not a person or 
living animal. Thus killing communism is 
LtftiD, hence it is not killing ideology'(ýq 
demeritorious ..... lz---- 
I In the next passage Kitthiwuttho invoke&the Buddha's teaching 
to support his assertion. He said that the Buddha taught Buddhists 
3 
to kill. He referred to a sutta, which tells the story of an exchange 
between the Buddha and Kesi, a famous horse trainer. In this, the 
Buddha said he would kill an untrainable person. What the Buddha meant, ' 
Kitthi, kattho explained, was that one killed by ceasing to teach the 
person who could not be taught. 
4 Kitthiwuttho then interpre ted the 
.. sutta: 
1. -Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
2. , Ibid., pp. 47-48- 
3. 'Kesi'-*sutta in the'Kesiya'-ý*vagga, 'the'Suttanpitaka, Anguttara 
Nikaya, *Catukaka'-*nipata. 
1 4. ''Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
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The Buddha kills and discards, but the word 'kill' 
according to the principle-of the Buddha is 
killing according to the Dhamma and Vinaya of 
Buddhism. To kill and discard by not. teaching is 
the method of killing. It does not mean that the 
Buddha ordered the killing of persons. But he , ordered the killing of the impurities * (LiLqýsja of 
people. 1 
Having invoked, the Buddha's authority,, Kitthiwuttho then justified 
his position by saying that what he meant by 'killing comminists' 
2 was killing ideology, the impurities in the hearts of the people. 
Why did he not make this point clear when he gave his interview? 
Ib said that he deliberately made the statement unclear in order first 
to 'fool those who claimed to be Buddhist scholars'.. and second, to 
'uncover the faces of the enemies of religion'. He said that his 
plan was successful because those enemies had come out to attack him 
'like an orchestra in concert'. 
3 
Although Kitthiwuttho did not make the connection between killing 
coummists (as persons) with killing commmism (as an ideology) explicit 
I 
at this point, he clearly suggested that soldiers were justified in 
killing if they did not intend to kill people but acted to protect the 
country. 4 If they were to protect religion, the'nation, and the 
monarchy, it was necessary to kill communists. The communists were 
not people, however; they were the Devil, impurities and ideology 
-personified, abstractions. 
It was therefore legitimate to kill an 
1. 'Ibid., 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
3. 'Ibid. 9 p. 53; see also pp. 18-19. 
4. ''Ibid., pp.. 17-18. 
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ideology because the Buddha taught us to do so. Yet, if the 
defenders of the nation, the religion, and the monarchy used the 
methods of the world (i. e. weapons) to kill com=ists, that was 
atceptable because their intention was morally correct. The merit 
they gained would be far more than the demerit acquired. '- The Buddha 
taught that 'me must sacrifice the lesser good for the greater kood' 9 
so too must 'our heroes sacrifice their lives in order to preserve the 
nation, religion,, and the monarchy for all of ust. 2 He was so grate- 
ful to these heroes that he always dedicated a portion of-the merit he 
3 made to them. 
He also said that while he was in the monkhood, he would do every-, 
thing the Vinaya allowed him to do. That is, he would use Dhanma and 
moral wisdom as weapons. 'But if it comes to the worst'. he continued, 
land the survival of the three institutions is at stake, and if I can 
no longer tolerate comumism. to the extent that I have to kill persons, 
I will disrobe and kill the enemies of the nation, religion, and the 
monarchy'. 
4 
one week later (8 July 1976) : Im speaking to an audience of anny, 
officers., 
5 Kitthiwuttho elaborated on the two methods-of killing. ' , 
First, killing a person according to the Dhama and Vinaya of Buddhism, 
f6 
and. secondly, killing persons by using weapons. To kill according 
1. 'Ibid,., pp.. 17-18,25,52, 
2. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
3. 'Ibid. 
4. ibid.., p. 59. 
I 
The speech was also entitled 'Killing Communists is not Demeritorious', 
published iri*, Chofa, Vol. 11, No. 9, September 1976, pp., 5-21. 
14. 
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to the Dhamma and Vinaya was the duty of the monks and to kill by'using 
weapons was the responsibility of the soldiers., If the soldiers were 
to kill conomists (as persons), it was necessary and morally correct. 
It was legitimate 'to kill some S., 000 people to secure and ensure the 
happiness of 42 million Thais'. Such an act of killing was an act, 
of sacrificing the lesser good for the greater good. 
2 He continued 
I 
to encourage killing by saying 1whoever_thinks of doing this will not 
3 
go to hell, but will acquire merit' . 
He also insisted that there was no conq)romise possible with the 
conmunists. 'Because if we coinpromisel, he said, 'it is tan, tamount to 
accepting defeat'. 
4' He declared: 
We must say the same words, that is, Thailand does 
not want conumists and we will not allow the 
coinnunists to rule our country.... If we want to 
preserve our nation, religion and monarchy, we 
sometimes have to sacrifice certairi'sila (rules of 
morality) for the survival of these institutions. 
If we are cautious in keeping to the rules of. 
morality., then these three institutions will not 
survive. I ask you to ponder this; how would you 
choose between the violation of the prohibition of 
killing and the survival of the nation, religion, 
and the monarchy? 5 
6 In another public lecture on the occasion of Asalha Puja, 
.. Kitthiwuttho dramatized the conummist threat to the monks. He told 
1. Ibid., p. 16. 
2. 'Ibid. 
3. 
4. Ibid. 
-, 
pp. '19-20. 
20. 
6. An important religiOUS holiday in Thailand, commemorating the 
foundation of-the Buddhist order, -held on the 
day of the full 
moon of the eighth month. 
_ 
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I 
them that con=ists not only subverted Buddhism,, but had also killed 
many monks in the North-East, North, and the South. The monks in 
, these regions were also threatened so that the monks would do nothing 
against the com=ists. He himself had also been threatened, but 
-he was not afraid. Instead, -he challenged the co=unists to face him 
openly. In this speech he once again called upon the Buddhists to 
kill all commists. As he said, 
Today is Asalha Puja day and we come to make merit 
together., It is-also a commemoration of the 
Buddha's Revolution ..... Let us take today as an 
auspicious moment to declare war on cormimists'. 
Let us be determined to kill all communists and 
clean the slate in Thailand ..... The Thai must kill 
communists. , Anyone who wants to gain merit must 
kill communists. The one who kills them will 
acquire great merit, and the merit acquired from 
such killing will help preserve the religion for as 
long as 5,, 000 or even 10., 000 years ..... If the Thai do not kill them, the communists will kill us. 2 
Kitthiwutthols call seemed to have a considerable impact, for 
many-people definitely felt that the nation was under attack by 
radical elements in Thailand and the new comamist govemments in 
neighbouring Laos.,, Vietnam and Cambodia. As the fate of the nation, 
religion, and the monarchy was at stake,, those who opposed Kitthiwuttho 
seemed to be constrained by the symbolism of the appeal he made. It 
seemed that his opponents could not provide better alternatives to 
supersede Kitthiwuttho's 'national ideology'. Nor could they, with 
any hope of'success, define or offer an ideology of Thai natipnaliST4 
other than one based on the three symbolic pillars of Thai nationhood. 
Iffiat they could do in opposing Kitthiwuttho was to, appeal to inter- 
pretations of Buddhist symbols which would persuadý the people that 
1. 'The Buddha's Revolutionl, 'Chofa, Vol. 12, 'No. 1 (1977) p. 9. 
2. ''Ibid... 
'p. 
18. 
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Kitthiwuttho was going against Buddhist morality. If this effort 
succeeded., then Kitthiwutthols message and his 'national ideology, 
would be seriously undenrdned. As we have seen, the liberals, 
socialists and leftists had looked for support to the public and the 
Sangha authorities. But their attempt was in vain. They could not 
secure the support of the goverment as the Prime Minister, Seni 
Pramojo made it clear to the public that the goverment could not 
intervene in the matter as it was an affair of the Sangha. 
1 It was 
the Sangha authority, -the Mahatherasamakom, who had the ultimate 
power to determine whether or not Kitthiwuttho had committed a serious 
Vinaya offence. Despite the general feeling that Kitthiwuttho clearly 
had breached a norm which most people thought guided the behaviour of 
monks, the Mahatherasmnakom announced on 11 August 1976 that, having 
considered the allegations against Kitthiwuttho., it would not conduct 
any further investigations into the matter because the evidence was 
insufficient. They stated that there was not enough information to 
determine whether Kitthiwuttho had been involved in the NAWAPOL move- 
ment, and that they did not know the nature of the purposes and 
activities of NAWAPOL. Furthermore, the assertion that Kitthiwutthots 
interview caused dissension was ambiguous, and indeed the allegations 
did not clearly specify the time, date, place, and context of the 
interview, and could not therefore be considered. Finally., it was 
not at all certain that the reports in the newspapers were true, because 
they represented different opinions. 
2 
- This decision would appear to suggest that, by not issuing even 
1. ''Prachachart, 29 June 1976. 
2. ''Prachachart, 11 August 1976; see also Siang'Yuwasong, Vol. 1, 
No. 15,1-B August 1976. 
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a mild public reprimand to Kitthiwuttho, the high Sangha authorities 
tacitly approved his action. Alternatively it might be aigUed'that 
they acted in lin6 with government policy. 
Kitthiwuttho on his part continued his Buddhist holy war. , His 
aims seemed to have been partly realized when on 6 October 1976'a 
military coup was staged and a military National Reform Council 
abrogated the constitution, abolished Parliament, and brought an end 
'to the three year old experiment with democracy in Thailand. In the 
bloody events of the three day coup, the police units, supported by 
right wing mobs described as NAWAPOL members, Village Scouts, and 
affiliated organizations such as the Krating Daeng (Red Gaur), carried 
out a sustained attack on the alleged 'student-leftists and ccmmmists, 
who were holding a large-scale demonstration at Thammasat University. 
Hundreds of students were killed, lynched or badly wounded, and 
thousands were arrested. It would require another lengthy paper to 
discuss the causes and inplications of this coup. For the purposes 
of this study it is inportant to note that the coup of 6 bctober 1976., 
was conditioned, in part, by the definition of the situation imposed 
by Kitthiuuttho and the radical, right, i. e. that the country was in 
grave danger of being destroyed by the conomists, and that the Thai 
must forestall their plans by killing them first. At the outset the 
11 
new government made a declaration of its intention to combat communists, and 
communism. Those arrested in the aftermath of the coup, or forced to 
go into exile, included those whom Kitthiwuttho, had identified as the 
'enemies'-. The radical student organizations, progressive labour 
unions'and farmers' organizations were destroyed. Those student leaders 
who had not been killed or arrested fled 'into the jungle' to join the 
communist insurrectionaries., They were also joined by a few socialist 
politicians, labour and farmers, leaders, journalists, 'and some outýpoken 
I 
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liberals. The. newspapers and magazines which Kitthiuuttho and other 
rightists found most offensive, such as'Prachachdrt, 'Prachathipathai 
and*Chaturat were closed down. The radical organizations of left 
wing monks, 'notably the MNCT and the YWr, and their leaders simply 
disappeared., It was reported later that. Jud Kongsook had disrobed 
and fled to join the commist insurrectionaries. Seemingly, at least, 
the goals sought by Kitthiwuttho were realized in the 6 October 1976 
coup and he continued to flourish. 
I 
N 
I 
363 
CHAPTERTIII ' CONCLUSIONS 
In the preceding chapters I have sought to describe and analyze 
the interaction of the Buddhist monkhood and politics in the situation 
of socio-political change in Thailand. Much of the information itself 
has demonstrated that the time dimensions and the nature of socio-, 
political change have played an inportant part in the realigment of 
relationships between the Sangha and state, the redefinition of the 
Sangha's roles, and in determining the responses of the Sangha. 
In this chapter I seek to draw out the general conclusions of the 
study and attempt to answer, however tentatively, some of the main 
questions with which this study began. I shall also make some tentative 
suggestions for further investigation in this field. 
1. ''Sme*General Conclusions 
Two important conclusions may be drawn from the study of the 
interaction of Buddhism with politics in Thailand. First, in the days 
of autocratic rule, Buddhism (as the religion of the nation) and the 
king (as the political ruler) had in a broad sense exercised joint 
sovereignty in the kingdom. Kingship was necessary for the organization 
of the state, the regulation of social order, and the administration of 
the material needs of the subjects. Buddhism provided the ruler with 
the legitimating ideology for his kingship, and the moral order for the 
state. A wise Buddhist king would atteupt to conform to the Buddhist 
ideals of a good ruler to ensure social prosperity and to maintain his 
power. As such, both religion and kingship may be considered as 
permanent concomitants of the enduring polity, exercising their combined 
authority over the people and the country. 
Second, throughout Thai history, the distinction between the church 
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(the Sangha) and the state as separate entities is not easily made. 
This is primarily due to the nature of the political nexus between 
them. The Sangha sought to secure the adherence of the political 
rulers (i. e. the king or dictator or government) to Buddhist values, 
for this would guarantee their virtual monopoly as spiritual leaders 
and religious professionals of the state. The political leaders 
needed to secure the co-operation of the Sangha, for this would provide 
the state with moral legitimation and could considerably assist in 
matters of social control. It is very likely that the interests of 
the political rulers and the Sangha more or less coincided: that an 
ideology which needed supportive political power met political rulers 
looking for a legitimating ideology. What developed was a peculiar 
type of state based on the reciprocal relationships between the political 
rulers and the Sangha. The political rulers (as patrons) supported and 
protected the Sangha (as clients) because the Sangha kept Dhamma alive 
and gave daily evidence that Dhamma could be studied to great effect. 
By supporting and protecting the Sangha, the rulers preserved Dhamma, 
and in preserving Dhamma, they performed their duty as good Buddhist 
rulers. Simultaneously, the survival of Dhamma depended on a sound 
and uncorrupted Sangha, and the rulers through their state control of 
the Sangha acted in effect as law enforcement officers for the monastic 
code of discipline, the Vinaya. Ideally, in canonical Buddhism, the 
Sangha was supposed to be governed by the Vinaya and free from lay 
control; the 'Sangha or religion's domain''(Satsanachak) and the 
'State or king's domain`(raýha*anarchak) were separate. But this has 
never been the cdse in Thailand, as we have shown, as the state has never 
allowed the monks to govern themselves. This kind of adaptation of 
Dhamma for political ends by the state has continued to the present day 
in Thailand. 
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However, the Sangha in such a situation has never been entirely 
without economic and political interest. Economically, it is depen- 
dent on the people, and politically (in respect of its own intemal 
discipline and organization, and its place in the life of the state) 
it is dependent on the political rulers. While there are historical 
exanples which indicate that the Sangha could for a time survive the 
loss of one or other of these supports, the historical evidence also 
suggests that it could not survive the loss of both together. 
It is the continuity of this relationship between the Sangha, the 
state and the people that has played an important part in shaping the 
roles of the Sangha in modern Thailand. On the one hand, the Sangha, 
especially at the higher levels, has closely identified and co-operated 
with the state in the construction and implementation of certain govern- 
ment policies. In this situation, the government has deliberately 
manipulated the Sangha as an integrative force and as an advance agent 
to effect its goals, and the Sangha has utilized the prestige it derives 
from its moral authority to make the govenment's actions and policies 
intelligible to the people. On the other hand, the Sangha, in the eyes 
of some of the monks and laity, should not be identified with political 
authority, even though it may be closely associated with it. They see 
the prestige and influence of the monks resting on their religious 
roles*pOr'se,, and not on their relations with the political authority. 
This view in its application would give the Sangha a degree of indepen- 
dence of political power. For then, under certain circumstances, the 
Sangha could react to socio-political changes independent of government 
direction., Whatever the case, their actions in a broad sense may be 
either altruistic, such as speaking for the underprivileged, or Buddhism 
or the country, or selfishly motivated as a response to threats to 
personal status, prestige and position. 
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What has developed from the rapid socio-political changes in 
modem Thailand has been ideological conflict and tension within the 
Sangha. These have resulted in the assumption of new roles or the 
redefinition of former roles by the Sangha in response to socio- 
political changes. The new roles assumed appear to have been non- 
traditional in the sense of assuming forms not popularly held by Thai 
Buddhists as appropriate for monks. Already I have demonstrated the 
variety of Sangha involvement in goverment policies and the overt 
interest in politics of the Sangha. Following the wide range of 
phenomena already set out, some answers to important questions can now 
be attempted. 
2. ''The*Sangha and the'Government Policies of National Development and 
. National'Int6gtdtion 
In my previous study I held the view that the government manipulation 
of the Sangha for politically defined ends and the Sangha's involvement 
in the goverment policies was very likely to put the Sangha into a 
dilemma. On the one hand the Sangha as part of the goverment structure 
had to accommodate and execute those goverment policies assigned to it. 
In this the Sangha utilized its prestige (its moral authority) which is 
traditionally held in esteem by the people for goal realization. On the 
other hand, if the monks, as'the main actors in accomplishing the assigned 
policies, seriously pursued the goals of the government programmes, they 
would have needed to manipulate commity responses through a combination 
of promised rewards (material and spiritual), persuasion, exhortation, 
and in some cases propaganda about direct or indirect threats (e. g. a 
communist threat to national interests and the position of Buddhism). 
These assigned tasks, then, might be carried out only at the cost of 
lessening the esteem in which monks traditionally have been held by 
laymen. Based on information available about the nature of socio- 
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political changes, and the involvement of monks in goverment policies 
between 1965 and 1972, my main conclusions then were that the Sangha 
proved not to be the best possible apparatus for the achievement of 
the government policies of national development and national integration, 
and that the Sanghals involvement in these progrannes was likely to put 
the prestige of the Sangha as religious leaders in jeopardy. 
' 
My findings in the present study apparently reaffirm my previous 
conclusions. The new evidence from the period 1973 to 1976 and after- 
wards suggests that the goverment policies in which the Sangha has 
become involved are unrealistic and perpetuate the underdevelopment of 
the country. It also indicates that the monks who are involved in 
these programmes are likely to find themselves confronting increasing 
opposition from the people and those monks who embrace views on develop- 
ment which have newly emerged in Thailand during the 1970s. 
The three national development plans of the Thai goverment (1961- 
1976) have followed 'conventional' westem development ideas. The Thai 
leaders during this period have given high priority to economic develop- 
ment efforts and the development of internal security programmes. The 
prime stimulus to change economically, as is true with other development 
goals, has not been a response to the felt needs of the population at 
large, but rather a response to the felt needs of the political-bureau- 
cratic-commercial complex. Norman Jacobs, for example, observed that the 
desire for economic development is not a reflection of various economic 
interests in the society, but of the economic dissatisfaction of the 
political and economic establishment, and their ideas that economic 
development'will afford Thailand political respect among developed Westem 
For details see Somboon Suksamran, Political']Buddhism in'Southeast 
'A-ýia, pp. 109-121. 
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powers. Thus, he argued, Thai leaders will follow the model that helps 
the country to achieve a Western norm of development while not running 
counter to their own political and economic interests. 
1 
The 1978 World Bank report suggests that the development efforts 
since 1961 have not yielded significant improvements in the economic 
and social well-being of the vast majority of the rural populace. It 
indicates that most farmers in the North, North-East and the South, 
which together account for over two-thirds of the agricultural sector 
of the country,, have not participated in the economic development process 
and have not benefited from a substantial improvement in their incomes 
over the past two decades. The farmers in the North-East in particular 
have benefitedthe least and are now among the poorest people in Thailand. 
2 
The peasants of the North and North-East constitute over 90 per cent of 
those 11 million who today remain in absolute poverty. 
3 
The report also shows that the national development policies of Thai 
rulers have always favoured the tiny minority of the already well-off. 
So the rich get richer, 
4 
and thus more powerful economically and 
politically. In these circumstances the idea of diffusing national 
wealth from the urban to the rural population has not yet been realized, 
and perhaps never will be. Rather, the wealth is drained from the poor 
rural people to the rich urban population. The report shows, for example, 
that. the people who have the lowest incomes have the highest relative tax 
1. Jacobs, op. eit., p. 126. 
2. World Bank (The); 'ThailaAd. 'Towatds'd Development Strategy of Full 
'Participation (Report No. 2059,, 1 September 1978),,, p. ii. 
3. Ibideq p. ill. The poverty line is defined by the World Bank as 
=. O/month/person in rural areas and B. 200/month/person in urban 
areas. 
4. Ibid.. p. 
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burden and that the export and import tax system penalizes the producers 
of export goods who are mainly the farmers. 
1 More importantly., the 
government has not been able to use the revenues collected to benefit 
the poor and to provide a level of service to them comparable to that 
enjoyed by the rich. 
2 Despite the fact that the rural populace 
produces over 70 per cent of exports by value, provides two-thirds of 
the labour force and bears the heavier tax burden; yet the basic public 
services necessary for their well-being such as education, health, 
3 
electricity and water supplies have been minimally extended to them. 
It suggests that instead of putting so much effort into improving national 
security through its Accelerated Rural Development programme, the govern- 
ment should concentrate its efforts on bringing those that have been 
neglected in the development process into the main stream of economic 
growth. This could help establish a healthier economy and a more stable 
political situation. The report also criticizes the over-ambitious 
thrust towards rapid industrialization, without a concomitant improvement 
in agriculture, as leading to an increasing balance of payments deficit 
and a heavy reliance on foreign capital. It warns that this will only 
increase the unevenness of development, and thus will result in a 
widening disparity of income between regions and between population 
groups. 
4 
The World Bank is also sceptical about the possible success of 
the latest development plan (1977-1981), because it tends to follow the 
previous modes of development. It maintains that such a plan will 
1. 'Ibid.. 9 pp. -23-24. 
2. ' Ibid*, pp. 24-27. 
3. -Ibid.,. p. 6. 
4. ''Ibid., P. V. 
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continue. the widening of the disparity of welfare between population 
groups and between different geographical areas of the country. 
' The 
main recomendation of the World Bank is that the goverment should 
turn its attention from the promotion of the already rich to the poor. 
Indeed, the Thai national development plans seem to run counter to 
the goal of becoming a developed country. Professor Puay Ungphakom, 
in his Thorpson Memorial Lecture entitled "The Role of Ethics and 
Religion in National Development" in 1973, suggested four characteristics 
of a developed nation. These were: (i) the society was efficient; 
(ii) the people were free; (iii) justice prevailed; and (iv) the 
people cared for one another. He also listed four prerequisites for 
development: (i) peace within and without, implying good administration; 
(ii) worthy goals for development; (iii) developmental procedures that 
were well planned; and (iv) power that was carefully used and properly 
checked. In regard to the goals (no. ii) he listed three: (a) increased 
income and improved health standards; (b) economic stability; and (c) 
even and just distribution of the fruits of production throughout the 
nation (not simply increasing the GNP). And in all development, 
sociology and ethics must play a role as well as economics. 
2 
Sulak Sivaraksa, a Thai Buddhist scholar, viewed development plans 
which emphasize quantity as fostering the Buddhist triad of evils. The 
development planners, mainly economists and politicians, by following 
the capitalist mode of development emphasized the end results of develop- 
ment in terms of production and consumption, and political power. Human 
beings were seen as instruments to provide labour, to produce and consume, 
1. ' Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
/ 
2. Cited in Sulak Sivaraksap-SAtsana'kU*kan Pdtthana (Religion and 
Development) (Bangkok: Prachachon Ltd., 1976)9 pp. 10-11. 
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and to save and invest. ' Economists saw development in terms of 
increased wealth. thus fostering greed'(Lohha 0. The politicians 
saw it in terms of increased power, thus fostering hatred'(josa). 
Both then pooled their resources to increase quantity in general, 
thus fostering ignorance*(ELh2a And thus the Buddhist triad of 
evils was complete. He also pointed out that this kind of develop- 
ment only increased the suffering and devaluation of hman beings, and 
in this process the underprivileged suffered most. 
1 
My main intention in drawing together these different ideas about 
the national development efforts of the Thai leaders is to point out 
that by associating or involving themselves with these policies the 
monks are very likely to alienate themselves from the masses (who -remain 
poor or get even poorer in the process of development),, and thus put 
the Sanghals position in danger of losing popular support. The 
ultimate duty of monks, as laid down by the Buddha, is to relieve human 
beings from suffering and reveal to them the path to happiness. 
2 
Indeed, the commitment to 'development' is a commitment to liberation 
from the oppression, -exploitation, poverty and ignorance which confront 
the majority of the people. 
In the rural areas religion is still a powerful force and the 
Sangha holds a strong leadership. It is then not surprising that in 
the effort'to promote national development as well as national integ- 
ration, the goverment has to mobilize all these, resources to enhance 
its success. The monks can certainly participate in goverment policies 
in so far as they do not abandon their ultimate duties which afford them 
1. Sulak Sivaraksa, 'ibid., pp. 20-51. J 
2. This is well illustrated in'Digha'Nikaya, Vol., III, pp. 188-189 
(Pali Text Society: Oxford tff1v-v-e-rs`1Ft-yPr6ss., 1911). 
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moral authority and religious values in the eyes of the public. They 
may utilize these assets with considerable caution in development 
efforts. The religion and its carriers should do two things: first, 
maintain a just and peaceful order in society, and promote individual 
freedom, and secondly, seek for improvement when society is oppressive. 
It would be morally and doctrinally wrong for the monks to abuse the 
people's trust and confidence in them by encouraging them to participate 
in goverment programes which perpetuate or even increase their 
suffering. 
The Sangha so far has been held in esteem and the monks at all 
levels enjoy the respect of the Thai population. They acquire prestige, 
respect and trust mainly from their religious roles and secondarily from 
their traditional secular roles which are perceived as proper by the 
laity. The laity sees the monkhood as the repository of refined and 
comprehensive knowledge of Buddhism (however much individual monks may 
vary in this regard) and expect the monks to transfer this ]knowledge to 
them by instruction and example. They are grateful for instruction 
and see it as being fully consonant with their perception of monks as 
world renouncers. As long as the monks limit their roles in the 
government programmes to what the people see as being consistent with 
Buddhism they should in no way jeopardize their own position. It Dust 
also be recognized that although the laymen value the monastic behaviour 
of the monks highly, they fully realize that the monks, way of life is 
removed from, and on a higher plan than, that of the layman, i. e. they 
recognize the purity of the sacred and contrast it with the impurity of 
the profane. It is therefore regarded as improper to induce the monks 
to become over-involved in mundane affairs since this would lead to de- 
merit. Even if it is accepted that monks involve themselves in govern- 
ment programmes, it does not mean that the laity will construe that 
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behaviour as religiously meritorious or exemplary. In all circLun- 
stances the layman will view the monks as a category apart, both in 
terms of behaviour and morality. Thus, the act that is considered 
productive of merit for a monk is not necessarily desirable for a lay- 
MM. We must take into account that, given the opportunity, the laity 
will work out their own economic salvation quite independently. 
The actual involvement of monks and the genuine purposes of the 
government programes, as I have shown in Chapter IV, prove to be a 
different matter. The progranmes are instigated for political reasons. 
They are designed mainly to counteract 'subversion', to pacify dissidents, 
particularly in the North and North-East, and to win the support and 
loyalty of the rural populace for the Bangkok goverment. The emphasis 
of development is often away from a gradual approach that involves the 
participation of villagers through identifying their expressed needs 
and securing their willing co-operation. Rather, the programes stress 
accelerated rural development through building roads and improving 
internal security from which the vast majority of the people derive 
minimal material benefits. The emphasis is also seldom placed on those 
activities which would enable the rural populace to achieve economic 
security and growth, in terms of improved agriculture and a higher 
standard of living. The people are seldom asked for their opinion, 
but frequently are told what kind of development assistance they are 
to receive and are then supervised and pressured to co-operate. 
Thus, the government and the villagers see national development 
efforts, especially the Commmity Development and Accelerated Develop- 
ment programmes, somewhat differently. From the goverment's point of 
view these activities are part of improving the local structure, and 
the villagers' willing co-operation is necessarily required. The 
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villagers, however, now expect the goverment to do things for them, 
and view the programmes with some suspicion. They experience develop- 
ment in terms of orders that have to be executed rather than as schemes 
that are designed for their benefit on the basis of needs they have 
expressed through local decision-making. They may gladly accept the 
new services without necessarily participating. But they do not 
participate with enthusiasm and rarely regard the Conrmity Development 
projects as requiring any personal commitment. The development aspects 
of the programmes therefore are put in jeopardy by the lack of co- 
operation and co-ordination and the brisk pace at which the programmes 
are implemented. Successful rural and community development is by its 
very nature a slow process even when enjoying the willing co-operation 
of the villagers. Schemes imposed from outside, however noble their 
motives., tend to defeat their own ends. The chances of success of 
the programmes are indeed slim when implemented under pressure and do 
not contribute to the prestige either of goverment or of those who 
associated with the programmes. 
-, 
If the monks, as the agents for 
accomplishing these government policies, seriously pursue the goals of 
the programmes, they will have to exploit the people's trust and confid- 
ence in them and thus lessen their esteem, and their prestige will 
suffer accordingly. If the Sangha is forced into exerting pressure on 
the villagers to get them to participate in government programmes which, 
they do not perceive as traditionally meritorious or conducive to their 
well-being, then the Sangha will become identified in their eyes with 
goverment and politics. 
In the political context it should be mentioned here that for Thai 
people politicsý(kanmuang) contains what is generally known by that term 
in the West and, in addition, the idea of distasteful manipulation of 
power, which is nevertheless recognized as necessary. They perceive 
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politics as a matter of who has power in the capital; what decisions 
are made; the personalities in provincial goverment; and the official 
policies affecting their lives. In other words, politics belongs to a 
wider world, the world of power-holders from whom ordinary people like 
themselves are detached. In view of such conceptions as these, the 
public activity of monks whether in aid of camunity development, or of 
Phra Dhanmatuta progrannes, or of Phra Dhammajarik activity, causes 
suspicion if it is regarded by villagers as being political in nature, 
and therefore neither a proper function of monks, nor consistent with 
Buddhism as the villagers perceive it. Thus, not only the monks' 
prestige suffers from an open association of politics and religion, but 
also the goverment's prestige is at risk when villagers realize that 
religion and the Sangha have been manipulated for political ends by 
the goverment. 
Likewise the active involvement Of the Sangha in the government 
policy of national integration seems to be deleterious rather than 
advantageous to the position of the Sangha. The goverment policy 
of integration which emphasizes the suppression of dissident groups 
has so far been a failure. Despite the ever-increasing means of 
suppression in terms of personnel in the armed forces, para-military 
volunteers, logistic equipment and propaganda. machinery, the number 
of dissidents, the area of territory they control and the violence of 
their campaigns against the goverment have all increased at a rapid 
rate. Insurgents under arms increased from an estimated 3,500 in 
1973, to'5,000 in 1974, and by February 1975 the number was placed 
over 8,000.1 It was officially estimated that 'nearly 4 million 
people in 6,096 villages lived in fear of communist terrorists and 
1. Prizzia, -oý. tit., p. 104. 
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over 2 million of them were under the influence of the CPT in 1975; 
and by 1977 there were 4,000 commmist influenced villages in the 
country'. 
1 
The goverment Is anti-communist propaganda, as revealed by a 
group of the CSOS who had long been involved in anti-comaunist 
activities, was in fact designed to deceive the people about the actual 
dangers of com=ism, so that the 'communist danger' slogan could be 
used to justify the goverment's own authoritarian rule. 
2 It included 
a policy of encouraging ordinary people to take to arms and help the 
government in fighting against com=ists. In this, the Sangha were 
enlisted, as is implicit in Phra Dhammatuta activities and more clearly 
in the Phra Dhammajarik programme, to enhance the success of the 
government policy. Thus the monks are being manipulated to mobilize 
the support of the masses for the goverment anti-communist campaigns. 
I am not disputing here that a 'communist danger' exists in Thailand. 
Rather, I am more concerned with the political exploitation of the monk- 
hood and Buddhism to justify or legitimize the goverment policy and 
action. From the data presented above it would appear that the govern- 
ment policy 'of national integration' through coercive pacification of 
the dissidents is not only fruitless, but also actively encourages 
further national disintegration., By associating themselves with such 
a government policy the monks not only impair their own position, but 
also unnecessarily put themselves in confrontation with those people 
who hold different ideas of how the state should be organized and how 
economic and social order should be regulated. The fear that 'Thai 
1. Patrice de Beer., 'History and Policy of Comumist Party of Thailand', 
in Turton'et al, *'op. *clt , p. 148. 
2. Senakhan'Ot'al, ''op. 'cit., pp. vii-vill. 
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conmiunism' or 'Thai socialism' would destroy religion seems to be over 
exaggerated, for even the Unummist Party of Thailand has never shown 
antagonism to Thai Buddhism and the Sangha. Its policy on religion 
of 1965 and 1968 that it guaranteed basic freedom of religious belief 
was re-euphasized in December 1976.1 Recently, one of the leaders 
of the CPT pointed out that the CPT position on Buddhism was that 
'Buddhism is an integral part of Thai culture and is not necessarily 
incompatible with M arx ism,. 
2 I am not suggesting that the CPT policy 
on religion is perfectly honourable or can be fully relied on. Rather, 
I would ask the goverment and Sangha authorities to consider one 
question. Is it wise and worthwhile to put the prestige of the Sangha 
and the fate of Buddhism at unnecessary risk by involving them in the 
goverment policy of anti-comounist propaganda? 
There is evidence to show that Buddhism may exist peacefully under 
certain communist regimes, such as in Laos and Vietnam. We have. 
evidence that after the strident anti-comamist-Prime Minister 
ýaingsak, 
Chamanan visited Laos in February 1979 he told the Thai public that 
3 BuddIiism. there has been treated well. We can also learn a lesson 
from Burma and Sri Lanka, both of which declare themselves socialist 
states, that Buddhism there still flourished and even thrives better 
than Buddhism in some non-socialist states. 
1. -Sminakkhao'Prachachon'Thulakom (a Thai fortnightly newspaper 
published in Oxford), Vol. - 3, No. 63,16 April 1979. 
2. The Observer, 24 December 1978, p. 4. 
3. ''Samakkhao'Prachachon Thulakom, Vol. 3, -No. 62., 16 February 1979. 
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3. Political'Monks'in'Thailand: The'Prospects 
In general tenns the majority of the Thai Sangha may be classified 
as conservative, fLmdamentalist or traditionalist, whose main concem 
is with the study, preservation and dissemination of the teachings of 
the Buddha, while maintaining a minimal involvement in secular political 
and economic affairs. With the increasing rapidity of socio-political 
change in recent times, there emerged 'modernizing monks' within the 
Sangha. They felt that the Sangha should adapt its roles to keep 
pace with changing socio-political conditions in order to retain its 
status in society. The activities of 'modernizing monks' have manifes- 
ted themselves in the institutionalized involvement of the Sangha in 
goverment policies of national development and integration since the 
1960s. Buddhist traditions and values have been invoked by the 
modernizing monks to legitimize the involvement of the Sangha, along 
with the justification that this has been done for the sake of national 
stability and the progress of the people, as well as the security of 
the religion. 
By 1974 there had appeared within the modernizing Sangha two 
clearly distinguishable sets of opinions regarding the means to maintain 
or achieve the nation's stability and progress. These manifested 
themselves in the formation of two broad groupings of 'political monks', 
the right and the left. Their emergence was induced by the unpreced- 
entedly rapid socio-political changes of the 1970s; and their actions 
were a response to threats to the stability and security of the nation 
and religion. Nevertheless, their perception of the nature of the 
threats were significantly different. 
The right wing political monks, represented by Kitthiwuttho, saw 
the threats as coming from counmism and any elements associated with 
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it, and as being forces which would ultimately destroy the nation, 
religion and the monarchy. Thus, to ensure stability and to achieve 
progress, the existing social structure had to be maintained and 
every Thai nationalist had to wage war on the counmist elements. 
Kitthiwuttho believed that only through authoritarian or very strong 
goverment could these aims be achieved. 
Opposed to them were the left wing political monks, especially 
the MT and the YM, who saw threats to the nation and religion as 
coming from capitalism and any kind of imperialiSm. They held that 
the capitalist system of government and economy which maintained close 
links with 'foreign imperialist countries' especially the United States, 
only perpetuated exploitation and oppression in the country. Thus, if 
the nation was to progress, a radical change in the gove=ent, the 
economy and the social structure was needed. This could be achieved 
only when 'power belonged to the people', and socialism prevailed. 
There appeared also a parallellism between the policies of the 
radical right and left wing political monks: they advocated the involve- 
ment of monks in politics for the benefit Of society and religion; they 
exploited Buddhism to legitimize their ideologies, and reinterpreted 
Buddhism to favour their activities and gain public support; and they 
believed that Buddhism was being undermined or even destroyed and that 
they must counteract any threat to Buddhism. 
Kitthiwutthols anti-communist campaign, largely based on the 
postulate that Tommunism is associated in Buddhist minds with two 
unacceptable features: violence and formal hostility to religion' was 
powerful. This was further strengthened by his appeal to the emotive 
collective symbolism of the Thai nation and monarchy. It is therefore 
not surprising that Kitthiwuttho persuaded a large number of the people 
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to his view. His opposition to the displacement of the existing 
social, political and economic order was undoubtedly attractive to 
the establishment, and hence they supported his anti-comnmist 
activity willingly. 
The left wing political rcnks justified their fear of capitalism 
by stressing that the -vast majority of the Thai population was already 
poor; capitalism would make them poorer and poorer; then, how could 
they materially support the monks? Buddhism, therefore, would suffer 
and the prestige of the monks decline. Imperialism was seen by the 
radical left wing monks as being associated with the political, 
economic and, most importantly, cultural domination of Thai society 
by foreign imperialist countries. They argued that imperialist damin- 
ance not only escalated exploitation and oppression, but also eventually 
destroyed the distinctive elements of indigenous culture and religion. 
Thus, to maintain national identity as a true Buddhist country the 
links with imperialist countries must be ended. 
lbuvver, the appeal of the radical left wing political monks, 
though powerful in its essence, seemed not to reach as many people as 
did Kitthiuutthols for many reasons. Firstly, their idea of forcing 
a change in the structure of society was not at all attractive to the 
power holders of the political and economic establisl=nt. Without 
support of these people, they lacked access to such important media as 
radio and television to transmit their message to the masses. Secondly, 
the radical left wing monks lacked charismatic leadership, and their 
associations were poorly organized and not very articulate. ýbreover, 
their bases of support in term of membership and finance were very 
limited compared with Kitthiuutthots solid establishment. Thirdly, the 
arousal of the realization by the msses of the nature of capitalist 
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exploitation and oppression had had but a short time in which to be 
achieved, in contrast to the long propaganda canpaign of 'communist 
dangers'. Similarly, as Thailand had never been colonized, the ideas 
of iEperialism and neo-colonialism were perhaps too abstract for the 
unsophisticated masses to understand. 
However good the intentions of these political monks, both right 
and left wing, their unconventional actions seem to run counter to the 
well-being of Buddhism, and are likely to undermine the prestige of 
the Sangha as a whole. For the majority of the monks the reinter- 
pretation of Buddhism and the assuoption by monks of unconventional 
roles, especially in a political context, seems to have been too novel 
to be accepted. It is very likely that they will tend to regard the 
actions of the political monks as incompatible with normative Buddhism, 
detrimental to the prestige of the Sangha and undenrdning the faith. 
Likewise,, the general attitude of the public towards the political 
actions of monks is unlikely to be favourable. In the case of Kitthi- 
wuttho', the Buddhist public may accept political activity by monks as 
legitimate in periods of crisis when the survival of Buddhism appears 
to be threatened. Given that the threat is real, the advocating of 
killing by monks is very unlikely to be accepted by the Buddhists. 
Even if the Buddhist public recognizes that a Thai monk is a-Thai, 
and that he can hardly be expected to escape knowledge of national 
. politics along with anything else 
in the national melting pot, the Thai 
hold that 'politics is a dirty business"(kanmang'pen'ruang'sokaphrok) 
and involved with a distasteful manipulation of power. Involving him- 
self with politics, a monk only inpurifies his monkhood and therefore 
jeopardizes his own position and the Sangha as a whole. 
Indeed, the very existence and the survival of the SaTigha and 
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Buddhism depends largely on the good will of the people. The monks 
enjoy prestige, people's trust and confidence, and respect because they 
are regarded by the people as religious specialists who derive their 
moral authority from a set of religious roles which are expected by the 
people. The majority of Thai Buddhists are tied to religiori'pot'se; 
they do not put their trust and confidence in the monks'per*se., and 
certaihly not in those monks whom they perceive to be government agents 
and involved with politics. To maintain their prestige, the monks will 
have to practice correct Buddhist behaviour as the laity, understands it. 
But if they become over involved in secular affairs, especially those 
with a political flavour, their actions will weaken the Sanghals 
prestige and influence as well as the whole institution of Buddhism in 
Thai society. 
In historical perspective, Thai Buddhism through its Sangha has 
shown a remarkable continuity through its ability to adapt itself and 
accommodate to contemporaneous pressures. Buddhism is, of course, a 
facet of the society's total culture, and as part of the socio-political 
structure it permeates other institutions as much as it is affected by 
them. What has developed over time is a continuous dialogue between 
two distinct, but not divergent, social phenomena, namely religion and 
politics. Buddhism as it emerged as the national religion over 
centuries, was as much a response to social needs as to the politico- 
economic system of the society. 
Conceived in this way, one can. envisage that changes in the Sangha's 
orientation and organization. have had a similar pace to changes in the 
socio-political structure of-which it is a part, though as we have seen, 
changes in the structure of the Sangha have followed changes in other 
aspects of the socio-political structure, and not preceded them. 
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Nevertheless, one has to recognize that Thailand in the 1980s 
or in the following decades is not Thailand in the 1960s, and that 
the pace and direction of change may not be couparable to those of 
previous decades. We have seen that Thailand has now become a battle 
field for conpetition between two major political ideologies, one 
which aims at maintaining the existing structure and another which 
aims at radical change. It is very probable that the advancing tide 
of radical change has begun to erode the existing structure as it has 
done in neighbouring countries. It is then likely that Thailand's 
conservative socio-political system will have to undergo a metamorphosis,, 
perhaps in the next decade. The question arises: can one envisage 
the demise of the Sangha as a body or the shrivelling of its roles as 
an institution? The survival of the Sangha as well as Buddhism very 
much depends on the decision of the Sangha to adjust its roles in 
accordance with change. As long'as its survival depends on the 'good 
will' of the people, there are not many alternatives for the Sangha 
other than to coEply with the wishes of the majority of the people. 
The monks will have to act as a cushion to soften the impact of undesir- 
able changes on the people and Buddhism and this will not be achieved by 
encouraging the people to fight a losing battle. They must remember 
that-Buddhism has long survived because of its flexible and accomodat- 
ing qualities. 
To appreciate the extent to which the modem Sangha can adjust 
itself to accomodate a new direction of change, and establish whether 
or not it can influence the direction of change,, we need to understand 
its attitudes and its perception of its own life in the process of 
change. This aim could be achieved only by a thorough field study, a 
task which I envisaged, but which I could not complete. 
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4. ''Scafte'Propo8dls *for the'Futurd Reseatch 
The period when the research was planned (1974-1975) was particularly 
suitable for discussions of political matters with monks, as well as 
discussions with the laity about the involvement of monks in politics. 
In the changed political climate after 1976, my original plan for 
interviewing monks and lay people suffered a considerable setback, and 
I could only fulfil it partly. However much I have tried to be objec- 
tive, my study is still somewhat hypothetical. Had I been able to 
conduct proper field work as I originally planned, the gap between 
hypothetical and empirical aspects could have been closed. 
What I regret most is that I have not been able to conduct an 
empirical investigation into the political connections between the high 
ranking administrative Sangha and the wielders of political power, and 
into patron-client relationships between 'political monks' and 
influential Sangha authorities. Had I been able to do this, some 
ambiguities could have been resolved. For example, did the Sangha 
authorities really believe that Buddhism was in danger of being destroyed 
by commists? Or where they pressured by-the political authorities 
(their patrons) into acting as if this were so? How did they define 
and distinguish 'the interests of political authorities', 'the interests 
of the masses' and 'the interests of the Sanghal? The investigation 
into monastic relationships also should have helped us to understand 
why the political movement led by Kitthiwuttho was more effective than 
the movements led by the left wing monks; why-the former was accept- 
able and the, latter -distasteful. 
Other aspects I would see as remaining to be investigated empirically 
are: what are the perceptions of political roles of other political 
monks who do not show themselves publicly and thus could not be studied 
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in this thesis? Who are the 'silent majority' of monks, and why are 
they silent? What are the attitudes of the 'silent majority' of 
monks (which ultimately may be decisive in determining the destination 
of the Sangha and the faith) towards the political roles of monks? 
Equally important, me wants to know to what extent both the 'political 
monks' and the 'silent majority' of monks understand different political 
and economic ideologies, which ideology is their preference, and how they 
conceive of its compatability with Buddhism? Also, the attitudes of 
the Buddhist public towards the political roles of the monks and how 
they expect the monks to behave need further intensive investigation. 
To understand these complicated problems objectively, one needs, 
in addition to the general understanding of the socio-economic and 
political structure of Thai society, to select and employ suitable 
techniques of inquiry to obtain information. AsJ have spelled out 
in my preface that an investigation into Buddhism and politics, 
especially the involvement of monks in political issues and their 
political ideologies tends to face religio-political constraints. I 
am doubtful that one could achieve accurate and reliable information 
about the monks' perceptions of theirýroles in the context of socio- 
political change, their attitudes towards politics, and their under- 
standing of political ideologies without having established a sub- 
stantial rapport with them. The use of conventional methods of 
inquiry, such as questionnaires and structured interviews, -seems 
unlikely to carry us very far. They are often superficial, however 
carefully prepared and administered, and frequently tend to give only 
part of the picture or even be positively misleading. For example, 
Tambiah, a careful and conscientious field researcher whose work I 
admire, on the basis of questionnaires to 324 monk-students of Mahachula. 
Buddhist University in 1971 concluded that the Isan monks 'are apolitical, 
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..... willing to accept constituted political authority and to work with 
it, let alone attack it'. 
' There is a remarkable difference between 
this observation and the almost contemporaneous action of the Isan 
administrative monks acting on behalf of the whole Sangha of the Isan 
-region, when they sent a letter to the military government in 1972 to 
demand the reinstatement of Phra Phimondham, and to warn the goverment 
that they would not give up their atteupt. Later (in 1975) the Isan 
monks were to threaten to relinquish their honorific titles and to 
return their honorific fans to the goverment. 
Using certain general theories to analyze particular aspects of a 
society can also tend to run counter to reality. Thus,, Ayal., a 
follower of Weber's theses on Protestantism and Capitalism, mistakenly 
attributes the economic underdevelopment of Thailand to certain doctrines 
of Buddhism. Without establishing the distinctive features of Thai 
Buddhism by empirical inquiry, Ayal proceeds to suggest that the Thai 
are preoccupied with 'personal values' which are inseparable from 
'Thai Theravada Buddhism' and which militate against bonds of 
obligation or comitment. to other individuals or institutions. 
2 As 
he said: 'This Buddhist emphasis on the individual is perfectly con- 
sistent with the fact that the Thai seldom have shown a sense of 
obligation, solidarity, ideological comitment, and possibly even 
3 loyalty, to anything beyond personal values'. He then draws the 
conclusion from, to use Tambiah's teminology, lunwarranted am-chair 
1. Tambiah (1976), ' op. cit-, p. 455. 
2. Eliezar B. Ayal., 'Value Systems and Economic Development in Japan 
and Thailarldl, 'Jotirnal. 'of*S6(ti; il'Issties, Vol. AIX (1963) pp. 3S-51. 
3. ''Ibid., p. 49. 
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deductions' 1 that many Buddhist doctrines hinder Thailand's economic 
development. To contradict Ayalls view, I cannot do better than to 
quote Sulak Suvaraksa who says that 
To speak of Buddhism as something concerned with the 
private salvation of the individual is to ignore 
entirely the-basic Buddhist repudiation of the notion 
of individual soul. The teaching of the Buddha is 
not concerned with the private destiny of the 
individual, but with something much wider: the whole 
realm of -sentient being, the whole of consciousness. 
This inevitably entails a concern with social and 
political matters, and these receive a large attention 
in the teaching of the Buddha ..... To attempt to under- stand Buddhism apart from its social dimension is 
mistaken. Preoccupation with individuals places limits 
on love and Buddhism is an attempt to deal with what it 
sees as the decease of individualism. Buddhism is 
primarily a method of overcoming the limits of 
individual self .... 2 
Ayal and Sulak Suvaraksa. of course are approaching the problem 
at different levels, the former being concerned with the view of the 
average man., the latter with a fundamental Buddhist philosophy which 
may not be known to, accepted by or acted upon by the ordinary Thai. 
Here then is another excellent problem for eWirical research. 
To conclude it would appear that the Sangha came to a ftmdamental 
turning point in its history in the 1960s. This arose from moderniz- 
ation, communism and foreign involvement. Briefly the goverment's 
search for legitimacy through modernization improved coummications 
which led to better knowledge of events elsewhere and of the inequalities 
of Thai society, and above all to an expansion of material expectations 
among the people. Nourished by the material concerns of the peasantry, 
.. communism arose as a challenge to the 
integrity of the state. At the 
1. S. J. Tambiah, 'Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity'.. ' Modem Asian 
. *Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1973) pp. 10-11, 
2. Sulak Sivaraksa. 'Budc Ihism'and*Soqidty: 'BeYond the Present'Horitons 
(Bangkok: Typescript paper, 1978) p. 4. 
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same time the United States' involvement in Vietnam and Thailand brought 
the questioning of authority and the form of goverment into focus. Any 
institution with allegiance both to the state and the peasantry, 
inevitably became involved, and contradictions iinplied in that dual 
allegiance equally inevitably emerged and developed. Thus the problems 
of the Sangha arose from the ambiguity of its own relations with the 
people and thestate. 
In the 1960s increasing government involvement in Sangha activities 
began to push it in a new direction., Political changes in the 197Qs 
allowed a vocal left wing opposition to this change to briefly emerge. 
The Sangha authorities reacted to this criticism,. partly-by attempting 
to go back to a conservative, traditional and in some ways fundamen- 
talist stance, and partly by, at least implicitly, supporting a pro- 
government activist course. This may mean that whether they basically 
approve of the direction in which they are proceeding or not, they are 
conrdtted to it. They will have to accept a Sangha which is politicized, 
and a public which is slow to accept changes in the monks' traditional 
roles. Assuming there is no radical change in the govenunent of 
Thailand likely in the inmdiate future, we can then expect an extension 
of politicized propaganda from the top as they seek to adjust opinions 
about the roles of the Sangha to the changed situation. Alternatively, 
as I have suggested, they may find the pressure of the political events 
in South-East Asia too great to adopt this authoritarian course, and 
therefore adjust their stance to accommodate the'increasing socialism 
of the masses. Either choice may lead to the dimmition of the 
religion; both offer little scope for a non-political role. What I 
have attempted to bring together in this thesis are the basic data 
necessary to understand how this situation arose, and by analysis to 
isolate the crucial factors in its resolution., I appear to have ended 
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with perhaps more questions than with those I began. In doing so, I 
hope I have contributed, albeit in a small way, to the continuing 
debate on the future of Buddhism in Thailand. 
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